An MCO’s ultimate threat to a physician is deselection—being bounced from the
plan. Legally, deselection is no different from being denied medical staff
privileges at a hospital. The difference is the economic incentive. Traditionally,
hospitals benefited from additional staff members. Each physician was a
potential source of admissions to the hospital. Most of the cases involving
improper termination of medical staff privileges arose from a group of
physician competitors who captured the hospital’s medical staff credentialing
process. [Patrick.] While hospitals might deselect physicians to maintain the
quality of medical care, they had no incentive to reduce their physician staff.
[Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1994).]
In MCOs that employ physicians, each additional physician over the minimum
needed to do the work is just more overhead. Even in MCOs that contract with
individual physicians and pay only for services provided, additional physicians
raise the overhead because they require additional case managers to oversee
them.
MCOs are in a stronger bargaining position than physicians because the United
States has an excess of physicians. Many specialties have more practitioners
than can keep busy doing only specialty practice. Nongovernmental MCOs have
only limited due process restrictions on their credentialing. [Liang, BA.
Deselection under Harper v. Healthsource: a blow for maintaining
patient–physician relationships in the era of managed care,
ND Law Rev.
1997;72:799.] They may choose not to renew a physician’s contract for any
nondiscriminatory reason, including staff reductions to lower costs. If the MCO
terminates the physician’s contract for medical negligence–related conduct,
most states will allow or require the MCO to report this to the State Board of
Medical Examiners (BOME), who then report to the National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB). [42 U.S.C. §§ 11131, 11133, & 11134 (1996).] Physicians have a
right to review their files, and to request corrections, but no right to force the
Data Bank to make corrections. The NPDB allows hospitals and MCOs to query
its files when they are hiring or granting staff privileges to a physician. An
adverse report in the NPDB can make it impossible for a physician to obtain
employment or medical staff privileges anywhere in the United States.
On balance, the NPDB is a good idea, but it poses several problems for
physicians in MCOs. An unscrupulous plan can use threats of reports to the
NPDB as coercion. This can be very effective if the physician is contesting a
noncompete agreement, or does not want to follow the plan’s rules. Arguably,
federal law does not mandate reporting to the NPDB by MCOs, but it is difficult
to contest the right of an MCO to make a report. Reporting entities have
immunity unless it can be shown that the reporting entity knew the information
in the report was false. [42 U.S.C. § 1137(c) (1996).] This is a difficult
standard to meet. If the physician loses, and the contract with the plan has an
indemnification agreement, then the physician may have to pay the plan’s
legal expenses.
For employee physicians the risk of deselection may be greater than just being
fired. Many MCO employment contracts include noncompete clauses that can
force the physician to leave the community. Some states strictly limit the
enforcement of these clauses as being against public policy, and a few have
outlawed them entirely. [Berg. Judicial enforcement of covenants not to
compete between physicians: protecting doctors’ interests at patients’
expense. Rutgers Law Rev. 1992;45:1.] However, in many states, these
agreements are enforceable for reasonable limitations of time and distance. In
at least one state, Missouri, the courts will enforce restrictions as long as two
years, covering a 200-mile radius, and have failed to find any public policy
rationale for treating physicians differently from other businesses or
professionals. The deselected physician faces having to move, and perhaps
getting licensed in another state. If physicians are deselected for not abiding
by financial guidelines established by the plan, then it is unlikely that other
plans will be interested in hiring them.
Physicians negotiating with an MCO should try to get a contract with very
specific criteria for termination. This is increasingly difficult to do. In many
communities, MCO contracts have become adhesion contracts because there
are too many physicians willing to take positions on any terms. The physician
should know at all times where he or she stands with the plan and what is
necessary to meet the plan’s objectives. These objectives should be spelled
out in sufficient detail that the physician can determine if they can be achieved
while preserving adequate quality of medical care. If possible, there should not
be a provision for the annual termination of any given percentage of
physicians, such as the 10% with the highest costs per capita. Such provisions
can force physicians to reduce access to care below what is medically
necessary.