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| [1] | SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |
| [2] | No. 80-808 |
| [3] | 1981.SCT.2495 <http://www.versuslaw.com>,
452 U.S. 576, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246, 49 U.S.L.W. 4743 |
| [4] | June 17, 1981 |
| [5] | UNITED STATES v. TURKETTE |
| [6] | CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT. |
| [7] | Mark I. Levy argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs
were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney,
Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Joel M. Gershowitz. |
| [8] | John Wall argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Harry
C. Mezer.* |
| [9] | White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J.,
and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined.
Stewart, J., filed a Dissenting statement, post, p. 593. |
| [10] | The opinion of the court was delivered by: White |
| [11] | Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, entitled Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), was added to Title 18 by the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970. Title 18 U. S. C. § 1962 (c), which is part
of RICO, makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt." The term "enterprise" is defined
in 18 U. S. C. § 1961 (4) as including "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." An indictment
charged respondent and others with, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate
§ 1962 (c). The indictment described the enterprise in question as
a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of engaging in
certain specified criminal activities. Respondent was convicted in Federal
District Court, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that RICO
was intended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration
by racketeers and does not make it criminal to participate in an association
which performs only illegal acts and has not infiltrated or attempted to
infiltrate a legitimate enterprise. |
| [12] | Held : The term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate
and illegitimate enterprises. Pp. 580-593. |
| [13] | (a) Neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its application
to legitimate enterprises. On its face, the definition of "enterprise" in
§ 1961 (4) appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises
within its scope. The section describes two separate categories of associations
that come within the purview of an "enterprise" -- the first encompassing
organizations such as corporations, partnerships, and other "legal entities,"
and the second covering "any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." The second category is not a more generalized
description of the first, and hence the rule of ejusdem generis cannot be
properly applied to hold that the second category should be limited by the
specific examples enumerated in the first. Pp. 580-582. |
| [14] | (b) With respect to § 1962 (c), an "enterprise" is not a "pattern
of racketeering activity" but is an entity separate and apart from the pattern
of activity in which it engages. In order to secure a conviction, the Government
must prove both the existence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern
of racketeering activity." Pp. 582-583. |
| [15] | (c) Applying RICO to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises does
not render any portion of the statute superfluous nor does it create any
structural incongruities within the statute's framework. On the contrary,
insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is
the more incongruous position. Pp. 583-587. |
| [16] | (d) Nothing in RICO's legislative history requires a Conclusion that the
statute is limited in its application to legitimate enterprises. In view
of the purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 to eradicate
organized crime in the United States, it cannot be said that Congress nevertheless
confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime,
and, in particular, under RICO, to only the infiltration of legitimate business.
Pp. 588-593. |
| [17] | JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. |
| [18] | Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U. S. C. §§
1961-1968 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), entitled Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO), was added to Title 18 by Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941. The question in
this case is whether the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises or is limited in application to
the former. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Congress
did not intend to include within the definition of "enterprise" those organizations
which are exclusively criminal. 632 F.2d 896 (1980). This position is contrary
to that adopted by every other Circuit that has addressed the issue. *fn1
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 449 U.S. 1123 (1981). |
| [19] | I |
| [20] | Count Nine of a nine-count indictment charged respondent and 12 others
with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise
*fn2 engaged
in interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activities, in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1962 (d). *fn3
The indictment described the enterprise as "a group of individuals associated
in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics and other
dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United States mails to
defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police
officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence
the outcome of state court proceedings . . . ." The other eight counts of
the indictment charged the commission of various substantive criminal acts
by those engaged in and associated with the criminal enterprise, including
possession with intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances,
and several counts of insurance fraud by arson and other means. The common
thread to all counts was respondent's alleged leadership of this criminal
organization through which he orchestrated and participated in the commission
of the various crimes delineated in the RICO count or charged in the eight
preceding counts. |
| [21] | After a 6-week jury trial, in which the evidence focused upon both the
professional nature of this organization and the execution of a number of
distinct criminal acts, respondent was convicted on all nine counts. He
was sentenced to a term of 20 years on the substantive counts, as well as
a 2-year special parole term on the drug count. On the RICO conspiracy count
he was sentenced to a 20-year concurrent term and fined $20,000. |
| [22] | On appeal, respondent argued that RICO was intended solely to protect
legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and that
RICO does not make criminal the participation in an association which performs
only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate
a legitimate enterprise. The Court of Appeals agreed. We reverse. |
| [23] | II |
| [24] | In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language.
If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Of course, there is no errorless test for identifying
or recognizing "plain" or "unambiguous" language. Also, authoritative administrative
constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled,
absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute
must be dealt with. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643
(1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965). We nevertheless
begin with the language of the statute. |
| [25] | Section 1962 (c) makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt." The term "enterprise" is defined
as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." § 1961 (4). There is no restriction
upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes
any union or group of individuals associated in fact. On its face, the definition
appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its
scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does legitimate
ones. Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could
easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word,
"legitimate." But it did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting
of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the
enterprise was exclusively criminal. |
| [26] | The Court of Appeals, however, clearly departed from and limited the statutory
language. It gave several reasons for doing so, none of which is adequate.
First, it relied in part on the rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory
construction problems suggesting that where general words follow a specific
enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to
persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. See 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973). The Court
of Appeals ruled that because each of the specific enterprises enumerated
in § 1961 (4) is a "legitimate" one, the final catchall phrase -- "any
union or group of individuals associated in fact" -- should also be limited
to legitimate enterprises. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning.
The rule of ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction and comes
into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular
clause in a statute. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588
(1980); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975); Gooch v. United
States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). Considering the language and structure
of § 1961 (4), however, we not only perceive no uncertainty in the
meaning to be attributed to the phrase, "any union or group of individuals
associated in fact" but we are convinced for another reason that ejusdem
generis is wholly inapplicable in this context. |
| [27] | Section 1961 (4) describes two categories of associations that come within
the purview of the "enterprise" definition. The first encompasses organizations
such as corporations and partnerships, and other "legal entities." The second
covers "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity." The Court of Appeals assumed that the second category was
merely a more general description of the first. Having made that assumption,
the court concluded that the more generalized description in the second
category should be limited by the specific examples enumerated in the first.
But that assumption is untenable. Each category describes a separate type
of enterprise to be covered by the statute -- those that are recognized
as legal entities and those that are not. The latter is not a more general
description of the former. The second category itself not containing any
specific enumeration that is followed by a general description, ejusdem
generis has no bearing on the meaning to be attributed to that part of §
1961 (4). *fn4 |
| [28] | A second reason offered by the Court of Appeals in support of its judgment
was that giving the definition of "enterprise" its ordinary meaning would
create several internal inconsistencies in the Act. With respect to §
1962 (c), it was said: |
| [29] | "If 'a pattern of racketeering' can itself be an 'enterprise' for purposes
of section 1962 (c), then the two phrases 'employed by or associated with
any enterprise' and 'the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through [a
pattern of racketeering activity]' add nothing to the meaning of the section.
The words of the statute are coherent and logical only if they are read
as applying to legitimate enterprises." 632 F.2d, at 899. |
| [30] | This Conclusion is based on a faulty premise. That a wholly criminal enterprise
comes within the ambit of the statute does not mean that a "pattern of racketeering
activity" is an "enterprise." In order to secure a conviction under RICO,
the Government must prove both the existence of an "enterprise" and the
connected "pattern of racketeering activity." The enterprise is an entity,
for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering
activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by
the statute. 18 U. S. C. § 1961 (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The former
is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and
by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The
latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering
committed by the participants in the enterprise. While the proof used to
establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof
of one does not necessarily establish the other. The "enterprise" is not
the "pattern of racketeering activity"; it is an entity separate and apart
from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise
at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government.
*fn5 |
| [31] | Apart from § 1962 (c)'s proscription against participating in an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities, RICO also proscribes
the investment of income derived from racketeering activity in an enterprise
engaged in or which affects interstate commerce as well as the acquisition
of an interest in or control of any such enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 18 U. S. C. §§ 1962 (a) and (b). *fn6
The Court of Appeals concluded that these provisions of RICO should be interpreted
so as to apply only to legitimate enterprises. If these two sections are
so limited, the Court of Appeals held that the proscription in § 1962
(c), at issue here, must be similarly limited. Again, we do not accept the
premise from which the Court of Appeals derived its Conclusion. It is obvious
that §§ 1962 (a) and (b) address the infiltration by organized
crime of legitimate businesses, but we cannot agree that these sections
were not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or reinvesting
in wholly illegal enterprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racketeering
activity wholly illegitimate enterprises such as an illegal gambling business
or a loan-sharking operation. There is no inconsistency or anomaly in recognizing
that § 1962 applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.
Certainly the language of the statute does not warrant the Court of Appeals'
Conclusion to the contrary. |
| [32] | Similarly, the Court of Appeals noted that various civil remedies were
provided by § 1964, *fn7
including divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, restrictions on future
activities by violators of RICO, and treble damages. These remedies it thought
would have utility only with respect to legitimate enterprises. As a general
proposition, however, the civil remedies could be useful in eradicating
organized crime from the social fabric, whether the enterprise be ostensibly
legitimate or admittedly criminal. The aim is to divest the association
of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains. See (infra), at 591-593. Even if
one or more of the civil remedies might be inapplicable to a particular
illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise
concept. Congress has provided civil remedies for use when the circumstances
so warrant. It is untenable to argue that their existence limits the scope
of the criminal provisions. *fn8 |
| [33] | Finally, it is urged that the interpretation of RICO to include both legitimate
and illegitimate enterprises will substantially alter the balance between
federal and state enforcement of . This is particularly true, so the argument
goes, since included within the definition of racketeering activity are
a significant number of acts made criminal under state law. 18 U. S. C.
§ 1961 (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). But even assuming that the more inclusive
definition of enterprise will have the effect suggested, *fn9
the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Congress
was well aware that it was entering a new domain of federal involvement
through the enactment of this measure. Indeed, the very purpose of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to address
a large and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that existing law,
state and federal, was not adequate to address the problem, which was of
national dimensions. That Congress included within the definition of racketeering
activities a number of state crimes strongly indicates that RICO criminalized
conduct that was also criminal under state law, at least when the requisite
elements of a RICO offense are present. As the hearings and legislative
debates reveal, Congress was well aware of the fear that RICO would " large
substantive areas formerly totally within the police power of the State
into the Federal realm." 116 Cong. Rec. 35217 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
See also id., at 35205 (remarks of Rep. Mikva); id., at 35213 (comments
of the American Civil Liberties Union); Hearings on Organized Crime Control
before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 329, 370 (1970) (statement of Sheldon H. Eisen on behalf
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). In the face of these
objections, Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing
that it would alter somewhat the role of the Federal Government in the war
against organized crime and that the alteration would entail prosecutions
involving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state law. There
is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so doing. That being
the case, the courts are without authority to restrict the application of
the statute. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379-380 (1978). |
| [34] | Contrary to the judgment below, neither the language nor structure of
RICO limits its application to legitimate "enterprises." Applying it also
to criminal organizations does not render any portion of the statute superfluous
nor does it create any structural incongruities within the framework of
the Act. The result is neither absurd nor surprising. On the contrary, insulating
the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous
position. |
| [35] | Section 904 (a) of RICO, 84 Stat. 947, directs that " provisions of this
Title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
With or without this admonition, we could not agree with the Court of Appeals
that illegitimate enterprises should be excluded from coverage. We are also
quite sure that nothing in the legislative history of RICO requires a contrary
Conclusion. *fn10 |
| [36] | III |
| [37] | The statement of findings that prefaces the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970 reveals the pervasiveness of the problem that Congress was addressing
by this enactment: |
| [38] | "The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a
highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and
the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives
a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors
as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property,
the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs,
and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly
used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and
to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities
in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system,
harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten
the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and
its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects
in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development
of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other
sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged
in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the
Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact." 84 Stat. 922-923. |
| [39] | In light of the above findings, it was the declared purpose of Congress
"to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening
the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Id.,
at 923. *fn11
The various Titles of the Act provide the tools through which this goal
is to be accomplished. Only three of those Titles create substantive offenses,
Title VIII, which is directed at illegal gambling operations, Title IX,
at issue here, and Title XI, which addresses the importation, distribution,
and storage of explosive materials. The other Titles provide various procedural
and remedial devices to aid in the prosecution and incarceration of persons
involved in organized crime. |
| [40] | Considering this statement of the Act's broad purposes, the construction
of RICO suggested by respondent and the court below is unacceptable. Whole
areas of organized criminal activity would be placed beyond the substantive
reach of the enactment. For example, associations of persons engaged solely
in "loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and
distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs," id., at 922-923, would
be immune from prosecution under RICO so long as the association did not
deviate from the criminal path. Yet these are among the very crimes that
Congress specifically found to be typical of the crimes committed by persons
involved in organized crime, see 18 U. S. C. § 1961 (1) (1976 ed.,
Supp. III), and as a major source of revenue and power for such organizations.
See Hearings on S. 30 et al. before the Subcommittee on s and Procedures
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1969).
*fn12 Along
these same lines, Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the bill,
gave two examples of types of problems RICO was designed to address. Neither
is consistent with the view that substantive offenses under RICO would be
limited to legitimate enterprises: "Organized criminals, too, have flooded
the market with cheap reproductions of hit records and affixed counterfeit
popular labels. They are heavily engaged in the illicit prescription drug
industry." 116 Cong. Rec. 592 (1970). In view of the purposes and goals
of the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that
Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects
of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltration
of legitimate business. |
| [41] | This is not to gainsay that the legislative history forcefully supports
the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration
of legitimate business by organized crime. The point is made time and again
during the debates and in the hearings before the House and Senate. *fn13
But none of these statements requires the negative inference that Title
IX did not reach the activities of enterprises organized and existing for
criminal purposes. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-775
(1979); United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S., at 377. |
| [42] | On the contrary, these statements are in full accord with the proposition
that RICO is equally applicable to a criminal enterprise that has no legitimate
dimension or has yet to acquire one. Accepting that the primary purpose
of RICO is to cope with the infiltration of legitimate businesses, applying
the statute in accordance with its terms, so as to reach criminal enterprises,
would seek to deal with the problem at its very source. Supporters of the
bill recognized that organized crime uses its primary sources of revenue
and power -- illegal gambling, loan sharking and illicit drug distribution
-- as a springboard into the sphere of legitimate enterprise. Hearings on
S. 30, (supra) , at 1-2. The Senate Report stated: |
| [43] | "What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that
will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through
which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic
well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source
of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available
fronts." S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 79 (1969) (emphasis supplied). |
| [44] | Senator Byrd explained in debate on the floor, that "loan sharking paves
the way for organized criminals to gain access to and eventually take over
the control of thousands of legitimate businesses." 116 Cong. Rec. 606 (1970).
Senator Hruska declared that "the combination of criminal and civil penalties
in this title offers an extraordinary potential for striking a mortal blow
against the property interests of organized crime." Id., at 602. *fn14
Undoubtedly, the infiltration of legitimate businesses was of great concern,
but the means provided to prevent that infiltration plainly included striking
at the source of the problem. As Representative Poff, a manager of the bill
in the House, stated: " IX . . . will deal not only with individuals, but
also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such
a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an
attack must be made on their source of economic power itself . . . ." Id.,
at 35193. |
| [45] | As a measure to deal with the infiltration of legitimate businesses by
organized crime, RICO was both preventive and remedial. Respondent's view
would ignore the preventive function of the statute. If Congress had intended
the more circumscribed approach espoused by the Court of Appeals, there
would have been some positive sign that the law was not to reach organized
criminal activities that give rise to the concerns about infiltration. The
language of the statute, however -- the most reliable evidence of its intent
-- reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of the word
"enterprise," and we are unconvinced by anything in the legislative history
that this definition should be given less than its full effect. |
| [46] | The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly |
| [47] | Reversed. |
| [48] | JUSTICE STEWART agrees with the reasoning and Conclusion of the Court
of Appeals as to the meaning of the term "enterprise" in this statute. See
632 F.2d 896. Accordingly, he respectfully Dissents. |
|
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| Opinion Footnotes | |
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|
| [49] | * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Harvey A. Silverglate
for the Boston Bar Association et al.; and by Barry Tarlow for California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice et al. |
| [50] | *fn1 See
United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1006-1009 (CA6 1980) (en banc),
cert. pending, Nos. 80-6058, 80-6137, 80-6141, 80-6147, 80-6253, 80-6254,
80-6272; United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 155 (CA2 1980); United States
v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992-993 (CA3), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980);
United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525, n. 1 (CA4 1980); United States
v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-305 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-569 (CA9 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 193 U. S. App. D.C. 92,
94-95, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248-1249 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 896-898 (CA5), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978). See also United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372
(CA8 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). But see United States v.
Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 264-270 (CA6 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (1980);
United States v. Rone, supra, at 573 (Ely, J., Dissenting); United States
v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (CA2 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., Dissenting),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). |
| [51] | *fn2 Title
18 U. S. C. § 1961 (4) provides: |
| [52] | "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity." |
| [53] | *fn3 Title
18 U. S. C. § 1962 (d) provides that " shall be unlawful for any person
to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or
(c) of this section." Pertinent to these charges, subsection (c) provides: |
| [54] | "It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt." |
| [55] | *fn4 The
Court of Appeals' application of ejusdem generis is further flawed by the
assumption that "any individual, partnership, corporation, association or
other legal entity" could not act totally beyond the pale of the law. The
mere fact that a given enterprise is favored with a legal existence does
not prevent that enterprise from proceeding along a wholly illegal course
of conduct. Therefore, since legitimacy of purpose is not a universal characteristic
of the specifically listed enterprises, it would be improper to engraft
this characteristic upon the second category of enterprises. |
| [56] | *fn5 The
Government takes the position that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity
in itself would not be sufficient to establish the existence of an enterprise:
"We do not suggest that any two sporadic and isolated offenses by the same
actor or actors ipso facto constitute an 'illegitimate' enterprise; rather,
the existence of the enterprise as an independent entity must also be shown."
Reply Brief for United States 4. But even if that were not the case, the
Court of Appeals' position on this point is of little force. Language in
a statute is not rendered superfluous merely because in some contexts that
language may not be pertinent. |
| [57] | *fn6 Title
18 U. S. C. §§ 1962 (a) and (b) provide: |
| [58] | "(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as
a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code,
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on
the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of
controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities
of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family,
and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in
the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more
directors of the issuer. |
| [59] | "(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce." |
| [60] | *fn7 Title
18 U. S. C. §§ 1964 (a) and (c) provide: |
| [61] | "(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing
appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to
divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing
reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person,
including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the
same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization
of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons. |
| [62] | "(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." |
| [63] | *fn8 In discussing
these civil remedies, the Senate Report on the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970 specifically referred to two state cases in which equitable relief
had been granted against illegitimate enterprises. S. Rep. No. 91-617, p.
79, n. 9, p. 81, n. 11 (1969). These references were in the context of a
Discussion on the need to expand the remedies available to combat organized
crime. |
| [64] | *fn9 RICO
imposes no restrictions upon the criminal Justice systems of the States.
See 84 Stat. 947 ("Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of
Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil
remedies in addition to those provided for in this title"). Thus, under
RICO, the States remain free to exercise their police powers to the fullest
constitutional extent in defining and prosecuting crimes within their respective
jurisdictions. That some of those crimes may also constitute predicate acts
of racketeering under RICO, is no restriction on the separate administration
of criminal Justice by the States. |
| [65] | *fn10 We
find no occasion to apply the rule of lenity to this statute. " 'rule,'
as is true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid
for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. . . . The
rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress
has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being
lenient to wrongdoers." Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)
(footnote omitted). There being no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue
here, the rule of lenity does not come into play. See United States v. Moore,
423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975), quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26
(1948) ("'The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes]
is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory
purpose. . . . Nor does it demand that a statute be given the "narrowest
meaning"; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord
with the manifest intent of the lawmakers'"); see also Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980). |
| [66] | *fn11 See
also 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("a full scale
attack on organized crime"); id., at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ("purpose
is to eradicate organized crime in the United States"); id., at 35199 (remarks
of Rep. Rodino) ("a truly full-scale commitment to destroy the insidious
power of organized crime groups"); id., at 35300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne)
(organized crime "must be sternly and irrevocably eradicated"). |
| [67] | *fn12 See
also id., at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); id., at 606-607 (remarks of Sen.
Byrd); id., at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott); id., at 962 (remarks of Sen.
Murphy); id., at 970 (remarks of Sen. Bible); id., at 18913, 18937 (remarks
of Sen. McClellan); id., at 35199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino); id., at 35216
(remarks of Rep. McDade); id., at 35300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne); id., at
35312 (remarks of Rep. Brock); id., at 35319 (remarks of Rep. Anderson of
California); id., at 35326 (remarks of Rep. Vanik); id., at 35328 (remarks
of Rep. Meskill); Hearings on S. 30 et al. before the Subcommittee on s
and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 108 (1969) (statement of Attorney General Mitchell); H. R. Rep. No.
1574, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968). |
| [68] | *fn13 116
Cong. Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("title IX is aimed at
removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations"); id., at 602
(remarks of Sen. Hruska) ("Title IX of this act is designed to remove the
influence of organized crime from legitimate business by attacking its property
interests and by removing its members from control of legitimate businesses
which have been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering methods");
id., at 607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("alarming expansion into the field of
legitimate business"); id., at 953 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) ("racketeers
. . . gaining inroads into legitimate business"); id., at 845 (remarks of
Sen. Kennedy) ("title IX . . . may provide us with new tools to prevent
organized crime from taking over legitimate businesses and activities");
S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 76 (1969). |
| [69] | *fn14 See
also, e. g., 115 Cong. Rec. 827 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("Organized
crime . . . uses its ill-gotten gains . . . to infiltrate and secure control
of legitimate business and labor union activities"); 116 Cong. Rec. 591
(1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("illegally gained revenue also makes
it possible for organized crime to infiltrate and pollute legitimate business");
id., at 603 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) (" is designed to root out the
influence of organized crime in legitimate business, into which billions
of dollars of illegally obtained money is channeled"); id., at 606 (remarks
of Sen. Byrd) ("loan sharking paves the way for organized criminals to gain
access to and eventually take over the control of thousands of legitimate
businesses"); id., at 35193 (remarks of Rep. Poff) (" IX. . . will deal
not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which
those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being
of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic
power itself . . ."); S. Rep. No. 91-617, (supra) , at 78-80; H. R. Rep.
No. 1574, (supra) , at 5 ("The President's Crime Commission found that the
greatest menace that organized crime presents is its ability through the
accumulation of illegal gains to infiltrate into legitimate business and
labor unions"); Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee
No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 170
(1970) (Department of Justice Comments) ("Title IX is designed to inhibit
the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, and, like the
previous title, to reach the criminal syndicates' major sources of revenue")
(emphasis supplied). |
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