The tension between a medical care practitioner’s right to refuse to participate
in certain types of medical care and a patient’s right to receive care begins in
medical school and residency training. The constitutional right to exercise one’s
religion freely has always been limited by the state’s right to pass laws that
apply equally to all citizens. Although the state has the right to specify the
required training and specific factual knowledge of persons it licenses to
practice medicine, this is usually left to the discretion of accreditation agencies
for medical training programs. These agencies determine the extent to which a
medical student or resident may avoid certain procedures and still be allowed
to be certified.
Medical training programs must meet the requirements of their accrediting
organizations if their students and residents are to be eligible for licensing or
advanced certification after completing their training. The federal courts have
recently upheld the right of the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education (ACGME) to require residents in an ACGME-accredited program to
receive training in abortion, sterilization, and contraception. The case in
question arose when the ACGME rescinded the accreditation of a residency
based in a Catholic hospital. Many Catholic hospitals prohibit residents from
performing these procedures in the hospital itself. This program was unusual in
forbidding the residents to perform the procedures in other hospitals, thus
ensuring that the residents did not learn techniques for abortion and
sterilization or have adequate training to provide information on contraception.
The court found that the training requirement was not religiously motivated.
Since the requirement did not advocate a religious doctrine and was
nondiscrimatorily applied, it did not violate the First Amendment protections on
free exercise of religion. [St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (1990).]
Once they are in independent practice, medical care practitioners must make
any self- imposed limitations on the care they offer clear to their patients as
early in the encounter as feasible. Ideally, patients will be asked what care
they are seeking when making their initial appointment. If the patient is
seeking care that the medical care practitioner is unwilling to provide, the
patient can be directed elsewhere at once. Under no circumstances should
medical care practitioners withhold their beliefs in an attempt to persuade the
patient to change her mind. Implicitly or explicitly holding out the availability
of services that are not in fact available is deception.
Putting the patient on notice of the medical care practitioner’s refusal to
provide certain types of care does not obviate the medical care practitioner’s
duty to inform the patient when this care is appropriate. For example, if the
medical care practitioner discovers that the patient has a medical condition
that would make pregnancy difficult, the medical care practitioner must
counsel the patient on the availability of contraception and sterilization. The
requirement that a health care practitioner refer a patient to an alternative
source of care is the same whether the medical care practitioner is unable to
provide the care or the health care practitioner has personal objections to the
care. A medical care practitioner may not abandon a patient on religious
grounds. The medical care practitioner–patient relationship carries with it a
duty to continue care until an alternative is provided.