State confidentiality laws anticipate that medical information must be shared
when taking care of the patient. (Some states enacted restrictions on entering
information about AIDS/HIV into the medical chart that made it very difficult to
care for these patients.) This is assumed to include quality assurance activities
and accreditation, and the review of medical records and confidential patient
information by private accrediting associations such as the Joint Commission.
Interestingly, there is no clear legal mandate for this release of confidential
medical information to a private group. In many states it could be argued that
this release comes under the exception for quality assurance review.
This exception is not an unlimited right to use medical information for all
administrative purposes. In one case, plaintiffs sued a hospital for releasing
records to its law firm so that the attorneys could determine if any patients
were eligible for additional federal benefits. The hospital moved for summary
judgment, claiming that the general consent patients sign on admission
covered this release of information. The court disagreed, noting that the
general consent mentioned only releases to insurers. The court also rejected
the defendant’s claim that this release was allowable under their
attorney–client relationship. The court held that the hospital could be sued for
releasing the records. [Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 86 Ohio St.3d 395, 715
N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999)]
Perhaps most interestingly, the court also found that the law firm may have
improperly induced the hospital to violate its fiduciary duty toward the patient
by releasing confidential medical information. The court applied a standard
drawn from a case involving an improper disclosure of psychiatric information
to an employer, who was alleged to have induced the psychiatrist to disclose
the information: “(1) [T]he defendant knew or reasonably should have known
of the existence of the physician–patient relationship; (2) the defendant
intended to induce the physician to disclose information about the patient or
the defendant reasonably should have anticipated that his actions would
induce the physician to disclose such information; and (3) the defendant did
not reasonably believe that the physician could disclose that information to the
defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality that the physician owed
the patient.” [Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Mass. 1985).] Such a
standard raises questions about many consulting schemes designed to increase
billing by reviewing records and tuning up the billing.