Assisted suicide was first before the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Cruzan case,
where one of the points urged on the court was that it should recognize a right
to suicide because it was part of the Anglo-American legal tradition. In
rejecting this claim, the Court outlined the history of suicide and assisted
suicide:
At common law in England, a suicide—defined as one who ‘deliberately
puts an end to his own existence, or commits any unlawful malicious
act, the consequence of which is his own death,’ 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *189—was criminally liable. Ibid. Although the States
abolished the penalties imposed by the common law (i.e., forfeiture and
ignominious burial), they did so to spare the innocent family and not to
legitimize the act. Case law at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment generally held that assisting suicide was a
criminal offense. See Marzen, O’Dowd, Crone, & Balch, Suicide: A
Constitutional Right?, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. 1, 76 (1985) (‘In short,
twenty-one of the thirty-seven states, and eighteen of the thirty ratifying
states prohibited assisting suicide. Only eight of the states, and seven
of the ratifying states, definitely did not’); see also 1 F. Wharton,
Criminal Law @ 122 (6th rev. ed. 1868). The System of Penal Law
presented to the House of Representatives by Representative Livingston
in 1828 would have criminalized assisted suicide. E. Livingston, A
System of Penal Law, Penal Code 122 (1828). The Field Penal Code,
adopted by the Dakota Territory in 1877, proscribed attempted suicide
and assisted suicide. Marzen, O’Dowd, Crone, & Balch, supra, at 76–77.
And most States that did not explicitly prohibit assisted suicide in 1868
recognized, when the issue arose in the 50 years following the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, that assisted and (in some cases)
attempted suicide were unlawful. Id., at 77–100; id., at 148–242
(surveying development of States’ laws). Thus, ‘there is no significant
support for the claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition
that it may be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’’ Id., at 100 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)). [Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294.]