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| [1] | United States Supreme Court |
| [2] | No. 98-1701 |
| [3] | 120 S.Ct. 1135, 2000.SCT.0042050 <http://www.versuslaw.com> |
| [4] | March 06, 2000 |
| [5] | UNITED STATES v. LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL. |
| [6] | David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States in No. 98-1701. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Michael Jay Singer, H. Thomas Byron III, David R. Andrews, Judith Miller, Nancy E. McFadden, Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, James S. Carmichael, Malcolm J. Williams, Jr., and Paul M. Wasserman. C. Jonathan Benner argued the cause for petitioner in No. 98-1706. With him on the briefs were Timi E. Nickerson and Sean T. Connaughton. William Berggren Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief for the state respondents were Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and Jay D. Geck, Thomas C. Morrill, and Jerri Lynn Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General. Jeffrey L. Needle filed a brief for respondent Washington Environmental Council et al. With him on the brief was John M. MacDonald. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Government of Belgium et al. by Alex Blanton and Laurie C. Sahatjian; for the American Waterways Operators by Eldon V. C. Greenberg and Barbara L. Holland; for the Baltic and International Maritime Council et al. by Dennis L. Bryant, Charles L. Coleman III, Brian D. Starer, and Jovi Tenev; for the International Chamber of Shipping et al. by William F. Sheehan, John Townsend Rich, and Heather H. Anderson; for the Maritime Law Association of the United States by Howard M. McCormack, James Patrick Cooney, and David J. Bederman; for the National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. by F. Edwin Froelich and Charles T. Carroll, Jr.; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., et al. by Kenneth S. Geller, Charles Rothfeld, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht and J. Matthew Rodriquez, Assistant Attorneys General, Dennis M. Eagan and Michael W. Neville, Deputy Attorneys General, Maya B. Kara, Acting Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Sheldon Whitestone of Rhode Island, Charlie Condon of South Carolina, and Jan Graham of Utah; for San Juan County, Washington, et al. by Randall K. Gaylord and Karen E. Vedder; and for the Steamship Association of Southern California by David E. R. Woolley and Thomas A. Russell. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Government of Canada by Margaret K. Pfeiffer; for the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations et al. by Bryan P. Coluccio; for the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association by Sam D. Delich and James B. Nebel; for the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council by Avrum M. Gross and Susan A. Burke; and for the Puget Sound Steamship Operators Association et al. by Richard W. Buchanan and Robert W. Nolting. |
| [7] | Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit |
| [8] | Argued December 7, 1999 |
| [9] | After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled crude oil off the coast of
England in 1967, both Congress, in the Port and Waterways Safety Act of
1972 (PWSA), and the State of Washington enacted more stringent regulations
for tankers and provided for more comprehensive remedies in the event of
an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State's
laws was addressed in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151. In 1989,
the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska, causing the largest
oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and Washington
responded. Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The State
created a new agency and directed it to establish standards to provide the
"best achievable protection" (BAP) from oil spill damages. That
agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements.
Petitioner International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko),
a trade association of tanker operators, brought this suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against state and local officials responsible for
enforcing the BAP regulations. Upholding the regulations, the District Court
rejected Intertanko's arguments that the BAP standards invaded an area long
pre-empted by the Federal Government. At the appeal stage, the United States
intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's
ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs
interests of the Federal Government. The Ninth Circuit held that the State
could enforce its laws, save one requiring vessels to install certain navigation
and towing equipment, which was "virtually identical to" requirements
declared pre-empted in Ray. |
| [10] | Held: Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures,
crew English language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting
are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing
oil tankers; the case is remanded so the validity of other Washington regulations
may be assessed in light of the considerable federal interest at stake.
Pp. 6-25. |
| [11] | (a) The State has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest
has been manifest since the beginning of the Republic and is now well established.
Congress has, beginning with the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, enacted a series
of statutes pertaining to maritime tanker transports. These include the
PWSA, Title I of which authorizes, but does not require, the Coast Guard
to enact measures for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation
and the marine environment, 33 U. S. C. §1223(a), and Title II of which,
as amended, requires the Coast Guard to issue regulations addressing the
design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping,
personnel qualification, and manning of covered vessels, 46 U. S. C. §3703(a).
Congress later enacted OPA, Title I of which, among other things, imposes
liability for both removal costs and damages on parties responsible for
an oil spill, 33 U. S. C. §2702, and includes two saving clauses preserving
the States' authority to impose additional liability, requirements, and
penalties, §§2718(a) and (c). Congress has also ratified international agreements
in this area, including the International Convention of Standards of Training
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). Pp. 6-11. |
| [12] | (b) In Ray, the Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard regulations promulgated
under that Act pre-empted Washington's pilotage requirement, limitation
on tanker size, and tanker design and construction rules. The Ray Court's
interpretation of the PWSA is correct and controlling here. Its basic analytic
structure explains why federal pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged
regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority
of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local concern.
In narrowing the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Ninth Circuit
placed more weight on OPA's saving clauses than they can bear. Like Title
I of OPA, in which they are found, the saving clauses are limited to regulations
governing liability and compensation for oil pollution, and do not extend
to rules regulating vessel operation, design, or manning. Thus, the pre-emptive
effect of the PWSA and its regulations is not affected by OPA, and Ray`s
holding survives OPA's enactment undiminished. The Ray Court's prefatory
observation that an "assumption" that the States' historic police
powers were not to be superseded by federal law unless that was the clear
and manifest congressional purpose does not mean that a presumption against
pre-emption aids the Court's analysis here. An assumption of nonpre-emption
is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been
a history of significant federal presence. The Ray Court held, among other
things, that Congress, in PWSA Title I, preserved state authority to regulate
the peculiarities of local waters, such as depth and narrowness, if there
is no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, see 435 U. S., at
171-172, 178, but further held that Congress, in PWSA Title II, mandated
uniform federal rules on the subjects or matters there specified, id., at
168. Thus, under Ray's interpretation of the Title II provision now found
at 46 U. S. C. §3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel
qualification, and manning of tankers. The Court today reaffirms Ray's holding
on this point. Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters.
See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141.
Although the Ray Court acknowledged that the existence of some overlapping
coverage between the two PWSA titles may make it difficult to determine
whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles,
applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable
generally to Title II, the Court declined to resolve every question by the
greater pre-emptive force of Title II. Thus, conflict pre-emption will be
applicable in some, although not all, cases. Useful inquiries in determining
which title governs include whether the regulation in question is justified
by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway, see Ray, supra, at
175, or whether it is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring
the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of water
purported to justify the local rule, see id., at 159-160, 171. Pp. 11-20. |
| [13] | (c) The field pre-emption rule surrounding PWSA Title II and 46 U. S.
C. §3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal statutes are
illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington's tanker regulations,
the attempted reach of which is well demonstrated by the briefs and record.
First, the imposition of a series of training requirements on a tanker's
crew does not address matters unique to Washington waters, but imposes requirements
that control the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of
those waters. The training and drill requirements pertain to "operation"
and "personnel qualifications" and so are pre-empted by §3703(a).
That training is a field reserved to the Federal Government is further confirmed
by the circumstance that the STCW Convention addresses crew "training"
and "qualification" requirements, and that the United States has
enacted crew training regulations. Second, the imposition of English language
proficiency requirements on a tanker's crew is not limited to governing
local traffic or local peculiarities. It is pre-empted by §3703(a) as a
"personnel qualification" and by 33 U. S. C. §1228(a)(7), which
requires that any vessel operating in United States waters have at least
one licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge who is capable of clearly
understanding English. Third, Washington's general requirement that the
navigation watch consist of at least two licensed deck officers, a helmsman,
and a lookout is pre-empted as an attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation"
and "manning" under §3703(a). Fourth, the requirement that vessels
in Washington waters report certain marine casualties regardless of where
in the world they occurred cannot stand in light of Coast Guard regulations
on the same subject that Congress intended be the sole source of a vessel's
reporting obligations, see 46 U. S. C. §§6101, 3717(a)(4). On remand, Washington
may argue that certain of its regulations, such as its watch requirement
in times of restricted visibility, are of limited extraterritorial effect,
are necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound, and therefore
are not subject to Title II field pre-emption, but should instead be evaluated
under Title I conflict pre-emption analysis. Pp. 20-24. |
| [14] | (d) It is preferable that petitioners' substantial arguments as to pre-emption
of the remaining Washington regulations be considered by the Ninth Circuit
or by the District Court within the framework this Court has herein discussed.
The United States did not participate in these cases until appeal, and resolution
of the litigation would benefit from the development of a full record by
all interested parties. If, pending adjudication on remand, Washington threatens
to begin enforcing its regulations, the lower courts would weigh any stay
application under the appropriate legal standards in light of the principles
discussed herein and with recognition of the national interests at stake.
Ultimately, it is largely for Congress and the Coast Guard to confront whether
their regulatory scheme, which demands a high degree of uniformity, is adequate.
States, as well as environmental groups and local port authorities, will
participate in the process. See 46 U. S. C. §3703(a). Pp. 24-25. 148 F.
3d 1053, reversed and remanded. |
| [15] | Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. |
| [16] | on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth
circuit |
| [17] | [March 6, 2000] |
| [18] | Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. |
| [19] | The maritime oil transport industry presents ever-present, all too real
dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills which could be catastrophes
for the marine environment. After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled
its cargo of 120,000 tons of crude oil off the coast of Cornwall, England,
in 1967, both Congress and the State of Washington enacted more stringent
regulations for these tankers and provided for more comprehensive remedies
in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption
of the State's laws was addressed by the Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978). |
| [20] | In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound,
Alaska, and its cargo of more than 53 million gallons of crude oil caused
the largest oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and
the State of Washington responded. Congress enacted new statutory provisions,
and Washington adopted regulations governing tanker operations and design.
Today we must determine whether these more recent state laws can stand despite
the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. Relying
on the same federal statute that controlled the analysis in Ray, we hold
that some of the State's regulations are pre-empted; as to the balance of
the regulations, we remand the case so their validity may be assessed in
light of the considerable federal interest at stake and in conformity with
the principles we now discuss. |
| [21] | I. |
| [22] | The State of Washington embraces some of the Nation's most significant
waters and coastal regions. Its Pacific Ocean seacoast consists, in large
part, of wave-exposed rocky headlands separated by stretches of beach. Washington
borders as well on the Columbia River estuary, dividing Washington from
Oregon. Two other large estuaries, Grays Harbor and Willapa Bay, are also
within Washington's waters. Of special significance in this case is the
inland sea of Puget Sound, a 2,500 square mile body of water consisting
of inlets, bays, and channels. More than 200 islands are located within
the sound, and it sustains fisheries and plant and animal life of immense
value to the Nation and to the world. |
| [23] | Passage from the Pacific Ocean to the quieter Puget Sound is through the
Strait of Juan de Fuca, a channel 12 miles wide and 65 miles long which
divides Washington from the Canadian Province of British Columbia. The international
boundary is located midchannel. Access to Vancouver, Canada's largest port,
is through the strait. Traffic inbound from the Pacific Ocean, whether destined
to ports in the United States or Canada, is routed through Washington's
waters; outbound traffic, whether from a port in Washington or Vancouver,
is directed through Canadian waters. The pattern had its formal adoption
in a 1979 agreement entered by the United States and Canada. Agreement for
a Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region,
32 U. S. T. 377, T. I. A. S. No. 9706. |
| [24] | In addition to holding some of our vital waters, Washington is the site
of major installations for the Nation's oil industry and the destination
or shipping point for huge volumes of oil and its end products. Refineries
and product terminals are located adjacent to Puget Sound in ports including
Cherry Point, Ferndale, Tacoma, and Anacortes. Canadian refineries are found
near Vancouver on Burrard Inlet and the lower Fraser River. Crude oil is
transported by sea to Puget Sound. Most is extracted from Alaska's North
Slope reserve and is shipped to Washington on United States flag vessels.
Foreign-flag vessels arriving from nations such as Venezuela and Indonesia
also call at Washington's oil installations. |
| [25] | The bulk of oil transported on water is found in tankers, vessels which
consist of a group of tanks contained in a ship-shaped hull, propelled by
an isolated machinery plant at the stern. The Court described the increase
in size and numbers of these ships close to three decades ago in Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U. S. 325, 335 (1973), noting that
the average vessel size increased from 16,000 tons during World War II to
76,000 tons in 1966. (The term "tons" refers to "deadweight
tons," a way of measuring the cargo-carrying capacity of the vessels.)
Between 1955 and 1968, the world tanker fleet grew from 2,500 vessels to
4,300. Ibid. By December 1973, 366 tankers in the world tanker fleet were
in excess of 175,000 tons, see 1 M. Tusiani, The Petroleum Shipping Industry
79 (1996), and by 1998 the number of vessels considered "tankers"
in the merchant fleets of the world numbered 6,739, see U. S. Dept. of Transp.,
Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets of the World 1 (Oct. 1998). |
| [26] | The size of these vessels, the frequency of tanker operations, and the
vast amount of oil transported by vessels with but one or two layers of
metal between the cargo and the water present serious risks. Washington's
waters have been subjected to oil spills and further threatened by near
misses. In December 1984, for example, the tanker ARCO Anchorage grounded
in Port Angeles Harbor and spilled 239,000 gallons of Alaskan crude oil.
The most notorious oil spill in recent times was in Prince William Sound,
Alaska, where the grounding of the Exxon Valdez released more than 11 million
gallons of crude oil and, like the Torrey Canyon spill before it, caused
public officials intense concern over the threat of a spill. |
| [27] | Washington responded by enacting the state regulations now in issue. The
legislature created the Office of Marine Safety, which it directed to establish
standards for spill prevention plans to provide "the best achievable
protection [BAP] from damages caused by the discharge of oil." Wash.
Rev. Code §88.46.040(3) (1994). The Office of Marine Safety then promulgated
the tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements now
subject to attack by petitioners. Wash. Admin. Code (WAC) §317-21-130 et
seq. (1999). A summary of the relevant regulations, as described by the
Court of Appeals, is set out in the Appendix, infra. |
| [28] | If a vessel fails to comply with the Washington rules, possible sanctions
include statutory penalties, restrictions of the vessel's operations in
state waters, and a denial of entry into state waters. Wash. Rev. Code.
§§88.46.070, 88.46.080, 88.46.090 (1994). |
| [29] | Petitioner International Association of Independent Tanker Owners ("Intertanko")
is a trade association whose 305 members own or operate more than 2,000
tankers of both United States and foreign registry. The organization represents
approximately 80% of the world's independently owned tanker fleet; and an
estimated 60% of the oil imported into the United States is carried on Intertanko
vessels. The association brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP
regulations. Groups interested in environmental preservation intervened
in defense of the laws. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards
invaded areas long occupied by the Federal Government and imposed unique
requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Intertanko
further contended that if local political subdivisions of every maritime
nation were to impose differing regulatory regimes on tanker operations,
the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental
and safety standards would be defeated. |
| [30] | Although the United States declined to intervene when the case was in
the District Court, the governments of 13 ocean-going nations expressed
concerns through a diplomatic note directed to the United States. Intertanko
lodged a copy of the note with the District Court. The concerned governments
represented that "legislation by the State of Washington on tanker
personnel, equipment and operations would cause inconsistency between the
regulatory regime of the US Government and that of an individual State of
the US. Differing regimes in different parts of the US would create uncertainty
and confusion. This would also set an unwelcome precedent for other Federally
administered countries." Note Verbale from the Royal Danish Embassy
to the U. S. Dep't of State 1 (June 14, 1996). |
| [31] | The District Court rejected all of Intertanko's arguments and upheld the
state regulations. International Assn. of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko)
v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (WD Wash. 1996). The appeal followed, and at
that stage the United States intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending
that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the
substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the State could
enforce its laws, save the one requiring the vessels to install certain
navigation and towing equipment. 148 F. 3d 1220 (1998) (The Court of Appeals
reasoned that this requirement, found in WAC §317-21-265, was "virtually
identical to" requirements declared pre-empted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978). 148 F. 3d, at 1066. Over Judge Graber's dissent,
the Court of Appeals denied petitions for rehearing en banc. 159 F. 3d 1220
(1998). Judge Graber, although unwilling, without further analysis, to conclude
that the panel reached the wrong result, argued that the opinion was "incorrect
in two exceptionally important respects: (1) The opinion places too much
weight on two clauses in Title I of OPA 90 [The Oil Pollution Act of 1990]
that limit OPA 90's preemptive effect. (2) Portions of the opinion that
discuss the Coast Guard regulations are inconsistent with Ninth Circuit
and Supreme Court precedent." Id., at 1221. We granted certiorari and
now reverse. 527 U. S. 1063 (1999). |
| [32] | II. |
| [33] | The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal
interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now
well established. The authority of Congress to regulate interstate navigation,
without embarrassment from intervention of the separate States and resulting
difficulties with foreign nations, was cited in the Federalist Papers as
one of the reasons for adopting the Constitution. E.g., The Federalist Nos.
44, 12, 64. In 1789, the First Congress enacted a law by which vessels with
a federal certificate were entitled to "the benefits granted by any
law of the United States." Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, §1, 1 Stat.
55. The importance of maritime trade and the emergence of maritime transport
by steamship resulted in further federal licensing requirements enacted
to promote trade and to enhance the safety of crew members and passengers.
See Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304; Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch.
94, 5 Stat. 626. In 1871, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of regulation
for steam powered vessels, including provisions for licensing captains,
chief mates, engineers, and pilots. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100, 16 Stat.
440. |
| [34] | The Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel.
Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852), stated that there
would be instances in which state regulation of maritime commerce is inappropriate
even absent the exercise of federal authority, although in the case before
it the Court found the challenged state regulations were permitted in light
of local needs and conditions. Where Congress had acted, however, the Court
had little difficulty in finding state vessel requirements were pre-empted
by federal laws which governed the certification of vessels and standards
of operation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), invalidated a New York
law that attempted to grant a monopoly to operate steamboats on the ground
it was inconsistent with the coasting license held by the vessel owner challenging
the exclusive franchise. And in Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859),
the Court decided that the federal license held by the vessel contained
"the only guards and restraints, which Congress has seen fit to annex
to the privileges of ships and vessels engaged in the coasting trade."
Id., at 241. The Court went on to explain that in such a circumstance, state
laws on the subject must yield: "In every such case, the act of Congress
or treaty is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise
of powers not controverted, must yield to it." Id., at 243. |
| [35] | Against this background, Congress has enacted a series of statutes pertaining
to maritime tanker transports and has ratified international agreements
on the subject. We begin by referring to the principal statutes and international
instruments discussed by the parties. |
| [36] | 1. The Tank Vessel Act. |
| [37] | The Tank Vessel Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1889, enacted specific requirements
for operation of covered vessels. The Act provided that "[i]n order
to secure effective provisions against the hazards of life and property,"
additional federal rules could be adopted with respect to the "design
and construction, alteration, or repair of such vessels," "the
operation of such vessels," and "the requirements of the manning
of such vessels and the duties and qualifications of the officers and crews
thereof." The purpose of the Act was to establish "a reasonable
and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning ... vessels carrying
the type of cargo deemed dangerous." H. R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess., 2 (1936). The Tank Vessel Act was the primary source for regulating
tank vessels for the next 30 years, until the Torrey Canyon grounding led
Congress to take new action. |
| [38] | 2. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. |
| [39] | Responding to the Torrey Canyon spill, Congress enacted the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA). The Act, as amended by the Port and
Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1471, contains two somewhat overlapping
titles, both of which may, as the Ray Court explained, preclude enforcement
of state laws, though not by the same pre-emption analysis. Title I concerns
vessel traffic "in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the
United States." 110 Stat. 3934, 33 U. S. C. §1223(a)(1) (1997 ed. Supp.
III). Under Title I, the Coast Guard may enact measures for controlling
vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment,
but it is not required to do so. Ibid. |
| [40] | Title II does require the Coast Guard to issue regulations, regulations
addressing the "design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance,
operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels ...
that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and
property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection
of the marine environment." 46 U. S. C. §3703(a). |
| [41] | The critical provisions of the PWSA described above remain operative,
but the Act has been amended, most significantly by the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 (OPA), 104 Stat. 484. OPA, enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez
spill, requires separate discussion. |
| [42] | 3. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990. |
| [43] | The OPA contains nine titles, two having the most significance for these
cases. Title I is captioned "Oil Pollution Liability, and Compensation"
and adds extensive new provisions to the United States Code. See 104 Stat.
2375, 33 U. S. C. §2701 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Title I imposes
liability (for both removal costs and damages) on parties responsible for
an oil spill. §2702. Other provisions provide defenses to, and limitations
on, this liability. 33 U. S. C. §§2703, 2704. Of considerable importance
to these cases are OPA's saving clauses, found in Title I of the Act, §2718,
and to be discussed below. |
| [44] | Title IV of OPA is entitled "Prevention and Removal." For the
most part, it amends existing statutory provisions or instructs the Secretary
of Transportation (whose departments include the Coast Guard) to take action
under previous grants of rulemaking authority. For example, Title IV instructs
the Coast Guard to require reporting of marine casualties resulting in a
"significant harm to the environment." 46 U. S. C. §6101(a)(5)
(1994 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV further requires the Secretary to issue
regulations to define those areas, including Puget Sound, on which single
hulled tankers shall be escorted by other vessels. 104 Stat. 523. By incremental
dates specified in the Act, all covered tanker vessels must have a double
hull. 46 U. S. C. §3703a. |
| [45] | 4. Treaties and International Agreements. |
| [46] | The scheme of regulation includes a significant and intricate complex
of international treaties and maritime agreements bearing upon the licensing
and operation of vessels. We are advised by the United States that the international
regime depends upon the principle of reciprocity. That is to say, the certification
of a vessel by the government of its own flag nation warrants that the ship
has complied with international standards, and vessels with those certificates
may enter ports of the signatory nations. Brief for United States 3. |
| [47] | Illustrative of treaties and agreements to which the United States is
a party are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974, 32 U. S. T. 47, T. I. A. S. No. 9700, the International Convention
for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 17 I. L. M. 546, and the International
Convention of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, With Annex, 1978 (STCW), S. Treaty Doc. No. 96-1, C. T. I. A.
No. 7624. |
| [48] | The United States argues that these treaties, as the supreme law of the
land, have pre-emptive force over the state regulations in question here.
We need not reach that issue at this stage of the case because the state
regulations we address in detail below are pre-empted by federal statute
and regulations. The existence of the treaties and agreements on standards
of shipping is of relevance, of course, for these agreements give force
to the longstanding rule that the enactment of a uniform federal scheme
displaces state law, and the treaties indicate Congress will have demanded
national uniformity regarding maritime commerce. See Ray, 435 U. S., at
166 (recognizing Congress anticipated "arriving at international standards
for building tank vessels" and understanding "the Nation was to
speak with one voice" on these matters). In later proceedings, if it
is deemed necessary for full disposition of the case, it should be open
to the parties to argue whether the specific international agreements and
treaties are of binding, pre-emptive force. We do not reach those questions,
for it may be that pre-emption principles applicable to the basic federal
statutory structure will suffice, upon remand, for a complete determination. |
| [49] | III. |
| [50] | In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, the Court was asked to review, in
light of an established federal and international regulatory scheme, comprehensive
tanker regulations imposed by the State of Washington. The Court held that
the PWSA and Coast Guard regulations promulgated under that Act pre-empted
a state pilotage requirement, Washington's limitation on tanker size, and
tanker design and construction rules. |
| [51] | In these cases, petitioners relied on Ray to argue that Washington's more
recent state regulations were preempted as well. The Court of Appeals, however,
concluded that Ray retained little validity in light of subsequent action
by Congress. We disagree. The Ray Court's interpretation of the PWSA is
correct and controlling. Its basic analytic structure explains why federal
pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope
and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and localities
to regulate some matters of local concern. |
| [52] | At the outset, it is necessary to explain that the essential framework
of Ray, and of the PWSA which it interpreted, are of continuing force, neither
having been superseded by subsequent authority relevant to these cases.
In narrowing the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Court of
Appeals relied upon OPA's saving clauses, finding in their language a return
of authority to the States. Title I of OPA contains two saving clauses,
stating: |
| [53] | "(a) Preservation of State authorities ... |
| [54] | "Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall -- |
| [55] | "(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as pre-empting, the authority
of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional
liability or requirements with respect to -- |
| [56] | "(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State
... . |
| [57] | "(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties |
| [58] | "Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U. S. C. 183 et
seq.), or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U. S. C.
9509]), shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority
of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof -- |
| [59] | "(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements |
| [60] | "relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge,
of oil." 33 U. S. C. §2718. |
| [61] | The Court of Appeals placed more weight on the saving clauses than those
provisions can bear, either from a textual standpoint or from a consideration
of the whole federal regulatory scheme of which OPA is but a part. |
| [62] | The saving clauses are found in Title I of OPA, captioned Oil Pollution
Liability and Compensation and creating a liability scheme for oil pollution.
In contrast to the Washington rules at issue here, Title I does not regulate
vessel operation, design, or manning. Placement of the saving clauses in
Title I of OPA suggests that Congress intended to preserve state laws of
a scope similar to the matters contained in Title I of OPA, not all state
laws similar to the matters covered by the whole of OPA or to the whole
subject of maritime oil transport. The evident purpose of the saving clauses
is to preserve state laws which, rather than imposing substantive regulation
of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules and financial requirements
relating to oil spills. See Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. ___, ___ (2000)
(slip op., at 5) (words of a statute should be interpreted consistent with
their neighbors to avoid giving unintended breadth to an Act of Congress). |
| [63] | Our conclusion is fortified by Congress' decision to limit the saving
clauses by the same key words it used in declaring the scope of Title I
of OPA. Title I of OPA permits recovery of damages involving vessels "from
which oil is discharged, or which pos[e] the substantial threat of a discharge
of oil." 33 U. S. C. §2702(a). The saving clauses, in parallel manner,
permit States to impose liability or requirements "relating to the
discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil." §2718(c).
In its titles following Title I, OPA addresses matters including licensing
and certificates of registry, 104 Stat. 509; duties of senior licensed officers
to relieve the master, id., at 511; manning standards for foreign vessels,
id., at 513; reporting of marine casualties, ibid.; minimum standards for
plating thickness, id., at 515; tank vessel manning requirements, id., at
517; and tank vessel construction standards, id., at 517-518, among other
extensive regulations. If Congress had intended to disrupt national uniformity
in all of these matters, it would not have done so by placement of the saving
clauses in Title I. |
| [64] | The saving clauses are further limited in effect to "this Act, the
Act of March 3, 1851 ... or section 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code."
§2718(a) and (c). These explicit qualifiers are inconsistent with interpreting
the saving clauses to alter the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA or regulations
promulgated thereunder. The text of the statute indicates no intent to allow
States to impose wide-ranging regulation of the at-sea operation of tankers.
The clauses may preserve a State's ability to enact laws of a scope similar
to Title I, but do not extend to subjects addressed in the other titles
of the Act or other acts. |
| [65] | Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined respects the established
federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce between the subjects
as to which the States retain concurrent powers and those over which the
federal authority displaces state control. We have upheld state laws imposing
liability for pollution caused by oil spills. See Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U. S., at 325. Our view of OPA's savings clauses preserves
this important role for the States, which is unchallenged here. We think
it quite unlikely that Congress would use a means so indirect as the savings
clauses in Title I of OPA to upset the settled division of authority by
allowing states to impose additional unique substantive regulation on the
at-sea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to saving clauses
where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by
federal law. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S.
374, 385 (1992); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office
Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227-28 (1998). |
| [66] | From the text of OPA and the long-established understanding of the appropriate
balance between federal and state regulation of maritime commerce, we hold
that the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and regulations promulgated under
it are not affected by OPA. We doubt Congress will be surprised by our conclusion,
for the Conference Report on OPA shared our view that the statute "does
not disturb the Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U. S. 151 (1978)." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, 101, p. 122 (1990).
The holding in Ray also survives the enactment of OPA undiminished, and
we turn to a detailed discussion of that case. |
| [67] | As we mentioned above, the Ray Court confronted a claim by the operator
of a Puget Sound refinery that federal law precluded Washington from enforcing
laws imposing certain substantive requirements on tankers. The Ray Court
prefaced its analysis of the state regulations with the following observation: |
| [68] | "The Court's prior cases indicate that when a State's exercise of
its police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, `we start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.' Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230
(1947)." 435 U. S., at 157. |
| [69] | The fragmentary quote from Rice does not support the scope given to it
by the Court of Appeals or by respondents. |
| [70] | Ray quoted but a fragment of a much longer paragraph found in Rice. The
quoted fragment is followed by extensive and careful qualifications to show
the different approaches taken by the Court in various contexts. We need
not discuss that careful explanation in detail, however. To explain the
full intent of the Rice quotation, it suffices to quote in full the sentence
in question and two sentences preceding it. The Rice opinion stated: "The
question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was. Congress legislated
here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." 331 U. S., at 230 (citations omitted). |
| [71] | The qualification given by the word "so" and by the preceding
sentences in Rice are of considerable consequence. As Rice indicates, an
"assumption" of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State
regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal
presence. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977)
("assumption" is triggered where "the field which Congress
is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States");
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Rice in case
involving medical negligence, a subject historically regulated by the States).
In Ray, and in the case before us, Congress has legislated in the field
from the earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory
and regulatory scheme. |
| [72] | The state laws now in question bear upon national and international maritime
commerce, and in this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent
regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers. Rather,
we must ask whether the local laws in question are consistent with the federal
statutory structure, which has as one of its objectives a uniformity of
regulation for maritime commerce. No artificial presumption aids us in determining
the scope of appropriate local regulation under the PWSA, which, as we discuss
below, does preserve, in Title I of that Act, the historic role of the States
to regulate local ports and waters under appropriate circumstances. At the
same time, as we also discuss below, uniform, national rules regarding general
tanker design, operation, and seaworthiness have been mandated by Title
II of the PWSA. |
| [73] | The Ray Court confirmed the important proposition that the subject and
scope of Title I of the PWSA allows a State to regulate its ports and waterways,
so long as the regulation is based on "the peculiarities of local waters
that call for special precautionary measures." 435 U. S., at 171. Title
I allows state rules directed to local circumstances and problems, such
as water depth and narrowness, idiosyncratic to a particular port or waterway.
Ibid. There is no pre-emption by operation of Title I itself if the state
regulation is so directed and if the Coast Guard has not adopted regulations
on the subject or determined that regulation is unnecessary or inappropriate.
This principle is consistent with recognition of an important role for States
and localities in the regulation of the Nation's waterways and ports. E.g.,
Cooley, 12 How., at 319 (recognizing state authority to adopt plans "applicable
to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits"). It is
fundamental in our federal structure that states have vast residual powers.
Those powers, unless constrained or displaced by the existence of federal
authority or by proper federal enactments, are often exercised in concurrence
with those of the national government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316
(1819). |
| [74] | As Ray itself made apparent, the States may enforce rules governed by
Title I of the PWSA unless they run counter to an exercise of federal authority.
The analysis under Title I of the PWSA, then, is one of conflict pre-emption,
which occurs "when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible,
or when the state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objective of Congress.' " California v. ARC
America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 100-101 (1989) (citations omitted). In this
context, Coast Guard regulations are to be given pre-emptive effect over
conflicting state laws. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U. S. 57, 63-64 (1988)
(" `[A] federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally
delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation' and hence render unenforceable
state or local laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law").
Ray defined the relevant inquiry for Title I pre-emption as whether the
Coast Guard has promulgated its own requirement on the subject or has decided
that no such requirement should be imposed at all. 435 U. S., at 171-172;
see also, id., at 178 (" `where failure of ... federal officials affirmatively
to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that
no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of
the statute,' States are not permitted to use their police power to enact
such a regulation. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
Board, 330 U. S 767, 774 (1947)"). Ray also recognized that, even in
the context of a regulation related to local waters, a federal official
with an overview of all possible ramifications of a particular requirement
might be in the best position to balance all the competing interests. Id.,
at 177. |
| [75] | While Ray explained that Congress, in Title I of the PWSA, preserved state
authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters if there was no
conflict with federal regulatory determinations, the Court further held
that Congress, in Title II of the PWSA, mandated federal rules on the subjects
or matters there specified, demanding uniformity. Id., at 168 ("Title
II leaves no room for the States to impose different or stricter design
requirements than those which Congress has enacted with the hope of having
them internationally adopted or has accepted as the result of international
accord. A state law in this area ... would frustrate the congressional desire
of achieving uniform, international standards"). Title II requires
the Coast Guard to impose national regulations governing the general seaworthiness
of tankers and their crews. Id., at 160. Under Ray's interpretation of the
Title II PWSA provision now found at 46 U. S. C. §3703(a), only the Federal
Government may regulate the "design, construction, alteration, repair,
maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning"
of tanker vessels. |
| [76] | In Ray, this principle was applied to hold that Washington's tanker design
and construction rules were pre-empted. Those requirements failed because
they were within a field reserved for federal regulation under 46 U. S.
C. §391a (1982 ed.), the predecessor to §3703(a). We reaffirm Ray's holding
on this point. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, the field
of pre-emption established by §3703(a) cannot be limited to tanker "design"
and "construction," terms which cannot be read in isolation from
the other subjects found in that section. Title II of the PWSA covers "design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel
qualification, and manning" of tanker vessels. Ibid. Congress has left
no room for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982) (explaining field pre-emption).
As the Ray court stated: "[T]he Supremacy Clause dictates that the
federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters
prevail over the contrary state judgment. Enforcement of the state requirements
would at least frustrate what seems to us to be the evident congressional
intention to establish a uniform federal regime controlling the design of
oil tankers." 435 U. S., at 165. |
| [77] | The existence of some overlapping coverage between the two titles of the
PWSA may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is
controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable generally to Title
I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II. The
Ray Court acknowledged the difficulty, but declined to resolve every question
by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. We follow the same approach,
and conflict pre-emption under Title I will be applicable in some, although
not all, cases. We recognize that the terms used in §3703(a) are quite broad.
In defining their scope, and the scope of the resulting field pre-emption,
it will be useful to consider the type of regulations the Secretary has
actually promulgated under the section, as well as the section's list of
specific types of regulation that must be included. Useful inquiries include
whether the rule is justified by conditions unique to a particular port
or waterway. See id., at 175 (a Title I regulation is one "based on
water depth in Puget Sound or on other local peculiarities"). Furthermore,
a regulation within the State's residual powers will often be of limited
extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its primary
conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local
rule. Limited extraterritorial effect explains why Ray upheld a state rule
requiring a tug escort for certain vessels, id., at 171, and why state rules
requiring a registered vessel (i.e., one involved in foreign trade) to take
on a local pilot have historically been allowed, id., at 159-160. Local
rules not pre-empted under Title II of the PWSA pose a minimal risk of innocent
noncompliance, do not affect vessel operations outside the jurisdiction,
do not require adjustment of systemic aspects of the vessel, and do not
impose a substantial burden on the vessel's operation within the local jurisdiction
itself. |
| [78] | IV. |
| [79] | The field pre-emption rule surrounding Title II and §3703(a) and the superseding
effect of additional federal statutes are illustrated by the pre-emption
of four of Washington's tanker regulations. We address these because the
attempted reach of the state rules is well demonstrated by the briefs and
record before us; other parts of the state regulatory scheme can be addressed
on remand. |
| [80] | First, Washington imposes a series of training requirements on a tanker's
crew. WAC §317-21-230; see also Appendix, infra, at ___. A covered vessel
is required to certify that its crew has "complete[d] a comprehensive
training program approved by the [State]." The State requires the vessel's
master to "be trained in shipboard management" and licensed deck
officers to be trained in bridge resource management, automated radar plotting
aids, shiphandling, crude oil washing, inert gas systems, cargo handling,
oil spill prevention and response, and shipboard fire fighting. The state
law mandates a series of "weekly," "monthly," and "quarterly"
drills. |
| [81] | This state requirement under WAC §317-21-230 does not address matters
unique to the waters of Puget Sound. On the contrary, it imposes requirements
that control the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of
Washington's waters. The training and drill requirements pertain to "operation"
and "personnel qualifications" and so are pre-empted by 46 U.
S. C. §3703(a). Our conclusion that training is a field reserved to the
Federal Government receives further confirmation from the circumstance that
the STCW Convention addresses "training" and "qualification"
requirements of the crew, Art. VI), and that the United States has enacted
crew training requirements. E.g., 46 CFR Pts. 10, 12, 13, 15 (1999). |
| [82] | The second Washington rule we find pre-empted is WAC §317-21-250; see
also, Appendix, infra, at ___-___. Washington imposes English language proficiency
requirements on a tanker's crew. This requirement will dictate how a tanker
operator staffs the vessel even from the outset of the voyage, when the
vessel may be thousands of miles from Puget Sound. It is not limited to
governing local traffic or local peculiarities. The State's attempted rule
is a "personnel qualification" pre-empted by §3703(a) of Title
II. In addition, there is another federal statute, 33 U. S. C. §1228(a)(7),
on the subject. It provides: "[N]o vessel ... shall operate in the
navigable waters of the United States ... , if such vessel ... while underway,
does not have at least one licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge
who is capable of clearly understanding English." The statute may not
be supplemented by laws enacted by the States without compromising the uniformity
the federal rule itself achieves. |
| [83] | The third Washington rule we find invalid under field pre-emption is a
navigation watch requirement in WAC §317-21-200. Washington has different
rules for navigation watch, depending on whether the tanker is operating
in restricted visibility or not. We mention the restricted visibility rule
below, but now evaluate the requirement which applies in general terms and
reads: "[T]he navigation watch shall consist of at least two licensed
deck officers, a helmsman, and a lookout." The general watch requirement
is not tied to the peculiarities of Puget Sound; it applies throughout Washington's
waters and at all times. It is a general operating requirement and is pre-empted
as an attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation" and "manning"
under 33 U. S. C. §3703(a). |
| [84] | We have illustrated field pre-emption under §3703(a) by discussing three
of Washington's rules which, under the current state of the record, we can
determine cannot be enforced due to the assertion of federal authority found
in that section. The parties discuss other federal statutory provisions
and international agreements which also govern specific aspects of international
maritime commerce. In appropriate circumstances, these also may have pre-emptive
effect. |
| [85] | For example, the record before us reveals that a fourth state rule cannot
stand in light of other sources of federal regulation of the same subject.
Washington requires vessels that ultimately reach its waters to report certain
marine casualties. WAC §317-21-130; see also Appendix, infra, at ___. The
requirement applies to incidents (defined as a "collision," "allision,"
"near-miss incident," "marine casualty" of listed kinds,
"accidental or intentional grounding," "failure of the propulsion
or primary steering systems," "failure of a component or control
system," "fire, flood, or other incident that affects the vessel's
seaworthiness," and "spills of oil"), regardless of where
in the world they might have occurred. A vessel operator is required by
the state regulation to make a detailed report to the State on each incident,
listing the date, location, and weather conditions. The report must also
list the government agencies to whom the event was reported and must contain
a "brief analysis of any known causes" and a "description
of measures taken to prevent a reoccurrence." Ibid. |
| [86] | The State contends that its requirement is not pre-empted because it is
similar to federal requirements. This is an incorrect statement of the law.
It is not always a sufficient answer to a claim of pre-emption to say that
state rules supplement, or even mirror, federal requirements. The Court
observed this principle when Commerce Clause doctrine was beginning to take
shape, holding in Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859), that Alabama
could not require vessel owners to provide certain information as a condition
of operating in state waters even though federal law also required the owner
of the vessel "to furnish, under oath ... all the information required
by this State law." Id., at 242. The appropriate inquiry still remains
whether the purposes and objectives of the federal statutes, including the
intent to establish a workable, uniform system, are consistent with concurrent
state regulation. On this point, Justice Holmes' later observation is relevant:
"[W]hen Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand coincidence
is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a
help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."
Charleston & Western Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237
U. S. 597, 604 (1915). |
| [87] | We hold that Congress intended that the Coast Guard regulations be the
sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations with respect to the matters
covered by the challenged state statute. Under 46 U. S. C. §6101, the Coast
Guard "shall prescribe regulations on the marine casualties to be reported
and the manner of reporting," and the statute lists the kinds of casualties
that the regulations must cover. See also §3717(a)(4) (requiring the Secretary
of Transportation to "establish a marine safety information system").
Congress did not intend its reporting obligations to be cumulative to those
enacted by each political subdivision whose jurisdiction a vessel enters.
The State's reporting requirement is a significant burden in terms of cost
and the risk of innocent noncompliance. The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185, 195
(1903) (the master of a vessel is in a position "such that it is almost
impossible for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each individual
State he may visit"). Furthermore, it affects a vessel operator's out-of-state
obligations and conduct, where a State's jurisdiction and authority are
most in doubt. The State reporting requirement under WAC §317-21-130 is
pre-empted. |
| [88] | V. |
| [89] | As to conflict pre-emption under Title I, Washington argues that certain
of its regulations, such as its watch requirement in times of restricted
visibility, are of limited extraterritorial effect and necessary to address
the peculiarities of Puget Sound. On remand, the Court of Appeals or District
Court should consider whether the remaining regulations are preempted under
Title I conflict pre-emption or Title II field pre-emption, or are otherwise
pre-empted by these Titles or under any other federal law or international
agreement raised as possible sources of pre-emption. |
| [90] | We have determined that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation
watch procedures, English language skills, training, and casualty reporting
are pre-empted. Petitioners make substantial arguments that the remaining
regulations are preempted as well. It is preferable that the remaining claims
be considered by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court within the
framework we have discussed. The United States did not participate in these
cases until appeal. Resolution of these cases would benefit from the development
of a full record by all interested parties. |
| [91] | We infer from the record that Washington is not now enforcing its regulations.
If, pending adjudication of the case on remand, a threat of enforcement
emerges, the Court of Appeals or the District Court would weigh any application
for stay under the appropriate legal standards in light of the principles
we have discussed and with recognition of the national interests at stake. |
| [92] | When one contemplates the weight and immense mass of oil ever in transit
by tankers, the oil's proximity to coastal life, and its destructive power
even if a spill occurs far upon the open sea, international, federal, and
state regulation may be insufficient protection. Sufficiency, however, is
not the question before us. The issue is not adequate regulation but political
responsibility; and it is, in large measure, for Congress and the Coast
Guard to confront whether their regulatory scheme, which demands a high
degree of uniformity, is adequate. States, as well as environmental groups
and local port authorities, will participate in the process. See 46 U. S.
C. §3703(a) (requiring the Coast Guard to consider the views of "officials
of State and local governments," "representative of port and harbor
authorities," and "representatives of environmental groups"
in arriving at national standards). |
| [93] | The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
| [94] | It is so ordered. |
| [95] | APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT |
| [96] | "1. Event Reporting -- WAC 317-21-130. Requires operators to report
all events such as collisions, allisions and near-miss incidents for the
five years preceding filing of a prevention plan, and all events that occur
thereafter for tankers that operate in Puget Sound. |
| [97] | "2. Operating Procedures -- [Watch Practices WAC-317-21-200.] Requires
tankers to employ specific watch and lookout practices while navigating
and when at anchor, and requires a bridge resource management system that
is the `standard practice throughout the owner's or operator's fleet,' and
which organizes responsibilities and coordinates communication between members
of the bridge. |
| [98] | "3. Operating Procedures -- Navigation WAC -- 317-21-205. Requires
tankers in navigation in state waters to record positions every fifteen
minutes, to write a comprehensive voyage plan before entering state waters,
and to make frequent compass checks while under way. |
| [99] | "4. Operating Procedures -- Engineering WAC -- 317-21-210. Requires
tankers in state waters to follow specified engineering and monitoring practices. |
| [100] | "5. Operating Procedures -- Prearrival Tests and Inspections WAC
--317-21-215. Requires tankers to undergo a number of tests and inspections
of engineering, navigation and propulsion systems twelve hours or less before
entering or getting underway in state waters. |
| [101] | "6. Operating Procedures -- Emergency Procedures WAC -- 317-21-220.
Requires tanker masters to post written crew assignments and procedures
for a number of shipboard emergencies. |
| [102] | "7. Operating Procedures -- Events WAC -- 317-21-225. Requires that
when an event transpires in state waters, such as a collision, allision
or near miss incident, the operator is prohibited from erasing, discarding
or altering the position plotting records and comprehensive written voyage
plan. |
| [103] | "8. Personnel Policies, Training -- WAC -- 317-21-230. Requires operators
to provide a comprehensive training program for personnel that goes beyond
that necessary to obtain a license or merchant marine document, and which
includes instructions on a number of specific procedures. |
| [104] | "9. Personnel Policies -- Illicit Drugs and Alcohol Use -- WAC 317-21-235.
Requires drug and alcohol testing and reporting. |
| [105] | "10. Personnel Policies -- Personnel Evaluation -- WAC 317-21-240.
Requires operators to monitor the fitness for duty of crew members, and
requires operators to at least annually provide a job performance and safety
evaluation for all crew members on vessels covered by a prevention plan
who serve for more than six months in a year. |
| [106] | "11. Personnel Policies -- Work Hours WAC -- 317-21-245. Sets limitations
on the number of hours crew members may work. |
| [107] | "12. Personnel Policies -- Language WAC -- 317-21-250. Requires all
licensed deck officers and the vessel master to be proficient in English
and to speak a language understood by subordinate officers and unlicensed
crew. Also requires all written instruction to be printed in a language
understood by the licensed officers and unlicensed crew. |
| [108] | "13. Personnel Policies -- Record Keeping WAC -- 317-21-255: Requires
operators to maintain training records for crew members assigned to vessels
covered by a prevention plan. |
| [109] | "14. Management WAC -- 317-21-260. Requires operators to implement
management practices that demonstrate active monitoring of vessel operations
and maintenance, personnel training, development, and fitness, and technological
improvements in navigation. |
| [110] | "15. Technology WAC -- 317-21-265. Requires tankers to be equipped
with global positioning system receivers, two separate radar systems, and
an emergency towing system. |
| [111] | "16. Advance Notice of Entry and Safety Reports WAC -- 317-21-540.
Requires at least twenty-four hours notice prior to entry of a tanker into
state waters, and requires that the notice report any conditions that pose
a hazard to the vessel or the marine environment." 148 F. 3d, at 1053
(footnote omitted). |
|
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| Opinion Footnotes | |
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| [112] | *fn1 Together with No. 98-1706, International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, Governor of Washington, et al., also
on certiorari to the same court. |
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