A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX

BY THE

SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA


MARCH 16, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX

BY THE

SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA


MARCH 16, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2006
SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION
FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

TOM DAVIS, (VA) Chairman

HAROLD ROGERS (KY)

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (CT)

HENRY BONILLA (TX)

STEVE BUYER (IN)

SUE MYRICK (NC)

MAC THORNBERRY (TX)

KAY GRANGER (TX)

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING (MS)

BILL SHUSTER (PA)

JEFF MILLER (FL)

Members who participated at the invitation of the Select Committee

CHARLIE MELANCON (LA)

GENE TAYLOR (MS)

WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON (LA)

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY (GA)

SHELIA JACKSON-LEE (TX)

Staff Designations

David L. Marin, Staff Director
J. Keith Ausbrook, Special Counsel
Lawrence J. Halloran, Deputy Special Counsel
Robert Borden, Senior Associate Special Counsel
Daniel Matthews, Senior Professional Staff
Arthur Wu, Senior Professional Staff
Thomas E. Hawley, Senior Professional Staff
Grace A. Washbourne, Senior Professional Staff
Kim Kotlar, Senior Professional Staff
Anne Marie Turner, Associate Special Counsel
Charles M. Phillips, Associate Special Counsel
Brooke Bennett, Assistant Special Counsel

Kim Baronof, Professional Staff
Risa Salsburg, Professional Staff
Susie Schulte, Professional Staff
Shalley Kim, Professional Staff
Wimberly Fair, Professional Staff
Chuck Turner, Special Investigator
Robert White, Press Secretary
Drew Crockett, Art Editor
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Amy Laudeman, Deputy Clerk
Robin Butler, Administrative Officer/Financial Administrator
Michael Sazonov, Staff Assistant
Pat DeQuattro, Coast Guard Fellow
Jay O'Callahan, Research Assistant
Michael Arkush, Editorial Assistant
Margaret Peterlin, Speaker's Designee

(II)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, I submit herewith the committee’s supplementary report and document annex to the 109th Congress.

TOM DAVIS,
Chairman.
CONTENTS

FORMER UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL BROWN’S COMMUNICATIONS WITH WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, REFLECTED A DISREGARD FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN ............................................................. 1
I. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
II. Brown Deliberately Ignored the National Response Plan .......................... 2
ADDITIONAL VIEWS SUBMITTED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE MELANCON AND REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM JEFFERSON .......................................................... 7
DOCUMENT ANNEX ............................................................................................. 11
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

MARCH 16, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. Tom Davis, from the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, submitted the following

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT AND DOCUMENT ANNEX

On March 16, 2006, the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina approved and adopted a report entitled, “A Failure of Initiative Supplementary Report and Document Annex.” The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

FORMER UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL BROWN’S COMMUNICATIONS WITH WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, REFLECTED A DISREGARD FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN

I. INTRODUCTION

The Select Committee’s efforts to obtain documents and other information from the White House are well-documented in the Select Committee’s original report. While the Select Committee received more than 22,000 pages from the Executive Office of the President and the Office of the Vice President, the White House refused to produce communications among senior White House staff and would not permit witnesses to testify or be interviewed regarding communications with senior White House officials and the President.

Before the Select Committee on September 27, 2005, Former Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Michael D. Brown told the Select Commit-
Brown he would not respond to certain questions regarding his communications with senior White House officials, including the President. Brown told the Select Committee, “I’m being advised by counsel that I can’t discuss with you my conversations with the President’s Chief of Staff and the President.”

On February 10, 2006, however, Brown appeared before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, declaring that, as a private citizen, he no longer felt bound by the same restrictions that applied to his previous testimony. In that appearance, he testified about specific conversations with, among others, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, and the President.

Deprived previously of this information, the Select Committee served a subpoena on Brown that same day, compelling him to appear on Monday, February 13, 2006. In lieu of his appearance on that date, the Select Committee took testimony from him in a sworn deposition on Saturday, February 11, 2006. In that testimony, he discussed his conversations with President Bush and Chief of Staff Card, among others.

Brown’s communications with the White House generally confirm the Select Committee report’s findings. They confirm the Select Committee’s conclusions regarding the use of the National Response Plan’s (NRP) protocols and procedures and the potential for better response if the President had been involved in the details of the response at an earlier date.

But Brown’s communications with the White House also raise serious questions about when and how the White House becomes involved in disaster response under the NRP. Brown testified he regularly communicated with senior White House officials and asked for their assistance in the response. It is well-documented that the response at all levels of government was inadequate. The record establishes that Brown deliberately ignored the procedures, responsibilities, and mechanisms of the NRP and called directly on the White House for assistance instead.

II. BROWN DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN

Brown’s communications with the White House and his sworn statements to the Select Committee and others reflect his deliberate decision to ignore the NRP. The NRP was required to be promulgated under the Homeland Security Act and was established at the direction of the President under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 “to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.” It was designed to

3 Subpoena served on Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm. Staff in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 10, 2006).
4 See Deposition of Michael Brown by House Katrina Select Comm. Staff in Wash., D.C. (Feb. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Brown Dep.1].
5 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan (Dec. 2004) at i [hereinafter NRP].
“serve[] to unify and enhance the incident management capabilities and resources of individual agencies and organizations acting under their own authorities in response to a wide array of potential threats and hazards.”

Thirty-two Departments and Agencies of the federal government adopted it.

The NRP was completed in 2004 and provided new tools for dealing with disasters, including catastrophic disasters. These tools include the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and its constituent entity the National Response Coordinating Center, the Regional Response Coordinating Center, the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), the Catastrophic Incident Annex, and the designation of the Secretary of Homeland Security as the person responsible for execution of “overall coordination of federal incident management activities” in a disaster.

Brown’s own testimony establishes that he ignored or circumvented the procedures under the NRP for managing the disaster. Brown’s testimony demonstrates that he deliberately chose to disregard key provisions of the plan, communicating with White House officials to secure resources. His circumvention of the NRP contributed to depriving the nation of an opportunity to determine whether the NRP worked. While it is clear that the federal, state, and local response was inadequate, it is not clear that the NRP itself would not have worked, or worked better, if it had been executed by those responsible for doing so, including Brown.

Brown chose to operate as he had in previous disasters—prior to the adoption of the NRP. Responding to questions from Select Committee Chairman Tom Davis, Brown testified that he relied on his “previous experience with lots of disasters” to “relay [his needs] to Hagin or Card, and it would get done. . . .” He reported that if he “needed, for example, DOD to do something in particular, then either [Deputy Secretary] Gordon England, or Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld or Assistant Secretary Paul McHale would call me and confirm that, yeah, we just got a call from Andy, and . . . we are going to get that done for you.” He testified that he had “literally dozens” of conversations or e-mails with senior White House staff, including the President, the Vice President, Card, Hagin, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Karl Rove.

Brown virtually boasted that he deliberately avoided communicating with the Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff. When asked in the Senate by Senator Lieberman whether he had talked to Chertoff on Monday, August 29, and why he “would . . . not have if that was the chain of command,” he responded: “Because I’m still operating that I need to get things done, and the way I get things done is I request them from the White House . . . .”

---

6 Id.
7 Id. at v–viii.
8 Id. at ix–x.
9 Id. at 15.
10 Brown Dep. at 16.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 8.
He further testified in the Senate that calling Chertoff for support “would have wasted my time. . . .” Brown claimed that “DHS was an additional bureaucracy that was going to slow me down even more. And the way I got around that was dealing directly with the White House.” Senator Bennett observed, “[I]f I were Secretary Chertoff and I had a Deputy Secretary who would prefer to call the White House rather than talk to me, I would find that very disturbing.”

At the same time as he was eager to call the White House for assistance, Brown tried to cut off communications with the Secretary. He told another FEMA official: “I did tell [Secretary Chertoff] privately that the phone calls were killing me, and he said he understood. He assures me he is not trying to interfere, but they are literally driving me crazy.”

He also admitted that Card directed him to use the proper procedures. He testified that Card responded to a request:

Mike, we are going to have to follow the protocol. We are going to have to follow the chain of command on this one. And I took that to mean that the way we have played ball for the past couple of years, we are not going to play ball that way, and now we are going to play ball by “if you really need something, you need to go to Chertoff or back through HSOC or whatever you are going to do and do those requests that way.”

Brown operated under the old procedures, despite his own recognition of changes to the NRP and at FEMA. In both his September 27, 2005 appearance before the Select Committee and his February 11, 2006 deposition, he complained about FEMA budget cuts and reorganization at DHS. In response to Chairman Davis’s question about whether the NRP had changed since the 2004 hurricane season in Florida, Brown replied: “It had. It had.” Brown was also asked: “[I]t looks [as if] you may have spent a couple of years fighting a system that you didn’t like, and then when the disaster came, it came [time] to use that system you chose not to use it. How would you address that?” He responded:

I would say that is generally true because the system that is in place works, whether it is catastrophic or not. The system that is in place worked.

But that was emphatically not the system in place for Hurricane Katrina, and Brown deliberately ignored it. He admitted that he never advised the Secretary to designate Hurricane Katrina as an Incident of National Significance and never even discussed with

---

14 Id. at 65–66.
15 Id. at 69.
16 Id. at 66.
17 E-mail from Michael Brown to Brooks Altschuler, Dep. Chief of Staff, FEMA (Sept. 1, 2005, 21:31).
18 Brown Dep. at 17.
19 See Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 114, 115–117 (statements of Michael Brown); Brown Dep. at 41, 43, 85, See also Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 77, 99, 114, 139–140 (statements of Michael Brown).
20 Brown Dep. at 17.
21 Id. at 94.
22 Id.
23 Brown Dep. at 48–49.
Chertoff activating the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex. He testified that he would have “fought the activation of the IIMG as hard as he could.”

He testified that, if he had gone through the HSOC or the Secretary, it would have “added two new phone calls and two new layers to get things done.” Similarly, he objected to the designation of the Principal Federal Official for an Incident of National Significance because “it adds an additional layer of bureaucracy.” He testified: “[T]hat’s why I am such an opponent of the PFO designation . . . .”

Yet when asked if these were the “mechanisms” for managing disasters under the NRP and for pushing resources into the field, he replied: “Right.” When confronted with that fact that he “choose [sic] not to use them,” again, his unambiguous response was “Right.”

At the same time, while he plainly perceived the structures of the NRP to be bureaucratic, he admitted that he had no reason to think that those structures could not and would not respond to his needs. When asked if he had “any reason to think that you couldn’t get [the logistics mission] assignment accomplished through regular channels,” he testified: “No. I really didn’t.” Thus, there did not appear to be any need to communicate with the White House to obtain the assistance that he sought.

Finally, Brown also appears to have represented to Secretary Chertoff that he could live with the changes at FEMA, when in fact he could not. According to Secretary Chertoff’s testimony, Chertoff and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson met with Brown and specifically asked him if he was “going to have a problem functioning as the head of FEMA” with the changes at FEMA that Brown had opposed. Chertoff testified that they told Brown it was “perfectly creditable to say, I can’t go along with this. I want to leave. If you are going to stay, though, we need to have your full commitment. He told us he had felt he had gotten a fair hearing and would give this his full commitment.” Brown’s refusal to follow the NRP seems contrary to that representation.

It is not clear that following the NRP’s procedures would have dramatically altered the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. It is clear, however, that it was Brown’s responsibility to use those procedures. It is equally clear, by his own admission,

---

24 Id. at 93.
25 Id. at 95.
26 Id. at 48.
27 Id. at 49.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 94–95.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 92. Even when Brown had the opportunity to seek assistance from the White House, he did not. When Andy Card asked Brown directly on Monday, August 29—the evening following landfall—if there were “[a]nything you want me to do?” Brown did not ask for anything, saying only that “Housing, transportation and environment could be long term issues.” (E-mail from Michael Brown to Andy Card, Chief of Staff, White House (Aug. 29, 2005; 22:00) in response to E-mail from Andy Card to Michael Brown (Aug. 29, 2005; 21:51:07).) Moreover, in the August 28 video teleconference in which the President appeared, Brown did not request anything. (Daily Video Teleconference [“VTC”] amongst key officials dated Aug. 28, 2005. Transcript at 14–15. Later in the same conference call, Brown asked Louisiana State Coordinating Officer Jeff Smith if he had “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you that you need . . . ?” Smith replied simply “Mike, no.” (Id. at 19.)
33 Id. at 24–25.
Brown failed to follow them. He thought he could just ignore the NRP and do it the way he did it in Florida in 2004. That way involved direct communication with the White House to get resources, circumventing the Secretary of Homeland Security and the interagency processes and mechanisms designed to speed relief to disaster victims.

The nation will never know whether its response would have been better if the NRP had been followed. We only know the actual response, where the NRP was not followed, was woefully inadequate.
Michael Brown appeared before the Select Committee on February 11, 2006. His testimony, while self-serving, provided a window into how he, Secretary Chertoff, and the White House responded to Hurricane Katrina. His testimony raises questions about the competence of the response at the highest levels of government.

The majority supplemental views emphasize Mr. Brown’s insubordination and failure to follow the National Response Plan. We agree that Mr. Brown’s testimony demonstrates serious deficiencies in his job performance. But his testimony also raises questions about the roles of Secretary Chertoff and White House officials that remain unanswered to this day.

Mr. Brown testified that he recognized that FEMA was overwhelmed and needed assistance from other departments, especially DOD. He said he tried to get this assistance by working the process from the bottom up, by sending requests through the FEMA mission assignment process, and from the top down, by requesting White House assistance. Neither seemed to work.

In previous disasters, Mr. Brown had been able to rely on the White House to break through red tape. But this time, operating with a new Secretary of Homeland Security and under the newly created National Response Plan, he said that the White House was less responsive to his requests. Mr. Brown appeared to have no clear method for getting what he needed from other agencies. Mr. Brown said that when he informed White House officials of the problems he was having, nobody at the White House took any initiative to break through bureaucratic obstacles.

Even after the publication of lengthy reports by this Committee and by the White House, we still know very little about what top White House officials knew and what actions they took to respond to Hurricane Katrina.

Mr. Brown’s Testimony about the White House

Mr. Brown testified that he had “innumerable” conversations with White House officials, including the President, the Vice President, Andrew Card, Joe Hagin, National Security Adviser Steven Hadley, Lee Ann McBride, Karl Rove, and Domestic Policy Adviser Claude Allen. He said that he had probably spoken to Homeland Security Adviser Fran Townsend, but that he did not have regular contact with her.

Mr. Brown stated that he did not know how many conversations he had with the President. He said that the President would occasionally join in on his calls with Joe Hagin. Mr. Brown stated:
“From my point of view, at that time, the President was clearly engaged.”

Mr. Brown stated that although FEMA did not have Cabinet-level status under this Administration, he had been able to work well with the White House in previous disasters. In previous disasters, “if I needed anything specific, I would relay that to Hagin or Card and it would get done.”

Things worked differently during this Hurricane Katrina. This time, the White House became “bureaucratic” and provided less assistance. During one phone call, Andrew Card told him that requests need to go through the “chain of command.” He understood Mr. Card to be telling him, “if you really need something, you need to go to Chertoff or back through HSOC or whatever you are going to do and do those requests that way.”

Informed that White House Deputy Homeland Security Adviser Ken Rapuano had told the Committee that when he left the White House at 10 p.m. on Monday, August 29, conflicting reports were still coming in about the severity of the impact on New Orleans, Mr. Brown testified that these statements were “disingenuous.”

He argued that the White House should have had clear information about the severity by that time and should have known that the levees had breached. He noted specifically that White House Homeland Security Council staff, including Ken Rapuano, Bethany Nichols, and Joel Bagnal, were on the regular video teleconferences that provided situational information.

He pointed to a teleconference held the evening of August 29 to discuss Marty Bahamonde’s report on the grim condition of New Orleans, and noted: “So either they all went home or they were all asleep during the SVTS, but there was a conference call that evening to discuss exactly what Marty had reported.”

Mr. Brown would not respond to a question about whether he thought it was irresponsible for Mr. Rapuano, the most senior official in the White House at the time, to go home at 10 p.m. without clear situational awareness, but noted that he would have acted differently.

**MR. BROWN’S TESTIMONY ABOUT SECRETARY CHERTOFF**

Mr. Brown told the Committee that Secretary Chertoff was not involved in the response immediately. Once he became involved however, Mr. Chertoff called frequently regarding “the most minute details of operation.” According to Mr. Brown, “the micromanagement was amazing,” to the point where Mr. Brown stated that he “couldn’t get my job done.” He also said that Mr. Chertoff’s involvement “exacerbated” problems.

Mr. Brown expressed dismay at the “whole leadership issue,” stating that “the problem I had was, I wasn’t perceived as the leader down there because I was undermined. Who was the face of Katrina?” He continued:

In Florida, who’s in charge of Florida? By God, I’m in charge. Now, in Louisiana and Mississippi, we’ve got this whole dance going around. Is Chertoff in charge? Is Mr. Brown in charge? The President? Who’s in charge here?
Well, in my opinion, the President’s always in charge, and when it comes these disasters whatever the cause of the disasters is, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of FEMA, he’s in charge. But you can’t be the leader and you can’t do that when you’re being undermined and micromanaged.

Mr. Brown told the Committee that he was “specifically constrained by Secretary Chertoff and told to stay in Baton Rouge.” On Wednesday, August 31, as he was on a plane flying back from Biloxi and a meeting with Governor Barbour, “I received a phone call in which I got my rear end chewed out by Michael Chertoff for having been in Mississippi.” He said that in that call, “I was instructed not to leave Baton Rouge.” He also said: “I knew that this FEMA Director could not operate under those conditions because you can’t run a disaster sitting in an office. . . . I can’t sit in a stupid office and try to run a disaster that covers 90,000 square miles and run it like a blasted bureaucrat.” Mr. Brown stated that this call was the “tipping point because I knew, okay, this is a different game.”

CONCLUSION

The Committee’s meeting with Mr. Brown was a valuable addition to the investigative record. His failure to work within the system did not reflect well on Mr. Brown, as the majority views note. But his statements also raise serious questions about the performance of the White House and Secretary Chertoff that should be further examined.
Executive Order 12148 directed FEMA to develop a plan to outline how their agency would cooperate and respond to a nuclear emergency. They established the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). The DoD developed its own set of instructions to complement the federal plan on how to respond to nuclear weapons accidents. In addition, each military service developed its own set of complimentary instructions.

EX. ORD. NO. 12148. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT


SECTION 1. TRANSFERS OR REASSIGNMENTS

1-1. Transfer or Reassignment of Existing Functions.

1-101. All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense, are transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-102. All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, are transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, including any of those functions redelegated or

reassigned to the Department of Commerce with respect to assistance to communities in the development of readiness plans for severe weather-related emergencies.

1-103. All functions vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration, are transferred or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-104. All functions vested in the President by the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (42 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.), including those functions performed by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, are delegated, transferred, or reassigned to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-2. Transfer or Reassignment of Resources.

1-201. The records, property, personnel and positions, and unexpended balances of appropriations, available or to be made available, which relate to the functions transferred, reassigned, or redelegated by this Order are hereby transferred to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1-202. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall make such determinations, issue such orders, and take all actions necessary or appropriate to effectuate the transfers or reassignments provided by this Order, including the transfer of funds, records, property, and personnel.

SEC. 2. MANAGEMENT OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE

2-1. General.

2-101. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall establish federal policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive agencies.

2-102. The Director shall periodically review and evaluate the civil defense and civil emergency functions of the Executive agencies. In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of those functions, the Director shall recommend to the President alternative methods of providing Federal planning, management, mitigation, and assistance.

2-103. The Director shall be responsible for the coordination of efforts to promote dam safety, for the coordination of natural and nuclear disaster warning systems, and for the coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents.

2-104. The Director shall represent the President in working with State and local governments and private sector to stimulate vigorous participation in civil emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery programs.

2-105. The Director shall provide an annual report to the President for subsequent transmittal to the Congress on the functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The report shall assess the current overall state of effectiveness of Federal...
EX. ORD. NO. 12148. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

2-2. Implementation.

2-201. In executing the functions under this Order, the Director shall develop policies which provide that all civil defense and civil emergency functions, resources, and systems of Executive agencies are:

(a) founded on the use of existing organizations, resources, and systems to the maximum extent practicable;

(b) integrated effectively with organizations, resources, and programs of State and local governments, the private sector and volunteer organizations; and

(c) developed, tested and utilized to prepare for, mitigate, respond to and recover from the effects on the population of all forms of emergencies.

2-202. Assignments of civil emergency functions shall, whenever possible, be based on extensions (under emergency conditions) of the regular missions of the Executive agencies.

2-203. For purposes of this Order, "civil emergency" means any accidental, natural, man-caused, or wartime emergency or threat thereof, which causes or may cause substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of property.

2-204. In order that civil defense planning continues to be fully compatible with the Nation’s overall strategic policy, and in order to maintain an effective link between strategic nuclear planning and nuclear attack preparedness planning, the development of civil defense policies and programs by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall be subject to oversight by the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.

2-205. To the extent authorized by law and within available resources, the Secretary of Defense shall provide the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with support for civil defense programs in the areas of program development and administration, technical support, research, communications, transportation, intelligence, and emergency operations.

2-206. All Executive agencies shall cooperate with and assist the Director in the performance of his functions.


2-301. The functions which have been transferred, reassigned, or redelegated by Section 1 of this Order are recodified and revised as set forth in this Order at Section 4, and as provided by the amendments made at Section 5 to the provisions of other Orders.

2-302. Notwithstanding the revocations, revisions, codifications, and amendments made by this Order, the Director may continue to perform the functions transferred to him by Section 1 of this

Order, except where they may otherwise be inconsistent with the provisions of this Order.

SEC. 3. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

(Revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12919, Sec. 904(a)(8), June 3, 1994, 59 F.R. 29533.)

SEC. 4. DELEGATIONS

4-1. Delegation of Functions Transferred to the President.

4-101. (Revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12155, Sept. 10, 1979, 44 F.R. 53071.)

4-102. The functions vested in the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization by Sections 103 and 303 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by Sections 8 and 50 of the Act of September 3, 1954 (Public Law 77-1228 and 1244) (50 U.S.C. 404 and 405), were transferred to the President by Section 1(a) of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note) (now set out above), and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-103. (a) The functions vested in the Federal Civil Defense Administration or its Administrator by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2281 et seq.), were transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

(b) Excluded from the delegation in subsection (a) is the function under Section 205(a)(4) of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2286(a)(4)), relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on the merit basis that was delegated to the Director of the Office of Personnel Management by Section 1(b) of Executive Order No. 11589, as amended (Section 2-101(b) of Executive Order No. 12107) (5 U.S.C. 3376 note).

4-104. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is authorized to redelegate, in accord with the provisions of Section 1(b) of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note) (now set out above), any of the functions delegated by Sections 4-101, 4-102, and 4-103 of this Order.

4-105. The functions vested in the Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration by Section 43 of the Act of August 10, 1956 (70 Stat. 636) (50 U.S.C. App. 2285), were transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2286) (the office was changed to Office of Emergency Planning by Public Law 87-296 (75 Stat. 630) and then to the Office of Emergency Preparedness by Section 402 of Public Law 90-608 (82 Stat. 1194)), were again transferred to the President by Section 1 of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note) (now set out above), and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/EO12148.htm

3/15/2006
4-106. The functions vested in the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness by Section 16 of the Act of September 23, 1950, as amended (20 U.S.C. 646), and by Section 7 of the Act of September 30, 1950, as amended (20 U.S.C. 241-1), were transferred to the President by Section 1 of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note) (now set out above), and they are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-107. That function vested in the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness by Section 702(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as added by Section 161(a) of the Education Amendments of 1972, and as further amended (20 U.S.C. 1132d-1(a)), to the extent transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (50 U.S.C. App. 2271 note) (now set out above), is hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-2. Delegation of Functions Vested in the President.

4-201. The functions vested in the President by the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, as amended (42 U.S.C. Chapter 58 note), are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-202. The functions (related to grants for damages resulting from hurricane and tropical storm Agnes) vested in the President by Section 4 of Public Law 92-335 (86 Stat. 556) are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Section (sic) 4-203. The functions vested in the President by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), except those functions vested in the President by Section 401 (relating to the declaration of major disasters and emergencies) (42 U.S.C. 5170), Section 501 (relating to the declaration of emergencies) (42 U.S.C. 5191), Section 405 (relating to the repair, reconstruction, restoration, or replacement of Federal facilities) (42 U.S.C. 5171), and Section 412 (relating to food coupons and distribution) (42 U.S.C. 5179), are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-204. The functions vested in the President by the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, as amended (42 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.), are delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-205. Effective July 30, 1979, the functions vested in the President by Section 4(h) of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 714b(h)), are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-206. Effective July 30, 1979, the functions vested in the President by Section 204(f) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. 485(f)), are hereby delegated to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4-207. The functions vested in the President by Section 502 of...
EX. ORD. NO. 12148. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT


SEC. 5. OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDERS

5-1. Revocations.


5-102. Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 10296, as amended, entitled "Providing for the Performance of Certain Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Service Functions"", are revoked.

5-103. Executive Order No. 10494, as amended, relating to the disposition of remaining functions, is revoked.

5-104. Executive Order No. 10529, as amended, relating to federal employee participation in State and local civil defense programs, is revoked.

5-105. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 10601, as amended, which concerns the Commodity Set Aside, is revoked.

5-106. Executive Order No. 10634, as amended, relating to loans for facilities destroyed or damaged by a major disaster, is revoked.

5-107. Section 4(d)(2) of Executive Order No. 10990, as amended, which concerns foreign currencies made available to make purchases for the supplemental stockpile, is revoked.

5-108. Executive Order No. 10952, as amended, entitled "Assigning Civil Defense Responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and Others"", is revoked.

5-109. Executive Order No. 11051, as amended, relating to responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, is revoked.

5-110. Executive Order No. 11415, as amended, relating to the Health Resources Advisory Committee, is revoked.

5-111. Executive Order No. 11785, as amended, entitled "Delegating Disaster Relief Functions Pursuant to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974", is revoked, except for Section 3 thereof.

5-112. Executive Order No. 11785, as amended, entitled "Transfer of Certain Functions of the Office of Emergency Preparedness"", is revoked.

5-113. Executive Order No. 11749, as amended, entitled "Consolidating Disaster Relief Functions Assigned to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development" is revoked.

5-2. Amendments.

5-201. Executive Order No. 10421, as amended, relating to physical security of defense facilities (formerly set out as a note under 50 U.S.C. 404) is further amended by (a) substituting the "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency" for "Director of the Office of Emergency Planning" in Sections 1(a), 1(c), and 6(b); and, (b) substituting "Federal Emergency Management Agency" for "Office of Emergency Planning" in Sections 6(b) and 7(b).

5-202. Executive Order No. 10480, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2153 note), is further amended by (a) substituting "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency" for "Director of the Office of Emergency Planning" in Sections 101(a), 101(b), 201(a), 201(b), 301, 304, 307, 308, 310(b), 311(b), 312, 313, 401(b), 401(e), and 605; and, (b) substituting "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency" for "Administrator of General Services" in Sections 305, 501, and 610.

5-203. Section 3(d) of Executive Order No. 10582, as amended, which relates to determinations under the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. 1403 note) is amended by deleting "Director of the Office of Emergency Planning" and substituting therefor "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency".


5-205. Executive Order No. 11179, as amended, concerning the National Defense Executive Reserve (50 U.S.C. App. 2153 note), is further amended by deleting "Director of the Office of Emergency Planning" in Section 2 and substituting therefor "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency".

5-206. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 11912, as amended, concerning energy policy and conservation (42 U.S.C. 6201 note), is further amended by deleting "Administrator of General Services" and substituting therefor "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency".

5-207. Section 2(d) of Executive Order No. 11988 entitled "Floodplain Management" (42 U.S.C. 4321 note) is amended by deleting "Federal Insurance Administration" and substituting therefor "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency".

5-208. Section 5-3 of Executive Order No. 12046 of March 29, 1978 (47 U.S.C. 305 note), is amended by deleting "General Services Administration" and substituting therefor "Federal Emergency Management Agency" and substituting therefor "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency".

5-209. Section 1-201 of Executive Order No. 12065 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) is amended by adding "The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency" and deleting "Director, Federal Preparedness Agency and to the' from the parentheses after "The Administrator of General Services".


5-211. Section 1-102 of Executive Order No. 12083 of September 27, 1978 (42 U.S.C. 7101 note) is amended by adding in alphabetical order "(e) the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency".

5-212. Section 9.11(b) of Civil Service Rule IX (5 CFR Part 9) (5 U.S.C. 3301 note) is amended by deleting "the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and".

5-213. (Revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12381, Sept. 8, 1982, 47 F.R. 39795.)

5-214. Executive Order No. 11490, as amended (see note above) is further amended as follows:

(a) Delete the last sentence of Section 102(a) and substitute therefor the following: "The activities undertaken by the departments and agencies pursuant to this Order, except as provided in Section 3003, shall be in accordance with guidance provided by, and subject to, evaluation by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency."

(b) Delete Section 103 entitled "Presidential Assistance" and substitute the following new Section 103: "Sec. 103 General Coordination. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall determine national preparedness goals and policies for the performance of functions under this Order and coordinate the performance of such functions with the total national preparedness programs."

(c) Delete the portion of the first sentence of Section 401 prior to the colon and insert the following: "The Secretary of Defense shall perform the following emergency preparedness functions."

(d) Delete "Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA)" or "the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA)", and substitute therefor "Director, FEMA", in Sections 401(3), 401(4), 401(5), 401(9), 401(10), 401(14), 401(15), 401(16), 401(19), 401(21), 401(22), 501(8), 601(2), 904(2), 1102(2), 1204(2), 1401(a), 1701, 1702, 2003, 2004, 2005, 3001, 3002(2), 3004, 3005, 3006, 3008, 3010, and 3013.

(e) The number assigned to this Order shall be substituted for "11051 of September 27, 1962" in Section 3001, and for "11051" in Sections 1802, 2002(3), 3002 and 3008(1).

(f) The number assigned to this Order shall be substituted for "10592" in Sections 1103, 1104, 1205, and 3002.

(g) Delete "Department of Defense" in Sections 502, 601(1), 804, 905, 1103, 1104, 1106(4), 1205, 2002(8), the first sentence of Section 3002, and Sections 3008(1) and 3010 and substitute therefor "Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency."
SEC. 6.

This Order is effective July 15, 1979.

Section 1-106 of Ex. Ord. No. 12155, which enacted sections 4-205 and 4-206 of Ex. Ord. No. 12148, was revoked by Pub. L. 100-188, div. C, title II, Sec. 3203(a), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1245.)
September 2, 2005

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve 180 days of military duty in Title 32 USC 901 status for soldiers and airmen serving on state active duty in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection.

Hurricane Katrina struck Alabama, our neighbors in Mississippi and Louisiana on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered over 3,000 Alabama National Guard soldiers and airmen to state active duty to provide security, medical, engineers and communication support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. None of the soldiers or airmen are serving in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of vital infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, I-10, water and power distribution systems which are all vital to the recovery of the entire Gulf coast area.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Bob Riley
Governor
September 4, 2005

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

Mr. Haynes - DoD General Counsel — via Fax
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve up to 180 days of military duty, retroactive to August 29, 2005, in Title 32 U.S.C. § 501 status for soldiers and airmen serving on State Active Duty in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection.

Hurricane Katrina struck Mississippi and our neighbors in Louisiana and Alabama on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered several thousand Mississippi National Guard soldiers and airmen to State Active Duty to provide security, medical, engineering and communication support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. None of those soldiers or airmen is serving in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of vital infrastructure to include medical facilities, food distribution, L-10, water and power distribution systems — all of which are vital to the recovery of the entire Gulf coast area.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Haley Barbour
Governor of the State of Mississippi

cc: COL Parker - NGB General Counsel — via Fax
September 5, 2005

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve 180 days of military duty in Title 32 USC 901 status for all National Guard soldiers and airmen serving in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As you are aware, Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina committed to Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection. Further, this section will ensure equitable compensation across the supporting National Guard force.

As you are aware, Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana, our neighbors in Mississippi and Alabama on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered over 3,000 Louisiana National Guard soldiers and airmen to state active duty in order to provide security, medical, engineering and communication support to relief efforts. None of these soldiers are in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of critical infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, water and power distribution systems which are all vital to the recovery of the entire region.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts

I approve Federal funding for use of the National Guard in Title 32 U.S. Code status to support Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts retroactive to August 29, 2005.

The Secretary of the Army and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force shall coordinate the exercise of this authority with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

cc: CICS
    USD(C)
    USD(P&R)
    GC, DoD
    ASD(HD)
    Chief, NGB
American Red Cross
Tropical Storm and Hurricane Action Plan

Introduction

Tropical storms and hurricanes, by their massive force and unpredictable nature, have the potential to cause injury, death and widespread destruction, and to displace many people.

Because these storms are a recurring threat to a substantial number of people in the United States, the American Red Cross has long held and frequently executed a special response plan specific to tropical storms and hurricanes. This plan has evolved over time and is based on operational experience and increasing development and resident population in at-risk areas. It is in accordance with changes to the structure of the Red Cross and its Disaster Services Program.

As in the past, the American people today expect the Red Cross to be at the site of such events quickly to render assistance for basic human needs. Reliance on the expertise and commitment of the Red Cross in times of major and sometimes catastrophic disasters is reaffirmed in the federal government's National Response Plan.

Purpose and Results

This document outlines the systematic approach the Red Cross will undertake to prepare for and respond to tropical storms and hurricanes (hereafter described simply as hurricanes). The objective of this plan is to enable the Red Cross to be ready to deliver immediate services and assistance needed by those threatened and affected by such storms at an appropriate scope and scale. These actions will be executed in an integrated and coordinated manner by Red Cross chapters, service areas, disaster relief operations and national headquarters and enable the Red Cross to meet the needs and expectations of its five key constituents groups − clients, partners, volunteers and employees, donors and the American people.

Assumptions

This response plan makes the following assumptions:

1. Hurricanes are a recurring threat to the United States mainland, territories and possessions.

2. While tropical storms are less intense than hurricanes, they can produce extensive damage (particularly flooding) and should not be considered a lesser threat.

3. The available technology used to predict the direction and intensity of these storms is limited; therefore the Red Cross must have an integrated approach of preparedness and readiness efforts followed by prompt, focused, flexible and prudent response actions.
4. Not all threatening storms make landfall in the United States, its territories or possessions. Yet, in order to ensure and conduct an effective response, the Red Cross must take action well in advance of each approaching storm.

5. Hurricanes, by their significant scope and force, have the potential to affect wide geographic areas and require special attention, unified direction, action, coordination and collaboration by the Red Cross.

6. The scope and magnitude of human needs produced by hurricanes triggers the deployment of Red Cross resources and technical support to the threatened or affected Red Cross chapters and their service areas.

7. Effective Red Cross service delivery following a hurricane requires the ongoing engagement of all affected Red Cross units.

8. Annual pre-hurricane season planning and targeted resource development by hurricane-prone chapters and service area jurisdictions enhances the ability of the Red Cross to effectively respond.

9. Response actions by Red Cross units must be conducted in concert with their local, state and federal government counterparts.

10. The success of the Red Cross response to a hurricane is defined by the key constituents of the organization – our clients, donors, volunteers and employees, partners and the American public.

11. A clear and visible Red Cross presence in the disaster-affected area, plus ready availability of and easy accessibility to Red Cross services and assistance, are essential factors in the satisfaction of our constituents.

12. Red Cross response actions during each hurricane season produce valuable lessons learned that facilitate more effective and efficient responses for future storms.

13. The pre-defined geographic risk of hurricanes supports the value of significant service delivery planning and preparedness, particularly in coastal areas.

14. The chapters serving the affected area provide the initial incident response in their respective communities, report their activities and assessments and are augmented by human and material resources and guidance, in a coordinated manner, from the service area or national headquarters.

15. The affected chapters are integrated into a service delivery system once the relief operation is established and retain their role as elements participating in service delivery throughout the life of the disaster relief operation.
Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle

The frequency, intensity and location of threatening storms often vary from year to year, yet ongoing focused preparedness and performance enhancement activities are possible and warranted in all regions susceptible to such storms. Attachment 1 outlines the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle, a critical component of this plan.

Concept of Operations

The Red Cross response to hurricanes begins with the preparedness and readiness actions taken by its units as outlined in the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle. Upon the development of each threatening storm, the Red Cross initiates a seamless two-phased (pre and post-landfall) set of actions.

During the pre-landfall phase, as it is not possible to determine the precise path of a storm, all chapters servicing threatened communities activate their respective response plans. At the same time, the jurisdictional service areas move into their Major Disaster Response Structure; see Attachment 2. The service areas establish direct communication with or staff Red Cross liaisons at the threatened states' emergency operations centers and with the federal Regional Response Coordination Center. The service area begins deploying resources from its jurisdiction to the threatened chapters as defined by the chapters' hurricane priority requirements (a deliverable of the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle) and activates an anticipated disaster relief operations headquarters.

Red Cross national headquarters provides support to and consultation with the threatened service areas, establishes direct liaison with appropriate federal government agencies and determines the availability of additional human and material resources the potentially affected region may need.

In anticipation of a hurricane and the resulting Red Cross relief operation, service areas not at risk from the storm will alert and place on standby human and material resources within their respective jurisdictions.

If landfall does not occur, the service area coordinates the phase-down of chapter pre-landfall activities.

The second phase begins upon landfall; the service area promptly transfers operational oversight and direction of Red Cross relief activities to the established disaster relief operation headquarters. The relief operation headquarters provides guidance and direction to the affected chapters and coordinates additional available resources to enhance service delivery throughout the disaster-affected area. The relief operation headquarters reports to Red Cross national headquarters while continuing to engage the service areas in planning and consultation. If the post-landfall operation is more limited in scope than initially expected, the service area and the Disaster Operations Center will decide the level of ongoing support to the relief operation.
When the Disaster Operations Center supports the relief operation, a conference call that includes the disaster relief operation, the service area and the Disaster Operations Center will occur to define the scaling-up of operations management support activities.

Chapters in the disaster-affected area remain actively engaged throughout the course of the disaster relief operation by providing, within their capability and capacity, assistance to their affected communities. These chapters continue their community involvement after the disaster relief operation concludes its activities.

**Pre-Landfall Roles and Actions Defined**

**Chapters**

When confronted with an approaching storm, the chapters servicing at-risk communities and hosting hurricane evacuation shelters activate their respective local response plans and prepare to receive the resources dispatched by the service area. Each chapter primarily focuses on five key activities (not a preferential order):

- Sheltering
- Feeding
- Government and Emergency Management Liaison
- Disaster Assessment
- Public Information and Fundraising

Chapters proactively establish and maintain these activities with knowledgeable staff in a timely manner prior to and after landfall. The chapters ensure the safekeeping of human and material resources received from their service area and deploy these resources, as needed, to ensure quality service delivery. Each chapter should identify a specific employee or volunteer to interact directly with the service area’s response structure.

**Service Area**

The hurricane-threatened service area(s) shift their group configuration to the Major Disaster Response Structure detailed in Attachment 2. In this posture, the service area begins direct communications with the hurricane-prone chapters and deploys human and material resources identified by the service area to individual chapters based on their hurricane priority resource requirements.

The service area, in its Major Disaster Response Structure, deploys personnel in advance to establish a relief operation headquarters. The service area identifies the location and facility and secures facility agreements. The service area or national headquarters (in joint consultation) activates one or more pre-designated staging areas, if required.
Disaster Operations Center

Upon activation of one or more service areas for a threatening storm, the Disaster Operations Center immediately shifts to its hurricane response mode. The Disaster Operations Center is staffed by personnel from Preparedness and Response and other national headquarters departments. Liaisons are dispatched, as needed, to the various federal operations centers. The Disaster Operations Center contacts other service areas to place human and material resources on alert and dispatches these resources, as requested and needed, to the threatened or affected service area jurisdictions.

Disaster Relief Operation Headquarters

The relief operation headquarters does not have an active operational role before hurricane landfall. Based on the storm's projected path and logistical considerations, one or more forward headquarters cells are deployed by the planning cell of the service area's Major Disaster Response Structure. The task of the forward headquarters cell is to establish the headquarters site and receive human and material resources. Service delivery is not a component of their purpose.

Post-Landfall Roles and Actions Defined

During the post-landfall phase, the Red Cross rapidly expands its service delivery focus and resources in the affected area. This effort supplements the service delivery actions of chapters during the pre-landfall phase and occurs quickly, seamlessly and in a coordinated manner.

Chapters

The affected chapters continue to provide and conduct five key activities (not a preferential order):

- Sheltering
- Feeding
- Government Liaison
- Disaster Assessment
- Public Information and Fundraising

Using all available human and material resources, the chapters enhance activities where needed and expand service delivery as required, including bulk distribution, individual assistance and mental and physical health services. The chapters support the relief operation in developing and executing a comprehensive service delivery plan for the entire affected area. The chapters also redirect their reports of service delivery activity from the service area to the disaster relief operation headquarters.

Disaster Relief Operation Headquarters

The relief operation headquarters establishes direct communications with the affected chapters regarding the overall service delivery plan and resource requirements. The relief operation
distributes incoming resources in accordance with the service delivery plan and monitors performance actions and accomplishments. The relief operation headquarters also establishes direct communication with state emergency operations centers and various federal disaster field offices via Red Cross liaisons. The chapters continue to maintain liaison activities with local emergency management.

The relief operation headquarters reports to Red Cross national headquarters while continuing to engage the service area in planning and consultation. If the post-landfall operation is more limited in scope than initially expected, the service area and the Disaster Operations Center will discuss the level of ongoing operations management support to the relief operation.

Affected Service Area

As the disaster relief operation headquarters becomes operational, the service area reduces its chapter guidance activities. The service area continues to provide consultation and support to the relief operation headquarters and provides additional service area-based resources as available.

Information from the pre-landfall stage transfers to the disaster relief operation through the planning cell of the service area and the functionality of the service area’s pre-landfall structure ceases.

Support Service Areas

Service areas not directly affected by the storm are designated support service areas. These units work directly with the Disaster Operations Center in channeling needed resources to the disaster relief operation(s) established for the hurricane. Chapters within support service areas may provide service to evacuees as well. Upon notification from national headquarters, support service areas will activate their Response units in the same configuration as the affected service areas.

Should the need arise, the support service areas stand ready to disseminate information and assist their chapters in providing Individual Client Services, particularly Welfare Information, and to meet any need for Community Services (i.e., assistance to stranded travelers at airports due to the storms). Any activities associated with the hurricane response will be reported to national headquarters, including volunteer and donation management information.

Material Support Services activities most likely to occur include assisting national headquarters with any requests to move supplies from the Disaster Field Supply Centers, shipping supplies directly to the event site from major vendors in the support service area’s jurisdiction and alerting chapters housing national ERVs to respond to the disaster-affected area(s). This will involve the chapters providing the ERV teams and reporting when the ERVs can deploy.

Staff Services activities most likely to occur include recruiting, training and preparing disaster volunteers for deployment to the relief operation as requested by the Disaster Operations Center. The support service area’s DSHR Senior Associate will receive a request from the Staff Deployment Center at national headquarters to begin communicating with chapters, ensuring DSHR availability is accurately recorded in the DSHR System, and placing available staff (supervisor and above) on alert as described in the Deployment Manual. Any assignment or
grouping of personnel for deployment will occur only at the request of the affected service area or by the relief operation.

Support service areas will continue to respond to disasters that affect their respective jurisdictions while supporting service area(s) affected by hurricanes. If staff or equipment from a support service area are committed to a hurricane response and there is a need for those resources in their home jurisdiction, the support service area would request assistance in replenishing their resources from neighboring service areas through the Disaster Operations Center.

National Headquarters

National headquarters continues consultation with the affected service area(s) while providing human and material resources and guidance to the relief operation. The Disaster Operations Center engages support service areas for additional resources needed by the relief operation. National headquarters will conduct national-level public relations and fundraising campaigns and activities. National headquarters will also maintain and leverage national agreements with partner groups and agencies. The Staff Deployment Center will activate and communicate with the Staff Services member of the planning cell and service area's DSHR Senior Associate. This activity will entail:

- Communication with unaffected service areas to request notification of available DSHR members (supervisors and above) of alert status.
- Notification, through the non-affected service area's DSHR Senior Associate, to place all Community Services, Partner Services (Government and Emergency Management Liaisons), and Information Management (Disaster Assessment) supervisors on standby status.
- Implementation of Deployment Manual notification procedures regarding staff support, including notifying Travel Office, BTV/World Travel and Corporate Lodging of preliminary needs and activation status.
- Implementation of Deployment Manual procedures for staff recruitment and deployment to the affected area.
Identification and Implementation of Lessons Learned

The Senior Vice President, Preparedness and Response, conducts a Lessons Learned Study of actions during the prior hurricane seasons by December 31. This study includes the development of recommendations for future performance enhancements and allied action plans that must be completed by June 30. Those resulting issues and actions involving systems improvements and program level guidance are assigned to the Preparedness and Response Department at national headquarters. Chapter development and human resource requirements are assigned to the respective service areas. Recommendations and allied actions related to individual chapters are assigned to the respective chapter manager. All units assigned Hurricane Response Lessons Learned action items report their completion to the Senior Vice President, Preparedness and Response, by June 30.

Chapter Priority Resource Requirements

The service areas at risk from hurricanes conduct a hurricane response assessment of the human, material and equipment resources needed by their chapters to deliver services and assistance before, during and after a threatening hurricane by May 31. This inquiry focuses on the five key activities (not a preferential order):

• Sheltering
• Feeding
• Government and Emergency Management Liaison
• Disaster Assessment
• Public Information and Fundraising

Upon completion of this assessment and in conjunction with the Lessons Learned study, the service areas work with their chapters to develop resources to fill these identified shortfalls and determine appropriate resource availability within their respective jurisdictions.

The service areas match chapter shortfalls against progress of resource development by July 1. These resource shortfalls are described as the chapter's hurricane priority requirements (the deliverable of the Annual Continuous Improvement Cycle) for the approaching hurricane season and are used to prioritize the provision of resources to each of these chapters when they are threatened by a hurricane.

A listing of each chapter's hurricane priority resource requirements is provided to Preparedness and Response at national headquarters and used by that department in providing resource support to each of the hurricane-prone service areas.
Attachment 2

Hurricane Response
Service Area Major Disaster Response Structure

Upon the approach of a tropical storm or hurricane, the threatened service area reconfigures its structure, priorities and actions to provide support, guidance and resource assistance to its threatened chapters. The service area augments its staff with pre-identified Red Cross volunteers and employees from throughout its service area jurisdiction. When required, the service area secures additional resources through the Disaster Operations Center at national headquarters.

Each service area reconfigures its internal staff in accordance with the charts in Attachment 3; this configuration consists of the following four interdependent elements working in concert, each with a specific focus: the Response Manager, the planning cell with its forward headquarters cell, the information and resource management cell and service area response operations.

Response Manager

The mission of the response manager is to oversee the Red Cross response to the threatening and/or occurring disaster incident. In consultation with the service area executive, the Response Manager activates the service area hurricane action plan and so informs the Disaster Operations Center. The Response Manager or designee—

1. Ensures appropriate staffing of the individual activities.
2. Hosts conference calls with the hurricane risk chapters.
3. Conducts staff meeting with the members in the Major Disaster Response Structure.
4. Ensures appropriate and accurate reports are compiled and distributed to the Disaster Operations Center and Red Cross liaisons at the state emergency operations centers.
5. Participates in conference calls with the federal Regional Response Coordination Center.
6. Ensures appropriate Red Cross representation at activated state emergency operations centers and Red Cross representation for ESF 6 at the federal Regional Response Coordination Centers.
7. Participates in response strategy sessions hosted by the Disaster Operations Center.
8. Deploys personnel to the disaster relief operations headquarters and staging areas.
9. Approves the activation and movement of service area-based human and material resources to the hurricane-threatened chapters.
10. Consults with the Disaster Operations Center and disaster relief operation to determine the appropriate time to transfer personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation.

Planning Cell

The mission of the planning cell is strategic with a concentrated focus on service delivery and service delivery support, looking forward five to seven days. The planning cell develops an anticipated service delivery plan and deploys the forward headquarters cell, which enables the relief operation to begin service delivery immediately after the storm makes landfall. All planning cell information and communication beyond the major disaster response structure flows to and from the information and resource management cell.
The planning cell accomplishes its mission via cross-functional activities performed together by Operations Management, Community Services, Material Support Services and Staff Services members. The relief operation director is likely to be present in the planning cell; other members assigned must be managers (Administrators for Community Services) in their respective DSHR groups and be available for a three week assignment with the expectation of moving to the disaster relief operation.

General activities performed by the planning cell include:

1. Utilize subject matter experts (Community Services, Material Support Services, etc., which could include activity leads and national headquarters) to analyze plans, data and evaluate resource needs and shortfalls (human and material) provided by the information and resource management cell.

2. Initiate an anticipated service delivery plan (including recommended resource allocations, locations for service centers, aid stations, long-term shelters, etc.) and share it with the Response Manager and disaster relief operation headquarters.

3. In consultation with the Disaster Operations Center and Response Manager, determine potential budget implications and develop an estimated range of the evolving service delivery plan.

4. Deploy its forward cell(s) to establish the relief operation headquarters.

5. Maintain constant communication with the disaster relief operations headquarters to share updates of resource deployments, chapter requirements and information.

6. Ensure human and material resources have been identified and requested.

7. Establish initial requirements and make recommendations for resource requests to enable implementation of initial service delivery plan.

8. Develop a plan for time phased allocation of resources based on chapter shortfall analysis, projected needs and the final best estimate of affected geography. The plan should take into consideration existing chapter resources or vendor relationships in order to make best use of limited resources. For example, a chapter with multiple community partner kitchens and restaurant vendors may only need vehicles to initiate significant community feeding as opposed to a neighboring chapter which may need several days to establish a mobile kitchen before being able to deliver services.

9. Prepare a briefing for the forward headquarters cell providing all information and assessments available. The briefing should include:
   a. The scope and extent of the disaster based on best available data at the time
   b. Continuing service delivery
   c. Issues and critical needs
   d. Key contacts with Red Cross leadership (chapters, stations, service area, etc.), government (local and state) and other voluntary agencies
   e. A plan and timetable for the scaling up to the relief operation
   f. The preliminary budget range

10. At the time deemed appropriate by the Response Manager (in coordination with the Disaster Operations Center and the relief operation headquarters), transfer appropriate personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation.
Additional Community Services activities performed by the planning cell include:
1. Estimate immediate post landfall needs for feeding and non-evacuation host sheltering.
2. Develop recommendations for the service area to push heater meals, food handling equipment, sheltering equipment, emergency aid station supplies and bulk distribution product, which may be pre-deployed in advance of landfall, to safe locations. Chapters can then quickly access those resources following the storm in order to initiate the scaling up of service delivery.
3. The Community Services planner must interact with a Partner Services representative to –
   a. Access situation reports and disaster data from emergency operations centers
   b. Participate in framing resource requests for support from government entities in collaboration with Materials Support Services if appropriate
If the complexity of the event demands it and at the discretion of the Response Manager, initiate direct contact with ESF 6 lead agency at the state emergency operations center to confer about high level interagency planning of initial mass care response and coordination of voluntary response organization activities, including Salvation Army and Southern Baptist Convention.
4. Utilize projected feeding needs relative to chapter shortfall analysis to define needs for Southern Baptist Convention feeding resources and coordinate activation, staging (if appropriate) and deployment with the Community Services lead in the Disaster Operations Center.

Additional Material Support Services activities performed by the planning cell include:
1. Maintain records to track all proposed resource movements.
2. Address the physical or life safety and security of Red Cross workers, facilities and equipment.
3. Survey any potential headquarters sites for technology capacity and deficiencies.
4. Analyze Client Assistance System infrastructure requirements. Identify chapters in the pre-landfall area that currently use the Client Assistance System and review their technology plans for a supporting infrastructure in their chapter’s jurisdiction.

Additional Staff Services activities performed by the planning cell include:
1. Analyze impact and potential impact information that may affect Staff Services including, but not limited to, the following:
   a. Potential for unaffiliated and affiliated volunteers from the affected chapter participating in relief operation activities (short and long term)
   b. Lodging effects and potential issues
   c. Issues concerning or having the potential to concern staff wellness, health and safety
   d. Issues related to hardship codes
   e. Recommendations for training
   f. Other languages the affected population speaks (for recruitment and training)
g. Groups for unaffiliated volunteer recruitment (for example, colleges, "strong Southern Baptist area," six out of eight shelters are in Lutheran churches, etc.)

2. Track proposed human resource requests by chapter.

3. Participate in daily conference calls with the Staff Deployment Center and service area DSHR Senior Associate; report on the following:
   a. Planning cell Staff Services activities
   b. Known information regarding the service delivery plan and its development
   c. Affected chapters and their human resource capacity status
   d. Potential human resource needs and time frames
   e. Statistics and demographics of expected impact areas
   f. Known information from the disaster relief operation headquarters and their current and future human resource needs
   g. Information above which may affect Staff Services and recommendations regarding the information (for example, based on X, recommend hardship code Y or based on A, recommend staff shelter initially, etc.)
   h. Any additional pertinent information

Forward Headquarters Cell

This is the deployed unit of the planning cell; its task is to establish a relief operation headquarters and receive human and material resources. Material Support Services representatives secure the facility using pre-disaster agreements and complete the Facility Agreement form, as well as initiating any utilities needed to operate the site and acquire and set-up any needed equipment and furniture.

At this point, service delivery is not a component of the cell's purpose. However, the Community Services representative ensures operational continuity during the transfer of staff and responsibility from the planning cell post-landfall and may direct resources to and coordinate with chapters during the initial response in accordance with the established service delivery plan.

During the transfer period, the forward headquarters cell will maintain regular communications with the planning cell, service area and the Disaster Operations Center to maintain information flow and stay up-to-date about resource movements.

The forward headquarters cell members will be fully briefed by the planning cell regarding existing and pending commitments and actions within their state. In the event of a multi-state impact where the planning cell leadership team is directed to the most heavily impacted state, the forward headquarters cells in the other states may be assigned as the interim relief operation leadership until others can be assigned.
Planning Cell Equipment and Resources:
- access to the DSHR System database
- DROMIS computer
- Staff Request forms
- e-mail capability
- phone
- deployment Manual
- Staff Services activity book

Information and Resource Management Cell

The American Red Cross makes decisions about mobilizing resources and responding to hurricanes and tropical storms based on numerous factors —
- The given risk to a geographic area and potential pre-landfall hazards.
- National Hurricane Center Watches, Warnings and other advisories as well as size, speed, intensity, projected storm track, forecasting errors and erratic or unusual storm characteristics.
- Information from emergency management officials such as evacuation orders and recommendations or spontaneous evacuations.
- Accurate assessment, availability and deployment time of resources and capabilities (people, equipment, vehicles, etc.).
- Identification of resource and capability shortfalls and a given method to monitor their ongoing status, such as Chapter Disaster Readiness Assessments, Exercises or other historical operational data.

The information and resource management cell will gather, receive, summarize, maintain and distribute information and allocate and deploy resources concerning these and other factors generated by the Red Cross response effort regarding a threatening or occurring disaster. The information and resource management cell mission is tactical with a concentrated focus on gathering information and supporting chapters in the immediate response to evacuations and the impending storm. All information and communication beyond the Major Disaster Response Structure flows to and from the information and resource management cell.

The information and resource management cell accomplishes its mission via cross-functional activities performed together by Community Services, Information Management Support Services, Material Support Services and Partner Services members and the chapter support section. To avoid duplication and streamline communication, the chapter support section will be the primary chapter information and interaction channel broker.

The members assigned to the information and resource management cell must be managers (supervisors for Community Services) in their respective DSHR groups and be available for a three week assignment with the expectation of moving to the disaster relief operation.

General activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:
1. Implement reporting requirements.
2. Receive or gather information from all units regarding actions and financial commitments.
3. Complete the Initial Hurricane Response Report and provide it to the Disaster Operations Center, per national headquarters requirement. The information and resource management cell gathers data for the Initial Hurricane Response Report as follows:
   a. Each day shelter managers will report status and counts to their chapters at noon and midnight.
   b. Chapters will report their collective status and counts to the service area by 1 a.m. and 1 p.m. each day.
   c. The information and resource management cell will accomplish the Initial Hurricane Response Report and provide it to the Disaster Operations Center by 3 a.m. and 3 p.m. (all times are local to the shelter).

   The Response Manager may institute additional reporting requirements as driven by the needs of partners or other constituencies.

4. Ensure the provision of timely Red Cross information to non-government organizations, partners and Red Cross liaisons in state and federal facilities.

5. Conduct data analysis and promptly inform the Response Manager of occurring or emerging problems.

6. Track resource requests from chapters and deployed resources to chapters.

7. Request additional resources (both human and equipment) from service area or the Disaster Operations Center to support the current needs and requirements of chapters or future needs identified in the service delivery plan.

8. Acquire any transportation resources required, including cars, trucks and national vehicles.

9. Maintain records to track resource movements.

10. Procure, secure and deploy or disperse requested expendable and non-expendable supplies, equipment and services through in-kind donations, loans or by renting, leasing or purchasing items with the approval of and within the financial authorities of the Response Manager or service area executive.

11. At the time deemed appropriate by the Response Manager (in coordination with the Disaster Operations Center and the relief operation headquarters), transfer appropriate personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation.

Additional Chapter Support activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Review resource requests for chapters and verify requests with appropriate chapter officials; ensure requests are completed and promptly inform the Response Manager of occurring or emerging problems. The chapter support section is not an approving authority.

2. Provide, through the Community Services Sheltering Manager assigned to the chapter support section, limited technical guidance and coaching for shelter evacuation center operational issues as needed but not in a management capacity. Any significant incidents in shelters will be channeled to the Response Manager.
Additional Information Management Support Services activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Disseminate listings and contact information of team members and daily reports to participating units (affected chapters, service area and national headquarters).
2. Produce situation and status reports, as required, for internal and external audiences; at minimum the daily 5266, SitRep, DOIS, impact and disaster assessments and Initial Hurricane Response Reports will be sent to the Disaster Operations Center.
3. Provide critical information elements to the Online Resource Book (ORB@usa.redcross.org) of the Response Center (1 (866) Get Info).
4. Monitor and display storm tracks, forecasts and current weather conditions, including river levels and flooding potential, and apprise all units of these conditions, as technology permits.
5. Gather and consolidate impact assessment information from chapters, government, utility companies and news media reports to allow the planning cell to define the priorities of the disaster relief operation. This assessment should be completed within a few hours following landfall and include the extent of damage to essential facilities, storm surge, visible housing damage and boundaries of the storm or at least the counties impacted. This is not a preliminary damage assessment.
6. Begin to gather and consolidate preliminary damage assessment from affected chapters as reported and consolidated on the Damage Assessment Summary Sheet (Form 5233).
7. Send bills and commitments to national headquarters for processing and payment.
8. Upon establishment of the disaster relief operation, reports, such as the 5266, will continue sequentially as the reports of the relief operation; all under the same DR number.

Additional Material Support Services activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Maintain accurate documentation of all sites used.
2. Receive, inspect, assign and maintain records of all vehicle, driver and transportation resources.
3. Open and maintain vendor accounts in support of the operation.
4. Oversee the warehousing of disaster relief supplies.
5. Track expenses by program service codes; process all invoices received for prompt payment.
6. Address the physical and life safety and security of Red Cross workers and clients along with the physical safety and security of Red Cross facilities and equipment.
7. Receive, track and maintain technology and communication equipment.
8. Establish a relationship with local amateur radio groups to assist with communications at pre-landfall sites. Depending on the effects of the storm on the local infrastructure, this may be the only reliable form of communications for the first 72 hours.
Additional Partner Services activities performed by the information and resource management cell include:

1. Establish and maintain liaison with non-government partner agencies and organizations.
2. Relay issues and problems conveyed by the Red Cross liaisons in the state emergency operations centers to the Response Manager and conduct follow-up actions to ensure issues and problems are addressed and resolved.
3. Conduct rumor investigation and control measures, as required, to address those problems.
4. Determine how many emergency operations centers will stand up; determine capacity to staff round the clock.
5. Determine ESF 6 staffing needs at all locations; coordinate with ESF 6 lead in the Disaster Operations Center for additional support.
6. Determine need for any additional liaison support at federal operations centers other than FEMA; coordinate with federal response unit in Disaster Operations Center for support.

Information and Resource Management Cell Equipment and Resources
- DROMIS computer
- printer
- e-mail or fax capability
- phone

Service Area Response Operations

This is the day-to-day operations staff of the service area which includes fundraising, communications, the DSHR Senior Associate and Chapter Solutions Managers. Service Area Response Operations will become an active response component at the point the service area moves to the Major Disaster Response Structure. They will interact and provide information to the information and resource management cell in the pre-landfall stage while continuing to provide ongoing day-to-day operational support.

The service area communicator or designee will:
1. Ask chapters to review and implement their communications plans.
2. Contact the Communication and Marketing activity lead at national headquarters to strategize and coordinate efforts.
3. Plan staffing for service area Public Affairs activity, as appropriate, with the service area's DSHR Senior Associate.
4. Monitor situation and continue to support chapters and communicate across various levels.
5. Transfer all records to Organizational Support on the relief operation when it is established.

The service area Development Director or designee will:
1. Assign fundraising staff from the service area (if members are needed from beyond the service area, Director, Managers, and Officer of Fund Raising positions will be approved by the activity lead at national headquarters).
2. Ask chapters to review and prepare to activate Disaster Fundraising Action Plans.
3. Contact Fund Raising activity lead at national headquarters to strategize and coordinate efforts.
4. Coordinate with the service area communicator for consistent messaging.
5. Plan staffing for service area fundraising activities as appropriate with the service area DSHR Sr. Associate.
6. Monitor situation and continue to support chapters and communicate across various levels.
7. Transfer all records to Organizational Support on the relief operation when it is established.

The DSHR Senior Associate recruits, assigns, deploys and provides human resource support in the form of transportation and lodging to affected chapters. Specifically, he or she will —

1. Review the chapter hurricane priority requirements and begin identifying and recruiting available DSHR members to fill identified staff shortfalls.
2. Notify the Response Manager of any shortfalls unable to be filled within the service area as soon as they are identified.
3. Fill staff requests received from affected chapters by recruiting, assigning and deploying qualified, available DSHR members from within the service area using procedures in the Deployment Manual.
4. Obtain lodging for deployed staff through Corporate Lodging by following the procedures in the Deployment Manual.
5. Obtain appropriate travel for deployed staff by following the procedures in the Deployment Manual.
6. Receive staff requests and information from the Staff Services member assigned to the planning cell.
7. Participate in daily conference calls with the Staff Deployment Center and Staff Services member assigned to the planning cell.
8. Activate service area procedures to expand recruitment capabilities as outlined in the Deployment Manual.
9. Be proactive in determining the number of potentially available staff and identifying shortfalls using the reports and recruitment tools found in the Deployment Manual.
10. Forward any unfilled requests to the Staff Deployment Center within four hours of receipt.
11. Communicate with unaffected chapters requesting DSHR member availability by following the procedures in the Deployment Manual.
12. Transfer all records to Staff Services on the relief operation when it is established.

The capacity, role and influence of the Chapter Solutions Managers are built through non-disaster interaction and relationships with their chapters. Chapter Solutions Manager are within the response structure but are not assigned to the relief operation. They will play a primary role in keeping open communication channels between the service area, disaster relief operation and the chapters in their respective territory. The Chapter Solutions Managers may troubleshoot potential problems, provide resolution and, as needed, give management support for affected chapters.
## Hurricane Activity Quick Reference Sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Pre-landfall</th>
<th>Post-landfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Sheltering</td>
<td>• Sheltering</td>
<td>• Sheltering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Feeding</td>
<td>• Feeding</td>
<td>• Feeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government Liaison</td>
<td>• Government Liaison</td>
<td>• Government Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disaster Assessment</td>
<td>• Disaster Assessment</td>
<td>• Disaster Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Information and Fundraising</td>
<td>• Public Information and Fundraising</td>
<td>• Public Information and Fundraising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Report service delivery activities to service area</td>
<td>• Integrate and remain a service delivery element</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected Service Area (includes those hosting evacuees)</td>
<td>• Shift to major disaster response structure</td>
<td>• Major disaster response structure ceases when deemed appropriate to transfer personnel, data and authority to the disaster relief operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support chapters and deploy assets</td>
<td>• Consult and support national headquarters and the relief operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Determine shortfalls of risk and host chapters</td>
<td>• Staff federal facilities; when Joint Field Office is established, transfer responsibility to relief operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide information and resource management in support of impacted chapters and to partners and constituents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deploy forward headquarters cell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Staff federal facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Service Areas</td>
<td>• Assess staff and equipment availability</td>
<td>• Channel requested resources (coordinated by the DOC) to the relief operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Relief Operation</td>
<td>• Forward headquarters cell of service area; establishes headquarters location and receives human and material resources</td>
<td>• Establish direct communications with affected chapters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Implement service delivery plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Distribute incoming resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitor performance actions and accomplishments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish direct communication with state emergency operation centers and federal disaster field offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reports directly to national headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Headquarters</td>
<td>• Activate DOC</td>
<td>• Continue consultation with service areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Send liaisons to federal operation centers</td>
<td>• Support relief operation with human and material resources and guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Alert other service areas, coordinate human and material resources as requested</td>
<td>• Support federal requests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attachment 3

Hurricane Plan Response Models

I. American Red Cross Routine Business Model Structure
II. Service Area Major Disaster Response Structure
III. Hurricane Pre-Landfall
IV. Hurricane Relief Operation Response Model
**Hurricane KATRINA**

**Discussion Number 14**

**NHC TPC/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL**

**5 PM EDT Fri Aug 26 2005**

**MOST RECENT REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT INDICATE THE CENTRAL PRESSURE HAS DROPPED TO 945 MB...BUT THE FLIGHT-LEVEL WINDS HAVE ONLY INCREASED TO 94 KT AT 700 MB...WHICH IS ABOUT AN 85-KT SURFACE WIND. A 17012 OBSERVATION IN THE NORTHEAST QUADRANT REPORTED 85 KT SURFACE WINDS. THEREFORE...THE INITIAL INTENSITY IS HELD AT 85 KT FOR THIS ADVISORY...EVEN THOUGH THE CENTRAL PRESSURE SUPPORTS ABOUT 95-KT SURFACE WINDS. THE EYEWALL IN THE NORTHEAST QUADRANT HAS REMAINED OPEN...PROBABLY DUE TO DRY AIR ENTRAINMENT...AND THIS MAY PARTIALLY EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OBSERVED WINDS AND WHAT THE CENTRAL PRESSURE TYPICALLY SUPPORTS.

**THE INITIAL MOTION IS WEST-SOUTHWESTWARD...ON 255 DEG...AT 27 KT. KATRINA REMAINS CAUGHT BETWEEN THE NORTHWESTERLY FLOW ON THE WEST SIDE OF AN INVERTED TROUGH OVER THE WESTERN CARIBBEAN SEA AND THE NORTHWESTERLY FLOW IN THE SOUTHEAST QUADRANT OF THE SUBTROPICAL RIDGE LOCATED TO THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF KATRINA. BOTH THE RIDGE AND THE FLOW ARE FORECAST TO SLOWLY WEAKEN OVER THE NEXT 12-24 HOURS...WHICH ALLOW THE HURRICANE TO TURN MORE WESTWARD...AND MOST OF THE NHC MODEL GUIDANCE AGREE ON THAT SCENARIO. AFTER 24 HOURS...THE MODELS ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON A SHORTWAVE TROUGH CURRENTLY OVER THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL FLORIDA STATES TO GRADUALLY DISAPPEAR TOWARD THE CENTRAL AND WESTERN GULF OF MEXICO AND TROUGH THE RIDGE...WHICH ALLOWS KATRINA TO MOVE NORTHWEST BY 72 HOURS. AS A RESULT...THE MODELS HAVE SHIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY WESTWARD AND ARE NOW IN BETTER AGREEMENT. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST TRACK BEING SHIFTED ABOUT 150 MILES WEST OF THE PREVIOUS TRACK...ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE GUIDANCE ENVELOPE. HOWEVER...PROJECTED LANDFALL IS STILL ABOUT 72 HOURS AWAY...SO FURTHER MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORECAST TRACK ARE POSSIBLE.

**KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE MOVING OVER THE GULF LOOP CURRENT AFTER 36 HOURS...WHICH WHEN COMBINED WITH DECREASING VERTICAL SHEAR...SHOULD ALLOW THE HURRICANE TO REACH CATEGORY FOUR STATUS BEFORE LANDFALL OCCURS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SHIPS AND GFDL MODELS...WHICH BRING KATRINA UP TO 115 KT. THE FGO SUPERENSEMBLE MODEL IS MORE ROBUST AND BRINGS KATRINA UP TO 119 KT JUST BEFORE LANDFALL.**

**FORECAST STEWARD**

**FORECAST POSITIONS AND MAX WINDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Max Winds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>210000 24.0N 82.5W</td>
<td>85 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2400</td>
<td>210000 24.0N 83.5W</td>
<td>90 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2400</td>
<td>210000 25.0N 85.1W</td>
<td>95 KT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2/6/2006
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Wind Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36HR VT</td>
<td>28/0600G</td>
<td>25.0N</td>
<td>86.4W</td>
<td>100 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48HR VT</td>
<td>28/1800G</td>
<td>26.9W</td>
<td>87.7W</td>
<td>105 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72HR VT</td>
<td>29/1800G</td>
<td>30.0W</td>
<td>88.5W</td>
<td>115 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96HR VT</td>
<td>30/1800G</td>
<td>35.0W</td>
<td>86.5W</td>
<td>35 KT...INLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120HR VT</td>
<td>31/1800G</td>
<td>40.0W</td>
<td>79.0W</td>
<td>25 KT...DISSIPATING INLAND</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$$
NNNN

---

Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Weather, & TPC Information Topics:
Storm Information, Hurricane Awareness, Historical Information,
Tropical Analysis and Forecasting Branch, About Us, Contact Us

NOAA National Weather Service
National Centers for Environmental Prediction
National Hurricane Center
Tropical Prediction Center
11691 SW 17th Street
Miami, Florida 33155-2148 USA
nhcwebmaster@noaa.gov
Page last modified: Friday, 26-Aug-2005 17:10:06 EDT

Hurricane KATRINA

BECU86 ALL
TTAA9X KHBC BB800M
HURRICANE KATRINA PROBABILITIES NUMBER 15
NWS TPC/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER MIAMI FL
11 PM EDT FRIDAY AUG 26 2005

PROBABILITIES FOR GUIDANCE IN HURRICANE PROTECTION
PLANNING BY GOVERNMENT AND DISASTER OFFICIALS

AT 11 PM EDT...0300Z...THE CENTER OF KATRINA WAS LOCATED NEAR
LATITUDE 24.6 NORTH...LONGITUDE 83.6 WEST

CHANCES OF CENTER OF THE HURRICANE PASSING WITHIN 65 NAUTICAL MILES
OF LISTED LOCATIONS THROUGH 8PM EDT MON AUG 29 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25.06N 86.0W</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>MURRS LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.06N 87.0W</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>NEW ORLEANS LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.06N 89.0W</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NEW IBERIA LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISIANA 89.0W</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PORT ARTHUR TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACKSONVILLE FL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GALVESTON TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENNESAW FL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FREEPORT TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMPA FL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PORT C OCONNOR TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAR KEY FL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>GULF 29N 85W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST MARKS FL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>GULF 29N 87W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVALANCHE FL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENSACOLA FL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>GULF 29N 91W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILE AL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GULFPORT MS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COLUMN DEFINITION: PROBABILITIES IN PERCENT
A IS PROBABILITY FROM NOW TO 8PM SAT.
B IS TOTAL PROBABILITY FROM NOW TO 8PM SAT.
C IS TOTAL PROBABILITY FROM NOW TO 8PM SUN.
D IS TOTAL PROBABILITY FROM NOW TO 8PM MON.
E MEANS LESS THAN ONE PERCENT.

FORECAST AVILA

SS
NBBN

Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Weather, & TPC Information Topics:

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/prb/ai122005.prblty.015.shtml?

2/5/2006
The satellite presentation has continued to improve and consists of a perfect comma-shaped cloud pattern which begins over western Cuba and wraps around a large cluster of very deep convection. This band is probably producing near tropical storm force winds along the north coast of western Cuba. Although the eye is not clearly visible on IR images... RADAR DATA INDICATES THAT THE EYE IS EMBEDDED WITHIN THIS CIRCULAR AREA OF DEEP CONVECTION. T-NUMBERS FROM SAB AND TAFB HAVE INCREASED TO 5.0 ON THE DORRAX SCALE. THEREFORE... THE INITIAL INTENSITY HAS BEEN ADJUSTED TO 90 KNOTS. AN AIR FORCE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT IS SCHEDULED TO BE IN KATRINA IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS. THE HURRICANE IS EXPECTED TO BE UNDER A TYPICAL 200 MB ANTICYCLONE... WITH A CYCLONIC CIRCULATION EXTENDING UPWARD TO 700 MCB. THIS IS THE TYPICAL PATTERN OBSERVED IN INTENSE HURRICANES. IN ADDITION... KATRINA IS FORECAST TO MOVE DIRECTLY OVER THE WARM LOOP CURRENT OF THE GULF OF MEXICO... WHICH IS LIKE ADDING HIGH OCTANE FUEL TO THE FIRE. THEREFORE... THE OFFICIAL FORECAST BRINGS KATRINA TO 115 KNOTS... OR A CATEGORY FOUR ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON HURRICANE SCALE. THE GFDL IS MORE AGGRESSIVE AND CALLS FOR 124 KNOTS AND 922 MB. THE PSU SUPPLEMENTARY IS EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE BRINGING KATRINA TO 131 KNOTS.

KATRINA CONTINUES TO MOVE STEADILY TOWARD THE WEST-SOUTHWEST OR 290 DEGREES AT 7 KNOTS ALONG THE EASTERN SIDE OF A VERY STRONG DEEP-LAYER HIGH CENTERED OVER TEXAS. IN FACT... DATA FROM THE NOAA JET JUST RELAYED BY THE METEOROLOGIST ONBOARD INDICATE THAT THE HIGH CONTINUES TO BE VERY STRONG. HOWEVER... THIS FEATURE IS EXPECTED TO MOVE WESTWARD AND LEAVE A WEAKNESS OVER THE CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO. KATRINA WILL LIKELY TAKEN THIS OPPORTUNITY AND BEGIN TO TURN GENERALLY TOWARD THE WEST-NORTHWEST AND THEN NORTHWARD. THE OFFICIAL FORECAST BRINGS THE CORE OF THE INTENSE HURRICANE OVER THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO IN 48 HOURS OR SO. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE GUIDANCE SPREAD HAS DECREASED AND MOST OF THE RELIABLE NUMERICAL MODEL TRACKS ARE NOW CLUSTERED BETWEEN THE EASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA AND THE COAST OF MISSISSIPPI. THIS CLUSTERING INCREASES THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST.

FORECAST AVILA

| INITIAL | 27/0305Z 24.4N 83.6W 95 KT |
| 12HR VT | 27/1200Z 24.4N 83.6W 100 KT |
| 24HR VT | 28/0000Z 25.0N 86.0W 115 KT |
| 36HR VT | 28/1200Z 26.0N 87.0W 115 KT |
| 48HR VT | 29/0000Z 27.0N 85.0W 115 KT |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>VT</th>
<th>Lat.</th>
<th>Lon.</th>
<th>Wind Speed</th>
<th>Weather</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72HR VT</td>
<td>30/0000</td>
<td>30.0N</td>
<td>85.5W</td>
<td>105 KT</td>
<td>INLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96HR VT</td>
<td>31/0000</td>
<td>35.0N</td>
<td>87.5W</td>
<td>35 KT</td>
<td>INLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120HR VT</td>
<td>31/0000</td>
<td>40.0N</td>
<td>81.0W</td>
<td>25 KT</td>
<td>BECOMING EXTRAUTROPICAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Weather, & TPC Information Topics:**
- Storm Information
- Hurricane Awareness
- Historical Information
- Tropical Analysis and Forecasting Branch
- About Us
- Contact Us

NOAA National Weather Service
National Centers for Environmental Prediction
National Hurricane Center
1155 SW 17th Street
Miami, Florida 33144 USA

Disclaimer
Credits
Glossary
Career Opportunities

Page last modified: Friday, 30-Aug-2005 22:56:07 EDT


12/11/2005
54

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
RALEY HARDY, GOVERNOR

MISSISSIPPI EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

ROBERT B. LAYHAM, JR.
DIRECTOR
August 27, 2005

The Honorable George W. Bush
President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Through: Ms. Mary Lynne Miller
Acting Regional Director
FEMA Region IV
3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road
Atlanta, Georgia 30341

Under the provisions of Section 501 (a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.35, I request that you declare an emergency for the State of Mississippi as a result of the anticipated impacts of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina is expected to impact the State of Mississippi as a strong Category 4 hurricane with winds in excess of 145 mph. Hurricane Katrina is expected to produce significant damages associated with coastal storm surges, high winds, tornadoes, torrential rainfall, and inland flooding. Our response to this event began on August 26, 2005, and is continuing. Current forecasts also indicate that the State will receive rains averaging eight inches as far north as the State’s northern border with Tennessee and some isolated rains in excess of 10 inches. The counties of Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone, Marion, Forrest, Jefferson Davis, Covington, Jones and Lamar are in the direct path of Hurricane Katrina and are anticipated to sustain the greatest amount of damages.

In response to the situation I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 26, 2005 in accordance with Section 501 (a) of the Stafford Act as well as issuing a State of Emergency for the entire State effective August 27, 2005 as well.

Pursuant to 44 CFR § 206.35, I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster.

POST OFFICE BOX 4520 • JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI • 39206-4520 • PHONE 601-352-9100
EMERGENCY 1-800-222-1222 1-800-222-1222
FDQ 1-800-445-4662
I am specifically requesting Direct Federal Assistance and the Public Assistance Program for Category A (Debris Removal) and Category B (Emergency Protective Measures) for Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone, Marion, Forrest, Jefferson Davis, Covington, Jones and Lamar Counties.

Preliminary estimates of the types and amount of emergency assistance needed under the Stafford Act, and emergency assistance from certain Federal agencies under other statutory authorities are tabulated in Enclosure A.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this emergency:

Local County Governments and the Department of Human Services with the assistance of the Department of Health have prepared to open more than 25 general population and special needs shelters as well as anticipating the opening of numerous additional shelters to meet the needs of the forecasted number of evacuees.

The State has purchased water, ice and other emergency commodities in order to be prepared to provide emergency supplies to the affected areas as well as placing sufficient numbers of National Guard Soldiers on State Active Duty to execute distribution to the local level.

The Department of Transportation, Public Safety, Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, and Military departments are sustaining personnel, materials and equipment cost in support of evacuations, including management of traffic flow along evacuation routes from Louisiana and Alabama as well as search and rescue missions.

Other state agencies continue to incur costs necessary to execute their responsibilities under the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.

I certify that for this emergency, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Mississippi agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easement, and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work.
Honorable George W. Bush  
August 27, 2005  
Page 3

2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;

3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and

4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 502 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5192 & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Thomas M. Womack as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He/she will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessments and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

Haley Barbour  
Governor
Appendix B: New Orleans Weather Forecast Office Hurricane Katrina Advisory

Urgent Weather Message
National Weather Service
New Orleans, LA

111 PM EST
Mon Aug 28 2005 22:57

Devastating damage expected

Hurricane Katrina - A most powerful hurricane with unprecedented strength, rivalling the intensity of Hurricane Camille of 1969.

Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or perhaps months. At least, one half of all homes and businesses will be severely damaged or destroyed.

The majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional. Partial to complete wall and roof failure is expected. All wood-framed one-story homes and many two-story frame buildings will be destroyed.

Commercial buildings, hotels, and homes will have severe damage and will require weeks or months to repair.

High-rise office and apartment buildings will sway dangerously - a few to the point of total collapse. All windows will blow out.

Airborne debris will be widespread. And may include heavy items such as household appliances and even light vehicles. All vehicles and high trees will be moved. The large debris will create additional dangerous road and traffic conditions.

Most power lines will be downed and roads washed out. Water, sewage, and gas will make homes suffering appearing uninhabitable by modern standards.

The vast majority of native trees will be snapped or uprooted. Only the heartiest will survive. Eventually they are expected to regrow. If snapped, livestock left within might die.

An interior escape route should be established. Sustained winds will prohibit escape "outside" within the next 24 hours.

Once tropical storm and hurricane force winds cease, do not venture outside!
August 28, 2005

The Honorable George W. Bush
President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC

Through: Mr. Mary Lynne Miller
Acting Regional Director
FEMA Region IV
3003 Chamblee – Tucker Road
Atlanta, GA 30341

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare a major disaster for the State of Mississippi as a result of Hurricane Katrina. The hurricane is expected to cause catastrophic damage from flooding, high-winds as well as tornadoes and severe thunderstorms. Our response to this hurricane started on August 26, 2005 and is continuing. The state is expected to receive Hurricane force winds along the entire Mississippi Gulf Coast and as far as Jackson in the central part of the state. Current forecasts indicate that the State will receive heavy rains, averaging eight inches as far north as the northern border with Tennessee and some isolated areas with rains in excess of ten inches.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 27, 2005 in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act as well as issuing a State of Emergency for the entire State effective August 27, 2005, as well. The State Mitigation Plan has been submitted and approved by FEMA.

A Preliminary Damage Assessment has been requested. I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster. I am specifically requesting 100 percent Direct Federal Assistance, 100 percent for Category A and B under the Public Assistance Program, for debris removal and emergency protective measures in the first 72 hours. I request the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for the entire State. I request direct Federal Assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property. I request Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for the entire State. I also request Public Assistance (Categories A-G) and Individual Assistance for the counties lying in or near the path of Hurricane Katrina that are likely to experience high-winds and torrential rains. I am requesting the full compliment of the Individual Assistance Programs, to include the Individuals and Households Programs, Disaster Unemployment Assistance, Crisis Counseling, Disaster Counseling, Disaster Legal Services, and the Small Administration Disaster Loans Program.
Honorable George W. Bush  
August 28, 2005  
Page 2


The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

- Local County Governments and the Department of Human Services with the assistance of the Department of Health have opened over 25 general population shelters and several special needs shelters as well as anticipating the opening of numerous more to meet the needs of the forecasted number of evacuees from our coastal areas as well as from the States of Alabama and Louisiana.

- Transportation, Public Safety, Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks, and the Military Departments are sustaining personnel, materials, and equipment costs in support of evacuations, including management of traffic flow along evacuation routes from Louisiana and Alabama as well as search and rescue missions and law enforcement efforts.

- Other State Agencies continue to incur cost necessary to execute their responsibilities under the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.

I certify that for this major disaster, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Mississippi agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;

2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;

3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and

4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.
In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 403 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Thomas M. Wornack as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Haley Barbour
Governor
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-3213-EM]

Mississippi; Emergency and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of an emergency for the State of Mississippi (FEMA-3213-EM), dated August 28, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 28, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 28, 2005, the President declared an emergency declaration under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Mississippi, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 27, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such an emergency exists in the State of Mississippi.

You are authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act to save lives, protect public health and safety, and property or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, you are authorized to provide debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B), including direct Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program, at 75 percent Federal funding. This assistance excludes regular time costs for subgrantees’ regular employees. In addition, you are authorized to
provide such other forms of assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act as you may deem appropriate.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, William L. Carwile, III, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared emergency.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Mississippi to have been affected adversely by this declared emergency:

The counties of Covington, Forrest, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River, and Stone for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individuals and Households Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1604-DR]

Mississippi; Major Disaster and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Mississippi (FEMA-1604-DR), dated August 29, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 29, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 29, 2005, the President declared a major disaster under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the State of Mississippi, resulting from Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster exists in the State of Mississippi.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

You are authorized to provide Individual Assistance and assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program in the designated areas, Hazard Mitigation throughout the State, and any other forms of assistance under the Stafford Act you may deem appropriate subject to completion of Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs), unless you determine the
incident is of such unusual severity and magnitude that PDAs are not required to
determine the need for supplemental Federal assistance pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 206.33(d).
Direct Federal assistance is authorized.

Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal
funds provided under the Stafford Act for Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and the
Other Needs Assistance under Section 408 of the Stafford Act will be limited to 75
percent of the total eligible costs. For a period of up to 72 hours, you are authorized to
fund assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, at
100 percent of the total eligible costs. Federal funding for debris removal will remain at
75 percent.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable
under the Stafford Act.

The time period prescribed for the implementation of section 310(a), Priority to Certain
Applications for Public Facility and Public Housing Assistance, 42 U.S.C. 5153, shall be
for a period not to exceed six months after the date of this declaration.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant
to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, William
L. Carwile, III, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this
declared disaster.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Mississippi to have been
affected adversely by this declared major disaster:

Amite, Forrest, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Lamar, Marion, Pearl
River, Perry, Pike, Stone, Walthall, and Wilkinson Counties for Individual Assistance.

Adams, Amite, Attala, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Claiborne, Clarke, Clay, Copiah,
Covington, Forrest, Franklin, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Hinds, Itawamba,
Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Kemper, Lamar, Lauderdale,
Lawrence, Lee, Lincoln, Lowndes, Madison, Marion, Monroe, Neshoba, Newton,
Noxubee, Oktibbeha, Pearl River, Perry, Pike, Rankin, Scott, Simpson, Smith, Stone,
Walthall, Warren, Wayne, Webster, Wilkinson, and Winston Counties for debris removal
and emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance. For a period of
up to 72 hours, assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal
assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. The period of up to
72 hours at 100 percent excludes debris removal.

All counties within the State of Mississippi are eligible to apply for assistance under the
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.
(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individual and Household Housing; 97.049, Individual and Household Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individual and Household Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 2005

The Honorable Bob Riley
Governor of Alabama
State Capitol
Montgomery, Alabama 36130

Dear Governor Riley:

I have declared a disaster emergency under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., ("Stafford Act") for the State of Alabama due to the emergency conditions resulting from Hurricane Katrina, beginning on August 28, 2005, and continuing. I have authorized Federal relief in the form of emergency assistance to the affected area.

The Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), intends to coordinate all disaster relief efforts that have the purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local population and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives, protect public health and safety, protect property, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, FEMA is authorized to provide direct emergency and disaster protective measures (Categories A and B), including direct Federal assistance under the Public Assistance program. Any Federal funds for Public Assistance will be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs.

FEMA will coordinate Federal assistance efforts and designate specific areas eligible for such assistance. The Federal Coordinating Officer will be Mr. Ron Thomason of FEMA. He will consult with you and assist in the execution of the FEMA-State Agreement for emergency assistance governing the expenditure of Federal funds.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

OCT 24 2005 20:38 From:
08/28/05 SUN 18:33 FAX
STATE OF ALABAMA

August 28, 2005

The Honorable George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Through: Mary Lynne Miller
Acting Regional Director
FEMA Region IV
3003 Chamblee Tucker Road
Atlanta, GA 30341

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. (the Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare an emergency disaster declaration for the State of Alabama as a result of Hurricane Katrina beginning August 29, 2005 and continuing, am requesting that Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Monroe, and Washington Counties be declared in the disaster declaration.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 28, 2005, in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act.

The Governor has declared a State of Emergency for the entire state on August 28, 2005. The Governor authorized mandatory evacuations on August 28, 2005, in Mobile and Baldwin Counties.

State and local damage assessments are underway. I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary. I am specifically requesting:

Public Assistance, Category A (Debris Removal), and Category B (Emergency Protective Measures) at 100 percent for the first 72 hours.

The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

Implementation of the State Emergency Plan
Activation of the State Emergency Operations Center
Activation of the local Emergency Operations Centers
Statewide mobilization of assets

The manpower and assets of the state are overwhelmed due to the storm. The state is estimating cost figures in excess of several million dollars. As soon as conditions allow, the state will be requesting post-disaster damage assessment assistance.

I certify that for this emergency, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.
The Honorable George W. Bush
Page 2

I request direct Federal assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property.

(a) Estimated 9.3 million cubic yards of debris (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
    Estimated 1.3 million pounds of ice daily (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
    Estimated 650,000 liters of water daily (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

(b) Debris Removal (Category A)

Emergency Protective Services (Category D) to include, but not limited to water, ice, and food.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.204, the State of Alabama agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;
2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;
3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and
4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 502 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170 (b) & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Bruce C. Baughman as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Bob Riley,
Governor

BILL PHIL.
August 29, 2005

The Honorable George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, DC

Through: Mary Lynne Miller
Acting Regional Director
FEMA Region IV
3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road
Atlanta, GA 30341

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR § 206.36, I request that you declare an emergency major disaster for the State of Alabama as a result of Hurricane Katrina beginning August 28, 2005 and continuing. I am requesting that Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington Counties be declared in the disaster declaration.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 28, 2005, in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act.

The Governor has declared a State of Emergency for the entire state on August 28, 2005. The Governor authorized mandatory evacuations on August 28, 2005, in Mobile and Baldwin Counties.

The State of Alabama has completed a Standard State Mitigation Plan which was approved in October 2004. The State is currently revising and updating the plan with effects for Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis in order to apply for an enhanced State Mitigation Plan status. Of the 67 Alabama counties, 64 counties have FEMA approved plans at this time.

A Preliminary Damage Assessment has been requested and/or is underway. I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary. I am specifically requesting:

Individual Assistance, including the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), Disaster Unemployment Assistance, Crisis Counseling, Small Business Administration disaster loans for Mobile, Baldwin, and Washington Counties and Public Assistance, Category A (Debris Removal) and Category B (Emergency Protective Measures) to include Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) at 100% for the first 72 hours for Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington Counties, and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for the entire state.
The following information is furnished on the nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

- Implementation of the State Emergency Plan
- Activation of the State Emergency Operations Center
- Activation of the local Emergency Operations Centers
- Statewide mobilization of assets

I certify that for this major disaster, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.208, the State of Alabama agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements and rights-of-ways necessary to accomplish the approved work;
2. Hold and save the United States free from damages due to the requested work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any claims arising from such work;
3. Provide reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-State Agreement; and
4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to Sections 403 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris.

I have designated Bruce P. Bamburg as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He/she will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Governor
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-3214-EM]

Alabama; Emergency and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of an emergency for the State of Alabama (FEMA-3214-EM), dated August 28, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 28, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 28, 2005, the President declared an emergency declaration under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Alabama, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 28, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such an emergency exists in the State of Alabama.

You are authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act to save lives, protect public health and safety, and property or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, you are authorized to provide debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B), including direct Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program at 75 percent Federal funding. This assistance excludes regular time costs for subgrantees' regular employees. In addition, you are authorized to provide such other forms of assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act as you may deem appropriate.
In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Ron Sherman, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared emergency.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Alabama to have been affected adversely by this declared emergency:

The counties of Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individuals and Households Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1605-DR]

Alabama; Major Disaster and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Alabama (FEMA-1605-DR), dated August 29, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 29, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 29, 2005, the President declared a major disaster under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the State of Alabama, resulting from Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster exists in the State of Alabama.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

You are authorized to provide Individual Assistance and assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program in the designated areas, Hazard Mitigation throughout the State, and any other forms of assistance under the Stafford Act you may deem appropriate subject to completion of Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs), unless you determine the incident is of such unusual severity and magnitude that PDAs are not required to
determine the need for supplemental Federal assistance pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 206.33(d). Direct Federal assistance is authorized.

Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal funds provided under the Stafford Act for Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and the Other Needs Assistance under Section 408 of the Stafford Act will be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs. For a period of up to 72 hours, you are authorized to fund assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. Federal funding for debris removal will remain at 75 percent.

The time period prescribed for the implementation of section 310(a), Priority to Certain Applications for Public Facility and Public Housing Assistance, 42 U.S.C. 5153, shall be for a period not to exceed six months after the date of this declaration.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Ron Sherman, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared disaster.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Alabama to have been affected adversely by this declared major disaster:

Baldwin, Mobile, and Washington Counties for Individual Assistance.

Baldwin, Clarke, Choctaw, Mobile, Sumter, and Washington Counties for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance. For a period of up to 72 hours, assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. The period of up to 72 hours at 100 percent excludes debris removal.

All counties within the State of Alabama are eligible to apply for assistance under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individual and Household Housing; 97.049, Individual and Household Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individual and Household Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)
/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

PROCLAMATION NO. 48 KBB 2005

STATE OF EMERGENCY - HURRICANE KATRINA

WHEREAS, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, R.S. 29:721, et seq., confers upon the governor of the state of Louisiana emergency powers to deal with emergencies and disasters, including those caused by fire, flood, earthquake or other natural or man-made causes, in order to ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with such emergencies or disasters and to preserve the lives and property of the citizens of the state of Louisiana;

WHEREAS, when the governor finds a disaster or emergency has occurred, or the threat thereof is imminent, R.S. 29:724(B)(1) empowers her to declare the state of disaster or emergency by executive order or proclamation, or both; and

WHEREAS, On August 26, 2005, Hurricane Katrina poses an imminent threat to the state of Louisiana, carrying severe storms, high winds, and torrential rain that may cause flooding and damage to private property and public facilities, and threaten the safety and security of the citizens of Louisiana;

NOW THEREFORE I, KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO, Governor of the state of Louisiana, by virtue of the authority vested by the Constitution and laws of the state of Louisiana, do hereby order and direct as follows:

SECTION 1: Pursuant to the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, R.S. 29:721, et seq., a state of emergency is declared to exist in the state of Louisiana as Hurricane Katrina poses an imminent threat, carrying severe storms, high winds, and torrential rain that may cause flooding and damage to private property and public facilities, and threaten the safety and security of the citizens of the state of Louisiana;

SECTION 2: The state of Louisiana's emergency response and recovery program is activated under the command of the director of the state office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to prepare for and provide emergency support services and/or to minimize the effects of the storm's damage.

SECTION 3: The state of emergency extends from Friday, August 26, 2005, through Sunday, September 25, 2005, unless terminated sooner.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand officially and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of Louisiana, at the Capitol, in the city of Baton Rouge, on this 26th day of August, 2005.

/S/ Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA

ATTEST BY
THE GOVERNOR

/S/ Al Ater
SECRETARY OF STATE
State of Louisiana
MILITARY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

August 27, 2005

Dear Mr. President:

The White House
Washington, D.C.

Through: Regional Director
FEMA Region VI
800 North Loop 288
Denton, Texas 76209

I request that you designate the State of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans in accordance with Section 502 of the Stafford Act. Under the provisions of Section 501 (a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5166, I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster. I am specifically invoking the following emergency measures under the Stafford Act.

Department of Social Services (DSS): Opening (5) Special Need Shelters (SNS) and establishing (4) in addition to existing (1) Shelters.

Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH): Establishing (3) additional Shelters.


Louisiana State Police (LSP): Providing support for the phased evacuation of the coastal areas.

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LWJ): Supporting the evacuation of the affected population and preparing for Search and Rescue Missions.
Mr. President
Page Two
August 27, 2005

- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Coordinating traffic flow and management of the evacuation with local officials and the State of Mississippi.

The following information is furnished on efforts and resources of other Federal agencies, which have been or will be used in responding to this incident:
- FEMA EMERGENCY RESPONSE:

I certify that, in any event, the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

I request direct Federal assistance for the work and resources to save lives and protect property.

(a) An approximate State and local government cost to perform this function is $0.

(b) Specify the type of assistance requested:

In accordance with 44 CFR 206.32, the State of Louisiana agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance:

1. Provide, without cost to the United States all labor, materials, and rights-of-way necessary to accomplish the approved work.

2. Hold and save the United States free from damages for any costs incurred in connection with this work.

3. Indemnify the United States for any loss of public and private property and for injury to persons during the performance of the work.

4. Assist the performing Federal agency in all support and related administrative matters.

In addition, I authorize the use for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and welfare.

Note: See sections 302 and 403 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5192 and § 5171, the State signed a declaration that will have no effect on the approval of any debris removal for this disaster. The State agreed that debris removal from public and private property will not pose a threat to the implementation of any significant amount of debris removal or debris removal, if any.

I have designated Mr. Anthony as the State Commissary Officer for the FEMA. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessment and may provide further information or justification on my behalf.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]
Governor

[Signature]

[Name]
## Estimated Requirements for Other Federal Agency Programs

- **Department of Social Services (DSS):** Opening (3) Special Need Shelters (DNS) and establishing (1) on standby. Cost estimated at $500,000 per week for each in operation.
- **Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH):** Opening (3) Shelters and establishing (1) on standby. Cost estimated at $900,000 per week for each in operation.
- **Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP):** Providing generators and support staff for DSS and Public Health. Cost estimated to range from $100,000-$500,000 to support (3) Shelters generator operations.
- **Louisiana State Police (LSP):** Cost to support evacuations - $500,000 for a non-direct landfill.
- **Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LWIP):** Cost to support evacuations - $250,000 for a non-direct landfill.
- **Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD):** Costs to support evacuations - $1,000,000 for a non-direct landfill.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and service extensions</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public relations</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency electric equipment</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Household Program (SSH)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of emergency supplies</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenses (2)</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grant Total</strong></td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Estimates are to reflect real eligible costs before any cost sharing.*
State of Louisiana
MILITARY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

August 28, 2005
The President
The White House
Washington, DC

Through: Regional Director
FEMA Region VI
800 North Loop 388
Round Rock, Texas 78664

Dear Mr. President:

Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5173(c), the President is hereby notified that you declare an emergency pursuant to the laws of Louisiana and the emergency assistance authorized for the State of Louisiana through disaster Public Assistance (PA) declarations for the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, dated August 18, 2005 and continuing. The affected areas include all the metropolitan area including the City of New Orleans directly impacted by the onset of the storm and the mid and southern parishes where the thousands of citizens deemed to evacuate from the impacted areas directly affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Parishes expected to receive major damage based on the anticipated track of Hurricane Katrina are: Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and Washington.

In addition we are expecting that the following parishes to suffer significant damage as tropical storm force wind and heavy rainfall occur in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall: Acadia, Caddo, Caldwell, Calcasieu, Cameron, Cass, Jefferson Davis, Lafourche, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, St. Charles, St. Mary, St. Martin, Vermilion, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana.

Parishes that are affected by the evacuation of persons from the southeastern parishes of the state as we implement the Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan are: Allen, Avoyelles, Bossier, Baton Rouge, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Cenla, East Carroll, Eunice, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vermilion, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn.

In response to the situation, I have taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the State Emergency Plan on August 26, 2005, in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. A State of Emergency has been issued for the State in order to support the evacuation of the coastal areas and the remainder of the State to support the State Evacuation and Sheltering Plan.

A Preliminary Damage Assessment will be conducted as soon as possible after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina.

Based on the predictions we have received from the National Weather Service and other sources, I have determined that this incident will be of such severity and magnitude that effective response will be beyond the capability of the State and the affected local governments and that supplementary Federal assistance will be necessary.

I am specifically requesting:

- Disaster relief and assistance under the Stafford Act and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
- Assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
Mr. President

Page two

August 28, 2005

Individual Assistance, including the Individual and Household Program (IHP), Disaster Unemployment Assistance, CASH Counseling, Public Assistance (Category A-45 funding at 100%), Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans and Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) funding at 75%. In the

To support the evacuation/evacuee relief effort, I am also requesting Individual Assistance, including the Individual and Household Program (IHP), Disaster Unemployment Assistance, CASH Counseling, and Public Assistance (Category A-45 funding at 100%), in the following parishes: Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Rapides, Red River, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, DeRidder, East Carroll, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Iberville, Lafourche, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Terrebonne, Tangipahoa, Tensas, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn.

The State Hazard Mitigation Plan (SHMP) was approved by FEMA on April 15, 2003. We are currently preparing a revised Hazard Mitigation Plan for the parishes that are approved within the application period for this disaster.

The following information is based on the names and amounts of loans and loan programs that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster:

- The Special Needs and General Population shelters have been opened in the following parishes on 8/30/2005.

- Ascension and St. James Parishes have opened a four-story nursing home.

- St. Charles, Jefferson (Gretna and Lafitte), Lafourche (outside of Thibodaux), Lafourche (portions of Port Barataria), Lafourche (portions of Port Fourchon) and Orleans (portions of Orleans) will open at least six days before 8/30/2005.

- Bridges, ramps and access are expected to open when minimum sustained wind speed 15 mph.

- Department of Social Services (DSS) / ASC / Local Open (RPS) Special Needs Shelters (SNS) and retraining (R) on St. Landry.

- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) / DDS: Opening (R) Special Needs Shelters (SNS) Shelters and Establishing (E) on St. James.

- LADES and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (ODHSEP) Fabrelli generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters and field personnel and equipment.

- Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations.

000005
Mr. President

Page Three

August 28, 2005

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (DWF): Costs to support evacuation.

Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuation.

Due to the extraordinary nature of this catastrophic hurricane and based on the anticipated damage in the impacted areas, including the New Orleans Metropolitan area, I am requesting an increase in the Federal cost share from 75% to 100% for Individual Assistance, Public Assistance (All Categories) and Emergency Management Assistance. I certify that for this major disaster, state and local governments will assume the applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act.

I request direct Federal assistance for work and services to save lives and protect property.

(a) We do not anticipate state and local government resources to be able to accomplish the volume of work anticipated for this disaster.

(b) We are requesting a direct Federal cost sharing assignment for Hurricane Katrina.

In accordance with 44 CFR § 206.200, the State of Louisiana agrees that it will, with respect to direct Federal assistance,

1. Provide sufficient means to the United States to land, maintain, and utilize vessels necessary to accomplish O&M-approved work.

2. Hold and save for the United States free from damage due to the repairs work, and shall indemnify the Federal Government against any liability arising from such work.

3. Deduct reimbursement to FEMA for the non-Federal share of the cost of such work from the amounts due the State in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA-state Agreement and

4. Assure the participating Federal agency in all support and local jurisdictional matters.

In addition, I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, public health, and safety.

Pursuant to sections 409 and 497 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5195(b) & 5173, the State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States from any claims arising from the removal of debris or materials by the federal government. The State agrees that debris removal, public health, and safety property will not be used as the basis for additional reimbursement to participants in the repair of debris.

I have designated Mr. Alleva C. Bonin as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. He will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in support activities and may provide further information on justifying any obligations.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor

Sherron

000006
ENCLOSURE A TO EXPEDITED REQUEST

Estimated requirements for other Federal agency programs:

- Department of Social Services (DSS): Opening 1 Special Need Shelter (SNS) and establishing
  1 on Standby. Costs estimated at $50,000 per week for such operation.
- Department of Health and Hospitals (DHHS): Opening 1 Shelter and establishing 1 on
  Standby. Costs estimated at $85,000 per week for such operation.
  generators and support staff for SNS and Public Shelters. Costs estimated to range from
  $250,000-$500,000 to support 1 shelter generator operations and personal/equipment support.
- Louisiana State Police (LSP), Costs to support evacuations - $500,000 for a direct lift (LA6),
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), Costs to support evacuation - $500,000
  for a direct lift (LA6),
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), Costs to support
  evacuation - $500,000 for a direct lift (LA6),

Total: $1,370,000

Estimated Requirements for assistance under the Stafford Act:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal and State assistance</td>
<td>$10,000,000 (est.)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery/long-term measures</td>
<td>$252,000,000 (est.)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual and Household Programs (IHP)</td>
<td>$97,000,000 (est.)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of emergency supplies</td>
<td>$90,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Other (specify)                      | |}

* Based on Hurricane Index, 15th and 30th of (FEMA 1415, 1417, 1445).

Note: Estimates are to reflect total eligible costs before any cost sharing.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-3212-EM]

Louisiana; Emergency and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of an emergency for the State of Louisiana (FEMA-3212-EM), dated August 27, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 27, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 27, 2005, the President declared an emergency declaration under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Louisiana, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 26, 2005, and continuing is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such an emergency exists in the State of Louisiana.

You are authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act to save lives, protect public health and safety, and property or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas. Specifically, you are authorized to provide debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program, including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding. This assistance excludes regular time costs for subgrantees' regular employees. In addition, you are authorized to provide
such other forms of assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act as you may deem appropriate.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, William Lokey, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared emergency.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Louisiana to have been affected adversely by this declared emergency:

The parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, De Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Carroll, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, La Salle, Lincoln, Livingston, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Helena, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, West Feliciana, and Winn for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, at 75 percent Federal funding.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individuals and Households Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security.
Federal Register Notice

Billing Code 9110-10-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1603-DR]

Louisiana; Major Disaster and Related Determinations


ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Louisiana (FEMA-1603-DR), dated August 29, 2005, and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 29, 2005.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that, in a letter dated August 29, 2005, the President declared a major disaster under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows:

I have determined that the damage in certain areas of the State of Louisiana, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 29, 2005, and continuing, is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (the Stafford Act). Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster exists in the State of Louisiana.

In order to provide Federal assistance, you are hereby authorized to allocate from funds available for these purposes such amounts as you find necessary for Federal disaster assistance and administrative expenses.

You are authorized to provide Individual Assistance and assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) under the Public Assistance program, and Hazard Mitigation in the designated areas; and any other forms of assistance under the Stafford Act you may deem appropriate subject to completion of Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs), unless you determine the incident is of such
unusual severity and magnitude that PDAs are not required to determine the need for supplemental Federal assistance pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 206.33(d). Direct Federal assistance is authorized.

Consistent with the requirement that Federal assistance be supplemental, any Federal funds provided under the Stafford Act for Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation and the Other Needs Assistance under Section 408 of the Stafford Act will be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible costs. For a period of up to 72 hours, you are authorized to fund assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. Federal funding for debris removal will remain at 75 percent.

Further, you are authorized to make changes to this declaration to the extent allowable under the Stafford Act.

The time period prescribed for the implementation of section 310(a), Priority to Certain Applications for Public Facility and Public Housing Assistance, 42 U.S.C. 5153, shall be for a period not to exceed six months after the date of this declaration.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, William Lokey, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this declared disaster.

I do hereby determine the following areas of the State of Louisiana to have been affected adversely by this declared major disaster:


The parishes of Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Pointe Coupee, Plaquemines, St. Barnard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John, St. Mary, St. Martin, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana for Public Assistance Categories A and B (debris removal and emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance. For a period of up to 72 hours, assistance for emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs. The period of up to 72 hours at 100 percent excludes debris removal.
The parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Catahoula, Claiborne, Concordia, Desoto, East Carroll, Evangeline, Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Natchitoches, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River, Richland, Sabine, St. Landry, Tensas, Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, and Winn for Public Assistance Category B (emergency protective measures), including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 100 percent of the total eligible costs.

The parishes of St. Mary, St. Tammany, and Ouachita in the State of Louisiana are eligible to apply for assistance under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance; 97.048, Individual and Household Housing; 97.049, Individual and Household Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 Individual and Household Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

/s/

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary,
Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Department of Homeland Security
## Superdome Personnel, MREs, and Water from 28 Aug to 3 Sep

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>NG Personnel</th>
<th>MREs</th>
<th>Water (liter bottles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>9,792</td>
<td>13,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>6,760</td>
<td>17,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>*35,000</td>
<td>*70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>*70,000</td>
<td>*120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sep</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>*90,000</td>
<td>*180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>*90,000</td>
<td>*120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>*45,000</td>
<td>*55,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the estimates of LANG distribution to evacuees and responders.

As of 081000DEC05
Conf call should be fine
Thanks!!!!!!!!!!

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 3:00 PM
To: Nielsen, Kirstjen M.
Subject: RE: Red Cross Hurricane Katrina Prep

Okay...have advised our folks that you'll want a brief Monday morning and they are flexible on time...also will you want them to come up (we've just down her at 205 E Street) Conf call?
Thanks

-----Original Message-----
From: Nielsen, Kirstjen M.
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 2:57 PM
To: Mall, Carol
Subject: RE: Red Cross Hurricane Katrina Prep

Thanks Carol
This is very helpful. Will get back to you with a time tomorrow.

-----Original Message-----
From: [Redacted]
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 2:48 PM
To: [Redacted]
Cc: Nielsen, Kirstjen M.
Subject: Red Cross Hurricane Katrina Prep

In preparation for Hurricane Katrina’s expected landfall in the New Orleans vicinity, the American Red Cross has every resource at its disposal on alert/moving in anticipation of this event to include personnel, equipment, and materials.

Below are some highlights of Red Cross activities as of 1400 hours today, Saturday, August 27th:

- Chapters across the region are opening shelters in support of evacuees in all states -275,000 shelter meals being moved to Baton Rouge -225,000 shelter meals being moved to Montgomery, Alabama -15 sites being identified to being in big kitchens with our NGO partners, the Southern Baptists, to provide 300,000 meals per day feeding capability -All 14 Disaster Field Supply Centers (warehouses) loading non-perishable support items to include: up to 50,000 cases, up to 350,000 blankets, comfort kits and clean up kits -All vehicles in the Red Cross fleet across the country are on alert for possible deployment -Being dispatched to staging areas (350) -Staffing Center recruiting/send in 1,300 person push package of volunteers to the staff processing center in Montgomery, AL (This in addition to 500 volunteers already deployed to south Florida to augment local volunteers in relief efforts there) -All 8 Emergency Communications Response Vehicles (ECRVs) on alert/deploying to staging areas -Red Cross staff providing liaison/support to
NRC, Region VI RRC, and Region IV RRC as well as all EM7-As and RNATs requesting ESF 6 presence

Please let me know if you have questions

Thanks

Carol

Tracking:

Recipient

Karemowski, Daniel J.

Read

Read: 8/27/2006 2:10 PM
Disaster Operations Summary Report
Disaster Operations Center

Hurricane Katrina Post- and Pre-Landfall Report #9
Update as of 3:00 PM 08/29/2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landfall Report for Katrina 2</th>
<th>Shelter Counts as of 3:00 pm August 29, 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State DR number</td>
<td>AL 871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Chapters Reporting</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># EOCs in Jurisdiction Activated</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># EOCs with Red Cross Liaisons</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Red Cross Shelters/Evacuation Centers on Standby*</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Red Cross Shelters/Evacuation Centers Currently Open*</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Population*</td>
<td>2,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Meals Served to Date</td>
<td>1,337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Shelter numbers fluctuate based on the location of the storm and the time of day. As a storm leaves an area, shelters close except for a few that remain open to house those people who cannot return home.

Impact of the Second Landfall of Katrina

As of 5:00 pm on Monday, August 29th, Hurricane Katrina was listed as a category one hurricane with maximum sustained winds at 95 mph and higher gusts. Weakening is forecast during the next 24 hours as the center continues moving over land. However, hurricane force winds are expected to spread as far as 150 miles inland along the path of Katrina. Hurricane force winds extend outward up to 125 miles from the center, and tropical storm force winds extend outward up to 230 miles.

New Orleans was spared direct hit. However, an estimated 770,000 utility customers in Louisiana are reported without power; Entergy Corp. alone reporting 700,000 and Cleco Corp reporting 70,000 outages. Reports of flooding vary based on region with some levees in New Orleans reportedly breached. Extensive flooding in the Lower 9th Board and St. Bernard Parish may be a result of water going over the tops of the levees. Boil water alerts have been issued.

A curfew is effective in New Orleans from Monday afternoon until dawn Tuesday, and dusk until dawn each day thereafter.

In Mississippi, local media reported 10,000 power outages, but no updates have been reported. Local media also reported a storm surge of more than 20 feet, with waves as high as 33 feet.

Hurricane Katrina is expected move north along the Mississippi River, resulting in showers and thunderstorms for the four state area, especially in northcentral Louisiana and southcentral Arkansas. These storms are not expected to become severe, although localized flooding will be possible across portions of Louisiana and Arkansas.

Alabama-Gulf Coast reports that blood drives have been cancelled for today resulting in a loss of 200 units in collections. AL-GC estimates that there will be a loss of 500 units collected over the next several days due to cancelled drives. The Mobile facility remains open with Mobile minimal staff present. All hospitals supported by Mobile received extra blood units prior to the storm. Mobile facility received superficial damage and is operating on auxiliary power.

(SOURCES: The Weather Channel/National Weather Service/CNN/The Times-Picayune)
Red Cross Response and Activation for Second Landfall of Katrina

Community Services

Feeding

- Identified, with the Southern Baptists, sites for 25 kitchens, which are on stand-by, each with 20,000 daily capacity (for a total of 500,000), to be moved to sites post-landfall.
- Requested an additional ten kitchens (with a daily capacity of 200,000). Spirit of America and Henry's Kitchen are being moved to Montgomery, AL for staging. (The Sysco Kitchen will move to the area post-landfall.)

Material Support Services

SAS:
- A Safe Area has been identified in the HQ facility for DRO staff
- A Weather Alert Radio has been set up, tested and is working
- An Evacuation Plan for the HQ facility has been completed

Logistics

- A Client Assistance Card (CAC) activation unit is operational at the Response Maintenance Center in Austin, TX
- Follow on orders for Sysco to support Baptist and Red Cross kitchens
- The Time Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) for kitchen has been received and is in stage one of implementation.
- Working with federal response for support of operations
- Henry's Kitchen and Spirit of America have arrived in Montgomery, AL
- 166 ERVs from the 48 continental United States have been deployed to the impacted region
- Approximately 288,000 heater meals are staged in Baton Rouge, with another 150,000 in Montgomery
- Obtaining FEMA cambros for Montgomery, AL
- Working with FEMA for equipment requests (fuel, dry boxes, generators, dumpsters, grey water containers, ice, water, forklifts, pallet jacks, shower units, port).
- Open SAM's accounts in Mississippi and Florida
- 2500 clean-up kits staged in Mississippi
- 5000 comfort kits in Mississippi

RTT

- ECRVs are staged in Alabama and Houston, with others supporting or in route to Louisiana.
- Received 25 check-ins from Red Cross communication-net.
- Creating 40 To-Go packs for the Kitchens
- Setting up coordinated communication networks for the affected areas to communicate with the Service Areas and National Headquarters

IKD

- Received offers from or placed requests by donors for support of relief operations
Partner Services

Government/Emergency Management Liaison

- **Alabama**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated with a Red Cross Liaison present.
- **Louisiana**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated and a Red Cross Liaison is present.
- **Florida**: Florida's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) remains fully activated with a Red Cross Liaisons present.
- **Mississippi**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is fully activated with Red Cross Liaisons present.
- **Georgia**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) continues operating at Level I (monitoring). No Red Cross Liaisons requested at this time.
- **South Carolina**: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) continues operating at Level I (monitoring). No Red Cross Liaisons requested at this time.
- **Tennessee**: Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) activated the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at noon on Monday, August 29th until further notice. This is a 24-hour partial activation to include a Red Cross liaison.

Federal

- An ESF#6 multi-partner coordination center has been established at Red Cross national headquarters in Washington, DC, and will be operational effective Tuesday, August 30th. The center will ensure better interagency coordination between the Red Cross, Federal agencies, other NGOs active in disaster, and public/private sector partners as we support community response actions.
- FEMA Region IV and Region VI Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) are staffed 24/7 by Red Cross. Red Crossers support the Emergency Response Team – Advanced (ERT-A) teams in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. Rapid Needs Assessment Teams (RNAT) ESF#6 are staffed in Florida and Mississippi.
- FEMA's National Response Coordination Center remains staffed 24/7 with ESF#6.
- ESF#6 partners are anticipating requests post-landfall.

External Affairs Liaison (EAL)

- EAL public members are present at the Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida State EOCs.
- Alabama, Louisiana, Florida and Mississippi Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) are fully activated today with Red Cross Liaisons present.

Non-government

- An ESF#6 Mass Care Coordination group was officially formed today. NGO representatives will convene at the new ESF#6 Mass Care Coordination Center at ARC NHQ. Initial NGO members include:
  - Adventist Community Services
  - America's Second Harvest (invited)
  - The Salvation Army
  - Southern Baptist Convention/North American Mission Board
  - American Humane Society
  - Church World Service (invited to coordinate faith-based organizations)
  - Labor representation
- VOAD partners are preparing for post-landfall support in LA, MS and AL.
- Beginning calls with emotional and spiritual care national NGO partners.
- ESF #6 NGO committee members are being identified to deploy to DOC.
Individual Client Services

- Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) staff are at NHQ assisting Red Cross in developing protocols for recruitment and deployment of their personnel and will have a representative in the DOC for the duration.
- Initiated contact with Mental Health Partners to mobilize their resources to augment operational staffing.
- Will train staff, via OJT, on the procedures and tools for the new Welfare Information system.

Organizational Support Services

Public Affairs

- Satellite equipment has been set up so interviews can be conducted from the Disaster Operations Center.
- Public Affairs is receiving a number of international media calls.
- Rapid Response Team coverage continues in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi.
- Rapid Response Teams are conducting media interviews and supporting the Southeast Louisiana Chapter in their public affairs efforts.

Fundraising

- Call 1-800-Help Now to make a contribution

Staff Services

- Moving staff to forward deployment centers in Houston, TX and Montgomery, AL
- A time $50.00 allowance will be added to the Disaster Staff Cards for personal preparedness for staff assigned to all Hurricane Katrina related disaster relief operations. These funds are to be used for the following personal preparedness items to ensure Red Cross staff members are prepared to maintain themselves in the Red Cross and partner staff shelters:
  - Flash light and extra batteries
  - Personal FA Kit and other personal choices for over the counter remedies
  - Bedding-sheets/sleeping bag, etc
  - Towels and wash cloths
  - Insect repellent
  - Sun screen
  - Hand sanitizer (Purell, packets, etc.)
  - Lip balm
  - Tissues
- Recruiting 1,900 DSHR members in the next three days
- 865 staff have been assigned and have arrived at all Hurricane Katrina operations; 39% of that number (342) were assigned to southern Florida

Preparedness

- Providing a list of appropriate brochures to Community Services (Mass Care) for public distribution to enhance awareness on safety information.
- Adjusting our preparedness content for this event to focus on people using bottled water and less on water treatment due to the significant amount of flood water, chemicals, or other hazards that can compromise water sources.
Response Center

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Landfall Report for Katrina 1, DR 863-06</th>
<th>Operational Facts in Southern FL as of 9:00 PM August 28, 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of Shelters Currently Open</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Shelter Population</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Centers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verified Hospitalized</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verified Ill/injured</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Service Contacts</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Contacts</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Disaster Volunteers to Date</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;M Volunteers to Date</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Feeding Units to Date</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort Kits Distributed</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact and Assessment for the First Landfall of Katrina

Early damage assessment reports in southern Florida (Miami-Dade) indicate 795 homes with major damage and 457 with minor damage. Damage assessment teams in Miami-Dade are heading south to the upper Keys and three teams in Key West are headed north. Damage assessment for Broward County is almost complete.

As of Sunday at 2:00 PM, power was restored to all but 162,800 customers in Broward County and 332,400 customers in Miami-Dade (total of 736,800). Source: Florida Power and Light

Client Services

Service delivery will be by outreach in Broward and Miami-Dade and a combination of outreach and service centers in the Keys. It is anticipated that there will be 3000 cases opened in Miami-Dade and the Keys and 250 in Broward.

Web-Based Resources

- Louisiana State Police Emergency web site: http://www.lsp.org/emergency.html
John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), asked me to verify that your office had received the documents it needed from the Army Corps of Engineers. I was told that there was some question whether you had the situation report from Col. Wagenaar for August 29, 2005. This is a copy of said report.

If this is not what you are looking for, or if you require some other document, please call me or COL Mike Dowson at [number].
I. Situation

Hurricane Katrina went over the city of New Orleans on Monday. Winds were 145 mph winds. River Reading: 10.1 ft. River Crest (Carrolton Gauge): 15.5 ft at 0900 hrs.

A. General

CEMVNs CMT and CAT are coordinating the execution plan with the Unwitting Planning Response Team. District employees are calling into the Alternate Headquarters Site to inform their supervisors of their status. CEMVNs CMT continues to brief CEMVNs CMT on CEMVNS AOR. The Commander's Reevaluation team inspected the District Headquarters Building and found minor damages to northeast corner of the third floor. COG Wagenar reconstituted the IOR in the District Headquarters building.

B. Weather

Rain and Windy

81 degrees F
Feels Like 85 degrees F
Wind: From WSW at 25 mph

C. Damage Assessment

No damages to report at this time.

D. Secondary Impacts

There is reported flooding in Kenner with water 4.5 ft. on Williams Blvd. There is flooding in St. Bernard Parish with reports of water up to the roof of houses. It has been reported that Causeway Blvd. has about 4 ft. of standing water. It has been reported that Arabi, in St. Bernard Parish, is under 10 ft. of water.

E. Other

PARISH EVACUATIONS:

SHELTERS:
Special Needs open: 9
General Population Shelter: 113

ROAD CLOSURES: Causeway Bridge; LA 23 Belle Chase Tunnel

A.1. MVN Project Operations

CDR has coordinated with Jefferson Parish and has the following information as of 1300 29Aug05:

3 pump stations in East Jefferson Parish are inoperable - no pump stations have operators on site - therefore no water is exiting the drainage culverts and they are overtopping with mixed water and flooding the local streets. We observed 4 feet of water standing in Williams Blvd.

East Jefferson Parish Levee District personnel have driven the length of the Lake Ponchartrain Levese and report that the levee is in good condition, with no evidence of overtopping or erosion, only minor waves may have lapped over the levee.
We observed most houses with major damage to their roofs - roofing will be a huge mission for FEMA.

We have been unable to contact St. Tammany, Plaquemines, Orleans, St. Charles, or St. Bernard Parishes. We continue to try to reach parish officials to assess the situation. We understand that some or all pump stations in Orleans parish have been impassable. We have been unable to confirm this. Info from the net indicates that St. Bernard Parish experienced heavy inundation.

I've heard from sources that water came from 17th St Canal into Lakeview, a subdivision in New Orleans.

Trying to make initial contacts with Memphis PPMD, but phone lines and email have not been functional most of the day.

Title: Map new orleans

A.3. Waterways Operations

The Mississippi River is closed to traffic from Southwest Pass to Natchez, MS

Port Allen Lock is closed to most traffic due to the closure of the railroad bridge. On 29 Aug at 0525 hrs, specific rain, 25 mph winds, river gage 6.9 ft (west 5.9 ft at 1500 hrs. on 28 Aug.) canal gage 1.6 ft. (was 1.8 ft at 1500 hrs on 28 Aug.) As of approximately 1700 hours on 29 Aug., the railroad bridge at Port Allen Lock is operational and USACE hydrographic survey boats will be able to exit the lock into the Mississippi River.

Harvey Lock remains closed. Lost power but is on generator power. On 29 Aug at 0550 hrs, steady rain with 65 mph winds. Gage readings unobtainable at this time. At midnight river gage 5.0 ft. and canal gage 1.45 ft. On 29 Aug at 1035 hrs, the gage on the canal side of Harvey Lock is at 5.0 ft and rising; the river gage at the lock is at 4.9 ft. There are approximately 300 trees down and all trees in the area are damaged. Hatch covers for the engine room were blown down but blew away and several buildings in the area have roof damage. On 29 Aug at 1330, water is rising on the canal side and is about 1/2 ft from topping the bank (gage is at 4.0 ft) and the river is dropping. The canal is backed up and overtopping the banks in areas.

Altes Lock remains closed. On 29 Aug at 2300 hrs, canal gage reading 0.75 ft. On 29 Aug at 0500 hrs. continuous rain and wind. Canal gage reading unobtainable at this time.

INNC Lock remains closed. Water is rising fast on canal side and is beginning to overtop concrete floodwall. Lock lost commercial power and generator power due to flooding from overtopping of floodwall along the west side of the INNC. On 29 Aug, at 06:00 hrs, river gage is 9.1 ft. and canal gage is 14.4 ft. On 29 Aug at 13:25 hrs, there is about 15 inches of water in the tunnels. The tide in the canal is going down (gage is about 11.0 ft) and the Florida Ave Bridge is under water. It has been reported that the electrical components of the lock were flooded, but the machinery was above the water level. Approximately a 1-block section of the floodwall along the canal failed on the east side of the canal & north side of Judge Seabrook Bridge.

Bayou Beach Lock sustained no visible damage and reported only small tree debris on the grounds. They
are on generator power and have enough fuel for about a week and a half. There is no visible damage to any of the buildings and the locks should be able to open at 1900 hrs on 29 Aug.

All other facilities are open for normal operations.

A.4. Pumping Stations
Jefferson Parish pumping stations at Duncan & Bommel canals are damaged. All Jefferson and Orleans Parish Pumping Stations are operable as of 29 Aug.

B. USACE Authorities

C. FEMA Mission Assignments

C.1. ICE Mission

C.2. Water Mission

C.3. Emergency Power Mission

C.4. Debris Mission

C.5. Temporary Roofing Mission

C.6. Temporary Housing

C.7. Technical Assistance

C.8. Regional Activation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Assigned = 47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Accounted = 254</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Unknown = 89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accountability of district personnel: Supervisors continue their attempts to contact all personnel, but connections are limited by cell phone traffic limitations. Employees have been instructed to call in to MVN and MTVK toll-free numbers to gain accountability. Those that get through have expressed difficulty in making telephone contact because of cell phone traffic limitations and land-line long distance connection problems.

cw/dl - 29 Aug 05

B. Information Management

Continue to address computer related problems and connectivity issues. Cell phone service is diminished. Out going long distance phone service was lost and remains down. Network connectivity with the New Orleans District district is currently down. DLB

C. Logistics

New Orleans District Facility status:
(NOTE: This is an initial status report.)
Shop building roof over the office area is coming off.
Canopy to new mail room (building 745) has blown off.
HO33 building has significant substantial damages, e.g., north side.
Also damages to Child Care Center building.
Deer to the 400 kw generator blew in, generator has been shut down. Busker is being supported by the 50kw generator.

MVN RECON team is scheduled to return to New Orleans ASAP to do site survey of damages. This is essential before we can reopen our district headquarters.

GSA leased vehicles that were on the grounds are damaged/deestroyed; not sure to what extent. GSA Regional Fleet Office was notified of this status and requested to be prepared for emergency replacement of vehicles.

Fort Allen Lock has been designated as staging area for FEMA and COE.

Orral Blankard, [redacted], is available on site to coordinate actions.

LM personnel status report: 23 assigned; 10 accounted, 13 unknowns. Various times today attempts have been made to contact unknown via personal cell, however, no calls have gone through. LT will continue calling.

Continuing coordination with local hotels to ensure CMT, CAT members are being accommodated with lodging. Hotel staff has been very supportive but there is much confusion ensuring that our team continues to have a room. Available rooms in Vidalia area are extremely hard to locate or non-existent at this time. One additional room was reserved today for new team member added.

Additionally the local area has experienced several power outages throughout the day and has had to switch to generator power. MVN personnel have been released due to no electrical power in the building. Hotels are now also reporting loss of water due to city problems.

Supported EOC by inputting data into eingle; also prepared T&A sheets for CMT & CAT team members. Initiated action to all members to fill out emergency deployment evacuation TDY Travel requesting legal dependents who accompanied Corps team members. RM requested this information to estimate cost.

Dr. Public Affairs

Phone outage: Due to long-distance phone outage, incapable of making outgoing long-distance calls back to media. Requested MVN PAO patch media directly to us and tell media about the situation and to keep calling us.

29 Aug Media interviews conducted:
- New York Times, Andrew Ravekin - science reporter [redacted]
  * John Hall - conditions at levees
  - Chicago Tribune, Jeffrey Manier [redacted]
  * John Hall and Al Naumi - overall situation, weaknesses
- Newsweek, Susana Schroeder [redacted]
  * returned call only
- ENR, Andrew Wright [redacted]
  * phone line busy

28-29 Aug
- NPR, Emily Baracas
  * John Hall, Al Naumi, Maj Murray Sturkel - overall situation

Positive media for the most part. Fox News reported "Corps of Engineers did a miraculous with the levees."
Live video coverage of New Orleans and vicinity at: http://www.wdha.com/index.html

Rumors reported in St. Bernard Parish are that the Corps, in concert with FEMA, blew the levees at Industrial Canal at Tennessee Street to prevent flooding at Orleans. Contacted local TV and WLL radio to help dispel the rumors. The following was emailed:

From: New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Date: Aug. 30, 2005

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers said Monday that reports are untrue that the Corps had created breaches in the hurricane levees. There have been no breaches of the levees by human action of any kind at this point.

If breaching of a levee to release water is required, it would be done only after careful coordination between the Corps of Engineers, levee districts and other local authorities.

At this point, the Corps of Engineers has no confirmed reports of levee breaching or levee failure of any kind during Hurricane Katrina. We are investigating for the possibility of any breaching, and we are also investigating whether levees have been overtopped at any point.

We have confirmed a floodwall failure on the Industrial Canal. The failure occurred on the east bank north of North Claiborne Avenue and south of Florida Avenue. It is about one block long.

We also have a confirmed report that there is no damage to the levee systems in Jefferson Parish and that the Jefferson Parish hurricane levees have not been overtopped.

New Orleans District Public Affairs can be reached at (504) 521-2836. Crisis Action Team operating temporarily in Vicksburg, MS.

E. Security & Safety

F. Contracting

Spoke with 15 additional CT personnel: All were evacuated. Spoke with MVM contracting and unwatering teams members on contracting strategy. Received numerous inquiries from potential vendors. Verbal NTP issued Thursday for two low boats to support the Bridge Wheel. Attempting to locate survey contractors with hydrographic capabilities. (JAB 8-29-05)

G. Resource Management

FOCS
Class 210 finding: $50K

Notified CENWO to process 80 hours of pay for all workers in New Orleans District. Will need to do prior period adjustments on return to work.

The fully burdened labor cost estimate for billets assigned to the various hurricane teams is $50,700 a day.

H. Engineering

Richard Pinner is located in Baton Rouge and is prepared to deploy on a river inspection. Richard has design experience with St. Bernard Parish and Orleans Parish floodwalls and levees.
Gages: Evaluation of storm surge was hampered by lack of gages and gage failure or not reporting. Also Internet problems also were encountered. Mississippi River gages on rivergages.com were accessed. The Carrolton gage crested at 15.5 feet at 0900. Venice gage was inoperable due to overtopping.

ADCIRC model was functional and helped to indicate water levels where gage data was not available or suspect.

Levees: Floodwalls were overtopped on the east side of the 17th street Canal and the east side of the IHNC. Sections of wall failed in each area.

Doug Dillon is Engineering Division representative on the unwatering team and is currently deployed in Memphis.

We are inventorying our P&ES under design for availability for construction.

CEMV/ED stands ready to provide engineering support to Memphis and St. Louis Districts for unwatering and remedial flood control repairs and other civil works efforts.

I. Real Estate

Contacted C/Real Estate, Memphis District, to deploy to Port Allen Lock on 31 Aug 05 - they anticipate handling roof mission for FEMA. FEMA will also be located at Port Allen Lock. Memphis RE has received no tasks associated with the unwatering plan.

A. Bunker

The Commander's Resumption team moved back to the EOC in the District Headquarters Building.

A. Command and Control

Bunker (located at New Orleans District):

COM, Richard P. Wagner

Commanding Officer

Sgt. W. H. S. (Bunker)

Rank (Bunker)

James Walters

National Manager

Rank (Bunker)

CMT (located at Vicksburg District):

MAJ Murray P. Starkel

Deputy Commander

Rank (fax)

Gregory Browning

Executive Assistant

Rank (fax)

Herbert "Joe" Wagner

National Disaster Manager

Rank (fax)

A. Field Officers

Mike Lowrey
Smith, Jeff

From: Robinson, Tony
Sent: Thursday, September 15, 2005 10:38 PM
To: Smith, Jeff

On 8/31/05 at 0130 verbal notification was given to provision buses. The first tasker was for 455 buses.

Tony Robinson
Response and Recovery Division Director
DHS-FEMA Region VI
Office:
Fax:
email:

This communication, along with any attachments, is covered by federal and state law governing electronic communications and may contain confidential and legally privileged information. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, use or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this in error, please reply immediately to the sender and delete this message. Thank you.
Update from FEMA PFO - 4 SEP 2005 (AM)

- PFO Staff has increased in size significantly and is rapidly gaining situational awareness and is working issues.
- JTFG standing Joint Force Headquarters personnel have arrived (approx 40 pax) and is now assisting JPO-LA and PFO staff in their operations.
- Some notes from this morning’s update from JPO-LA:
  - JTF is establishing pickup points throughout city of New Orleans and is sustaining regular bus service to these locations to facilitate rapid evacuation of the city.  Police and military are delivering evacuees to these sites.
  - 3 hospitals/cleaners in New Orleans are now able to begin taking patients again and JPO is working plan to shift some immediate care to these facilities, although mandatory evacuation of city continues.
  - All hospitals in New Orleans are cleared of patients reported by us last night, but reiterated (for emphasis, given new reporting to contrary).
  - Evacuations continued throughout night - total of 2287 evacuated between 031845-042440. Total evacuations now at 88K according to JTF-E.
  - Priority for evac operation at Algiers is 3000 pax at that location. Begins evac operation at 0915HR and will finish at 1030HR.
  - Convention Center and Superdome are now locked—no further evacuations from this area, although some evacuees moving to these locations have been identified and are being addressed.
  - Search and rescue reports significantly less evacuees on rooftops and therefore a reduced requirement for supply of water and food.
  - JTF-E is now able to handle calls for evacuation support. For example, call came in last night to evacuate 40 nursing home residents. JTF-E dispatched vehicles with security and addressed this requirement.
  - JPO is focused on assessing and addressing needs for commodities and evac of St. Bernard Parish. FEMA has personnel on the ground at that location.
  - 3000 pax arrived last night - FEMA has 18 trucks loaded now (approx 21K cases each). Will receive 1 NH meals tonight (over 150K cases). Appears that flow is now sufficient to meet all needs.
  - Sheltering is being addressed by tiger team today. Issue is establishment of local shelters facilities to allow in situ relocation at some future point.
  - Key Point. Appears state is reluctant to execute a true mandatory evacuation—i.e., forced if necessary. Therefore, state is pushing for shelters (includes all life support) in city to house citizens that will not leave voluntarily.
  - Major issue working from state. New Orleans has requested, according to PFO, a complete replacement of city services for New Orleans, to include police and fire. Some details are sketched, but this issue is being worked very hard by PFO and FEMA National is very engaged in this discussion.

NOTE: JPO-LA will move to permanent headquarters tomorrow. 5 SEP. Plan being worked to ensure no degradation of operational capability.
From: john.jordan2@mil.def.mil
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 9:13 PM
To: john.jordan2@mil.def.mil, joseph.high@mil.def.mil, mark.graham@mil.def.mil, mark.graham@mil.def.mil, brown.michael@mil.def.mil, brown.michael@mil.def.mil, o'byran.stewart.m@mil.def.mil, o'byran.stewart.m@mil.def.mil, rana.sheehan@mil.def.mil, rana.sheehan@mil.def.mil
Cc: maj.kraig.sheest@mil.def.mil, christian.degroot@mil.def.mil, christin.degroot@mil.def.mil, thomas.thompson@mil.def.mil, thomas.thompson@mil.def.mil, wittmoe.walter.e@mil.def.mil, wittmoe.walter.e@mil.def.mil, usnorthcom.ddecc
Subject: Update from MIL ADDT to FFO
Attachments: Card for john.jordan2

---

Sir,

See attached update from FFO. We are trying to improve our format to make it a bit easier to read. Will still be BlackBerry friendly.

V/r,

John J. Jordan
COL, U.S. Army

Update from Principal Federal Official (FFO) Military Assistants
5 SEP 2005 (18)

1. Information from 1800 FCO-LA Update Brief

   a. Rescue and Evacuation.
      - Governor Blanco has decided not to force any evacuations in New Orleans.
      - Residents are still encouraged to evacuate.
      - Buses were sent through NO on previously identified evac routes today and no additional residents would board buses for voluntary evacuation. It appears that the evacuation phase of operations is winding down, or may be completed.

   b. Commodity Distribution
      - Since NO is not being fully evacuated, requirements now exist to provide all commodities to the remaining population. Since FEMA did not anticipate reversal of decision for mandatory evacuation, crisis-action planning is now underway to provide this support.
      - Special note: Porta-potties ordered for support of Superdome and Convention Center (when full of evacuees) arrived today. This will provide some relief to the residents remaining in NO.
      - Logistics reported zero balance on MREs again - after pushing all remaining stocks to FFOs. Will attempt to determine daily requirement and ascertain whether stocks of MREs are simply collecting at points outside the USA at Camp Beauregard. Numbers of MREs pushed has increased each day and it is not clear whether we are tracking and meeting requirements, or simply pushing everything forward.

   c. Medical
      - DMAT went to outlying Parishes (St. Charles and St. Tammany) and conducted assessments. No major medical facility issues, but medical supply is a critical requirement. Issue is being addressed by HHC (HHC-6).
      - Full DMAT support will be provided to Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes tomorrow. Includes provisions for medical care, medical supply, etc. to support fatigued medical providers in these locations.
      - DMAT continues to assess ability to bring hospitals in the 13 impacted
d. Mortuary
- Plan for collecting and processing remains was presented by Mortuary Tiger Team to State EMS leadership but no decision was made.
- Meeting was held today between EMDR, 32nd ABN, State PAM, Urban Search and Rescue, and USCG to address roles and responsibilities for house to house search for survivors and remains.
- EMDR currently has 472 Mortuary Affairs Officers and Type I, II and III Recovery Teams available. Major increase since yesterday’s report.

e. Security
- ESF-12 (DES) brought up issue of security at refineries. EXXON Refinery in St. Bernard Parish specifically requested assistance with security. Action was passed to State for their consideration.

f. Sheltering
- State has still not identified location to replace previously planned shelter location at Camp Minden, LA. FEMA remains ready to being immediate work once location is identified. Major issue that needs high-level attention to maximize use of time and available other resources.

g. Recovery
- Community Relations Teams are in place in the eight most impacted Parishes, as prioritized by the State of Louisiana. CRTs will expand into other five Parishes beginning tomorrow. Teams are also being deployed to remote sheltering locations in States outside Louisiana to answer evacuees questions and provide FEMA authorized assistance.
- State requested assistance with facility to house NO City Government. Idea included an airlift location (quarter boat / deck boat) near Algiers.

2. Current PFO activities.

a. Staff is establishing itself at new PFO/JFO location and continues to build situational awareness.

b. Deputy PFO is increasing PFO staff size to accommodate scope of mission requirements. Expect some additional personnel to arrive in next few days. New hard site JFO will facilitate staff expansion.

c. Primary focus will be building a better awareness of JFO-Mississippi situation and establishing an operational rhythm to improve situational awareness and enhance ability to provide PFO with best possible decisional information.

3. Focus of PFO for 24-72 Hours.
- Continue house to house search for survivors and remains.
- Complete operation to identify shelters and prepare for shelter plan.
- Complete expansion into outlying Parishes to establish FEMA presence and basic life sustenance.
- Continue improvement of logistics system.

4. Miscellaneous.

a. Our office is up and running at new PFO facility at 15th Avenue and Florida Street in Baton Rouge, LA. It is located on the second floor in the PFO suite immediately across from Mr. Brown’s office. Phone is 347-3333. Cell numbers remain same.

b. Good visit today by POTUS – visited State RTO and held discussions with key leaders at local, state and federal levels. Mr. Chertoff completed his 2-day visit today as well.

c. RADM O’Bryan, JFQOR from JFRON briefed Mr. Brown today on their capabilities and recommendations for use to facilitate ongoing FEMA operations. Mr. Brown approved concept brief and directed execution. JFQOR tasks are to provide the PFO and all subordinate FEMA elements with a common operating picture and to suggest improvements in processes to support better situational awareness and information flow throughout the FEMA structure. Agreed focus was current operations, not long-term planning.
e. Order from JTF-X indicates that JTF-NORTHCOM mission has changed. They will not move to Baton Rouge to support FEMA long-range planning. Will work with RADM O'Regan (JFREQ-JFCOM) to see if he recommends expansion of his focus to support FEMA long-range planning.
From: john.jordan
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 11:17 AM
To: john.jordan, joseph.ingel, mark.graham, Brown, michael.d.brown, michael.d.obbyan, stewart.m. reed, russel.honeycutt, christian.degroat, ronald.mcelwee, thomas.thompson
Cc: HAJ Craig Sheehy, ronald.mcelwee, thomas.thompson
Subject: Update from MIL ASST to PFO
Attachments: Card for john.jordan

Sir,

Our update for this morning.

v/r

John
John J. Jordan
COL, U.S. Army

Update from Principal Federal Official (PFO) Military Assistants

1. Information from 0000 PCD-LA Update Brief
   a. Rescue and Evacuation.
      - Decision by Governor Blanco to not force any evacuations in New Orleans remains in place.
      - Mayor of New Orleans is not forcing evacuations in NO and is not prohibiting residents from returning. Residents are still strongly encouraged to evacuate.
      - Limited bus circuits through NO will continue to evacuate residents who did not previously decide to evacuate. Major evacuation operations are completed and all evacuee collection points have been cleared.
   b. Commodity Distribution.
      - As reported last SITREP, since NO is not being fully evacuated, requirements exist to provide all commodities to the remaining population. FEMA is focused on that effort today.
      - Major push today to develop lines of supply to all outlying Parishes. Task Force Pelican establishment of National Guard operations in those locations will greatly facilitate PFO operations and provide better C1 of commodity distribution.
   c. Medical.
      - Continuing medical assessment and beginning medical re-supply in St. Charles Parish today.
      - Medical assessment in all 13 impacted Parishes continues and is expected to be complete in 48 hours.
      - CDC experts in environmental and occupational health arrive today to assist State and FEMA in their areas of expertise.
   d. Mortuary.
      - Meeting today at 1000 hours among all interested parties to address body
collection and mortuary operations.
- Advance Party from 54 QM CO (Mortuary Affairs) is on the ground. Expect deployment of main body on 8 SHF.
  a. Security
  b. Status reports all Parishes secure except Orleans. Expect Orleans to be secure in next 24 hours.
  c. Sheltering
  d. Movement of evacuees from Astrodome in Houston to 2 cruise ships in Galveston, TX area is beginning today. Third cruise ship will arrive Thursday vic Mobile, AL.
  e. Recovery
    - FEMA directed that a FEMA representative will be placed in every shelter to facilitate contact with evacuees. FEMA goal is to accomplish this mission by Thursday. Longer shelters outside LA are being addressed by FEMA Headquarters in Washington through the FEMA Region offices.
    - FEMA is working a national information campaign to contact evacuees and residents of impacted area to provide contact information and being process of relief and assistance to entitled persons and businesses.
  g. Current FFO activities.
    a. Staff is establishing itself at new FFO/JFO location and continues to build situational awareness.
    b. Deputy FFO is increasing FFO staff size to accommodate scope of mission requirements. Expect new additional personnel to arrive in next few days. New hard site JFO will facilitate staff expansion.
    c. Primary focus is building a better awareness of JFO-Mississippi situation and establishing an operational rhythm to improve situational awareness and enhance ability to provide FFO with best possible decisional information.
  j. FFO Focus Areas as established in 0900 Executive Conference today:
    - Evacuation
    - House to House Searches
    - Body Recovery Operations and Disaster Mortuary Services
    - Assistance to Outlying Parishes
    - Issue of non-enforcement of mandatory evacuation order - way ahead and ultimate end state.
    - Public Health and Environment
  k. Miscellaneous.
    a. Our office is up and running at new FFO facility at 15th Avenue and Florida Street in Baton Rouge, LA. It is located on the second floor in the FFO suite immediately across from Mr. Brown’s office. Phone is (504) 696-0100. Cell numbers remain same.
    b. As previously reported, Mr. Cheffo directed establishment of a FEMA Deputy FFO-Forward in New Orleans to assist Mr. Brown’s FEMA operations within this severely damaged city. Director will be VADM Allen, Vice Commandant of the USCG. Key to note that Mr. Brown remains FFO for the entire disaster area, including New Orleans and its environs – DoD needs to understand this FEMA organisational structure.
    c. Orders indicate deployment of an Army BMSS cell from Fort Leavenworth to join SFFO and assist in their support to FEMA FFO/JFO. NAVY O’Bryan is aware of this deployment and will CI this call.
From: Weber, Scott [O=DHS ORG/OU=E2K3 ADMIN
GROUP/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=SCOTT WEBER]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 2:55 PM
To: Heath, Michael
Subject: RE: answers

Sorry for the frenetic pace before, thanks for pulling this together.

From: Heath, Michael [mailto:Michael.Heath]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 1:20 PM
To: Weber, Scott
Subject: answers

1. Evacuation began Wednesday afternoon for special needs patients and four buses of general population.
   Resumed on Thursday morning.

2. Number of people evacuated from Super Dome:
   1500 Special Needs patients
   2000 plus general pop.

3. Arrived at Superdome:
   21 Buses with 2500 plus folks

4. 10 Additional buses have notified the AstroDome that they are inbound.

5. Evac stopped last night due to darkness and shooting. Resumed this morning

6. We do not have a confirmed number of total buses involved. Working this now
State of Louisiana

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. KBB 2005 - 25

EMERGENCY EVACUATION BY BUSES

WHEREAS, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, R.S. 29:721, et seq., confers upon the governor of the state of Louisiana emergency powers to deal with emergencies and disasters, including those caused by fire, flood, earthquake or other natural or man-made causes, to ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with such emergencies or disasters, and to preserve the lives and property of the citizens of the state of Louisiana;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005, a state of emergency was declared and is currently in effect;

WHEREAS, R.S. 29:724(D)(4) provides that the governor, subject to any applicable requirements for compensation, may commandeer or utilize any private property if she finds it necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency;

WHEREAS, there is an immediate need for mass transportation to move citizens to shelters and other safe locations from disaster areas; and

WHEREAS, given the current exigent circumstances, buses are the most reasonable and practical mode of mass transportation to move our citizens to safety;

NOW THEREFORE, KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO, Governor of the state of Louisiana, by virtue of the authority vested by the Constitution and laws of the state of Louisiana, do hereby order and direct as follows:

SECTION 1: Each Superintendent of Education for each school district in Louisiana that remains substantially operational following the passage of Hurricane Katrina shall contact the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness at 225-925-3916 and provide an inventory of school buses and bus drivers in their district;

SECTION 2: As determined by the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, such buses shall be made available to be used as necessary for the mass transportation of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, accompanying law enforcement personnel, and necessary supplies to and from areas of concern to areas of safety;

SECTION 3: The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness is hereby authorized to commandeer and utilize such buses for such purposes;

SECTION 4: Each Superintendent of Education for each school district in Louisiana that remains substantially operational following the passage of Hurricane Katrina shall coordinate with local law enforcement agencies and peace officers to ensure that at least one peace officer ride in each bus and at least two marked law enforcement vehicles accompany every ten buses;

SECTION 5: The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness shall make efforts to work with the superintendents and local boards of education to minimize interruption of regular transportation of students;

SECTION 6: La. R.S. 17:158, relative to parish and city school boards providing free
transportation to students, is hereby suspended until Sunday, September 25, 2005, unless reinstated sooner; and

SECTION 7: La. R.S. 32:402, relative to the requirement for drivers to secure commercial driver’s license (CDL), is hereby suspended until September 25, 2005, unless reinstated sooner. Notwithstanding the above suspension, such drivers must have a valid Louisiana or other valid driver’s license of their state of residence.

SECTION 8: Executive Order No. KDB 2005-31, issued on August 31, 2005, is hereby rescinded and terminated.

SECTION 9: This Order is effective upon signature and shall continue in effect until amended, modified, terminated, or rescinded by the governor, or terminated by operation of law.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand officially and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of Louisiana, at the Capitol, in the city of Baton Rouge, on this 2nd day of September, 2005.

/S/ Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA

ATTEST BY
THE GOVERNOR

/S/ Al Ater
SECRETARY OF STATE
WHEREAS, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, R.S. 29:721, et seq., confers upon the governor of the state of Louisiana emergency powers to deal with emergencies and disasters, including those caused by fire, flood, earthquake or other natural or man-made causes, to ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with such emergencies or disasters, and to preserve the lives and property of the citizens of the state of Louisiana;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005, a state of emergency was declared and is currently in effect;

WHEREAS, R.S. 29:724(D)(4) provides that the governor, subject to any applicable requirements for compensation, may commandeer or utilize any private property if she finds it necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency;

WHEREAS, there is an immediate need for mass transportation to move citizens to shelters and other safe locations from disaster areas; and

WHEREAS, given the current exigent circumstances, buses are the most reasonable and practical mode of mass transportation to move our citizens to safety;

NOW THEREFORE I, KATIELEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO, Governor of the state of Louisiana, by virtue of the authority vested by the Constitution and laws of the state of Louisiana, do hereby order and direct as follows:

SECTION 1: Each Superintendent of Education for each school district in Louisiana that remains substantially operational following the passage of Hurricane Katrina shall contact the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness at 225-922-3916 and provide an inventory of school buses and bus drivers in their district;

SECTION 2: As determined by the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, such buses shall be made available to be used as necessary for the mass transportation of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, accompanying law enforcement personnel, and necessary supplies to from areas of concern to areas of safety;

SECTION 3: The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness is hereby authorized to commandeer and utilize such buses for such purposes;

SECTION 4: Each Superintendent of Education for each school district in Louisiana that remains substantially operational shall coordinate with local law enforcement agencies and peace officers to ensure that at least one peace officer ride in each bus and at least two marked law enforcement vehicles accompany every ten buses;

SECTION 5: The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness shall make efforts to work with the superintendents and local boards of education to minimize interruption of regular transportation of students;
SECTION 6:  R.S. 17:158, relative to parish and city school boards providing free transportation to students, is hereby suspended until Sunday, September 25, 2005, unless reinstated sooner.

SECTION 7:  This Order is effective upon signature and shall continue in effect until amended, modified, terminated, or rescinded by the governor, or terminated by operation of law.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand officially and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of Louisiana, at the Capitol, in the city of Baton Rouge, on this 31st day of August, 2005.

/S/ Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA

ATTEST BY
THE GOVERNOR

/S/ A[. A]ter
SECRETARY OF STATE
Jessica Ourso Dardenne

From: Miles Buder
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 11:38 PM
To: GOV-Gov.Staff ALL Staff
Subject: BUSES

Andy is asking that we make special note of bus services being offered by our callers, for potential use in both evacuations from New Orleans and movement of victims between shelters.

In order to facilitate bus coordination, we need to evaluate the legitimacy of the bus services being offered. To do so, ask the following questions:

-- How many people can the bus hold?
-- Where is the bus currently located?
-- Is the driver an experienced, professional bus driver?
-- Will you have any additional assistance available on the bus for the sick or those with special needs?
-- When is the bus available, and for how long?
-- What is the fuel capacity of the bus, and what mileage per gallon does it cover?

Finally, ensure that the caller will arrange to have at least two local law enforcement agents (i.e. sheriff's deputies) traveling on the bus. They should not expect us to provide law enforcement, but the safety situation here is obviously uncertain.

For now, we will follow the same protocol that we have to this point—the staff at the workforce commission will collect and prioritize bus service offers from us. Please ensure that tomorrow they receive any offers you have collected tonight. Put the callers on standby for a return call as soon as we can ID specific bus service needs.

Thanks,
Miles

11/1/2005
From: Jones, Gary  
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 8:03 AM  
To: Craig, Daniel; Buikema, Edward  
Cc: Lowder, Michael; Lekey, William; Wells, Scott; Robinson, Tony  
Subject: LA evacuees going to Houston  

Ed and Dan, I assume you both know of the plan to move LA evacuees to the Houston Astro Dome. I just got a call from Scott Wells and he said the Gov of LA has not approved this plan. Jack Colley just advised me that Gov Perry has not received a call from Gov Blanco regarding this plan. Jack said he heard that she was going to make the call early this morning, again this has not happened. Jack advised me again that this is going to be a tremendous expense for the State of Texas and FEMA should declare at least an emergency declaration for his state. I know you both are busy but I wanted to keep you in the loop on what I know at this time.

Gary

9/21/2005
--------Original Message--------
From: Lower, Michael <Michael.Lowerer@pa.gov>
To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@pa.gov>; Buikema, Edward <Edward.Buikema@pa.gov>; "Ken.Burris" <Ken.Burris@pa.gov>
CC: "brooks.althouse@pa.gov" <brooks.althouse@pa.gov>
Sent: Fri Sep 02 22:55:53 2005
Subject: RE:

This is flat wrong! We have been flying planes all afternoon and evening.

--------Original Message--------
From: Rhode, Patrick
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 1:43 PM
To: Buikema, Edward; Lower, Michael; "Ken.Burris"
CC: "brooks.althouse@pa.gov"<brooks.althouse@pa.gov>
Subject: FW:

--------Original Message--------
From: Brown, Michael D <Michael.D.Brown@pa.gov>
To: 'patrick.rhode@pa.gov' <Patrick.Rhode@pa.gov>
"brooks.Althouse@pa.gov"
Sent: Fri Sep 02 22:17:56 2005
Subject:

Spoke to Misato and Cino. ATH has arranged for commercial air carriers to fly over Arwaza. United, Delta, etc. But, no action from us. Carriers will withdraw planes if not used. If we're not we should get carriers know why, etc. Please get me info or call Cino away.

Hope this is the last of these I send and we can have the call down here handle.

Also, be aware that Gen H is going into the convention center tonight to secure it - room by room, remove bodies, etc. We've kept quiet so media won't be around.
From: Hill, Ken
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 8:22 PM
To: Jackson, Michael (Deputy); Brown, Michael (DHS); Hala, Janet; McQueeney, Charles; Stephan, Bob; Beardsworth, Randy; Perry, Phil; Collins, Thomas; Divine, Robert C; Basham, W; Mayer, Matt; Lockwood, Thomas
Cc: Wood, John (COS); Cannatti, Ashley; Boudreaux, Chad; Rhode, Patrick; Filler, Joshua; Richmond, Susan; Maner, Andrew; Tambone, Victor; Ressler, Shila; Kliks, Jennifer; IAIPExecSec; Armstrong, Sue; Woods, Keshia; Pultz, Rick; Hehr, Casey; Paar, Tom; Woodard, Steven; Heinlein, Elaine; Wall, Kenneth; Weber, Scott; Mandelker, Sigal; Isles, Adam; DHS ExecSec; Wiley, Miles; Sullivan, Timothy (Admin.); Allshuler, Brooke; Ayers, Dana; Shara, Robert F
Subject: Hurricane Katrina - Designation of Principal Federal Official
Attachments: Designation of Principal Federal Official for Hurricane Katrina - Internal DHS memo.pdf

Attached please find a memo from Secretary Chertoff declaring Hurricane Katrina an "Incident of National Significance" and designating US Michael Brown as the Principal Federal Official (PFO).
Catastrophic Incident Annex

Coordinating Agency:
Department of Homeland Security

Cooperating Agencies:
All Federal departments and agencies (and other organizations) with assigned primary or supporting Emergency Support Function (ESF) responsibilities

Introduction

Purpose

- The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP-CIA) establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.

- A more detailed and operationally specific NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) that is designated "For Official Use Only" will be approved and published independently of the NRP Base Plan and annexes.

Scope

- A catastrophic incident, as defined by the NRP, is any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All catastrophic incidents are Incidents of National Significance. These factors drive the urgency for coordinated national planning to ensure accelerated Federal/national assistance.

- Recognizing that Federal and/or national resources are required to augment overwhelmed State, local, and tribal response efforts, the NRP-CIA establishes protocols to prudently and rapidly deploy key essential resources (e.g., medical teams, urban search and rescue teams, transportable shelters, medical and equipment caches, etc.) that are expected to be urgently needed or required to save lives and contain incidents.

- Accordingly, upon designation by the Secretary of Homeland Security of a catastrophic incident, Federal resources—organized into incident-specific "packages"—will deploy in accordance with the NRP-CIS and in coordination with the affected State and incident command structure.

Policies

- The NRP-CIA strategy is consistent with NRP and National Incident Management System protocols and Incident Command System conventions.

- Only the Secretary of Homeland Security or designee may initiate implementation of the NRP-CIA.

- All deploying Federal resources remain under the control of their respective Federal department or agency during mobilization and deployment.
• Federal resources arriving at a Federal mobilization center or staging area remain there until requested by State/local incident command authorities, when they are integrated into the incident response effort.

• Federal assets unilaterally deployed in accordance with the NRP-CIS do not require a State cost-share. However, in accordance with the Stafford Act, State requests for use of deployed Federal assets may require cost-sharing.

• Unless it can be credibly established that a mobilizing Federal resource identified in the NRP-CIS is not needed at the catastrophic incident venue, that resource deploys.

• The occurrence or threat of multiple catastrophic incidents may significantly reduce the size, speed, and depth of the Federal response. If deemed necessary or prudent, the Federal Government may reduce the availability or allocation of finite resources when multiple venues are competing for the same resources, or hold certain resources in reserve in case of additional incidents.

Situation

Incident Condition: Normal procedures for certain ESFs may be expedited or streamlined to address the magnitude of urgent requirements of the incident. All ESFs must explore economies of scale to maximize utilization and efficiency of scarce resources. In the case of catastrophic incident, it is expected that the Federal Government or other national entities provide expedited assistance in one or more of the following areas:

• Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (ESF #6): The ability to provide temporary shelter, food, emergency first aid, clothing, and other essential life support to people may be complicated by contaminated resources or facilities.

• Urban Search and Rescue (ESF #9): Resources and personnel to perform operational activities (e.g., locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures) are limited. If search and rescue operations are required in areas of contamination, the limited availability of properly equipped resources supports or underscores the need for prompt Federal response.

• Decontamination (ESFs #8 and #10): Incidents involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) may require decontamination of casualties, evaucuees, animals, equipment, buildings, critical infrastructure, and other areas. Given the potentially large numbers of casualties and evacuees, resulting decontamination requirements may quickly outstrip local and State capabilities.

• Public Health and Medical Support (ESF #8): There is a significant need for public health and medical support, including mental health services. Medical support is required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points, evacuee and refugee points and shelters, and at other locations to support field operations. In addition, any contamination requirement increases the requirement for technical assistance.

• Medical Equipment and Supplies (ESF #8): Shortages of available supplies of preventive and therapeutic pharmaceuticals and qualified medical personnel to administer available prophylaxis are likely. Timely distribution of prophylaxis may forestall additional illnesses, and reduce the impact of disease among those already exposed.

• Casualty and Fatality Management and Transportation (ESF #8): Federal resources may be required to manage the transportation and storage of deceased, injured, and exposed victims if their numbers are extremely high. In addition, the immense numbers of casualties are likely to overwhelm the bed capacities of local and State medical facilities.

• Public Information (ESF #15): When State and local public communications channels are overwhelmed during a catastrophic incident, the Federal Government must immediately provide
resources to assist in delivering clear and coherent public information guidance and consistent messages to the affected areas.

Planning Assumptions

- A catastrophic incident results in large numbers of casualties and/or displaced persons, possibly in the tens of thousands.

- The Secretary of Homeland Security designates the event an Incident of National Significance and directs implementation of the NRP-CIA.

- A catastrophic mass casualty/mass evacuation incident triggers a Presidential disaster declaration, immediately or otherwise.

- The nature and scope of the catastrophic incident may include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive attacks, disease epidemics, and major natural or manmade hazards.

- Multiple incidents may occur simultaneously or sequentially in contiguous and/or noncontiguous areas. Some incidents, such as a biological WMD attack, may be dispersed over a large geographic area, and lack a defined incident site.

- A catastrophic incident may occur with little or no warning. Some incidents, such as rapid disease outbreaks, may be well underway before detection.

- The incident may cause significant disruption of the area’s critical infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, and public health and medical systems.

- The response capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction (to include mutual aid from surrounding jurisdictions and response support from the State) may be insufficient and quickly overwhelmed. Local emergency personnel who normally respond to incidents may be among those affected and unable to perform their duties.

- A detailed and credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours (or longer) after the incident. As a result, response activities must begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and critical needs assessment.

- Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage. This may require mobilizing and deploying assets before they are requested via normal NRP protocols.

- Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occur. More people initially are likely to flee and seek shelter from attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents than for natural events. The health-related implications of an incident aggravate attempts to implement a coordinated evacuation management strategy.

- Large numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require prolonged temporary housing.

- A catastrophic incident may produce environmental impacts (e.g., persistent chemical, biological, or radiological contamination) that severely challenge the ability and capacity of governments and communities to achieve a timely recovery.

- A catastrophic incident has unique dimensions/characteristics requiring that response plans/strategies be flexible enough to effectively address emerging needs and requirements.

- A catastrophic incident may have significant international dimensions. These include potential impacts on the health and welfare of border community populations, cross-border trade, transit, law enforcement coordination, and other areas.

- If the incident is the result of terrorism, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level likely may be raised regionally, and perhaps nationally. Elevation of the HSAS level carries additional local, State, and Federal security enhancements that may affect the availability of certain response resources.
Concept of Operations

Local and State Response: Local and State response operations and responsibilities are covered in the NRP and the NRP-CIS. This annex addresses the proactive Federal response to be taken in anticipation of or following a catastrophic incident to rapidly provide critical resources to assist and augment State, local, and tribal response efforts.

Federal Response

- In accordance with NRP provisions for proactive Federal response to catastrophic incidents, the NRP-CIA employs an expedited approach to the provision of Federal resources to save lives and contain the incident.
- Guiding principles for a proactive Federal catastrophic incident response include the following:
  - The primary mission is to save lives, protect property and critical infrastructure, contain the event, and protect the national security;
  - Standard procedures outlined in the NRP regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended in the immediate aftermath of an incident of catastrophic magnitude, pursuant to existing law;
  - Preidentified Federal response resources are mobilized and deployed, and, if required, begin emergency operations to commence life-safety activities; and
  - Notification and full coordination with States occur, but the coordination process should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical Federal resources.
- Upon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition (e.g., involving mass casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of Homeland Security immediately designates the event an Incident of National Significance and begins, potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster declaration, implementation of the NRP-CIA. Upon notification from the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) that the NRP-CIA has been implemented, Federal departments and agencies:
  - Take immediate actions to activate, mobilize, and deploy incident-specific resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;
  - Take immediate actions to protect life, property, and critical infrastructure under their jurisdiction, and provide assistance within the affected area;
  - Immediately commence those hazard-specific activities established under the appropriate and applicable NRP Incident Annex(es), including the NRP-CIA; and
  - Immediately commence functional activities and responsibilities established under the NRP ESF Annexes.
- NRP-CIA actions that the Federal Government takes in response to a catastrophic incident include:
  - All Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross initiate actions to mobilize and deploy resources as planned for in the NRP-CIS;
  - All Federal departments, agencies, and organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross) assigned primary or supporting ESF responsibilities immediately begin implementation of those responsibilities, as appropriate or when directed by the President;
  - Incident-specific resources and capabilities (e.g., medical teams, search and rescue teams, equipment, transportable shelters, preventive and therapeutic pharmaceutical caches, etc.) are activated and prepared for deployment to a Federal mobilization center or staging area near the incident site. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response strategies (as detailed in
the NRP-CIS that include the preidentification of incident-specific critical resource requirements and corresponding deployment/employment strategies accelerate the timely provision of critically skilled resources and capabilities:

- Regional Federal facilities (e.g., hospitals) are activated and prepared to receive and treat casualties from the incident area. Federal facilities are directed to reprioritize services (in some cases reducing or postponing certain customary services) until life-saving activities are concluded. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response plans that include the

preidentification of projected casualty and mass care support requirements and potentially available facilities expands the response architecture and accelerates the availability of such resources;

- Supplementary support agreements with the private sector are activated; and

- Given the projected high demand for Federal augmentation support, as well as the potential national security implications of a catastrophic incident, Federal departments and agencies may be asked to redirect efforts from their day-to-day responsibilities to support the response effort.

Responsibilities

This section summarizes Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRP-CIA. For a complete listing of Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRP-CIA, refer to the NRP-CIS, which is designated For Official Use Only and maintained as a separate document. For additional Federal department and agency responsibilities, refer to the individual ESF Annexes and hazard-specific Incident Annexes in the NRP.

Coordinating Agency: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

- Establish that a catastrophic incident has occurred and implement the NRP-CIA.

- Notify all Federal departments and agencies to implement the NRP-CIA and the NRP-CIS.

- Upon implementation of the NRP-CIA:

  - Activate and deploy (or prepare to deploy) DHS-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;

  - Identify, prepare, and operationalize facilities critical to supporting the movement and reception of deploying Federal resources;

  - Activate national-level facilities and capabilities in accordance with the NRP-CIS and standard NRP protocols;

  - Establish and maintain communications with incident command authorities to ensure a common and current operating picture regarding critical resource requirements. As specific resource requirements are identified, advise the Department of Transportation to reprioritize and adjust accordingly the schedule of execution for resource flow in the NRP-CIS; and

  - Make every attempt to establish contact with the impacted State(s) to coordinate the employment of Federal resources in support of the State.

Cooperating Agencies

- When notified by the HSOC that the Secretary of Homeland Security has implemented the NRP-CIA, Federal departments and agencies (and the American Red Cross):

  - Activate and deploy (or prepare to deploy) agency- or ESF-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;
Commence ESF responsibilities as appropriate;

Commence assessments of the probable consequences of the incident and projected resource requirements; and

Commence development of shorter and longer term response and recovery strategies.

The NRP-CIS provides a list of the specific actions that are initiated upon activation of the NRP-CIA. The following Federal departments and agencies and other organizations are assigned specific responsibilities as cooperating agencies:

- Department of Agriculture
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Transportation
- Department of Veterans Affairs
- Environmental Protection Agency
- American Red Cross

Departments and agencies assigned primary responsibility for one or more functional response areas under the NRP-CIS appendixes are identified below.

- **Mass Care:** American Red Cross
- **Search and Rescue:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Decontamination:** Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Health and Human Services
- **Public Health and Medical Support:** Department of Health and Human Services
- **Medical Equipment and Supplies:** Department of Health and Human Services

- **Patient Movement:** Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Defense
- **Mass Fatality:** Department of Health and Human Services
- **Housing:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Public and Incident Communications:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Transportation:** Department of Transportation
- **Private-Sector Support:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Logistics:** Department of Homeland Security
HSOC SPOT REP

SPOT REP #: 7013
Date/Time (EDT): 08/29/05 04:27:30
Reference: New Orleans Helicopter Overflight
Source of Information: FEMA Teleconference – observations from Marty Bahamonde, FEMA Public Affairs. Participants included Patrick Rhode, Mike Lowder, Bill Locke, Mike Pawlowski and Mary Anne Lyle
Type of Incident: Hurricane Katrina

Update
Summary: Marty Bahamonde of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial over flights of the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005. As additional information becomes available it will be reported.

He concluded the two immediate major problems would be:

1. Access to the city because roads are flooded to the north and east.
2. Housing

His observations include the following:

- The I-10 Twin Span bridges to the east of the City to Slidell are compromised in both directions for a stretch of five to seven miles. On the east side bridge sections are gone, on the west side bridge sections are buckled and sinking.
- There is no way to enter New Orleans from the east. Highway 11 appears generally intact but is under water where it enters the City and will require some repair but appears to be a quick fix.
- The western I-90/I-10 junction connecting Jefferson and Orleans Parishes is under water.
- Entrance from the north is not possible because as roads get into the city, they are under water.
- I-110 to the west appears to have several underwater sections.
- The Airline Highway by the airport is above water.
- There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to flow into the City.
- The levee in Marsee is in tact.
- Only one of the main pumps is reporting to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.
- In the neighborhoods there are many small fires where natural gas lines have broken.
- Flooding is greatest in the north and east in New Orleans, Metairie

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
Page 1 of 2

WHC-07159
and north towards Slidell – an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.
- The lights did not go all the way north to Slidell so conditions there are not reported.
- Some homes were seen with water to the first floor and others completely underwater.
- Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the city. The location has been provided to City officials.
- Downtown there is less flooding. Most buildings have windows blown out but otherwise appear structurally sound.
- West and South of the City appear dry.
- Lake Front Airport by Lake Pontchartrain is under water.
- There is an oil tanker grounded in the Industrial Canal – two tugs were observed working with the ship.
- The Coast Guard reported two other tankers aground but they were not observed.
- The Coast Guard is flying rescue missions for people stuck on roofs. They reported seeing about 150 people but also said that as they lifted people out, they saw others breaking through the roofs of adjacent homes.
- The Coast Guard will use night vision devices and continue rescue missions into the night.
- Search and Rescue will need boats, in some locations high wheeled trucks may be usable. FEMA USR Teams are coordinating boat use with Louisiana Fish and Game officials.
- The City reports about 300 people have been rescued by boat so far. These rescue operations will continue through the night.
- Boat traffic is not restricted and movement of supplies by boat and barge is feasible.
- The Inner Harbor Canal is not visible.
- A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or numbers.

Significance:

Actions/Follow-Up: NA

Miscellaneous:

Prepared By: Matthew Thompson NRCC Planning Section Analyst
September 15, 2003

Secretary Tom Ridge
Department of Homeland Security
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me Friday regarding grant consolidation and the overall preparedness strategy of the Department. My sole motivation regarding these topics is to ensure that you have the benefit of all perspectives during your decision making process. As I mentioned in our conversation, decisions regarding grants and preparedness will have a substantial impact upon the future mission of FEMA. Regardless of your final decision, I will have one reaction. I will support and apply all necessary assets and manpower to implement your decision.

I believe the following proposals present a unique opportunity to achieve a tremendous success for both the Department and the Administration. Undoubtedly, individuals within and outside the Department will raise concerns regardless of your ultimate decision. Through your leadership and a focused effort to answer these concerns, I am confident these proposed actions will not only placate the detractors, but will ultimately gain their praise when the advantages to the first responder and the preparedness of the nation are revealed.

The proponents of moving grant programs and FEMA’s preparedness mission to the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination (OSLGC) describe the reorganization as an effective way to consolidate preparedness and grants responsibilities to achieve an effective, Department-wide, terrorism preparedness initiative or a “one-stop shop”.

In reality, their proposed action does not consolidate grants or preparedness initiatives. The proposal would still result in a bifurcation of these functions within the Department. There will still be congressionally mandated all-hazards grant and preparedness programs within EP&R. Additionally, the proposed move would ignore the painful lesson FEMA learned years ago during the 1985 Pennsylvania tornadoes and Hurricane Andrew that the separation of the preparedness mission from the response mission inevitably leads to an ineffective and uncoordinated response. These realities shaped President Bush’s proposal for EP&R and reinforce my continuing belief that the only way to truly consolidate these programs within the Department is to consolidate both the grant and preparedness programs within EP&R by moving ODP to FEMA.
This proposal is consistent with the National Strategy for Homeland Security. It directly tracks several of President Bush’s priorities in his proposed legislation for the Department. The proposal is also consistent with the President’s ’04 Budget that calls for the transfer of a handful of FEMA grants to ODP. The goal of the President’s budget is the consolidation of grant programs. You can achieve that consolidation and remain consistent with the budget by using the Secretary’s administrative powers to move ODP into EP&R. It is this same logic that allows the move of ODP into OSLGC, as the budget does not address the move of ODP once the proposed grant programs are incorporated into it.

The goal of creating a grants and preparedness “one-stop shop” for the first responder and State and local governments is truly achieved only by moving ODP to EP&R. This move will eliminate potential political liabilities for the Secretary by distancing the Secretary’s office from the operational and decision making role of the disbursement of billions of dollars of highly sought after and contested grant monies. The example of the Fire service’s active lobbying with regards to grant funding and their tensions with other entities competing for limited grant dollars is a primary reason to remove these political liabilities from the direct office of the Secretary. Moving ODP and these functions into an operational directorate provides the Secretary’s office with the appropriate oversight of these programs while removing the direct responsibility of addressing the tensions and criticisms that arise from the first responder community. Simply put, a denial letter comes from an Under Secretary rather than the Office of the Secretary.

President Bush clearly signaled that First Responder Grants belong in EP&R when he proposed the First Responder Initiative in his budget proposal of January 2002. The President later advocated moving ODP to EP&R in his proposed legislation for the Department. The recommendation to move ODP to FEMA received far greater scrutiny and policy review by the President’s senior staff than has the current proposal to move ODP into the OSLGC. In fact, the move to OSLGC has never been formally vetted at the senior staff level within the Department. Additionally, both the President in his proposal and Congress in the Act, clearly indicated that the preparedness mission should reside within the EP&R directorate by including the word ‘preparedness’ in the Directorate’s name and mission.

While the President’s attempts to move ODP were unsuccessful, it is important to note that during the creation of the Department, the President’s legislative strategy was centered on gaining several key and unprecedented management authorities for the Secretary of DHS. This calculated strategy was made knowing that later, these powers could be exercised to achieve many of the President’s unfulfilled legislative priorities. Due to the President’s successful efforts to gain these authorities, you are now in the position to move ODP to EP&R thereby delivering on a key element of the President’s original proposal for the Department.

The precedent setting use of the Secretary’s unique management authorities should be exercised for high-level initiatives so as not to dilute the baseline upon which these
authorities are utilized. Moving ODP and a handful of grants from FEMA to the OSLOC reduces the threshold of these powers. Instead of consolidating all aspects of grants and preparedness within one directorate of the department, it uses the authority to move limited aspects of programs from a division level office to a different support office. This will not result in the sought after Departmental consolidation of preparedness responsibilities. The move of ODP to OSLOC will not solve the fundamental problem of the separation of some preparedness activities (i.e. terrorism preparedness) from the all-hazards preparedness and grant functions of FEMA. The move of ODP to OSLOC will also dilute the future abilities of DHS Secretaries to exercise these unprecedented authorities at the appropriate level and indeed, could further limit your ability to exercise these authorities during your tenure.

FEMA has an existing infrastructure to handle the transfer of ODP that is far more robust in structure, experience, regional presence, and established historical relationships with State and local entities and first responders than that of the OSLOC. Since FEMA’s inception in 1979, it has cultivated an extensive infrastructure enabling effective coordination of emergency preparedness and response through our long-standing relationships with State and local entities. This infrastructure is founded in common efforts among Federal and State entities to coordinate throughout the entire continuum of the emergency management cycle.

FEMA’s relationships with its State and local partners have been formed, maintained, and improved over the course of 111 emergency declarations, 912 major disaster declarations and numerous response operations. Similarly, our decades of operations in these areas is buttressed by a developed financial management system that supports our expertise in grants administration by disbursing a massive amount of awards each year. In FY ’03 alone, FEMA has distributed $5.4 billion in 175,374 awards. This is compared to ODP’s awards of approximately $2.8 billion in 204 awards in FY ’03.

Moving ODP to EP&R will create the full integration of all preparedness functions within one Directorate. ODP will enhance the terrorism delta on FEMA’s solid all-hazards foundation. It will merge ODP’s strong point of law enforcement prevention grants and training functions with FEMA’s solid relationships with fire, EMS, public works, local officials, and emergency managers. Additionally, the move will match ODP’s experience in the mandated state homeland security plans with the strong relationship FEMA has developed with the Governors, mayors, and State and local emergency managers that execute these state plans. The result will be a unified and balanced approach to all preparedness activities.

In my opinion, there is one hurdle that the proposal of moving ODP to EP&R must overcome. A traditional tension between the division of influence between the fire and police services must be addressed. Currently, the fire community opposes moving Fire grants to ODP due to its concern that fire issues will be given a lower priority in the historically law enforcement oriented approach of ODP. Vice versa, moving ODP to EP&R raises similar concerns with the law enforcement community. I believe a
politically viable and beneficial strategy exists for this issue and FEMA can lead its implementation immediately.

To address the concerns of the law enforcement community, I am proposing a reorganization of the Preparedness Division of FEMA. Currently, the U.S. Fire Administrator is the Director of Preparedness. This will raise concerns from the law enforcement community. To address this issue, EP&R will modify the structure of the Preparedness Division to incorporate a Presidentially appointed senior representative and advocate from both the fire and police services. These representatives will serve as the operational Deputy Directors of Preparedness under the newly confirmed Sue Mencer who would be the Director of Preparedness. This will facilitate a unified and balanced approach to the Department’s preparedness activities.

The newly designated Deputy Director of Preparedness and U.S. Fire Administrator would represent the fire services. The newly created Deputy Director of Preparedness and U.S. Law Enforcement Representative would represent Law enforcement services. Both of these positions would be filled with proven, experienced, and respected senior officials from their respective service. The creation of these co-equal positions will provide each of the traditional services with an advocate who is recognized as one of their own.

The creation of the U.S. Law Enforcement Representative gives the police services something they have never had within the Federal government. Local police officials have associated their preparedness activities with the Department of Justice. Regardless of the existing perception of ODP representing law enforcement issues, there exists a reality that DOJ/ODP represents the Federal law enforcement views rather than local police interests. The police services have never had one of their ‘own’ representing their issues at the appropriate level of ODP or DOJ. This proposed reorganization of FEMA’s Preparedness Division gives them their own representative. Cops identify with cops, not the FBI.

The USFA representative will focus more on preparedness issues for fire, EMS, and the traditional FEMA constituency. The Police Representative will focus more on preparedness issues relating to prevention and law enforcement. Each of these Deputy Directors should benefit from the expertise of liaisons from IAIP, S&T, USCG, USSS, and BTS in order to fully integrate all missions of the Department into a common delivery of a unified, all-hazards preparedness strategy.

If appropriately executed, this strategy will gain the support of first responders, the law enforcement community, and their representatives in Congress.

In light of your administrative powers and the President’s initial proposal, the question is not why should ODP be in EP&R, but rather why should ODP not be in EP&R? In my opinion, no sufficient policy justifications exist to justify the proposition that ODP should not be in EP&R.
While detractors resort to the fact that the President twice unsuccessfully tried to move ODP, they fail to account for the reality that the dynamics behind the Congressional opposition to the move have changed due to committee realignments. Detractors also ignore the fact that you wield Congressionally granted reorganizational authorities that the Executive did not possess during its prior attempts to effectuate the move. Mark Twain once said, “We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again—and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one either.”

The transfer of ODP to FEMA will help facilitate the development of a true one-stop shop for first responders. The one-stop shop will consist of a web portal that will include training standards, equipment procurement, training coursework, grant resources, and applications combined into a viable portal that can be utilized by the smallest communities to our largest cities. FEMA’s development of the Compendium of Federal Terrorism Training is the preexisting foundation for the development of a comprehensive, interagency, terrorism training and preparedness portal. Having all preparedness and grant functions in EP&R will enable the Department to streamline its ability to determine training needs; determine responsibility for developing specific training among the Directorates and the federal government in order to fill gaps and avoid duplication; develop and maintain required training; and ensure quality, consistency, and conformity with existing standards.

The backbone of our one-stop shop concept is the development of a National Terrorism Mission-essential Task List (NTMETL). This element is the key to any system that focuses on the needs of the first responder. First responders consistently state that their single biggest need is to have a list of tasks that they can train against. NTMETL will enable the Department to target preparedness efforts by organizing available training and grants in a system that considers the discipline (i.e. public health, law enforcement), scenario (i.e. RDD, communicable bio agent), role (i.e. technician, operations), and tasks (i.e. condition, standard). Adding the delta to this system of the existing training compendium, a standardized equipment list for each task, available grants to help acquire the suggested training and equipment, and an online application will make the system a true “one-stop shop”.

The benefit to the first responder will be the ability for them to have a performance/training roadmap for their emergency personnel, determine training priorities, access course information, contact training providers to schedule training, plan exercises using standardized performance criteria, and apply for grants. The benefit to the Department will be an ability to use empirical data to guide federal training management, tie equipment and grants to key preparedness activities, control training gaps and duplication, and provide an empirical basis to determine the preparedness of the nation as well as determining necessary funds to adequately prepare. Ultimately, we will be able to truly compare a state’s plan to its level of preparedness.
This one-stop shop proposal could be achieved with a series of milestones announced along the way to a complete, operational one-stop shop. The stage of completing the Compendium of Federal Training portion is essentially complete today. The completion of cataloging available Federal grants can also be achieved in short order. The final element of creating the NTMELT will take more time, but can be achieved in a reasonable period if it is given the right resources and appropriate interagency priority.

To facilitate this effort, I believe it would be extremely helpful if an Executive Order were issued to designate DHS (operational responsibility would be delegated to EP&R) as the lead for this interagency effort. Strong IT contracts supported by an interagency working group comprised of program experts operating under a stringent timeline for deliverables will enable this project to succeed. The inter-agency is already accustomed to EP&R/FEMA acting as the inter-agency coordinator on the Compendium, and will readily embrace this role, too.

The final issue I would like to address is the impact of removing the preparedness mission from FEMA will have on its response mission. Just as grants are so closely linked to preparedness, preparedness is integrally linked to response. It is for this reason that the backbone of FEMA’s responsibilities given to it in the Stafford Act are reflected in the emergency management cycle of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This cycle forms a chain that should not be broken. Because this cycle guides every action that FEMA takes, it is clear why the agency has organized its four divisions of Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation directly in line with the priorities set out by the cycle. The preparedness function represents an integral pillar of FEMA’s ability to meet the requirements of this rigorous cycle.

The placement of the preparedness mission in the Department is a fundamental question for the future mission of FEMA. Preparedness defines EP&R’s vision of “A Nation Prepared” and drives our mission to lead the Nation to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade, including incidents of terrorism.

Since FEMA’s inception in 1979, it has cultivated an extensive infrastructure enabling the effective coordination of emergency preparedness and response through our long-standing relationships with state and local entities. This infrastructure is founded in common efforts among Federal and State entities to coordinate throughout the entire continuum of the emergency management cycle.

An effective preparedness policy is validated through an increased ability to respond through training, planning, education, guidance, exercises and assessments. Preparedness is fundamentally linked to response, as it is the cornerstone of planning in advance for the response phase of the emergency management cycle. Therefore, we believe that all preparedness functions of the Department should be consolidated into FEMA where the response mission resides.
In the 1980's, FEMA learned the hard way that disjointed efforts between preparedness and response create significant problems in effectively managing disasters. As an example, the 1985 tornado outbreak that affected northwestern Pennsylvania highlighted significant planning and response problems. More recently, as Secretary Card can attest, the lack of a synchronized effort between the preparedness and response missions led to an ineffective response to Hurricane Andrew. It is interesting to note that then, as today, there were competing interests involved in the preparedness mission. Years ago this tension was caused by the separation of resources applied to the preparedness for nuclear war from all-hazards preparedness. Today, the tension is between preparedness for terrorism as opposed to all-hazards.

The Stafford Act, as we know it today, was strongly influenced by the Federal shortcomings in response to the 1985 tornado outbreaks in Pennsylvania. As a result, the Act focused on the need for an all-hazards approach to preparedness and response. The all-hazards approach operates upon the understanding that there is a cycle to emergencies that begins with preparedness and mitigation, flows into response, and ends with recovery. These primary areas or phases of disaster management are inextricably linked. The further preparedness efforts are distanced from the response, recovery, and mitigation duties, the greater the opportunity for disconnects that can result in an ineffective and uncoordinated response.

Moving the preparedness function out of FEMA and into OSLGC would fundamentally sever FEMA from its core functions of supporting first responders, State and local governments and the public. It would shatter agency morale and would completely disconnect the Department's response functions from the responders and governments they are supposed to support. It would break longstanding, effective and tested relationships with the states and first responder stakeholders. The move would also sever effective FEMA training delivery systems that directly train over 1,000,000 first responders each year. The appropriate pairing of the preparedness and response missions in the EP&R directorate compliments emergency management structures at the State and local level. In those structures, the same people responsible for responding to any emergency or disaster, no matter the cause, would be the same people responsible for preparing for it.

The preparedness mission should remain in FEMA. The agency has decades of experience in preparedness, an existing field structure in its regions, and is the Directorate tasked with providing the response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The Department does not need to start from scratch by shuffling and recreating preparedness responsibilities within other areas of the Department. FEMA has laid a solid preparedness foundation and the Department should build upon it.

I recognize that these proposals differ significantly from your original thinking. These proposals likewise represent a significant divergence from the original design for a one-stop shop and the role of preparedness within the Department. However, I sincerely
believe that the senior leadership of the Department would readily embrace such bold changes.

I am also convinced that you should exercise your reorganization authorities in such a way that establishes a higher baseline for the future exercise of those authorities, both for yourself and future secretaries. Whatever your decision, the dedicated employees of EP&R/FEMA will work diligently to implement them.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to outline both my concerns and these proposals.

Very truly yours,

Michael D. Brown

cc:
Duncan Campbell
March, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: Michael Chertoff
FROM: Michael D. Brown
SUBJECT: Component Head Meeting

Overview of Component:

Mission:

To lead the Nation to prepare for, to mitigate the effects of, to respond to, and to recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade, including incidents of terrorism.

Key Staff:

Chief of Staff, Patrick Rhode
Deputy Chief of Staff, Scott Morris
Acting Chief Operating Officer, Ken Burris
Policy Director, Brooks Altshuler
National Security Division Director, Reynold Hoover
Acting Director NIMS Integration Center, Gil Jamieson
Acting Preparedness Division Director, David Garratt
United States Fire Administrator, David Paulison
Acting Response Division Director, Ed Buikema
Recovery Division Director, Dan Craig
Mitigation Division Director, David Maustad
---DRAFT---

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Emergency Preparedness & Response
Directorate
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Office of the Under Secretary
Emergency Preparedness & Response
-FEMA-
Assistant Secretary for EP&R*
(Deputy Director of FEMA)
Chief of Staff

Office of Policy & Strategic Planning
Office of External Affairs Coordination
Regional Operations

Human Resources Division
Finance & Acquisition Mgmt. Division
Facilities Mgmt. & Services Division
Information Technology Services Division

Director of Operations
Preparedness Division
Response Division
Mitigation Division
Recovery Division
Regions
Region I
Region II
Region III
Region IV
Region V
Region VI
Region VII
Region VIII
Region IX
Region X

* indicates proposed

Office of General Counsel
Equal Rights
International Affairs
Intergral Affairs (State & Local Coord)
Legislative Affairs
Public Affairs
Summary Budget Information
FEMA Operating Budget
Fiscal Year 2005 (Dollars in Thousands)

- BioDefense, $2,507,776
- Fee Supported, $2,085,742
- Other Non-Discretionary, $487,000
- Rent, Security & Expenses, $72,889
- Salaries and Benefits, $191,183
- DHS Working Capital Fund, $18,501
- Remaining Operating Budget, $164,643
- Supplemental to Disaster Relief Fund, $6,500,000
- Disaster Relief Fund, $2,042,380

Legend:
= Mandatory and Non-Discretionary Funds
= One-time Supplemental (Not part of base budget)

Total FEMA FY 2005 Budget: $14,070,114 (Dollars in Thousands)
FEMA Budget

Homeland Security (HS) vs. Non-HS

Fiscal Year 2006 President's Budget

(Dollars in Thousands)

- FEMA Activities Designated as "Homeland Security" by OMB:
  - National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration
  - Catastrophic Surge
  - Medical Surge
  - Continuity of Operations (COOP)
  - National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Support
  - Noble Training Center Support
  - Reimbursement to DOE for Nuclear Incident Response Team Exercises

- Homeland Security
  - 5%
  - $146,000

- Non-Homeland Security
  - 95%
  - $2,968,000
### Reductions to FEMA Base, FY 2003-2005

**Dollars in Thousands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FY 2003</strong></td>
<td>* Transfers to DHS from FY 2002 un-obligated balances</td>
<td>30,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Transfers to DHS from FY 2003 Annual Accounts</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Transfer to BTS (ODP) from FY 2003 Annual Accounts</td>
<td>10,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer to IG for audits and investigations</td>
<td>21,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer to TSA from Liberty Shield Fund</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total FY 2003 Reductions</td>
<td>$80,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FY 2004</strong></td>
<td>Transfer to IG for audits and investigations</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charges for DHS Working Capital Fund</td>
<td>6,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Preparedness Transfer to BTS-Office of Domestic Preparedness</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction to Base – Disaster Relief Fund</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Reduction to Base – Operating Expenses</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total FY 2004 Reductions</td>
<td>$90,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FY 2005</strong></td>
<td>* DHS Mandated Efficiencies</td>
<td>11,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charges for Working Capital Fund</td>
<td>18,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Estimated FY 2005 Reductions</td>
<td>$30,198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A total of $77.9 million has been permanently lost from the base. These permanent reductions represent a 14.8 overall decrease in FEMA’s already limited discretionary spending account since joining DHS.
# Pre-Decisional Over-Target Requests

**FY 2007-11**  
Dollars in Millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>FY10</th>
<th>FY11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rebuild of Base Operating Budget</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal Regional Centers - Improvements</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. NETC/Noble Training Center</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. National Response Plan (NRP) Maintenance</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Catastrophic Planning</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Convert National Security Terms to FTE</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Facility Relocations</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>*20.7</td>
<td>*44.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. National Security Special Events</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. National Exercise Support</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>85.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>109.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>128.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>80.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>83.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Spike in Facility Relocations in FY 2008 and 2009 is due to expected FEMA Headquarters relocation.
Management of FEMA Base Budget

FY 2005

- September 2004 - FEMA froze hiring for over 500 positions to assure availability of funding for all on-board staff.
- January 2005 - FEMA issued a staffing baseline with 3,771 full-time positions, including 565 vacancies.
- January 2005 - Guidelines issued requiring case-by-case approval to fill vacancies in Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery, and Administration and Regional Operations appropriations.
- FEMA is now unable to fill 189 vacancies.
Identification of Top Near-Term Management Issues

Most Important Goals

1. Operational Construct

Create and begin implementation of a revised FEMA operational construct that ensures the best utilization of the Nation’s resources when responding to disasters and emergencies. The intent is to examine our conceptual approach to disaster management and develop new approaches that improve effectiveness through re-designed processes. Examples include re-design of our disaster work force, including operational readiness of full-time FEMA staff; tracking and visibility of operational assets; and examination of the proper balance of operational roles between headquarters and regional offices.

2. Logistics Capability and Asset Visibility

Develop and begin implementation of a supportable logistical strategy that effectively and efficiently supports the DHS and FEMA disaster response and recovery requirements, to include: acquisition, deployment, tracking, warehousing, and operation and maintenance of all assets.

3. Catastrophic Planning

Develop and begin implementation of a comprehensive and integrated multi-year catastrophic planning strategy that meets the requirements of FEMA and its partners, and supports implementation of the National Response Plan.

4. National Incident Management System Integration Center (NIC)

Establish a NIC to provide strategic direction for and oversight of the NIMS to ensure a consistent, nationwide approach to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size or complexity.

5. Disaster Work Force

Establish and begin implementation of a plan to recruit, train, credential, deploy and retain a disaster workforce with the appropriate skill mix and management structure to support the operational requirements of all disaster related functions.

6. Position Management

Establish and maintain a baseline of all positions in the Agency, and hold managers accountable for developing long-range workforce plans to assure appropriate numbers, skills, and grades of employees to support current and long-term mission needs.
Most Serious Challenges:

1. Preparedness

The preparedness mission is scattered across the Emergency Preparedness & Response Directorate (EP&R), Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP), Public Affairs, and the Headquarters Integration Staff (I-Staff).

The President recommended moving ODP into EP&R in his legislative proposal for the Department. However, the Congress enacted legislation placing ODP within the BTS Directorate.

Recently, the Department missed an opportunity to consolidate the preparedness mission when DHS chose to use its own authorities to move ODP to the newly created OSLGCP. This reorganization has failed to produce tangible results due to the lack of a clearly defined chain of command. The absence of effective leadership in the preparedness mission has further spawned a complete lack of accountability for results. For example, in HSPD-8, the President called for the submission of the National Preparedness Goal with the DHS Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission. The deadline passed and OSLGCP did not submit the preparedness goal.

These recent organizational changes have divided what was intended to be one, all-hazards preparedness mission into two artificially separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural disasters. DHS has institutionalized the split by dividing the primary responsibilities for each category between the separate organizations of FEMA and ODP. Having two organizations and several other ancillary organizations working on preparedness has bred internal and external confusion.

The DHS Preparedness mission should be centralized in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. This recommendation is consistent with The President's original intent and is consistent with the Act's direction that the first responsibility of the EP&R Under Secretary is "helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies".

Moving OSLGCP/ODP to EP&R will create the full integration of all preparedness functions within one directorate. ODP will enhance the terrorism delta on FEMA's solid all-hazards foundation. Most importantly, the move would reconnect the severed link between preparedness and response within the Department. The link ensures that capabilities and procedures trained will be identical to the capabilities and procedures actually applied during a real event.
2. National Response Plan and other operational planning initiatives

Ambiguity regarding the organizational placement of the National Response Plan (NRP) and other operational planning initiatives needs to be resolved. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned EP&R in Section 502 with,

(3) Providing the Federal Government’s response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, including:
   (A) managing such response;
   (B) directing the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and...the Nuclear Incident Response Team;
   (C) overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System;
   (D) coordinating other Federal response resources in the event of a terrorist attack or major disaster;

(4) Aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;

(5) building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters; and

(6) Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan;

Instead of assigning many of these responsibilities to EP&R, as described in the Act, the former Secretary made the decision to assign these responsibilities to varying departmental entities. For example, the development of the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System was initially assigned to TSA for development. Then after several months, the Secretary again shifted responsibility for NRP/NIMS development to the newly created I-Staff within the immediate office of the Secretary. This decision was consistent with past and subsequent decisions that removed key areas of operational responsibility from line directorates.

Since the completion of the NRP and NIMS, another operational planning function has been created and assigned, outside of EP&R, to the I-Staff. The Operational Planning Integrated Process Team (OPIPT) has been tasked with developing an operational planning approach to maximize DHS preparedness and response capabilities. This effort will center on the development of plans for 16 scenarios developed in conjunction with the HSC. It is still unclear how these plans will be reconciled with the existing Incident Annexes to the NRP, ongoing catastrophic planning at FEMA, and similar planning efforts at DOD and the NCTC. On its face, the assignment and implementation of these efforts outside of the NRP construct appears to contradict the Act’s original intent when it assigned EP&R with “Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan.”

In addition to the OPIPT’s federal planning responsibilities, there is a proposal to also make OPIPT responsible for planning initiatives at the State and local level. These proposals ignore FEMA’s decades long expertise, relationships, and understanding of the
emergency management system and potentially ignore basic concepts of authority. The effect of these assignments has been a confused operational framework, and an implementation strategy that is vexing to staff as well as congressional authorizers and appropriators.

Since the inception of the Department, responsibilities that the Act delegated and that FEMA’s mission encompasses, have been assigned to other areas of the Department. The result has led to confusion and the duplication of mission areas within the Department. Fundamentally, the continual redelegation of EP&R/ FEMA’s responsibilities for preparedness, response, and emergency/incident management has called into question EP&R’s future role and existence within the Department.

**Proposals for long-term cross-cutting effectiveness**

1. **Organization**

The management trend since the inception of the department has been to ignore the statutory roles of the Under Secretaries who are appointed by the President to serve as the Department’s senior leadership team. The department has failed to enable a leadership team that works across the department. Instead, DHS created a top-heavy organization that is led by its staff rather than its leadership.

The department has focused on building org charts: the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the department; the assembling of tasks into jobs and jobs into departments, and divisions. However, the department has failed at an equally important element of organization by excluding any attention to the personal networks that link people throughout the department and across the department’s boundaries. These networks are just as important, if not more important, for the execution of the department’s mission.

The lack of these networks, coupled with a skewed allocation of missions and authorities, have encouraged unfocused empire building in duplicative mission areas rather than facilitating the development of cohesive strategies to fill the homeland security vacuum that DHS was created to address. To create personal networks, the leadership of the department must be part of an environment that facilitates integration. This can be done by having permanent office space available to the Under Secretaries and their staffs at the NAC. This will better enable the Under Secretaries to collaborate with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, all other Under Secretaries, and their respective staffs. The availability of collocated space will help create integration through the development of personal networks at the leadership level. These networks will, in turn, be driven throughout the respective organizations resulting in increased horizontal integration.

2. **Decision Authority**

The allocation of decision authority within the department- i.e. what decisions are made by which people at what levels, with what oversight or review, is dysfunctional. The formal delegations of authority by the Act have been ignored. Decision making authority
often resides within positions that are outside the span of control of the Under Secretaries who are statutorily responsible for particular missions.

The expectation of Under Secretaries being responsible for the management of their statutory responsibilities has eroded to an operating construct that places much of these responsibilities within newly created and expanded staff organizations such as the I-Staff and the OSLGCP. The executive office staff’s involvement in operational and management areas that are clearly within an Under Secretary’s purview has created conflicts. These conflicts are compounded by the executive office’s track record of continually bringing additional operational responsibilities into the Secretary’s Office rather than pushing them down to the directorates.

The current rationale given for expanding staff organizations is to create integration within DHS. However, these moves create the opposite effect. In an attempt to ‘integrate’, the executive office has merely pulled representatives out of their existing directorates, cut all ties from their home organization’s chain of command, and created yet another layer of bureaucracy. These staff functions are uncoordinated with the directorates and perform duplicative functions that create confusion and organizational tension.
DHS Headquarters Integrated Operations Staff Capability

CONCEPT PAPER
FOR DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP TEAM REVIEW

January 26, 2004
Purpose:

This paper discusses the need for an overarching operations staff capability within the DHS headquarters to bridge the existing gap between integrated threat monitoring and assessment (an HSOC/Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis responsibility) and corresponding integrated operational response activities (fragmented across DHS components and staff offices), on a “steady-state” basis and during contingencies. This gap also includes a lack of an appropriate mechanism to coordinate operational response activities with the interagency, as well as with the HSC/NSC (CSG).

Issue:

DHS headquarters does not have an established mechanism for linking the threat monitoring and assessment functions (in an all-hazards context) with a corresponding integrated operational response function across DHS components and activities. Although DHS headquarters does have an established and validated mechanism for enabling executive decisionmaking during “post-incident” contingency situations (Homeland Security Operations Center/Interagency Incident Management Group/Initial National Response Plan), this mechanism is currently not functional in the “steady-state” or “heightened alert” mode outside the context of an actual incident. This deficiency denies the DHS leadership the ability to consider and direct operational actions in day-to-day or “pre-incident” scenarios based upon a coordinated and integrated set of course of action recommendations developed by an appropriate integrating staff function. This deficiency also complicates DHS operational coordination with other agencies and with the HSC/NSC (CSG) during steady-state and pre-incident periods. These problems will become more acute with the implementation of the DHS regional structure if not remedied.

Proposed Operations Staff Capability

Develop a DHS headquarters staff function to: facilitate seamless horizontal integration and coordination of headquarters-level operational activities by integrating cross-directorate operations and contingency planning; providing synchronized staff support to the Department Leadership Team for day-to-day operational response, heightened alert, and crisis decision making activities; managing the operational planning and execution of headquarters-level readiness exercises; and coordinating and integrating operational planning, contingency support, and exercise requirements with DHS Regional Directors and their staffs.

Proposed Operations Staff Roles and Functions

- Develop a headquarters-level operational planning system and coordinate the development of cross-directorate and regional operations and contingency plans;
- Develop a system to facilitate integrated, cross-component operational and contingency plan execution at the national and regional levels;
- Develop a national base line “campaign” plan detailing operational activities associated with changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System;

Pre-decisional working paper
Develop and administer a system to ensure the seamless integration and coordination of threat monitoring and corresponding cross-directorate operational response activities on a day-to-day basis (beyond the scope of IA and IP coordination with external stakeholders);

Provide integrated, cross-directorate operational staff support, to include operational response course of action development, to the DHS leadership on a day-to-day basis;

Provide day-to-day integrated DHS operational interface with the Counterterrorism Security Group and other EOP organizations;

Enable senior executive decisionmaking and provide “battlestaff” support during periods of heightened alert and contingency situations;

Provide overall administrative oversight of headquarters-level operational functions and programs assigned to DHS in the National Response Plan;

Provide sustained management oversight for the Interagency Incident Management Group, Homeland Security Operations Center, and the nationwide Principal Federal Official (PFO) network;

Coordinate and integrate cross-directorate headquarters and regional-level operational participation in the National Homeland Security Exercise Program (NHSEP) and other designated training activities;

Develop and administer an after action reporting, “lessons learned,” and best-practices system based on NHSEP and other training event outcomes; and

Develop a system to assess DHS regional-level preparedness for contingency operations.

Proposed Concept of Operations

DHS functional components maintain operational control over all component resources/assets; Operations staff personnel perform a coordinating/integrating role and have no directive or command authority over DHS component resources/assets

Operations staff personnel take the lead role in integrating and coordinating cross-directorate “steady-state” operational preparedness activities (HSAS operational “campaign plan” development, contingency plan development, “care and feeding” of the nationwide PFO network, administrative maintenance of the IIMG and INRP support functions, readiness exercises, etc.)

Operations staff personnel attend daily threat SVTC sessions and HSOC briefings to gain and maintain “steady-state” situational awareness

Operations staff personnel compile and consolidate cross-directorate input and lead DHS representation at the weekly Risk Management Group (RMG) SVTC session

During normal periods, HSOC continues to monitor the overall threat picture and consolidate and report day-to-day situational awareness and component operational activities to the DHS leadership through the Secretary’s Morning Summary and operational SITREPs as required

HSOC handles routine operational activities not keyed to specific threats; oversees daily common operating picture and alerts DHS leadership of any anomalies
For Official Use Only
26 January 2004

During periods of heightened alert based on a general threat picture, operations staff personnel will compile and provide an enhanced set of cross-directorate operational course of action recommendations to help inform the initial HSAS change decision, as well as continuously update and provide additional course of action recommendations to the DHS leadership as the threat-operational picture evolves.

Operations staff personnel will convene and lead tailored DHS/IIMG meetings/planning sessions as required to coordinate the operational activities of appropriate DHS entities and other Federal departments and agencies within a common framework.

Operations staff personnel will take the lead in daily coordination with the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) and help prepare the DHS leadership for Homeland Security DC/PC meetings associated with the evolving threat-operational picture.

During periods of heightened alert based upon specific, credible threats, operations staff personnel will convene and lead continuous internal DHS planning sessions and tailored IIMG meetings and provide continuously updated operational situational awareness briefings and operational course of action recommendations to the DHS leadership.

Operations staff personnel will take the lead in daily coordination with the CSG and help prepare the DHS leadership for Homeland Security DC/PC meetings associated with the evolving threat-operational picture.

During a "post-incident" response, operations staff personnel will convene and lead a continuous session of the IIMG tailored to meet the demands of the scenario at hand as detailed in the Initial National Response Plan and IIMG Standard Operating Procedures document.

Operations staff personnel will work in conjunction with IISOC, IA, DHS component staffs, and staff offices; representatives from other federal departments and agencies; and the deployed PFO network to provide continuous situational awareness, overall incident management oversight, and enable DHS executive crisis decisionmaking.

Operations staff personnel will take the lead in continuous coordination with the CSG and help prepare the DHS leadership for Homeland Security DC/PC meetings associated with the evolving threat-operational picture.

Recommendation:

- Recommend that a day-to-day operational support staff function be instituted within the recently activated Headquarters Operational Integration Staff (I-Staff).
- The I-Staff charter approved by the Secretary currently reflects all the tasks and functions described above (to include cross-directorate planning, exercises, and incident management), with the exception of those related to the tying together of threat monitoring, analysis, and operational response activities on a day-to-day and pre-incident basis.
- This recommendation leverages the existing incident management systems, processes, and protocols that have been developed and validated during the past.

Pre-decisional working paper
year in line with the INRP; minimizes change from a known and rehearsed set of protocols

- The I-Staff works directly for the DHS leadership Team and is at the appropriate level to interface with the CSG, HSC, and other EOP organizations on operational matters.

- This recommendation ties together the headquarters-level operational planning and execution process horizontally across the directorates, as well as vertically down to the DHS regions.
The Purpose and the Issue as defined in the working paper are based upon conflicting statements. The Purpose paragraph states that there is a “lack of an appropriate mechanism to coordinate operational response activities within the interagency,” while the Issue paragraph states, “this mechanism is currently not functional in the “steady-state” or “heightened alert.” There is a system for interagency coordination and it is called the Emergency Support Function (ESF) under the National Response Plan.

If this system, which is currently directed by FEMA through its role and responsibilities, does not meet the requirements of the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) it would be more efficient to enhance FEMA’s responsibilities and concentrate on the integration of that role into the HSOC needs as opposed to recreating the wheel as this proposal proposes.

The first thought that comes to mind is empire building or a lack of understanding of the role and responsibilities of the EP&R directorate of DHS. The very use of the descriptor that there exists a “deficiency” that complicates the operational coordination of other agencies indicates a notional thought that something exists to serve this function. Therefore, an understanding of the role that FEMA plays in coordinating through the former Federal Response Plan and now through the Interim National Response Plan and through the National Response Plan in the future is critical in addressing this issue.

Virtually each example cited is a current capability that FEMA maintains. The very fact that one doesn’t know about it or doesn’t understand it does not necessitate the requirement to go forth and create it. Under Proposed Operations Staff Roles and Functions, Bullets 1, 2 and 3 are already being conducted through FEMA’s program directorates and regional planning functions. Bullets 11 and 12 again are being performed through the RAMP. How many of these programs does DHS need?

FEMA is already in the business of coordinating operations within the scope of most DHS activities. You have to look no further than the response to the shuttle disaster to see that the system does in fact work. If the desire is to make that capability more robust to address the issues and ideas discussed in the working paper, then the appropriate action would be to strengthen those responsibilities and not attempt to insert a staff level organizational element within the Secretary’s office into the chain of command between the Secretary and those organizational elements responsible for operations within the department. It would be a most positive and welcome occurrence to have DHS recognizes the capabilities and role that FEMA plays and build upon these capabilities.

We all strive to serve the Secretary to the best of our abilities; however the effectiveness and efficacy of that service need not be judged on the proximity to the Homeland Security Operations Center. The Proposed Concept of Operations completely ignores the day-to-day activity in which FEMA is involved. The whole tenor of the working paper ignores the very core of the response to events in this country and that is FEMA’s response to the garden-variety disaster. The paper does not begin to delve into the response and coordination efforts necessary to respond to that localized flood, or ice storm that consumes much of the monies of the disaster support account. You cannot
have a system that is not interested in picking up the debris from an ice storm in South Carolina in January and turn around and want to have an operational role in an approaching hurricane in May. This type of approach does little more than confuse state and local officials. The current working paper serves as an outline of the problem that is created by structuring an operational concept for response to terrorism while ignoring the natural disaster component.
LOUISIANA TOTALLY INTEROPERABLE ENVIRONMENT

Prepared by the Louisiana State Police
December 07, 2005
Interoperability Overview

Communications interoperability refers to the ability of emergency service agencies to communicate across disciplines and jurisdictions via wireless networks to exchange real-time voice and data information. Initial widespread attention was given to communications interoperability after the terrorist attacks in 2001. The Louisiana State Police (LSP) has been working diligently over the past several years to assemble a statewide interoperable communications system, but our efforts continue to be hampered by the lack of funding. The importance of interoperable communications in Louisiana was reinforced during disaster mitigation efforts following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. A vast number of federal, state and local agencies responded to this disaster; however, their efforts were hindered by inadequate and impaired communication infrastructure.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Louisiana Homeland Security Strategy identify Emergency Preparedness and Response as a critical mission area. A major initiative in both strategies is to “enable seamless communication among all responders” and improve “information sharing and systems.” As we witnessed during the recent events, these initiatives are critical for the safety of the people in Louisiana, and for the safety of those emergency service personnel responding to critical incidents.

Expansion Limitations

The Louisiana State Police presently operates a statewide analog wireless communications system which was initially installed for voice communications (last upgraded in 1996). This system is presently used by approximately 70 agencies with over 10,000 subscriber users. The system’s infrastructure consists of 46 tower sites and 28 dispatch consoles. Continued use of the current system is limited by four major factors:

1. **Expansion of Sites** – The technology used on the present system does not allow for additional tower sites due to port limitations. The zone controller is at maximum site capacity, thus eliminating the possibility of improvement in coverage. The system’s capacity is maximized at forty six (46) tower sites without expansion capability.

2. **System Capacity** – The state’s current 800 MHz communication system was initially designed to be utilized only by state users. The system is currently operating at maximum capacity and now accommodates 70 state and local agencies. The addition of any other agencies would overburden the state’s communication system which would result in unreliable performance.

3. **The current system was designed and built for mobile radio coverage. This severely limits adequate hand-held portable and in-building coverage for users.**

4. **The state’s communication system is near the end of its service life. Motorola is no longer offering upgraded technology or repeaters, and will discontinue technical support in approximately one year.**
Technological advances in the law enforcement field have progressed rapidly since September 11, 2001. These advancements make the need for reliable data communication just as vital as the need for voice communication. The Louisiana State Police patrol units are currently equipped with mobile data computers and video cameras. Receiving data imagery from the patrol units over a wireless network is restricted because of the current bandwidth limitations. Computer modem and infrastructure limitations make it virtually impossible for officers in the field to exchange information such as images, fingerprints and databases. Currently, there is no means of increasing the bandwidth capacity in the 800 MHz range; however, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has allocated high capacity bandwidth in the 700 MHz range for emergency services use.

**Communications Failures During Hurricane Katrina**

The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina severely hampered the ability of emergency responders operating on the state system to communicate with other emergency services personnel. In addition, communications systems maintained by local governments also suffered severe and debilitating damage. This further restricted communications between emergency responders; however, the state’s communication system did provide limited communication between responders through the use of mutual aid channels.

In the current system, the state communication towers are linked by T-1 lines (land telephone lines). Several of these T-1 lines were damaged by water and wind, limiting the communications range of the tower. When a tower loses its T-1 connection, communications are limited specifically to personnel only within that tower’s coverage area. When T-1 lines were lost during Hurricane Katrina, first responders were only able to communicate with other first responders within that tower area. Additionally, these emergency responders were unable to communicate with others outside of the tower’s coverage area.

The equipment located at the communications towers is dependent on electricity. During Hurricane Katrina, the power supply was lost and emergency power was supplied to the towers by generators. Although a substantial supply of fuel was available at each tower site to operate the generators, refueling efforts were hampered by debris and flood waters. Most often, loss of power at these towers resulted in a loss in the ability to communicate in that area.

Many of the commercial communications towers were also damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, which limited the use of cellular telephones for communication. Repair of the commercial tower sites was arduous, rendering this back-up option unrealistic in the days immediately following Hurricane Katrina. As repairs were made to the commercial tower sites, cellular telephone communications was slowly restored.

Portable satellite telephones were delivered to several troop headquarters in the effected area; however, heavy cloud coverage and system inundation limited their effectiveness. Internet service was also interrupted in the effected area because of damage to the hardware supporting this service and loss of power.
The communication infrastructures in Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes were some of the most severely damaged. Many first responders in these areas relied on mutual aid channels to communicate. Additionally, the State Police mobile transmitter site was deployed in New Orleans to provide an additional communications capability.

Connectivity between the state system and the New Orleans system is currently being provided by the use of an ACU1000. While this does allow voice communications between state and local emergency responders, it does not provide true interoperability.

The Plaquemines Parish tower location in Buras, which is utilized by the state system, suffered damage from both wind and water. State personnel restored communications in this area by installing temporary communications repeaters. State personnel restored communications in St. Bernard Parish through the installation of a temporary transmitter site along with 330 portable radios for local use.

State Police technicians programmed and enabled hundreds of radios for various agencies to aid in the restoration of communications. Over 800 of these radios were added in the first week alone. In particular, this significantly expanded the National Guard’s and Coast Guard’s communications capabilities in the effected areas.

Department of Public Safety personnel also provided assistance to a large number of local agencies in the effected area to assist in the restoration of their communication systems. This support included deploying radios and installing temporary repeaters. In addition, DPS provided parts and accessories, emergency microwave connectivity, cellular telephones and satellite telephones.

**Communications Failures During Hurricane Rita**

Assets such as satellite network links, supplemental radios, cellular telephones and generators were deployed with necessary personnel in numerous southwest parishes. Cameron Parish communications was affected drastically due to wind and flooding. The Hackberry and Rockefeller tower sites suffered severe damage. The Rockefeller tower site sustained heavy damage to the guy wires and antenna structure. The Hackberry site was flooded and inaccessible. The Rockefeller site was repaired and re-connected to the state network using spread spectrum microwave dishes while the Hackberry site required six days to access, remove flooded equipment, provide temporary generator power and install repeaters.

The LSP worked closely with other agencies, specifically Cameron Parish, to provide programming assistance for their emergency personnel.
Re-banding of 800 MHz Spectrum and 700 MHz Communication System Overview

The FCC has mandated a realignment (rebanding) of the 800 MHz band to keep Nextel and other cellular operations from interfering with public safety radio transmissions. Interference in the public safety 800 MHz spectrum generally occurs because public safety channels are intermingled with commercial channels such as those used for cell telephones. The FCC rebanding project affects all users of 800 MHz equipment. In the FCC ruling, the FCC mandated that all 800 MHz licensees move to an alternate frequency in the event their current communications operate between 806.00 / 851.00 to 809.00 / 854.75 MHz and 821 / 866 to 824 / 869 MHz. LSP currently operates in the 806 and 821 MHz frequencies and will be required to undergo re-banding.

The FCC rebanding agreement with Nextel is designed to provide an effective and equitable solution with minimum disruptions to first responders utilizing 800 MHz networks. Nextel has agreed to reimburse responder entities throughout the country a maximum of 2.5 billion dollars for the following:

1. Inventorying Subscriber Equipment and Infrastructure Facilities
2. Evaluating Proposed Frequencies to be Re-banded
3. Defining the Interoperability Environment as it Relates to Re-banding
4. Equipment Costs Required for Reconfiguration, Including Returning, Reprogramming, and Replacement (where necessary)
5. Filing FCC Applications
6. Installation, Testing, and Engineering Associated with Reconfiguration
7. Legal Fees Associated with Negotiating Reconfiguration Contracts with Nextel
8. Preparing a Cost Estimate and a Statement of Work (when necessary) for Reconfiguration Implementation
9. Activities of Licensee Personnel Performing Reconfiguration and Associated Planning Activities

The expenses associated with rebanding could be several million dollars for LSP alone, and tens of millions for other local responders statewide utilizing 800 MHz spectrum.

In addition, the FCC has designated a portion of the 700 MHz spectrum be set aside specifically for use by the public safety community. This designation will ultimately eliminate the competition for frequencies between the emergency services community and the commercial users that is currently occurring on the 800 MHz system. Upgrading the State's current communication system to the 700 MHz spectrum will alleviate the congestion that plagued us during the Hurricanes.

The FCC rules for the 700 MHz band also ensure that all radios operating within the 700 MHz band will include designated interoperability channels and a common digital interoperability standard (Project 25). Project 25 (P25) is the standard for interoperable digital two-way wireless communications products and systems. Developed under state, local and federal government guidance and Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) governance, P25 is gaining worldwide acceptance for public safety, security, public service, and commercial applications. The published P25 standards suite is administered by the TIA in their Mobile and Personal Private Radio Standards
Committee. Equipment that demonstrates compliance with P25 is able to meet a set of minimum requirements to fit the needs of public safety. These include the ability to interoperate with other P25 equipment so that users on different systems can talk via direct radio contact.

Upgrading the statewide communication system to the 700 MHz frequency will deliver a wireless network with much greater bandwidth that will support full voice, data, and imagery interoperability. This upgrade will benefit all of Louisiana’s emergency services agencies including EMS, Police and Sheriff’s Departments, Fire Departments, 911/Communication Operators, Public Health and Hospitals, Public Works, Federal Agencies, Louisiana National Guard, and Key State Government Executive Staff.

**Interim Interoperability Solutions**

LSP has purchased five ACU1000 devices to aid in the state’s interoperability endeavor. These devices have been installed at the LSP Troops located in Shreveport, New Orleans, Lake Charles, and Covington and will allow multiple agencies to communicate with each other on a common channel. The ACU-1000 has 12 ports, which means 12 radios can be connected together, utilizing a common channel. In theory, this would allow 12 different agencies to be connected simultaneously to the same channel.

Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, LSP officials met with FEMA in an effort to coordinate the emergency implementation of a 700 MHz communications network. In response to requests by LSP officials, FEMA issued a purchase order to Motorola for $15.9 million to repair and augment the current infrastructure in the effected area. This included the construction and upgrade of 19 communications tower sites in southeast Louisiana. Currently, 13 of these sites are fully operational, with work and funding still pending on the remainder. Further enhancement of the statewide network is needed to move all first responders to a statewide 700 MHz system.

In addition, FEMA has funded a $5 million purchase of mobile and portable radios for St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes which will utilize the state’s 700 MHz communications system. Orleans Parish has applied to FEMA for $20 million to purchase mobile and portable radios, also for use on the 700 MHz network.

Although Nextel telephones were utilized during the hurricanes, they have limited capabilities and are less reliable than conventional public safety networks. The commercial cellular telephone providers concentrate their infrastructure in the metropolitan areas and are unlikely to expand to the rural areas because of the limited population base. Because commercial companies are profit driven, statewide cellular coverage is unlikely. Like all the land mobile systems, these telephones rely on the public network which leaves us at the mercy of the commercial vendor’s coverage areas.
Permanent Interoperability Solutions

Louisiana State Police initiated an attempt at full state wide interoperability for all emergency service users in early 2004. This effort is named Louisiana Totally Interoperable Environment, or LATIE, and is an attempt to create a single statewide architecture to support all state, local, federal, and military emergency service personnel, providing sufficient bandwidth to facilitate voice, data, and imagery interoperability for each user. The statewide network would support all users by regions with user autonomy in each region while providing an open standard, open architecture to permit statewide interoperability for each user. The need for this was proven in the recent hurricane season when emergency responders from all over the state and nation poured into the affected areas and were unable to communicate over local communication systems which were not only disable, but were incompatible with systems other than their own.

Using the newly allocated 700MHz and 4.9GHz spectrums, Louisiana’s emergency services community can achieve full interoperability within a secured and assured robust network with sufficient and expandable coverage and capacity. Once implemented, the network, and user capabilities can be upgraded in small parts as technology advances provide new capabilities.

Conclusion

To achieve the foregoing interoperable environment, all emergency service agencies must set aside their desires for duplicitious, expensive, and diverse stand alone systems and become part of a single emergency response communications system. The acquisition of a statewide system will be expensive, but much more cost effective over time in terms of operation costs and delivery of public safety services. In the post 911 and post Katrina environment which has been thrust upon us, we can do nothing less than pool our resources for a common solution.
### INITIAL ACQUISITION COST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upgrade from 800 MHz to 700 MHz (113 sites)</td>
<td>$92,619,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towers and Buildings (45 Sites)</td>
<td>$18,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwave Connection (113 Connections)</td>
<td>$22,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consoles (200 two position consoles)</td>
<td>$32,517,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Voice Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td><strong>$186,337,127</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadband coverage for metropolitan areas (Hotspots)</td>
<td>$4,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Data Applications (Central Hardware and Software)</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Building enhancement coverage (Superdome, State Capitol etc.)</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation of T-1 lines</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three tactical emergency command posts to support all agencies during critical incidents</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency, Testing, and Training</td>
<td>$5,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total DATA and other Misc.</strong></td>
<td><strong>$18,700,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Subscriber Units</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Unit Price</th>
<th>Total State Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portables</td>
<td>6136</td>
<td>$5,372</td>
<td>$32,962,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobiles</td>
<td>2912</td>
<td>$5,044</td>
<td>$14,688,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Modems</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>$2,250</td>
<td>$1,822,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Data Computers</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>$4,500</td>
<td>$3,645,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Stations</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total State Units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$53,318,220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Subscriber Units</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Unit Price</th>
<th>Total Local Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portables</td>
<td>37266</td>
<td>$5,372</td>
<td>$200,192,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobiles</td>
<td>16446</td>
<td>$5,044</td>
<td>$82,953,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Modems</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>$2,250</td>
<td>$3,105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Data Computers</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>$4,500</td>
<td>$3,757,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Stations</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td>$4,316,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Local Units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$294,325,076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL ACQUISITION COST** $552,680,423
### RECURRING EXPENDITURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries (five additional employees)</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Salaries</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/C - Operating Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>$400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site Maintenance</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent for Tower Site</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPS Battery Backup</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL O/C - Operating Services</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/C - Supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel for Generators</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL O/C - Supplies</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/C - Professional Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance service agreement</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL O/C - Professional Services</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/C - IAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTM (Rental of T-1 and Fiber Lines)</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL O/C - IAT</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Repairs and Tower Enhancement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Enhancement</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Major Repairs</td>
<td>$1,050,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL RECURRING OPERATING COSTS** $10,150,000

**TOTAL STATEWIDE COMMUNICATION EXPENDITURES** $562,830,423

**Total expenditures does not include FEMA funding for 700 MHz system and subscriber units for St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes.**
Interoperability Funding Initiatives

COPS Grant – (the State of Louisiana is not eligible to receive this funding)

The City of New Orleans received a FY03 Federal COPS Interoperable Communications Technology Grant with an award amount of $5,510,412 and a local cash match of $1,836,804 to support the Louisiana Department of Homeland Security Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Louisiana Region 1 area (Orleans, Jefferson, Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes). This funding will support a communication system in that area; however, that system will not support the state’s infrastructure. This plan will satisfy the daily operational communications requirements through resolution of coverage area and equipment obsolescence issues and establish an 800 MHz network that is upgradeable to the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) Project 25 standard. The interoperability achieved by this proposal meets the needs of the region at this time. The Communications Interoperability Committee understands that migration to federal standard APCO compliancy will bring interoperability on a national level.

Due to Hurricane Katrina, it is questionable whether the cash match can be funded to secure the grant. Therefore, the region is requesting that the cash match be waived and additional funds be awarded to make the grant whole. Furthermore, if the City of New Orleans receives additional funds from FEMA to purchase radios compatible with the 700 MHz system, UASI Region 1 will consider utilizing grant funds to integrate into the current 700 MHz radio system.

In addition to the Region 1 COPS Grant received by New Orleans, Baton Rouge has received a Region 2 COPS Grant of $5,999,184 and a local cash match of $1,999,728 to be used for interoperability.

Department of Homeland Security – Office for Domestic Preparedness Grants

The Department of Homeland Security through the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) awarded the State of Louisiana the following homeland security grants for the prevention and response to terrorism.

Eligible categories include management and administration, training, planning, exercises, and equipment procurement. The focus for Louisiana has been upon enhancing the capabilities of state and local first responders to prevent and respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) related incidents.

Also a priority, interoperable communications has received $15,906,999 of ODP funding in Louisiana.
### ODP Grant Dollars Awarded to Louisiana and Expended on Interoperability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODP Grant Name</th>
<th>Total Funding Amount</th>
<th>Interoperability Expenditures To Date</th>
<th>Percent Interoperability Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1999</td>
<td>904,000</td>
<td>198,156</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2000</td>
<td>1,175,000</td>
<td>308,526</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2001</td>
<td>1,228,000</td>
<td>182,009</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2002</td>
<td>5,331,000</td>
<td>1,289,581</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 I</td>
<td>9,451,000</td>
<td>2,177,141</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 II</td>
<td>21,698,692</td>
<td>5,803,437</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 UASI NO</td>
<td>6,228,661</td>
<td>2,599,092</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 SHSP</td>
<td>27,951,091</td>
<td>2,184,997</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 LETPP</td>
<td>8,296,000</td>
<td>1,078,765</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI NO</td>
<td>7,110,625</td>
<td>74,601</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI BR</td>
<td>7,151,362</td>
<td>10,693</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 HSGP</td>
<td>17,579,253</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 LETPP</td>
<td>6,428,817</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI NO</td>
<td>9,305,180</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI BR</td>
<td>5,226,495</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 HSGP est.</td>
<td>10,990,600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 LETPP est.</td>
<td>6,400,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 UASI est.</td>
<td>17,907,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>170,363,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,966,999</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Remaining ODP Grant Dollars Awarded to Louisiana (State and Local Awards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODP Grant Name</th>
<th>Total Funding</th>
<th>Dedicated Equipment Funding</th>
<th>Remaining Equipment Funding</th>
<th>Percent Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1999</td>
<td>904,000</td>
<td>904,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2000</td>
<td>1,175,000</td>
<td>1,175,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2001</td>
<td>1,228,000</td>
<td>1,228,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2002</td>
<td>5,331,000</td>
<td>5,331,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 I</td>
<td>9,451,000</td>
<td>9,451,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 II</td>
<td>21,698,692</td>
<td>21,698,692</td>
<td>17,346,481</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 UASI NO</td>
<td>6,228,661</td>
<td>6,228,661</td>
<td>5,501,630</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 SHSP</td>
<td>27,951,091</td>
<td>27,951,091</td>
<td>20,987,328</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 LETPP</td>
<td>8,296,000</td>
<td>8,296,000</td>
<td>8,104,830</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI NO</td>
<td>7,110,625</td>
<td>7,110,625</td>
<td>4,766,764</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI BR</td>
<td>7,151,362</td>
<td>7,151,362</td>
<td>3,522,872</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 HSGP</td>
<td>17,579,253</td>
<td>17,579,253</td>
<td>13,281,581</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 LETPP</td>
<td>6,428,817</td>
<td>6,428,817</td>
<td>6,233,476</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI NO</td>
<td>9,305,180</td>
<td>9,305,180</td>
<td>7,444,144</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI BR</td>
<td>5,226,495</td>
<td>5,226,495</td>
<td>4,181,196</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 HSGP est.</td>
<td>10,990,600</td>
<td>10,990,600</td>
<td>8,792,480</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 LETPP est.</td>
<td>6,400,000</td>
<td>6,400,000</td>
<td>5,120,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 UASI est.</td>
<td>17,907,500</td>
<td>17,907,500</td>
<td>14,326,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>170,363,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>135,112,352</strong></td>
<td><strong>87,646,694</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Honorable Tom Davis  
Member of Congress  
Chair, House Select Committee to Investigate the  
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina  
2157 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515-6143  

Re: Communications Interoperability  

Dear Congressman Davis:  

The Honorable Kathleen B. Blanco, Governor of Louisiana, testified before your committee on December 14, 2005 regarding Hurricane Katrina. The issue of funding for interoperable communications was raised, and I offer this letter of further information. For your convenience, I have attached a copy of the chart supplied to your Committee which reflects the amount of grants received through the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) of the United States Department of Homeland Security (or the predecessor agency) from fiscal year 1999 to the present. The chart also includes an estimate of competitive grant money that may be received in fiscal year 2006.  

The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) is the state administrative agency for Office of Domestic Preparedness grants. The Louisiana State Police assists LOHSEP with the administration of the portion of the grants allocated for the state and local governments to purchase equipment.  

As you may be aware, the current focus of grants awarded by the United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness, is prevention and response to terrorism. In addition, the guidelines have historically provided that at least 80% of the funds are dedicated to local authorities, and no more than 20% may be retained by the State. While the State is required to insure that the local authorities follow the grant guidelines, the State cannot dictate how the local authorities spend the grant money.  

The grant guidelines limit both State and local expenditures to specific allocations within five categories: equipment procurement, training, planning, exercises, and administrative. Each category may contain further limitations.
For instance, the grant may limit the funds allocated to equipment to designated subcategories such as personal protective equipment, decontamination equipment, incident response vehicles, medical supplies and/or communication.

In accordance with the guidelines’ attention to prevention and response to terrorism, the focus of the State of Louisiana has been to enhance the capability of state and local first responders in regard to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) related incidents.

Nevertheless, acting within the grant guidelines, in the past 6.5 years, $15,906,999 in ODP grant funds have been expended for interoperability ($1,269,840 by the State and $14,637,159 by local governments).

To clarify the chart reflecting grant moneys received from the Office of Domestic Preparedness, United States Department of Homeland Security (or the predecessor grantor), since fiscal year 1999, the State of Louisiana has received $135,065,086 in total awards, of which $108,274,392 has been awarded to local governments, and $26,790,694 to the State. It is estimated that an additional $35,298,392 will be received in ODP grant funds for fiscal year 2006; thus the sum of $170,363,186 reflected for “total funding” on the chart.

Of the $135,065,086 in current grant funding, $106,873,872 is allocated for equipment purchases and the remaining $28,191,214 is allocated for planning, training, exercises, and administrative costs. The amount expended for equipment purchases as of December 14, 2005 is $48,213,765.

In addition to the level of funding, there are two limitations in the grant guidelines that render achievement of true interoperability at the state level virtually impossible. First, for Louisiana to achieve true interoperability, the initial acquisition cost for infrastructure and equipment is $552,680,423, which must be supplemented by $10,150,000 in recurring operating costs. For a state, such as Louisiana, that has never received more than $50,000,000 in ODP grant money in any given year, and which has now lost one-third of its economy, true interoperability is unaffordable.

Compounding the issue of inadequate funding, is the grant requirement that local governments receive a minimum of 80% of the funds, coupled with the inability of the State to direct these expenditures. By virtue of the grant guidelines, the State cannot control how the local governments spend the grant funds. The current grant funding and restrictions are not consistent with this nation’s goal since 9-11 of achieving true interoperability for all emergency responders in every community.

A more sensible approach, which acknowledges the importance of interoperability would be to restrict grant funds to interoperable communications with the State as sole grantee, under the proviso that the State must include all Parishes, and also any municipality having a population of over 100,000 within the system.
The State would be encouraged to include all emergency responders within the system. Once true interoperability has been demonstrated and achieved, the restrictions on funding should revert to prevention and response to natural disasters and terrorism at both the state and local levels.

Louisiana has long recognized the need for a totally interoperable communications environment that would permit local, state and federal emergency services agencies to communicate. A plan has been developed by the Louisiana Totally Interoperable Environment (LATIE) user group which provides a statewide plan to achieve communications interoperability for all of the emergency response disciplines identified by the United States Department of Homeland Security. The Louisiana proposed solution includes voice, data and image interoperability. We request your support for Louisiana to achieve true interoperability.

I thank you for this opportunity to assure the committee that Louisiana is working diligently to enhance the communication capabilities of our state and local first responders, and ask that this letter be filed of record as part of Governor Blanco’s testimony.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Henry L. Whitehorn, Colonel
Superintendent
Louisiana State Police

Attachment

cc:  Terry Ryder  
      Nick Gachassin
### ODP Grant Dollars Awarded to Louisiana and Expended on Interoperability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODP Grant Name</th>
<th>Total Funding Amount</th>
<th>Interoperability Expenditures To Date</th>
<th>Percent Interoperability Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1999</td>
<td>904,000</td>
<td>198,156</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2000</td>
<td>1,175,000</td>
<td>308,526</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2001</td>
<td>1,228,000</td>
<td>182,009</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2002</td>
<td>5,331,000</td>
<td>1,289,581</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 I</td>
<td>9,451,000</td>
<td>2,177,141</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 II</td>
<td>21,698,692</td>
<td>5,803,437</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 UASI NO</td>
<td>6,228,661</td>
<td>2,599,092</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 SHSP</td>
<td>27,951,001</td>
<td>2,184,997</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 LETPP</td>
<td>8,296,000</td>
<td>1,078,765</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI NO</td>
<td>7,110,625</td>
<td>74,601</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI BR</td>
<td>7,151,362</td>
<td>10,693</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 HSGP</td>
<td>17,579,253</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 LETPP</td>
<td>6,428,817</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI NO</td>
<td>9,305,180</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI BR</td>
<td>5,226,495</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 HSGP est.</td>
<td>10,990,600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 LETPP est.</td>
<td>6,400,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 UASI est.</td>
<td>17,907,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>170,363,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,906,999</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Remaining ODP Grant Dollars Awarded to Louisiana (State and Local Awards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODP Grant Name</th>
<th>Total Funding</th>
<th>Dedicated Equipment Funding</th>
<th>Remaining Equipment Funding</th>
<th>Percent Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1999</td>
<td>904,000</td>
<td>904,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2000</td>
<td>1,175,000</td>
<td>1,175,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2001</td>
<td>1,228,000</td>
<td>1,228,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2002</td>
<td>5,331,000</td>
<td>5,331,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 I</td>
<td>9,451,000</td>
<td>6,865,570</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 II</td>
<td>21,698,692</td>
<td>17,346,481</td>
<td>1,395,947</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003 UASI NO</td>
<td>6,228,661</td>
<td>5,501,630</td>
<td>794,004</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 SHSP</td>
<td>27,951,001</td>
<td>20,987,328</td>
<td>15,542,367</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 LETPP</td>
<td>8,296,000</td>
<td>8,104,830</td>
<td>2,144,663</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI NO</td>
<td>7,110,625</td>
<td>4,766,764</td>
<td>4,289,305</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004 UASI BR</td>
<td>7,151,362</td>
<td>3,522,872</td>
<td>3,628,531</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 HSGP</td>
<td>17,579,253</td>
<td>13,281,581</td>
<td>4,289,672</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 LETPP</td>
<td>6,428,817</td>
<td>6,233,476</td>
<td>195,341</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI NO</td>
<td>9,305,180</td>
<td>7,444,144</td>
<td>1,861,036</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005 UASI BR</td>
<td>5,226,495</td>
<td>4,181,196</td>
<td>1,045,300</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 HSGP est.</td>
<td>10,990,600</td>
<td>8,792,480</td>
<td>2,198,120</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 LETPP est.</td>
<td>6,400,000</td>
<td>5,120,000</td>
<td>1,280,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006 UASI est.</td>
<td>17,907,500</td>
<td>14,326,000</td>
<td>3,581,500</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>170,363,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>135,112,352</strong></td>
<td><strong>87,646,694</strong></td>
<td><strong>64.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frequently Asked Questions

This page contains a comprehensive list of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) that pertain not only to the NCS but also to the various services and programs that we offer.

FAQ Index

- National Communications System (NCS) FAQ
- National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) FAQ
- National Communications System Committee of Principals (COP) FAQ
- National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC) FAQ
- Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS)
- Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) Program
- Wireless Priority Service (WPS)
- Shared Resources (SHARES) High Frequency Radio Program
- One-Stop Shop Service (OSSS)
- Emergency Response Training (ERT) Seminars
- Alerting and Coordination Network (ACN)
- NCS Augmentation Program
- Network Design and Analysis Capability (NDAC)
- Telecommunications Infrastructure Sharing and Analysis Center

National Communications System (NCS) FAQ

- What is the mission of the National Communications System (NCS)?
- What is the current structure of the NCS?
- Describe the links between government and industry. What roles and relationships does each have in the NCS?
What is the mission of the National Communications System (NCS)?
The mission of the NCS is to assist the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Office of Management and Budget, in the coordination of the planning for and provision of national security and emergency preparedness communications for the Federal Governments under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution.

What is the current structure of the NCS?
On April 3, 1994, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order (E.O.) 12472 which defined the NCS' national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) capabilities and superseded President Kennedy's original 1963 memorandum that established the NCS. The NCS expanded from its original six members to an interagency group of 22 Federal departments and agencies, and began coordinating and planning NS/EP telecommunications to support crises and disasters. The NCS membership currently stands at 23 members, with the addition of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003.

Describe the link between Government and industry. What roles and relationships does each have in the NCS?
The NCS' Committee of Principals (CoP) – and its working body, the Council of Representatives (CoR) – represents the member organizations of the NCS. The CoP – formed as a result of Executive Order 12472, provides advice and recommendations through the NCS to the National Security Council on NS/EP telecommunications and its ties to other critical infrastructures. The NCS also participates in inter-industry-Government planning through its work with the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), with the NCS National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NC3), and with its Telecommunications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (TISAC).

Who is the Executive Agent?
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff serves as the Executive Agent of the National Communications System. The Secretary of Homeland Security assumed duties of the Executive Agent on March 1, 2003 when sponsorship of the NCS transferred from the Defense Department to the Department of Homeland Security.

Who is the Manager?
The Department of Homeland Security's Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, is the Manager of the NCS. Mr. Robert Stephan was appointed by President George W. Bush on April 8, 2005 to serve as the Assistant
How often does the NSTAC meet?
The NSTAC conducts face-to-face meetings annually in May to report on its activities and provide recommendations to the President. In addition, the NSTAC membership conducts quarterly meetings via conference calls to discuss ongoing work and potential issues between principals and senior government leaders.

Who can be NSTAC members?
Executive Order 12352 provides for no more than 30 NSTAC members who “shall have particular knowledge and expertise in the field of telecommunications and represent elements of the Nation’s telecommunications industry.” In addition to the criteria set out in the Executive Order, the FACA requires “balanced” membership. As applied to NSTAC that means not all 30 members should come from the same segment of the telecommunications industry or be from large companies. Only the President may appoint or terminate a member. Any member may resign.

Which companies are currently represented on NSTAC?
As of January 13, 2005 the following companies are represented on the President’s NSTAC:

- Advanced Micro Devices
- AT&T
- Bank of America
- BellSouth
- Boeing
- Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA)
- Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)
- EDS
- Lockheed Martin
- Lucent Technologies
- Microsoft
- Motorola
- Northrop Grumman
- Nokia Networks
- PacificBell
- Qwest Communications
- Raytheon
- Rockwell Collins
- Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Who or what does the NSTAC principal represent?
The principal represents the member company. If the President appointed a member to provide advice as an individual, the Government would consider the member as a "Special Government Employee" and subject to the conflict of interest statutes. If a principal leaves the company, the company may nominate a new principal for the President's consideration. The former principal does not take the NSTAC membership to his or her new company. Two NSTAC companies that merge may have only one NSTAC principal to represent the surviving company.

Who is the Designated Federal Official (DFO) for NSTAC and what is the DFO's role?
The DFO requires that each Federal advisory committee have what is called a Designated Federal Official. For NSTAC, the DFO is the NCS Manager. The DFO attends or chairs, and adjourns each meeting. No committee meeting may be held in the absence of the DFO or without his advance approval. There is a difference in the duties of the DFO, if NSTAC, a Presidential Federal advisory committee, and non-presidential Federal advisory committee. FACI does not require that the DFO of a presidential advisory committee approve the meeting agenda.

What is the Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES)?
Executive Order 12382 authorizes the NSTAC to establish subcommittees. The NSTAC Principals, in accordance with its committee by-laws, established the IES. The purpose of the IES is to assist the NSTAC on matters concerning procedures, plans, and policies for the telecommunication and information systems that support national security and emergency preparedness. The IES may establish working groups, task forces, and ad-hoc groups to address pertinent issues. Each member of the NSTAC may appoint one member of the IES.

May the IES provide advice to the Government?
No. The IES is not a Federal advisory committee. Should it appear to be giving advice, it could become an unauthorized de facto Federal advisory committee. IES members may be polled individually for their opinions and the responses consolidated by the Government. However, the result of the poll of individual IES members does not constitute a formal NSTAC endorsement of a product and should not be represented as such. Only matters voted upon by NSTAC Principals represent NSTAC products.
What is the role of the NCS in regards to the NISTAC, the IES and other subcommittees?
Executive Order 12472 assigns the NCS the role of providing staff support and technical assistance to the NISTAC, and therefore the IES and other subcommittees. The NCS Manager is the Designated Federal Official of the NISTAC. The NISTAC bylaws name the NCS Deputy Manager as the non-voting IES Chair. Since the IES is not an advisory committee, the Deputy Manager is not a formal Designated Federal Official.

Must the NISTAC, the IES and other subcommittee meetings be open to the public?
The purpose of the FACA was to allow the public to be aware of the advice its Federal Government was getting and who was giving it. Federal advisory committee meetings are generally required to be open to the public. However, the FACA does contain a national security exception to the general rule and it is on that basis that NISTAC does most of its meetings. IES and other subcommittee meetings are not subject to the openness requirements of the FACA since they are not Federal advisory committees.

Who may have access to the records of the NISTAC?
The FACA established the public's right to be kept informed with respect to the number, purpose, membership, activities and cost of federal advisory committees. The Federal Register publishes notices of meetings. Unless the meeting is closed for national security reasons, interested persons are permitted to attend. FACA requires that "...the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendices, working papers, drafts, studies, agendas, or other documents which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory committee shall be available for public inspection." For NISTAC purposes, this means the material presented by the IES to the NISTAC itself, not any subcommittee material, be made available. The NISTAC fulfills this responsibility by posting the reports on its website. Again, a national security exception may be applied. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not apply to the NISTAC since it is not a Federal "agency" subject to that act. Materials in the physical possession of the NCS, in its role as the provider of support and assistance to the NISTAC can be deemed NISTAC material and not releasable under FOIA.

National Communications System Committee of Principals (COP) FAQ

- What is the Committee of Principals (COP)?
- What federal organizations maintain seats on the Committee of Principals?
- Who chairs the COP?
- What are the responsibilities of each COP representative?
- What is the Council of Executiveatives (COR)?
- How often does the COP meet? What is a COP meeting like?
- How often does the COR meet? How are they tasked?
Does the COP have subcommittees?

What is the Committee of Principals (COP)?
The Committee of Principals (COP) is a Presidential designation interagency group that provides advice and recommendations on national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications to the Executive Office of the President. High-level Government officials representing Federal operational, policy, regulatory, and enforcement organizations compose the COP. Its diverse representation across 23 federal departments and agencies embraces the full spectrum of Federal telecommunications assets and responsibilities. As an interagency group, it serves as a forum for members to review, evaluate, and present views and recommendations on current or prospective NCS programs to the Manager, NCS, the Executive Agent (the Secretary of Homeland Security), and the Executive Office of the President (EOP).

What Federal Organizations Maintain Seats on the Committee of Principals

- The Department of State
- The Department of Defense
- The Department of Treasury
- The Department of Justice
- The Department of Commerce
- The Department of Interior
- The Department of Energy
- The Department of Agriculture
- The Department of Health and Human Services
- The Department of Transportation
- The Department of Veterans Affairs
- The Department of Homeland Security
- The Joint Staff (DOD element)
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS element)
- The National Security Agency (DOD element)
- The Central Intelligence Agency
- The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (DOC element)
- The Federal Reserve Board
- The General Services Administration
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- The Federal Communications Commission
- The United States Postal Service
Who chairs the COP?
The Manager of the National Communications System chairs the Committee of Principals.

What are the responsibilities of each COP representative?
The COP member is responsible for providing the position of their parent organization on policy, technical, and programmatic NSSEP telecommunications issues. Principals ensure that written reports, comments, and recommendations are made available to the Committee through the Executive Secretary (the NCS Deputy Manager). Principals also participate as members of subordinate groups, as required, and provide guidance and direction to their respective organizations' representatives.

What is the Council of Representatives (COR)?
The Committee of Principals (COP) formally established the Council of Representatives (COR). The COR is a permanent subordinate group which participates in NCS activities. Each department and agency provides a representative to the Council of Representatives (COR). The Office of the Manager, NCS, provides support to the COP, COR, and their subgroups.

How often does the COP meet? What is a COP meeting like?
The COP meets a minimum of twice annually. At these meetings, the COP receives a series of reports, which are designed for action or information. The Committee is asked to recommend forwarding a report or issuance to the Executive Office of the President. It is by the COP's consensus and direction that the majority of the programs and activities of the NCS take place. The COP bylaws outline these procedures.

How often does the COR meet? How are they tasked?
As the working group of the COP, the COR normally meets on a quarterly basis. At COR meetings, members consider initiatives from various sources, for forwarding to the COP. For example, the Executive Office of the President or the National Security Council may task the COP to investigate a specific area and produce recommendations for action. The Committee, in turn, often tasks the COR to study that area and provide a report within a specific period of time. The COR may convene a subcommittee to fulfill the COP's request. As another example, the OMMCS may present or initiate a new program for consideration by the COR and the COP. Alternatively, an NCS Member organization may present a briefing for NCS consideration.

Does the COP have subcommittees?
National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC) FAQ

What is the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC)?

Who is the Manager of the NCC?

Is the NCC a joint effort between the Government and Industry?

How many Industry members belong to the NCC?

What type of liaison exists between the telecommunications industry and Government representatives in the NCC?

Is there any coordination between the NCC and other similar coordinating centers?

Is the information received in the NCC available to the community at large?

Is the FCC represented in the NCC?

Is there information available on the NCC and the National Communications System?

Do the major telecommunications companies in the U.S. provide status reports at a regular frequency to the NCC?

Will the general public be able to call the NCC for information about their telecommunications service?

When did the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications activate in reaction to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?

What is the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC)?

The National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications is an Industry-Government operations center, established in 1984. The NCC mission is to assist in the initiation of national coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of national security/emergency preparedness (NSSEP) telecommunications service or facilities under all conditions, crises or emergencies. Full and part-time telecommunications industry and Government representatives support the NCC and serve as liaisons with their parent companies or organizations. The cooperation fostered between the telecommunications industry and the Government in the NCC provides an operational focal point for all Government/Industry NSSEP telecommunications response across the spectrum of emergencies.

Who is the Manager of the NCC?

The NCC Manager is Mr. Donald Smith.
Is the NCC a joint effort between the Government and Industry?
Yes, the NCC is a joint effort between Government and Industry. In addition to the NCC, there are nine Federal Participants (as of 2/22/00) - Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency (part of the Department of Homeland Security), Federal Reserve Board, and the General Services Administration.

How many industry members belong to the NCC?
There are 38 industry members (as of 6/11/00) - American, AT&T, Avici, BellSouth, Boeing, Cincinnati Bell, Cingular, Chel System, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA), EDS, Inktel, Inforo, Juniper Networks, Level 3, Lockheed Martin, Lucent Technologies, MCI and USA, Nortel Networks, Northrop Grumman, Qwest, Starvis, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Sprint Nextel, Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA), U.S. Telecom Association (USTA), VeriSign, Verizon.

What type of fusion exists between the telecommunications industry and Government representatives in the NCC?
The telecommunications industry and the Government staff work together to coordinate support to national security and emergency preparedness issues and to prevent and mitigate impact on the national telecommunications infrastructure.

Is there any coordination between the NCC and other similar coordinating centers?
Yes, the NCC coordinates with Federal departments and agencies, and telecommunications companies.

Is the information received in the NCC available to the community at large?
Information is normally sensitive or proprietary, and not releasable to the public.

Is the FCC represented in the NCC?
The FCC is a non-voting member of the NCC, participates in weekly meetings, and supports the NCC in the event of an emergency.

Is there information available on the NCC and the National Communications System?
Information on the NCC is available through its Web Site at http://www.ncs.gov/ncoc/
Wireless Priority Service (WPS) FAQ

The Wireless Priority Service (WPS) list of Frequently Asked Questions is maintained by the WPS Management Team on the WPS website.

SHAREd RESources (SHAREs) High Frequency Radio Program FAQ

- What is the mission and purpose of the SHAREs Program?
- What is the make-up of the SHAREs network?
- How does the SHAREs program service the Federal Government community?
- Who is responsible for the SHAREs program? Who manages the everyday operations of SHAREs?

What is the mission and purpose of the SHAREs Program?
SHAREs combines existing high frequency (HF) assets from 93 Federal, state, and industry organizations into a single emergency voice and data message handling network supporting national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) when normal communications are destroyed or unavailable.

SHAREs FAQ Index FAQ Index

What is the make-up of the SHAREs network?
As of June 2003, the SHAREs network consists of 110 HF radio stations, representing 93 Federal, State, and industry resource contributors. There are SHAREs stations situated in every state and at 20 overseas locations. Nearly 200 emergency planning and response personnel also participate in SHAREs. Over 150 HF frequencies are maintained for use in SHAREs. The National Communication System publishes the SHAREs HF Radio Program Bulletin, to periodically keep members updated on program activities. They can be accessed at http://www.ncs.gov/m/sharesshare.htm

SHAREs FAQ Index FAQ Index

How does the SHAREs program service the Federal Government community?
SHAREs provides the Federal community a forum for addressing issues affecting HF radio interoperability. The SHAREs' HF Interoperability Working Group (HWG), established as a permanent standing committee under the NCS Council of Representatives, is responsible for providing guidance and direction for the SHAREs radio network and for fostering interoperability of Federal HF radio systems through examination of regulatory, procedural, and technical issues. The SHAREs' HF Interoperability Working Group currently consists of 146 members.

One-Stop Shop Service (OSSS) FAQ

- What is the purpose of the One-Stop Shop Service (OSSS)?
- What organization in the Department of Homeland Security implements the OSSS?
- What NCS programs and services are included in the OSSS?
- How do NCS customers use the OSSS?
- Can I obtain OSSS service using the website?
- How are the processes of the various OSSS services being implemented?
- What is the future goal of the OSSS?
- Where do I contact for further information on OSSS?

What is the purpose of the One-Stop Shop Service (OSSS)?
The purpose of the NIEP Priority Communications One-Stop Shop Service (OSSS) is to enable National Communications System (NCS) customers to acquire information on NCS priority communications services, programs, and operations from a single source by consolidating user support, operational, subscription, and help-desk services for the NCS telecommunications information.

What organization in the Department of Homeland Security implements the OSSS?
Within the DHS, the NCS Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Division provides NIEP priority telecommunications services to Federal, State, and local governments, industry, and other authorized NIEP organizations that participate in the OSSS.

What NCS programs and services are included in the OSSS?
The One-Stop Shop Service (OSSS) consolidation began its implementation in September 2002 and includes user and operational support for the following programs.

http://www.ncs.gov/faq.html

3/6/2006
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) - The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) provides NS/SEP personnel emergency access and priority processing in the local and long distance segments of the Public Switched Network (PSN). Its intended use is in an emergency or crisis situation during which the probability of completing a call over normal or other alternate telecommunication means has significantly decreased.

Wireless Priority Service (WPS) - The Wireless Priority Service (WPS) provides a means for NS/SEP telecommunications users to obtain priority access to available wireless radio channels when necessary to initiate emergency calls.

Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) Program - The Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) Program is a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) program, managed and operated by the NCS, that provides for priority provisioning and restoration of critical NS/SEP telecommunications assets/circuits. Critical NS/SEP circuits are defined as those that are critical to maintaining a state of readiness for, responding to, or managing telecommunications during an event or crisis that could cause harm to the population, damage property, or threaten the security of the United States.

SHAREd REsource (SHARE) High Frequency (HF) Radio Program - The SHAREd REsource (SHARE) High Frequency (HF) Radio Program provides a single, interagency emergency message handling system by bringing together existing HF radio resources of Federal, state, and local agencies and organizations that need NS/SEP telecommunications services.

OSIS FAQ Index FAQ Index

How do NCS customers use the OSIS?
As an initial step toward implementation, the NCS created a telephone connectivity OSIS Call Center by creating a NS/SEP consolidated virtual call center. The objective is to have a single number for all NCS customers to call for priority communications services. The OSIS Call Center contact information is 1-866-NCS-CALL (1-866-627-2255), or in the metro Washington, D.C. area at (703) 676-CALL (703) 676-2255. This call center provides one centralized access point with multiple selections for the various NCS NS/SEP telecommunications services.

OSIS FAQ Index FAQ Index

Can I obtain OSIS service using the worldwide web?
The NCS also implemented a consolidated web-based approach for NS/SEP priority communications services using a web portal to maximize the overall benefits of one-stop service. The NCS home page will act as the portal and will provide top-level information on the various priority communications services available. Users will then be automatically linked to the appropriate web pages for specific services. NS/SEP program, service, and operational information can be obtained via the NCS homepage at http://www.ncs.gov.

OSIS FAQ Index FAQ Index

How are the processes of the various OSIS services being implemented?
The architecture used for consolidation of the technical/information processes for all NCS priority telecommunications services/programs will utilize web-based technology and a web-based information delivery service. Consolidation of the technical/information processes for administration and operations of these services/programs provides an efficient method for continuing to process them on an on-going basis while transitioning to the consolidated environment. Partitions or other security measures will be established to protect
more sensitive information as required.

OSSS FAQ Index  FAQ Index

What is the future goal of the OSSS?
OSSS provides an efficient and effective means of managing and supporting the consolidated operations/user support missions and functions of the NCS and provides all NCS users/customers with priority communications services and coordination/help Desk services and operations during any circumstance. Support for the operational/administrative process activities for all NSEP communications services under a single organizational environment allows continuity and integrity of management for the services/programs. The goal is to understand the needs of the organizations with NSEP responsibilities across all levels of government, industry, and critical infrastructure sectors and to determine how to assist them with services provided by the NCS under the OSSS implementation. As the NCS implements OSSS, it envisions that it will be able to provide its services not only to the NSEP programs and services but also to other services and programs that are supported by the NCS.

OSSS FAQ Index  FAQ Index

Who do I contact for further information on OSSS?
Additional information may be obtained by contacting the OSSS Coordination Group: Telephone: 1-866-NCSS-CALL (1-866-627-7225), or in the metro Washington, D.C. area at (703)-476-CALL (703)-476-2256; Fax: (703)-476-2256, or Website - http://www.ncs.gov.

OSSS FAQ Index  FAQ Index

Emergency Response Training (ERT) Seminars FAQ

What are ERT Seminars?
What is the purpose of ERT Seminars?
What is the Seminar Concept?

What are ERT Seminars?
The Telecommunications Emergency Response Training (ERT) seminars, a joint venture between the NCS, General Services Administration (GSA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the telecommunications industry, train emergency responders at the Federal, regional, State and local level on telecommunications resources and procedures that are available to support emergency response operations.

ERT FAQ Index  FAQ Index

What is the purpose of ERT Seminars?
The NCS conducts ERT seminars nationwide to reach emergency responders and planners in the ten Federal Regions. A core program delivered within an 8-hour period is augmented by specifically designed presentations tailored to regional interests and operational requirements. The seminar provides an overview of current and

Alerting and Coordination Network (ACN) FAQ

- What is the Background of the ACN?
- What is the mission and purpose of the ACN program?
- Who is responsible for the ACN program? Who manages the everyday operations of ACN?

What is the Background of the ACN?
Prior to January 1, 2001, the National Telecommunications Alliance (NTA) managed and operated the Alerting and Coordinating Network (ACN) - a switched, private line network - to provide emergency communications among the Regional Bell Operating Companies, their suppliers and certain Government agencies. When NTA dissolved on January 1, 2001, the ACN was in jeopardy of being dismantled. Because the ACN provides emergency back-up communications capabilities that could help coordinate response to and recovery from a
What is the mission and purpose of the ACN Program?
The ACN provides a stable emergency voice communications network connecting telecommunications service providers, Emergency Operations Centers, and Network Operations Centers. The ACN supports National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications network restoration coordination, transmission of telecommunications requirements and priorities, and incident reporting when the Public Switched Network (PSN) is inaccessible, stressed, or congested. The ACN provides a telecommunications network that is independent of the Public Switched Network (PSN).

Who is responsible for the ACN program? Who manages the everyday operations of ACN?
Overall support for the ACN Program is the responsibility of the Manager, National Communications System. The Chief, Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, Office of the Manager, NCS, is responsible for administering the ACN program. The Manager, National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, is responsible for day-to-day operations of the ACN.

NCS Augmentee Program FAQ

- What is the Augmentee Program?
- What is the IMA Mission?
- Who sponsors the IMA Program?
- What experience is needed?
- What training is needed?

What is the Augmentee Program?
The National Communications System established the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Unit to provide a cadre of skilled civilian and military resources to enhance the efforts of the Office of the Manager, NCS (CIMCS), the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), and NCS Regional Managers (NCS RM).
The NCS initiated the NCS IMA program in 1988 to provide emergency telecommunications support to the DMNCS during mobilization and wartime. More recently, the NCS has expanded the IMA mission to reflect the all-hazard NCS mission of providing emergency telecommunications support to the full spectrum of wartime and peacetime contingencies, including Emergency Support Functions (ESF) #2 (Communications) under the National Response Plan (NRP). NCS IMAs personnel augment various NCS staffs during national and regional crises and emergencies. IMA personnel are deployable to support DMNCS headquarters, the NCC, Emergency Operations Teams (EOT), the RMA, or the Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator (FECC) at the Joint Field Office (JFO).

As a general rule, NCS IMAs serve as Regional Emergency Staff Officers who are regionally trained and centrally managed by the IMA Program Manager. The NCS IMAs are U.S. Army Reserve officers with military and civilian training and experience in communications and information systems planning and operations.

Who sponsors the IMA Program?
The U.S. Army Reserve sponsors the NCS IMA Program. The USAR assigns senior reserve officer personnel to fill positions in Federal departments and agencies that have significant military-related functions during a transition to war, mobilization for war, and other national security emergencies, as well as all-hazard emergency preparedness and response activities. Within this context, IMAs' assignments assist the DMNCS to fulfill NSEP requirements within the 10 Federal Regions and the National Capital Region.

What experience is needed?
NCS IMAs are normally U.S. Army Signal Corps field grade officers with staff officer experience and demonstrated the leadership and organizational skills required to fulfill the responsibilities expected of NCS IMAs. IMAs are screened carefully to ensure they meet the operational requirements of the NCS. As Regional Emergency Staff Officers, NCS IMAs must possess the requisite mix of skills and experience to perform any duties assigned by the NCS Regional Manager of FECC. Successful IMAs are self-starters who can work with little or no supervision, have strong communication (presentation and writing) skills, and have experience in the fields of communications and information systems planning and operations.

To be fully functional in their assigned NCS positions, IMAs must obtain experience in and/or knowledge of the following:

- NSEP telecommunications procedures
- Emergency planning and preparedness
- Telecommunications planning and operations supporting the FRP
- NCS organization, functions, authorities, and intergovernmental relationships
- National and regional telecommunications capabilities and guidelines for the management and control of telecommunications activities and personnel
- Appropriate employment of Telecommunications Service Priority in commercial telecommunications restoration and service ordering
- Use of automated resources to manage and track NSEP actions and prepare accurate and timely...
situation reports concerning emergency operations.

What training is needed?
Participation in and support to emergency response efforts provides peacetime training of IMAs that, in turn, prepares them to assume the higher-level responsibilities of their mobilization positions immediately upon call to active duty during a national security crisis or emergency. Training of NCS IMAs begins with the understanding that individuals considered for the program are normally U.S. Army Reserve Signal Corps field grade officers or other branch-qualified officers with civilian training or experience in telecommunications and information systems planning and operations.

The CMMICS IMA Training Plan provides a curriculum that focuses on the functional requirements defined in the IMA position descriptions and the requirements of the U.S. Army as outlined in Army Regulation 140-142, Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program. As reservists, NCS IMAs are required to attend annual training (AT) for one 2-week period each year. In addition, Drilling IMAs participate in Inactive Duty Training (IDT) with 48 drill periods for pay annually. During annual training and the IDTs, every effort is made to ensure that IMAs perform the same duties to which they would be assigned during an emergency. NCS IMAs are required to attend a one-week initial orientation training at the NCS Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, and a one-week NS/EP off-site training course, before being deployed to support NCS emergency telecommunications requirements. Additionally, IMAs may enroll in distance learning course sponsored by the FEMA Emergency Management Institute. This training ensures that the NCS IMAs are fully integrated into the NCS NS/EP mission and support peacetime emergency telecommunications contingencies.

IMA Deployments
NCS IMAs also derive on-the-job training benefits from actual NCS deployments in support of exercises and peacetime natural disasters, crises, and other emergencies. Since 1995, NCS IMAs telecommunications emergency response activities consisted of various natural disasters, man-made incidents and national special events.

Some of the significant events were: Northwest and Southeast floods; wildfires in Florida and the western states; Hurricanes Charlee, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne; ice storms, typhoons and tropical storms; earthquakes in California and Washington state; and terrorist bombings in Oklahoma City, Atlanta, and New York City, and the District of Columbia. Additionally, the NCS IMAs participate in regional interagency exercises to enhance the unit’s level of readiness for activation to support real-world events.

Augmentee FAQ Index FAQ Index

Network Design and Analysis Capability (NDAC) FAQ

- What is the NDAC?
- Why was the NDAC developed?
- What Natural Disasters does the NDAC support?
- What is the role of the IMA in the NDAC?
What is the NDAC?
The Network Design and Analysis Capability (NDAC) is a modeling and analysis tool designed to view the Public
Switched Network (PSN) (including the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), Internet Protocol (IP), and
next generation packet networks, and wireless and satellite infrastructures) under various threats and
conditions. NDAC software resources include the tools, models, and telecommunications databases used to
assess network performance, perform modeling and simulation, and visualize network topologies. The NCS continuously
refines and expands the NDAC through software updates, the acquisition of new data sets, and application
module development.

Why was the NDAC developed?
NCS developed the NDAC because of heavy NS/EP reliance on the PSN. The NDAC works to model natural and
man-made disruptions to the PSN, perform vendor independent analyses, develop models and methodologies to
detect and help mitigate damage caused by accident or attack and to assist in network performance.

What features does the NDAC support?
- NS/EP communications planning
- Custom modeling/simulation studies under a variety of conditions
- PSN dependability and resiliency analyses
- Examine effect of new technologies on the PSTN and Internet infrastructure
- Laboratory test bed perspectives on network performance resulting from emerging technologies
- Flexibility to customize network architectures and routing schemes, introduce new carrier network data,
  and simulate the effects of emerging technologies

What are some examples of current studies using the NDAC?
- Backup Dial Tone (BDT) study - uses NDAC to examine methods and technology approaches to enhance
  communications reliability in the Washington metropolitan area under emergency conditions.
- Next Generation Networks (NGN) study - uses NDAC to develop likely NGN architectures and traffic
  streams, and apply multiple traffic overload scenarios to identify potential network bottlenecks. Cyber
  attack and nuclear attack scenarios are also applied to the simulated NGN architectures to assess their
  impact on performance.
- Internet Service Provider (ISP) study - uses NDAC for an Internet modeling capability that captures the
  operational and technical interdependencies between NCSs from both architectural and traffic perspectives.
Telecommunications Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Telecom-ISAC) FAQ

- What is the mission of the Telecom-ISAC?
- What are the operational goals of the Telecom-ISAC?
- What criteria must companies meet for membership in the ISAC?
- Who are the members of the Telecom-ISAC?
- How is information shared among the Telecom-ISAC members? (as of 10/6/03)
- Is there a switch function to support the Telecom-ISAC?

What is the mission of the Telecom-ISAC?
The Telecom-ISAC mission is to facilitate voluntary collaboration and information sharing among Government and industry in support of Executive Order 12947 and the national critical infrastructure protection goals, to gather information on vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions, and anomalies from multiple sources and perform analysis with the goal of warning or mitigating impact upon the telecommunications infrastructure. The scope of the Telecom-ISAC’s mission is all hazards, which include natural and man-made disasters and physical and cyber attacks.

Telecom-ISAC Operational Goals:

- Be an honest and impartial information broker
- Facilitate voluntary collaboration to support both Government and industry information sharing requirements
- Foster working liaisons with external sources and liaison partners
- Add value—provide information not available elsewhere, filter appropriately, perform high-quality analysis
- Ensure protection of information and the rights of data owners
What criteria must companies meet for membership in the ISAC? Membership is open to companies that provide telecommunications or network services, equipment or software to the communications and information sector and to select professional associations or companies with participation/representation in the communications and information sector. Currently, the Telecom-ISAC membership consists of eighty companies and three associations that together represent the majority of the telecommunications infrastructure.

Who are the members of the Telecom-ISAC?

Twenty Eight Companies:

- Americal
- AT&T
- Avocet
- BellSouth
- Boeing
- Cincinnati Bell
- Cingular Wireless
- Cisco Systems
- Computar Sciences Corporation (CSC)
- EDS
- Eintel
- Intero
- JPoint Networks
- Level 3 Communications
- Lockheed Martin/COMSAT General
- Lucent Technologies
- Nortel/USA
- Motorola
- Nortel Networks
- Northrop Grumman
- Phoenix
- Qwest Communications
- Raytheon
- Sanvix
- Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
- Sprint Nextel
- SunCom
Three Associations:

- Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association (CTIA)
- Telecom Industry Association (TIA)
- United States Telecom Association (USTA)

How is information shared among the Telecom-ISAC members? (as of 10/8/03)

All information received from NCC, Telecom-ISAC members, and liaison partners is deemed sensitive and proprietary, whether or not it is specifically marked as such. Only the originator of information may approve its release to anyone or any entity. The information owner retains its rights regardless of the location of the information within the NCC Telecom-ISAC facility.

Is there a watch function to support the Telecom-ISAC?

The NCS operates the on-site continuous (twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week) Telecom-ISAC watch and analysis operation (WAO). The WAO consists of senior analysts closely integrated with the Government NCC operations staff and industry representatives from Telecom-ISAC member companies. The Telecom-ISAC watch and analysis operation serves a dual function as the operational arm of the Telecom-ISAC and as one of The Department of Homeland Security’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection watch and analysis centers.

Questions or comments concerning this site? Please contact the webmaster.

Reviewed 13 January 2005

Privacy Policy
Oval, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 10:00 PM
To: 
Subject: Re: Checking in

Thanks for writing Andy. This is a bad one. Housing, transportation and environment could be long term issues.

If you want any details (not too good on the blackberry) feel free to call anytime. 202 309 1603.

And, I appreciate your support and notes. MB

-----Original Message-----
From: 17524309
To: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Mon Aug 29 21:51:07 2005
Subject: Checking in

Joe Hagan has kept me well-informed about your reports. Anything you want me to do??
Andy Card
Ovall, Jeffery

From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 9:31 PM
To: 'Altsbuler, Brooks'
Subject: RE: Grape vine

OK. I did tell him privately that the phone calls were killing me, and he said he understood. He assures me he is not trying to interfere, but they are literally driving me crazy.

Is it that people think that through my interviews and what I'm saying, or is it something specific?

-----Original Message-----
From: Altsbuler, Brooks [mailto:Brooks.Altsbuler@]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 7:59 PM
To: 'Michael.D.Brown@'
Subject: Grape vine

Please talk up the Secretary during your press avail I.e. "Solid team with solid support from the secretary" etc. Unconfirmed, but people are noticing and they are reading into friction and this is not people at DHA but people at WM.

Just tuck that away, nothing that has boiled to the surface, but it could if you don't dispel any perceived connotations.

Hang tough. You did a good job at the afternoon presser today.

Sent from my Blackberry Wireless Handheld
September 3, 2005

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of all Louisianans, I thank you for your visit yesterday to see the devastation Hurricane Katrina has inflicted on the lives of our citizens. The enormity of the situation is, as you saw yourself, impossible to truly comprehend without seeing it firsthand.

I am deeply grateful for your willingness to come down to personally pledge to the people of Louisiana to do whatever it takes to get the job done. We appreciate the unique contributions that the Department of Defense has made, and know that if the soldiers and assets I have requested are immediately deployed consistent with that pledge, we can rescue our citizens still in harm's way, reclaim our communities and rebuild them, and give our people renewed hope for the future.

I also agree with your idea that - given the unprecedented requests for federal military assistance that I, and my fellow Governors in Mississippi and Alabama have made - a "single military commander" of "Federal Joint Task Force Katrina" be named for federal forces.

I believe such a decision is critical to improving the timeliness of fulfilling and coordinating the requests for federal assistance that have already been made. This officer would serve as the single military commander for all Department of Defense resources providing support to the Department of Homeland Security and the State of Louisiana. This could also enhance the contribution of over 25 National Guard states currently being commanded by the Louisiana Adjutant General.

I ask that you direct the assigned Federal Coordinating Officer at the Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) to co-locate with my Homeland Security and Emergency and Preparedness Office at the Federal Joint Task Force headquarters. This would make the Joint Interagency Operations Center a truly integrated operation.

Mr. President, these actions are essential to ensure unity of effort and a fully coordinated federal, state and local response to this extraordinary natural disaster. I look forward to your favorable response to my request and welcome any comments or suggestions you might have. Thank you again for your efforts on behalf of Louisiana.

Sincerely,

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor
State of Louisiana
September 3, 2005

President George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Mr. President:

As you know, Hurricane Katrina caused massive devastation in the State of Louisiana. Working with our Federal partners, and with the help of National Guard forces from other states throughout our nation, we are providing much-needed disaster relief of unprecedented scope. We appreciate the unique contributions of the Department of Defense.

In order to enhance Federal and State efforts, and if you grant permission, I would like to appoint the Regular Army officer commanding the Federal Joint Task Force Katrina to be an officer in the Louisiana National Guard. I would assign him to command the National Guard forces under my command. This officer would then be the single military commander for all Department of Defense military forces, including active, reserve, and National Guard, providing support to the Department of Homeland Security as the lead Federal agency.

I ask that you direct the assigned Principal Federal Officer of the Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) to collocate with my Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Office and the headquarters of the Federal Joint Task Force Commander at the Joint Interagency Operations Center.

Finally, I request that the Department of Defense be tasked to support the Joint Interagency Task Force in the planning and logistics efforts associated with the disaster response effort.

Mr. President, these actions are essential to ensure unity of effort and a fully coordinated state and Federal response to this extraordinary natural disaster. I thank you in advance for your support.

Respectfully,
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT CONCERNING AUTHORIZATION, CONSENT, AND USE OF DUAL STATUS COMMANDER FOR JTF-KATRINA

1. **Purpose.** This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outlines the separate chains of command responsibilities of the dual status commander for JTF-Katrina, focused on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The President of the United States, or his designee, and the Governor of Louisiana, by executing this agreement have provided authorization and consent for the activation of this commander pursuant to 32 USC 315(a). The commander’s activation is not expected to exceed three months beginning on or about 2 September 2005 and ending on or about 2 December 2005.

2. **Mutually Exclusive Chains of Command.** The dual status commander will receive orders from a Federal chain of command and a State chain of command. As such, the dual status commander is an intermediate link in two distinct, separate chains of command flowing from different sovereigns. While the dual status commander may receive orders from two chains of command, those chains of command must recognize and respect the dual status commander’s duty to exercise all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner, i.e., either in a Federal or State capacity, but never in both capacities at the same time. This MOA contains special procedures to maintain the required separation of State and Federal chains of command.

A. **State Command and Control**

1. The Louisiana Governor will provide command and control over the supporting National Guard forces. As a member of the Louisiana National Guard in a state status, the dual status commander is subject to the orders of the Governor of the State of Louisiana.

2. The dual status commander, acting pursuant to state authority, may issue orders to National Guard forces serving in a state status (i.e., Title 32 or State Active Duty).

3. Command and control of National Guard forces provided to Louisiana from other states will be determined by prior coordination between those states and Louisiana.

4. All military justice issues concerning Louisiana National Guard forces will be determined in accordance with the Louisiana code of military justice. Military justice issues concerning National Guard forces from states other than Louisiana will be determined in accordance with their respective states’ codes of military justice.
B. Federal Chain of Command.

1. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), will provide command and control over the supporting Federal forces. The dual status commander, as a Federal officer ordered to active duty under Title 10, U.S. Code, is subject to the orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Commander USNORTHCOM, or other Federal officers ordered to act on their behalf.

2. The dual status commander, acting pursuant to Federal authority, may issue orders to Federal forces, i.e., active duty forces including reserve forces serving on active duty such as federalized National Guard forces (Title 10 status). Such Federal forces are required to act in accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act.

3. All military justice issues for supporting Federal forces will be determined in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice as implemented by applicable Military Department regulatory guidance.

3. Missions.

a. State Military Mission: Plan, coordinate, and provide requested, authorized, and approved support to lead Federal agencies, and state agencies, performing activities related to JTF-Katrina.

b. Federal Military Mission: Plan, coordinate, and provide requested, authorized, and approved support to lead Federal agencies performing activities related to JTF-Katrina.

Purpose of Dual Status Command Structure. Utilizing a dual status commander allows the efficient use of both Federal and state authorities to execute authorized missions in support of Federal agencies for JTF-Katrina. This relationship will capitalize on the military expertise of both sovereign military forces, reduce duplicative effort, provide better coordination and synergy, and ensure unity of effort. The dual status commander will have enhanced situational awareness through this dual status, and both Federal and state chains of command will have a common operating picture. This enhanced situational awareness will ensure optimal tasking and mission accomplishment by state and Federal military forces.
5. **Compliance with Federal and State Law.** The dual status commander must comply with all applicable state and Federal laws appropriate to the mission, while executing his duties. If the dual status commander perceives that orders provided by the Federal or state chain of command might violate Federal or state law or create a potential conflict of interest or mission conflict, the dual status commander must immediately inform both chains of command of the perceived problem.

6. **Sharing of Documentation.** To avoid miscommunication, the Federal and state chains of command should share all documents and guidance concerning their respective missions at the earliest possible opportunity.

7. **Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Standards.** During JTF-Katrina, the Louisiana National Guard agrees to comply with anti-terrorism/force protection guidance established by USNORTHCOM unless the Louisiana National Guard has established more stringent guidance. USNORTHCOM will provide AT/FP guidance in all warning, planning, alert, deployment, or execution orders. Any obstacles in achieving compliance with this paragraph will be resolved by the Governor or her designee and the Commander, USNORTHCOM.

8. **Mission Conflicts.**

   A. The dual status commander should attempt to ensure there are no conflicts between Federal and state mission taskings. If the dual status commander believes a conflict exists, he should notify both chains of command at the earliest possible opportunity. Both chains of command and the dual status commander must be involved in the resolution of such conflicts.

   B. In the event that a mission tasking conflict cannot be resolved, the dual status commander should consult with a judge advocate from both the Federal chain of command and the state chain of command. While the conflict is being resolved, the dual status commander will continue to execute his Federal mission, and will continue to execute her state missions in areas not subject to the conflict.

9. **Status.** During the course of this mission, the dual status commander shall describe the status of all forces in writing. The purpose of this requirement is to minimize possible confusion in appropriate Federal/state force taskings by the dual status commander. If it becomes necessary to make a change to the status of forces, the dual status commander will ensure both chains of command are aware of any changes.

10. **Incapacity of the Dual Status Commander.** In the event that the dual status commander becomes incapacitated, subordinates will need to be in place to assume command of both the Federal and state chains of command. For this
reason, the dual status commander needs a Federal status deputy commander and a state status deputy commander.

11. **Effective Date.** This MOA shall become effective upon the signing of this document by both parties. Upon the effective date of this MOA, the dual status commander may maintain ongoing direct liaison authority with his Federal and state chains of command and exercise state authority and Federal authority as provided by those sovereigns.

12. **Termination.** This MOA will automatically terminate upon the redeployment of forces from the performance of activities related to JTF-Katrina. If either party wants to withdraw from this agreement, it should do so in writing with sufficient notice to allow proper mission accomplishment, if possible, by the other party.

__________________________  _______________________________
Governor of Louisiana  Date

__________________________  _______________________________
Date
The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman, Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have now had an opportunity to review Representative Melancon’s correspondence to you dated January 23, 2006. This correspondence generated a related news article in the Washington Post, a copy of which is enclosed.

Representative Melancon’s concern involves the processing and approval of a September 1, 2005, FEMA request for assistance (RFA) that the Department of Defense provide “full logistics support” throughout the entire region affected by Hurricane Katrina. While it must be noted that the sequence of events outlined in Representative Melancon’s letter is substantially inaccurate, the clarifying documentary record is detailed and beyond dispute.

On Thursday, September 1, 2005, FEMA requested that DoD accept the responsibility to provide “full logistics support” throughout the entire disaster area. It was recognized that this was a substantial mission assignment, with enormous planning and resource requirements, reflecting the extraordinary damage and immediate need. On September 1-2, 2005, DoD reviewed this request, assessed the requirements, identified available military capabilities, and notified the Department of Homeland Security, in writing, that the RFA had been approved by the Secretary of Defense. I am enclosing a copy of my September 2, 2005, email to DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson informing him of this decision, as well as a copy of the actual FEMA RFA. The documentary record corroborates that within approximately 24 hours, our Department processed and approved what may well be the single most complex civil support mission in the history of the U.S. military. Further, I wrote in my Friday email to Deputy Secretary Jackson that, “We may actually be able to do more than you have requested.” Clearly, there was no resistance or delay on the part of our department in responding to FEMA’s request for “full logistics support.”

On Saturday morning, I met with Deputy Secretary Jackson and, during that time, we drafted a list of current or emerging FEMA requirements likely to generate additional DoD RFAs: search and rescue; security assessment; command
and control infrastructure; geo-spatial surveillance; firefighting; health and medical support; disease prevention; quarantine planning; debris removal; and restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes. On Sunday, draft RFAs were reviewed and further refined by senior DHS and DoD officials working jointly and with a sense of urgency. On Monday, these RFAs were approved by the Secretary of Defense. Many of these RFAs were in active execution long before the associated paperwork was signed. Considering the magnitude of physical resources and the complexity of the transportation plan, as well as the number of DoD personnel involved in meeting this requirement, a more rapid or positive response is hard to envision. This joint DHS-DoD effort produced seven comprehensive RFAs on Monday, in addition to the “full logistics support” RFA approved the previous Friday.

DoD’s deployment of military resources in support of civil authorities after Hurricane Katrina, the deadliest storm to strike the United States since 1928, exceeded, in speed and size, any other domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United States. Over 72,000 military personnel, 23 ships, 68 fixed-wing aircraft, 293 helicopters, amphibious landing craft, space-based imagery, night vision capabilities, port and waterway surveillance, mortuary teams, and large-scale construction capabilities provided through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Navy Seabees supported the response to Hurricane Katrina. Approximately 15,000 residents of the Gulf coast were rescued and more than 80,000 others evacuated by military personnel. DoD delivered critical emergency supplies – more than 30 million meals and some 10,000 truckloads of ice and water. Military personnel also provided significant medical assistance, including 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and air, medical treatment of more than 5,000 patients, as well as support for disease prevention and control. Further, DoD made available more than 3,000 beds in field hospitals, installations, and aboard U.S. Navy ships. DoD also supplied 13 mortuary teams to support local authorities in the systematic search, recovery, and disposition of the deceased.

DoD takes its role in support of civil authorities seriously and has continued its long tradition of supporting civil authorities while maintaining its primary mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. During Hurricane Katrina, DoD approved more than 93 hurricane-related requests for assistance from civil authorities requiring a broad range of military capabilities. DoD felt a sense of urgency and acted upon it, as provided in the National Response Plan. In addition to Hurricane Katrina, DoD acted on over 140 requests for assistance in 2005, including responses to hurricanes Dennis, Ophelia, and Rita, and unmanned aerial system support to the Department of Homeland Security’s border security activities.
The ability of our military forces -- Active Duty, Reserves, and the National Guard -- to respond quickly and effectively to an event of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina and to simultaneously sustain the on-going War on Terror is a testament to their readiness, agility, and professionalism. It is also a reflection of the resources provided by Congress that enable them to organize, train, and equip to meet the full range of DoD’s missions.

In support of investigations into the response to Hurricane Katrina, DoD has provided approximately 240,000 pages of documents, including electronic mail and other correspondence of senior DoD leaders. All of these documents validate the overall assessment that DoD acted quickly and effectively in its response to Hurricane Katrina. Aside from documents provided, 18 DoD personnel have testified before Congress and 57 DoD personnel have been made available for interviews by congressional staff on DoD’s response to Hurricane Katrina. In our judgment, DoD has now produced the documents and provided access to the personnel necessary for a complete and comprehensive review by the Committee. We look forward to working with you as the Committee continues its work. If we may be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

Paul McHale

Enclosures

cc: Representative Melancon
Enclosure 1

Washington Post
January 24, 2006
Pg. 6

Pentagon's Records On Katrina Sought

A Louisiana Democrat yesterday urged a House panel to enforce a Dec. 14 subpoena issued to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, citing new accounts that he delayed the Pentagon's reaction to Hurricane Katrina.

The Pentagon has ignored three requests for Rumsfeld's correspondence but has provided other records to the panel led by Government Reform Committee Chairman Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.).

"Secretary Rumsfeld's failure to cooperate thwarts the legitimate work of the committee in examining the military's role in responding to Hurricane Katrina, and it shows contempt for Congress's oversight role," said Rep. Charlie Melancon (D-La.).
Enclosure 2

-----Original Message-----
From: McHale, Paul  HON, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 7:41 PM
To: Jackson, Michael
Subject: FW: D/ DHS to ASD HD concerns--NO Louis Armstrong IAP Security

Michael -

Thought you might be interested in reading this follow-up to our conversation. SecDef has agreed to support your RFA for broad logistics support, throughout the entire four state AOR. We're working on the specific language - and a planning staff to implement it. We may actually be able to do more than you have requested. Will get back to you with written confirmation tomorrow AM. Keep up the good work.

Paul

-----Original Message-----
From: Kuster, Thomas, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 5:22 AM
To: McHale, Paul, HON, OSD-POLICY
Cc: Verga, Pete, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Slaessens, Robert, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Subject: FW: D/ DHS to ASD HD concerns--NO Louis Armstrong IAP Security

Rich Rowe summary to ADM Keating of your discussion.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3 [mailto:Rich.Rowe@northcom.mil]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 11:33 PM
To: TK Kuster (E-mail)
Subject: FW: D/ DHS to ASD HD concerns--NO Louis Armstrong IAP Security

Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

working. rich

-----Original Message-----
From: Rowe Rich MG USA USNORTHCOM J3
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 8:19 PM
To: Keating Timothy J ADM USN NORAD USNORTHCOM CC: Russel L. LTG CG Honore (russel.honore@us.army.mil)
Cc: John A., MG, CMD GRP Yingling (john.yingling@us.army.mil); Hickey, James R., COL CMDGRP; Sullivan Paul J Maj Gen USAF NORAD USNORTHCOM CS; Brooks Gene RDML USEC
USNORTHCOM J3; Aylward, Peter M - NGB-33 DOP; McConnell Bear SEC-5 NORAD USNORTHCOM IC
Subject: D/ DHS to ASD HD concerns--NO Louis Armstrong IAP Security

Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sirs,

Good discussion with Mr Paul McHale.

1. Per his discussion earlier this evening with Mr Michael Jackson, the Deputy DHS, there is a significant concern with security at the New Orleans Louis Armstrong Airport. Concern is several hundred displaced people vic the airport to include a number of 'thugs'a cling in gangs. TRANSCOM J3 folks have passed to me similar concern—using the number 600
plus—wandering gangs. I have passed this information to Col Peter Ayward at the NOB JOC and requested detail on action by LA National Guard to secure the airport. Pete is going to work to provide us with a 'troops to task' Military Police effort for the Airport tonight. Also, Pete will try to give us some greater granularity on the MP presence and other security associated with the Superdome, sports convention center, and other New Orleans assembly points for displaced persons.

I told Mr McHale that I would pass these concerns onto the JTF Commander and his staff who have been collaboratively working with the TAG and his team to assess and to operationalize security needs.

2. There is additionally a concern with criminal activities by gang types directed against critical infrastructure such as the NOLA area petro chemical facilities. Pete is going to work to lay out the CIP protection effort and identify current and future activities. Concurrently, I suggested that our NC J34 along with IC work with DHS to determine the DHS assessment of CIP for New Orleans, LA and MS.

Mr McHale conveyed to me his appreciation and admiration for the efforts of our DoD personnel—in the Joint Task Force, our National Guard, and NORTHCOM. He believes that the right strong efforts are underway with more capabilities flowing. He used the examples of the Naval deployments underway as well as the deployment of 1400 Military Police per day over four days into New Orleans—by comparison the City of New Orleans Police Department is 1500 officers strong—we are deploying the equivalent each day for the next four days. *** Finally, Mr McHale emphasized the value of the public affairs effort to inform the citizens and to let them see Soldiers with MP armbands executing the necessary security missions.

When I spoke to Pete Ayward, he asked us to help press for a common operational map / picture to show the areas under water. We will work with our interagency folks to have NGA provide this product. Pete suggests that if we can 'provide the map by zip code'--the product will be of value for operational planning and execution—but perhaps even more significantly to the effort to inform Soldiers who are deployed or committed to our Nation's efforts in OIF, OEF, or hurricane relief the status of their homes and family.

vr

Rich
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY  
MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)  

I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)  
State: MS (Mississippi) Incident 2005082001 Hurricane Katrina Evacuation  
Program Code/Event #: 10424-MA: HURRICANE KATRINA  
Date/Time: 09/02/2005 18:15  

II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED  

FEMA requests that DOD provide planning and execution for the procurement, transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel and medical supplies in support of the Katrina in Louisiana and Mississippi.  

Quantity: 1 (Each)  

Internal Control #:  

III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)  

Action to:  

IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)  

Mission Statement: Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment Monthly Progress Report to FEMA to include cost data when Mission Assignments take more than 60 days to complete, including billing. The Mission Assignment Monthly Progress Report can be accessed and submitted online at www.fema.gov/missionassignment.html. The new ALC number can also be accessed at the web address.  

FEMA requests that DOD provide planning and execution for the procurement, transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel and medical supplies in support of the Katrina in Louisiana and Mississippi.  

This Mission Assignment resulted from a coordination meeting with Ken Burns, Acting Director of Operations, Pat English, Chief Financial Officer's  

Assigned Agency: DOD (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)  

Start Date: 09/02/2005  

End Date: 11/02/2005  

Total Cost Estimate: $1,000,000.00  

V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)  

Type of MA:  

State Cost Share Percent: 0.01  

State Cost Share Amount: $0.00  

Mission Assignment Coordinator (Program): MARIE GLOVER  

Date: 09/02/2005  

VI. APPROVAL  

State Approving Official (Required for D/RA and TA):  

Date: 09/02/2005  

VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)  

Mission Assignment #10424-MA-NG-07O-19  

Amt. This Action: $1,000,000.00  

Date/Time O/Billed: 09/02/2005  

Inhibit: IPMS  

FEMA Form 90-129, Oct 03  

REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

DOD SUPPORT FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2005, AS OF 0700

Command and Control
- U.S. Northern Command Commander is Admiral Keating in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
- Joint Task Force Katrina East (Forward) is located at Camp Shelby, Mississippi – Lieutenant General Honore is on the USS IWO JIMA pier side in New Orleans, Louisiana.
- Joint Task Force Commander for the Louisiana National Guard is Major General Landreneau, at New Orleans.
- Joint Task Force Commander for the Mississippi National Guard is Major General Cross, at Stennis Space Center, Mississippi.

Operational Highlights
- 70,073 Active Duty and National Guard personnel are on the ground or aboard ships supporting relief operations.
  - 22,028 Active Duty.
  - 46,028 National Guard. (1,717 outside area ready to assist)
- 20 US Navy ships are in the area.
- Total aviation support in area:
  - 346 helicopters (Active Duty and National Guard).
  - 68 airplanes (Active Duty and National Guard).
- DoD has provided extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical support:
  - 2,565 Active Duty sorties flown – 171 in the past 24-hours.
  - 9,104 National Guard sorties flown – 103 in the past 24 hours.
- Total DoD medical personnel in the area is 2,037 (1072 Active Duty and 965 National Guard). Lieutenant General Honore directed that no Federal military service member will perform or assist with any type of forced evacuation.
- JTF-Katrina is executing strategy that focuses on recovery while continuing to support disaster relief operations.
- 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Cavalry Division, I and II Marine Expeditionary Force conducting humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, evacuation and security assessments.
  - Division soldiers will not recover remains of deceased persons; will only mark and record locations for mortuary teams.
  - Lieutenant General Honore directed that no Federal military service member will perform or assist with any type of forced evacuation.

9/12/2005
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense: Legislative Affairs

Legislative Update

- Commander, U.S. Northern Command requested the deployment of two fire trucks to support airport operations at New Orleans International.
  - Fire trucks from Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico will assist with aircraft fire and rescue operations.
- Mosquito spraying operations approved. To date, no DoD aircraft have flown mosquito spraying missions.
  - 910th Air Wing, Air Force Reserve, from Youngstown, Ohio has two C-aircraft (C-130s) deployed to Duke Field, Florida.
  - First missions to be flown by DoD on September 12. Focus of operations is the New Orleans area - will spray outlying areas of Louisiana and Mississippi if required.
- Seven installations are providing support as transportation staging areas for ice, water, food and medical supplies.
- 21 million Meals Ready to Eat have been ordered by FEMA to support Hurricane Katrina response. 16.7 million have been delivered. 1 million have been diverted to Virginia and Georgia to support Hurricane Opelika response if required.
- 789 beds are available in field hospitals: New Orleans International Airport (25 beds), USS BATAAN (360 beds), USS IWO JIMA (105 beds), USS Tortuga (35 beds), 14th Combat Support Hospital (204 beds), and the USS Shreveport (60 beds).
- Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas is the central collection point for supplies donated by foreign countries - 115 nations and 12 international organizations have offered assistance.
- Redeployments: USS H. S. Truman, USS Whidby Island, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Platoon, Army Aviation Assets, 4th Expeditionary Medical Support, 920th Rescue Wing, and the USNS Comfort – USS Comfort redeployment pending agreement with Secretary DHS and Principal Federal Official that ship is no longer required.

9/12/2005
From: Blong Clair K GS-15 DHS/FEMA NORAD USNORTHCOM IC
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 7:51 PM
To: Fema-NRCC, FEMA, HSOC
Cc: Louden, Michael, Lokey, William, Buikema, Edward, Eller Ronald C GS-14 USACE LNO
NORAD USNORTHCOM IC
Subject: FW: Requesting DoD Support for Hurricane Katrina: Phone Numbers

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Please pass to FEMA and DHS congressional and public affairs folks. clair

From: Nadeau Nanette A GS-14 DAF NORAD USNORTHCOM CX
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 5:47 PM
To: Blong Clair K GS-15 DHS/FEMA NORAD USNORTHCOM IC
Subject: Requesting DoD Support for Hurricane Katrina: Phone Numbers

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Sir...Here's an email OSD/LA sent to congressional staffs...vt Nanette

---

From: Carstens, Roger, LTC, OSD-LA [mailto:]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 5:31 PM
Subjects Requesting DoD Support for Hurricane Katrina: Phone Numbers

All,

The purpose of this email is to outline to Members of Congress, their staffs, and members of the military liaison community the DoD support in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.

While DoD is not the lead agency in a domestic emergency, it can be actioned to provide support, provided the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA - which holds lead responsibility in a crisis such as Katrina) requests the support in conjunction with state emergency management officials.

The process looks like this: Requests come from the State Emergency Manager (FEM) to the Federal Coordinating Official (FCO - from FEMA), who in turn requests support from the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO, an Army Colonel co-located with the FCO). That request then winds its way rapidly from the DCO to JTF Katrina, who routes it through NORTHCOM to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Secretariat, to the Joint Directorate of Military Support (JDOMS). At each stage, the request is validated to ensure that the request can be met with capability and that it is legal to provide. Once vetted, the request is tasked to Services and coordinated with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and forces or resources are then allocated to JTF-Katrina - which in turns gets the support down to the user level at the state by way of the DCO.

In effect, the best way to start the process to receive DoD support is by contacting the State.
EM and telling them of your requirement. That starts the rapid process that puts the request into DoD channels.

Below are the phone numbers for the respective state Emergency Management Offices. The main number connects to a switchboard in each office. The switchboard will then be able to get you connected with someone specific within the EOC depending upon the type of assistance offered, i.e. communications, food/water, trans, etc. The names of EM leadership have also been provided, as it may be more helpful to talk to them when requesting support from a congressional office.

AL  [Contact Information]
Bruce Bauman, Director of Emergency Management. 
Perry Martin, Bureau Chief, Emergency Management. 
Bill Filter, Ops Chief, Emergency Management. 

FL  [Contact Information]
Leo Lachat, Operations Chief, 
Mike Di Lorenzo, Bureau of Preparedness and Response, 

[Contact Information]  [Contact Information] - CONTINUOUS BUSY SIGNAL. WE ARE WORKING ON GETTING A BETTER NUMBER AND WILL SEND AN UPDATE WHEN WE HAVE IT.

MS  [Contact Information]; ALTERNATE:  
Robert Latham, Director of Emergency Management. 
Mike Womack, Deputy Director of Emergency Management. 

I hope that this helps. Feel free to provide me with feedback - and know that we will still be trying to find the LA contact numbers.

Best,

Roger 
ROGER D. CARSTENS 
Lieutenant Colonel, Special Forces 
Special Assistant for Special Operations 
and Homeland Defense 
Office of the Secretary of Defense - Legislative Affairs

DHS-FEMA-0028-0000586
MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina

☐ Intent: Provide DoD support to FEMA for Disaster Relief Operations resulting from Hurricane Katrina

☐ Plan: Approve CDR USNORTHCOM, Supported Combatant Commander, to plan and conduct disaster relief operations in support of FEMA
  - MOD 8 Directs CDR USNORTHCOM:
    - Provide ONE (1) Public Information Officer to the Joint Information Center, MS Joint Field Office
  - MOD 8 Directs Director, Defense Logistics Agency:
    - Provide and coordinate delivery of 51,000 Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) and water to New Orleans vicinity
  - MOD 8 Directs CDR USNORTHCOM:
    - Plan and develop a Concept of Operations to execute logistical support operations
    - Upon CJCS approval of CONOPS, execute logistical support operations in affected areas of Louisiana and Mississippi.
  - A Presidential Declaration was issued for LA, MS, AL, and FL
  - Reporting: USNORTHCOM will provide situational reports on a daily basis
  - Deployment Window: 3 SEP 05 to 2 NOV 05

☐ Key Considerations:
  - Funding: Reimbursement is IAW Stafford Act.
  - Staffing Issues: None

☐ Public Affairs Guidance: Active for participating units
JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose: The purpose of this Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is to request DoD assistance for Field Operations in Support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in response to Hurricane Katrina.

2. Discussion:
   a. Situation:
      (1) The impacts of Hurricane Katrina have devastated many areas along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
      (2) The capabilities and resources of state and local emergency services have been exceeded and many areas are inaccessible to vehicular traffic.
      (3) Presidential Disaster Declarations have been issued for designated counties and parishes in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida.
   b. Support Requirements:
      (1) Procurement and delivery of 51,000 MREs and water to affected areas.
      (2) One (1) Public Information Officer to represent DoD in the Joint Information Center.
      (3) Planning and execution for the transportation and distribution of logistical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.
   c. Funding:
      A Presidential Disaster Declaration was issued on 29 AUG 05. Requests for Federal Assistance (FA’s) are reimbursed under the authorities of the Stafford Act. FEMA mission assignment for planning and execution of logistical support operations provided $1 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T. Drake</td>
<td>DOD/HD</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td>CAPT Reitnay, USN</td>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Wagner</td>
<td>OSS/NOC</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td>COL Goetsch, USN</td>
<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL A. Aranda</td>
<td>JCS/DCOC</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td>COL Rame, USN</td>
<td>JPOM</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC B. Gentry</td>
<td>JD/CR</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td>COL Howle</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Wagner</td>
<td>OSS/NOC</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td>COL Siley, USAR</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASRES/DCOC</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td>CAPT Debra, USN</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Shugart</td>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>3 SEP 05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGENCIES: Maj John Wood/J-3, JD/CR 693-3300

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
d. MOD 8 Content:
   (1) Tasks Director, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to provide:
       - Provide 51,000 MREs

   (2) Tasks Commander, U.S. Northern Command, to provide:
       - One (1) Public Information Officer to the Joint Information Center in MS
       - Plan and develop a Concept of Operations to execute logistical support operations
       - Upon CJCS approval of CONOPS, execute logistical support operations in affected
         areas of Louisiana and Mississippi.

3. Recommendation. DJS authorize message for subsequent approval by SECDEF.

ENDNOTE

1 FEMA RFA, Procurement and delivery of 51,000 MREs

2 FEMA RFA, Public Information Officer

3 FEMA RFA. Planning and execution of logistical support operations
JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION NUMBER: JDOMS 05-05-08

TO: DJI
THRU:

SUBJECT: MOD 8 TO EXORD FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE KARINA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose: To obtain DJI authorization of MOD 8 (TAB) to the Execution Order for subsequent SecDef approval and DDAT/HD release, directing CDRUSNORTHCOM to conduct disaster relief operations in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

2. Discussion

a. Situation:
   (1) The results of Hurricane Katrina have devastated many areas along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
   (2) The capabilities of state and local emergency services have been exceeded and many areas are inaccessible to vehicular traffic.
   (3) Presidential Disaster Declarations have been issued for designated counties and parishes in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida.

b. Support Requirements: FEMA has requested the following support from DOD:
   (1) Procurement and Delivery of 51,000 MREs and water to affected areas.
   (2) One (1) Public Information Officer to represent DoD in the Joint Information Center, MS Joint Field Office.
   (3) Planning and execution for the procurement, transportation and distribution of logistical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.

c. Funding: A Presidential Disaster Declaration was issued on 29 AUG 05. Requests for Federal Assistance (IFA's) are reimbursed under the authorities of the Stafford Act. FEMA mission assignment for planning and execution of logistical support operations provided $1 billion.

COORDINATION

| NAME: AARON D. Wood, JR.
| AGENCY: JDOMS/693-3300
| DATE: 2 SEP 05

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS: SENT TO JS T/S D/JOC FOR CURRENT

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE
UNCLASSIFIED

3. Recommendation. DJS authorize message for subsequent approval by SECDEF.

ENDNOTE

1 FEMA RFA, Procurement and delivery of 51,000 MREs
2 FEMA RFA, Public Information Officer
3 FEMA RFA, Planning and execution of logistical support operations
UNCLASSIFIED
OPORD DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA

MSG ORDER / JOINT STAFF JDMS MOD 05-05-07
REFA/MSG ORDER JS JDMS 05-05/291300Z AUG 2005
REFB/MSG ORDER JS JDMS 03-05/01/301500Z AUG 2005
REFC/MSG ORDER JS JDMS 03-05/02/311220Z AUG 2005
REFD/MSG ORDER JS JDMS 05-05/03/010507Z SEP 2005
REFE/MSG ORDER JS JDMS 05-05/04/012100Z SEP 2005
REFF/DOC ORDER JS JDMS 05-05/02/211000Z SEP 2005
REFG/DOC ORDER JS JDMS 05-05/06/072200Z SEP 2005

REFH/DOC ORDER JS JDMS 05-05/07/10BD
REFI/DOC/FEMA MA (51,000 MRES AND WATER) 01 SEP 2005
REFJ/DOC/FEMA MA (PUBLIC INFO OFFICER) 02 SEP 2005
REFK/DOC/FEMA MA (LOGISTICAL SPPT) 02 SEP 2005

AMPN

REF A IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (2 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT TO TRANSPORT RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT TEAMS).

REF B IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 1 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (2 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE, 3 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST IN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, AND STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TO MOVE SWIFT WATER RESCUE TEAMS).

REF C IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 2 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (500-BED HOSPITAL AND NDMS BED COUNT).

REF D IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 3 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (36 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT).

REF E IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 4 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (DOD FACILITIES AS DEPLOYMENT SITES FOR MULTIPLE FEDERAL MEDICAL SHELTERS (FMS) AND USNS COMFORT FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS IN THE NEW ORLEANS AREA).

REF F IS THE SECDEF-APPROVED MOD 5 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (TWO ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT FOR DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAMS, JP8 FUEL AND TRUCK SUPPORT FOR ROTARY WING AIR OPERATIONS, AND NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTER, GULFPORT, MISS FOR USE AS A FEDERAL OPERATIONAL STAGING AREA).

REF G IS THE SECDEF-APPROVED MOD 6 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TO TRANSPORT AN ESTIMATED 10,000 EVACUEES).

REF H IS THE SECDEF-APPROVED MOD 7 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (FUEL BLADDERS, PHARMACEUTICALS, PASSENGER SHIP(S), DELIVERY OF MRES).

REF I IS A FEMA REQUEST FOR PURCHASE AND DELIVERY OF 51,000 MRES AND WATER TO NEW ORLEANS, LA, AND THE CLOVER LEAF VICINITY.
REF: I IS A FEMA REQUEST FOR DOD TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED PUBLIC
INFORMATION OFFICER TO THE JOINT INFO CENTER, MS.
REF: I IS A FEMA REQUEST FOR DOD TO PLAN AND EXECUTE FOR THE
PROCUREMENT, MOVEMENT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES.

NARR:
THIS IS MOD EIGHT (8) TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR
DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA. THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

ORD: TYPE: EXORD/JDMS 05-05.
TIME: 0722 
GEN: TEXT/EXECUTION:
1. ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 4:

D. IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEMA'S REQUEST THAT DOD PROVIDE PLANNING
AND EXECUTION FOR THE TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ICE,
WATER, FOOD, AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN SUPPORT OF THE KATRINA DISASTER
IN LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI:

(1) CONDUCT DELIBERATE PLANNING AND IN COORDINATION WITH
COMBATANT COMMANDS, MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, DEFENSE AGENCIES, AND
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS (CONOPS) FOR THE PROCUREMENT, TRANSPORTATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ITEMS (INCLUDING, ICE, WATER, FOOD,
AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES, AT A MINIMUM) REQUIRED IN THE SUPPORT OF
DISASTER RELIEF EFFORTS FOR LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI. SUBMIT CONOPS
TO JICS, THROUGH THE HURRICANE KATRINA CAT, NO LATER THAN
030000ZSEP05. AT A MINIMUM, ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING IN THE CONOPS:

(A) NUMBER AND LOCATIONS OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AREAS (LSA);

(B) CONTRACTING OPTIONS;

(C) ESTIMATED REQUEST FOR FORCES (REFF) REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE,
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FORCE PROTECTION,
ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT, TRANSPORTATION, AND DISTRIBUTION
REQUIREMENTS;

(D) ESTIMATED LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES REQUIRED FOR 60 DAYS OF
DISASTER SUPPORT OPERATIONS;

(E) UTILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD (NG) PERSONNEL AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL NG PERSONNEL;

(F) ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE
PLANNING AND EXECUTION;

(G) ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE REPORT FOR PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND
SUPPLIES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR 60
DAYS;

(H) EXIT STRATEGY.

(2) UPON DOD APPROVAL OF THE CONOPS, EXECUTE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE PROCUREMENT, TRANSPORTATION, AND
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES.
-L-ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 3.A.:

E. PROVIDE ONE (1) FULLY QUALIFIED DOD PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TO REPRESENT DOD AT THE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER, MISSISSIPPI, JOINT FIELD OFFICE FOR A MINIMUM OF 30 DAYS.

-2.- ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 7.A.:

(4) PROVIDE 51,000 MRES AND DELIVER TO THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS FOR PERSONNEL LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF THE SUPERDOME AND CLOVER LEAF OF NEW ORLEANS, LA. COORDINATE DETAILS OF DELIVERY TIMES AND PICK-UP AND DROP-OFF LOCATIONS WITH USNORTHCOM, NGB AND FEMA REPRESENTATIVES TO ENSURE REQUIREMENT AND LOCATION REMAIN VALID. IF NECESSARY, COORDINATE WITH USNORTHCOM, MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, AND NGB, FOR ON-SCENE ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING FOOD AND WATER TO DESIGNATED LOCATIONS. DELIVERY OF FOOD AND WATER WILL BEGIN UPON SECRETARY APPROVAL.

-3.- ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 8.:

F. COMBATANT COMMANDS, MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, DEFENSE AGENCIES, AND NGB WILL ASSIST USNORTHCOM IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS AS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 4.D., ABOVE.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG:

-6.- ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 11.D.:

(18) FEMA FUND SITE # FOR PURCHASE AND DELIVERY OF MRES AND WATER (MISSION ASSIGNMENT # 1603DR-LA-DOD-12) IS 2005-06-1603DR-9064-XXXX-2501-D, FEDERAL APPROPRIATION CODE IS 70X0702, AND FEMA DOLLAR LIMIT IS $100,000.

(19) FEMA FUND SITE # FOR DOD TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TO THE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER, MS, JOINT FIELD OFFICE FOR A MINIMUM OF 30 DAYS (MISSION ASSIGNMENT # 1604DR-MS-DOD-19) IS 2005-06-1604DR-9044-XXXX-2501-D, FEDERAL APPROPRIATION CODE IS 70X0702, AND FEMA DOLLAR LIMIT IS $20,000.

(20) FEMA FUND SITE # FOR THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS (MISSION ASSIGNMENT # 1604DR-MS-DOD-19) IS 2005-06-1604DR-9044-XXXX-2501-D, FEDERAL APPROPRIATION CODE IS 70X0702, AND FEMA DOLLAR LIMIT IS $1,000,000.

GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/JOINTDIRMILSPT OFFICIAL: DD ATHERIDGE/GEN SCHERLING/CDR GALLAGHER/
AKMDG/YES
UNCLASSIFIED

AMPN/1

REP A IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (2 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT TO TRANSPORT RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT TEAMS).

REP B IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 1 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (2 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE, 3 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST IN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, AND STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TO MOVE SWIFT WATER RESCUE TEAMS).

REP C IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 2 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (500-BED HOSPITAL AND NDMS BED COUNT).

REP D IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 3 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (36 ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT). REP E IS THE DEPSECDEF-APPROVED MOD 4 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (DOD FACILITIES AS DEPLOYMENT SITES FOR MULTIPLE FEDERAL MEDICAL SHELTERS (FMS) AND USNS COMFORT FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS IN THE NEW ORLEANS, LA, REGION).

REP F IS THE SECDEF-APPROVED MOD 5 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (TWO ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT FOR DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAMS, JP8 FUEL AND TRUCK SUPPORT FOR ROTARY WING AIR OPERATIONS, AND NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTER, GULFPORT, MS, FOR USE AS A FEDERAL OPERATIONAL STAGING AREA).

REP G IS THE SECDEF-APPROVED MOD 6 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TO TRANSPORT AN ESTIMATED 10,000 EVACUEES).

REP H IS THE SECDEF-APPROVED MOD 7 TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR HURRICANE RELIEF OPERATIONS (FUEL BLADDERs, PHARMACEUTICALS, PASSENGER SHIP(S), DELIVERY OF MRES).

REP I IS A FEMA REQUEST FOR PURCHASE AND DELIVERY OF 51,000 MRES AND WATER TO NEW ORLEANS, LA, AND THE CLOVER LEAF VICINITY.
REF J IS A FEMA REQUEST FOR DOD TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TO THE JOINT INFO CENTER, MS.

REF J IS A Fema request for DOD TO PLAN AND EXECUTE THE TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES.

NARR
THIS IS MOD EIGHT (8) TO EXORD 05-05 FOR DOD SUPPORT TO FEMA FOR DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS AS A RESULT OF HURRICANE KATRINA. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

ORDTypEXORD/JOINT STAFF JDOMS 05-05.8/
TIMEZONE/2/

GENTEXT/EXECUTION
1. ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 4:

D. IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEMA'S REQUEST THAT DOD PROVIDE PLANNING AND EXECUTION FOR THE TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ICE, WATER, FOOD, AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN SUPPORT OF THE KATRINA DISASTER IN LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI:

1) CONDUCT DELIBERATE PLANNING AND IN COORDINATION WITH COMBATANT COMMANDERS, MILITARY DEPARTMENT SECRETARIES, DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES, AND NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) FOR THE TRANSPORTATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ITEMS (INCLUDING, ICE, WATER, FOOD, AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES, AT A MINIMUM) REQUIRED IN THE SUPPORT OF DISASTER RELIEF EFFORTS FOR LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI. INCORPORATE EXISTING CONTRACTED CAPABILITIES/CONTRIBUTIONS. SUBMIT CONOPS TO CICS, THROUGH THE HURRICANE KATRINA CAT, NO LATER THAN 032000Z SEP 05. AT A MINIMUM, ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING IN THE CONOPS:

(A) NUMBER AND LOCATIONS OF OPERATIONAL STAGING AREAS AND CONCEPT FOR DISTRIBUTION FORWARD.

(B) ESTIMATED REQUEST FOR FORCES (REF) REQUIREMENTS (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FORCE PROTECTION, ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT, TRANSPORTATION, AND DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS).

(C) UTILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD (NG) PERSONNEL.

(D) ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE PLANNING AND EXECUTION.

(G) EXIT STRATEGY.

(2) UPON SECDEF APPROVAL OF THE CONOPS, EXECUTE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS, INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES.
E. PROVIDE ONE (1) FULLY QUALIFIED DOD PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TO REPRESENT DOD AT THE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER, MISSISSIPPI, JOINT FIELD OFFICE, FOR A MINIMUM OF 30 DAYS.

2. ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 7.A.:

(4) PROVIDE 51,000 MRES AND COORDINATE DELIVERY TO THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS FOR PERSONNEL LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF THE SUPERDOME AND CLOVER LEAF OF NEW ORLEANS, LA. COORDINATE DETAILS OF DELIVERY TIMES AND PICK-UP AND DROP-OFF LOCATIONS WITH USNORTHCOM, NGB AND FEMA REPRESENTATIVES TO ENSURE REQUIREMENT AND LOCATION REMAIN VALID. IF NECESSARY, COORDINATE WITH USNORTHCOM, MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, AND NGB, FOR ON-SCENE ASSISTANCE IN DELIVERING FOOD AND WATER TO DESIGNATED LOCATIONS. DELIVERY OF FOOD AND WATER WILL BEGIN UPON SECDEF APPROVAL.

3. ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 8.:

F. COMBATANT COMMANDS, MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, DEFENSE AGENCIES, AND CHIEF OF THE NGB WILL ASSIST CDR USNORTHCOM IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS AS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 4.D., ABOVE.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

4. ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PARAGRAPH 11.D:

(19) FEMA FUND CITE # FOR PURCHASE AND DELIVERY OF MRES AND WATER (MISSION ASSIGNMENT # 1603DR-LA-DOD-12) IS 2005-06-1603DR-9064-XXXX-2501-D, FEMA APPROPRIATION CODE IS 70X0702, AND FEMA DOLLAR LIMIT IS $100,000.

(20) FEMA FUND CITE # FOR DOD TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TO THE JOINT INFORMATION CENTER, MS, JOINT FIELD OFFICE, FOR A MINIMUM OF 30 DAYS (MISSION ASSIGNMENT # 1604DR-MS-DOD-18) IS 2005-06-1604DR-9044-XXXX-2501-D, FEMA APPROPRIATION CODE IS 70X0702, AND FEMA DOLLAR LIMIT IS $20,000.

(20) FEMA FUND CITE # FOR THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS (MISSION ASSIGNMENT # 1604DR-MS-DOD-19) IS 2005-06-1604DR-9044-XXXX-2501-D, FEMA APPROPRIATION CODE IS 70X0720, AND FEMA DOLLAR LIMIT IS $1,000,000,000.

GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/JointDirmilspt Officier: DD ADM/BRIG GEN Scherling/CDR Gallagher/ AKNLDG/YES
I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)
State: LA (Louisiana)  Action Requested: DUE DATE GRANTED
Program/Code/Event #: 09037-0011 Hurricane Katrina
Action Requested: DUE DATE GRANTED

II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED

- Quantity: 1
- Day/Time Requested: 09/01/05
- Approval Status:
  - See Attached

III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operational Focus)
Action #: 09037-0240
- State Attorney Official (Required for DFA and TAA): Date:

IV. DESCRIPTION (Assignee Agency Upon Approval)
- Mission Statement: "Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment Activity Report to FEMA to include cost data when Mission Assignment is over $300,000. The Mission Assignment Activity Report can be used as an audit trail for assisting in the assignment of funds. The new MFR number can also be used as the audit trail.

V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)
- Type of Mission: Direct Federal Assistance
- State Share Amount: 15%
- State Share Breakdown: State Share (15%)
- State Share Percentage: Direct Federal Assistance
- Fund Claims:
  - 09037-0240-US-

VI. APPROVAL
- State Attorney Official (Required for DFA and TAA): Date:
- Federal Attorney Official (Required for all DFA and TAA): Date:

VII. CERTIFICATION (FEMA Use Only)
- Certification #:
- Certification Date: 09/01/05
- Signed by: 09/01/05

REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS
**FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY**

**MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)**

### I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)
- State: LA (Mississippi - Incident-9064084-MC-Hurricane Katrina - Evacuation)
- Program: 9064084-MC-HURRICANE KATRINA
- Action: Request for Assistance
- Date/Time: 08/22/2006 10:23

### II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED
- Assistance Requested: 9064084-MC
- Type: Individual
- Description: Assistance requested for emergency services and assistance for transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, and medical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.

### Quantity: 1 (Each)
- Date/Time Requested: 09/03/2005
- Latest Caution: Amendment of Task, 10/29/2005

### IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)
- **Mission Statement:** Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment Summary Report to FEMA to indicate what assistance you have been able to provide. This mission assignment summary report should be sent to the assigned agency's authorized representative as soon as possible.
- **FEMA Request:** FEMA requests that this mission assignment summary report indicate what assistance you have been able to provide in response to the transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, and medical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.

### V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)
- **Type of MA:** Direct Federal Assistance
- **State Cost Share:** 90%
- **Federal Cost Share:** 10%
- **Total Cost Share:** 90.00

### VI. APPROVAL
- **Date:** 09/03/2005

### VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)
- **Date/Time:** 09/03/2005
- **Amount:** $1,000,000.00

---

**REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS**
Additional Mission Statement

Liaison, and Capt. McDaniel, OOD Liaison
| **FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY** |
| **MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)** |
| **See reverse side for Paperwork Burden Disclosure Notice** |
| **O.M.E. No. 3067-8276** |
| **Expires November 30, 2007** |

**I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)**

- **State:** MS (Mississippi), Incident: 2005/06-241 Hurricane Katrina
- **Program Code/Event #:** 16049-MA; **HURRICANE KATRINA**
- **Action Request #:** 1928-2563
- **Date/Time Rec’d:** 06/30/2005 13:54

**II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED**

- See Attached

**Assistance Requested:**

- Require fully qualified Department of Defense Public Information Officer to represent his or her agency at the Joint Information Center, Mississippi, Joint Field Office for a minimum of 30 days.

**Quantity:** 1 (Each)  
**Date/Time Required:** 06/30/2005 13:54  
**Internal Control #:** N/NOTED

**Delivery Location:** Mississippi JFO, Joint Information Center, MS 30000

**Inquirer/Requestee Name:** Mary Hendrix  
**24-hour Ph#:** (779) 222-5407  
**Date:** 06/30/2005

**POC Name:** SOUTHERN JOHN A  
**24-hour Ph#:** (779) 222-5517  
**Date:** 06/30/2005

**State Approving Officer Required for DPA and FA:**

**III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)**

- **Action to:**
  - [ ] ESF #
  - [ ] Other
  - Date/Time:
  - Priorities:
    - [ ] 1.0摒除
    - [ ] 2.0 Shaping
    - [ ] 3.0 High
    - [ ] 4.0 Medium
    - [ ] 5.0 Normal

**IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)**

- See Attached

**Mission Statement:** Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment (MA) to FEMA to include cost data when Mission Assignments take more than 60 days to complete, including billing. The Mission Assignment (MA) can be accessed on-line at www.fema.gov/administrative_agencies.htm. The new ALC number can also be accessed at the web address.

- Require fully qualified Department of Defense Public Information Officer to represent his or her agency at the Joint Information Center, Mississippi, Joint Field Office for a minimum of 30 days.

**Assigned Agency:** DOD (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)  
**Assigned Agency POC Name:** CDD  
**Phone and fax #:** (775) 222-5002

**V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)**

- **Type of MA:**
  - [ ] Direct Federal Assistance
  - [ ] Technical Assistance
  - [ ] Federal Operations Support

- **State Cost Share Present:** 0.0%  
**State Cost Share Amount:** $0.00

**Fund Citation:** 2005-06-1049-MA, XXXX-2563-C
**Appropriation Code:** 700/0702

**Mission Assignment Coordinator (Prepared):** CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTON  
**Date:** 06/30/2005

**FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chief (Program Approval):** JOHN SOUTHERN
**Date:** 06/30/2005

**Congressional Funds Control (Funds Review):** RUPERT RAWLE SHIRLEY L  
**Date:** 06/30/2005

**VI. APPROVAL**

- **State Approving Official (Required for DPA and FA):**
  - [ ] Date:

- **Federal Approving Official (Required for AFI):** PAUL FAY, JR  
**Date:** 06/30/2005

**VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)**

- **Mission Assignment #:** 16049-MA-CC-2563-C
  - **Amt, This Action:** $20,000.00
  - **Date/Time Obligated:** 06/30/2005

**Attachment #:** 00

**Inquiries:** FEMA 80-2563, FEMA 80-2564

**REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS**
Lystra, Clark, CTR, OSD-POLICY

From: Wood, John E, MAJ, JCS J3 [john.wood@js.pentagon.mil]
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 4:18 AM
To: Wood, John E, MAJ, JCS J3; J4 Battle Capt; USTC-DDOC COS; USTC-DDOC Chief; Cdo (E-mail); CDO; CAT00 OPS; CAT Executive Officer; CAT Director; CAT Team Chief; HD Notifications Army EOC; OSD-POLICY; tazastorm@hqda.army.mil; Navy Command Center (NCC); hocwo@cano.navy.mil; Woody, Stephen R, Col, JCS SJS; Chavez, Richard, COL, OSD-POLICY; Limberis, Gregory, LTC, OSD-POLICY; Lystra, Clark, CTR, OSD-POLICY; DLA; DLA Log Ops Center; DLA JS COORD; 'hcjoc.chief.omb@northcom.mil'; 'hcjoc.land.omb@northcom.mil'; 'hcjoc@ng.pentagon.mil'; 'ngb-hd-rasca@ng.pentagon.mil'
CC: J-3 DDA/T/HD JDOMS NEWS GROUP
Subject: RE: MOD 8 to EXORD for DoD Support FEMA

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

All,

Please change the tasking for the Public Information Office (PI on the MOD, ref Para 5.A.(1)(G)) from USIFCOM to USNORTHCOM. It appears that there is already a NORTHCOM PA individual identified and ready to occupy the JC in MS.

Thanks and VFR, John

MAJ John E. Wood
JDOMS, Current Operations
(703) 697-9439/400
DSN: 227-9439
Room: 1E1008

-----Original Message-----
From: Wood, John E, MAJ, JCS J3
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 3:00 AM
To: J4 Battle Capt; USTC-DDOC COS; USTC-DDOC Chief; Cdo (E-mail); CDO; CAT00 OPS; CAT Executive Officer; CAT Director; CAT Team Chief; HD Notifications Army EOC; OSD-POLICY; tazastorm@hqda.army.mil; Navy Command Center (NCC); hocwo@cano.navy.mil; Woody, Stephen R, Col, JCS SJS; Chavez, Richard, COL, OSD-POLICY; Limberis, Gregory, LTC; OSD-POLICY; Lystra, Clark, CTR, OSD-POLICY; DLA; DLA Log Ops Center; DLA JS COORD; 'hcjoc.chief.omb@northcom.mil'; 'hcjoc.land.omb@northcom.mil'; 'hcjoc@ng.pentagon.mil'; 'ngb-hd-rasca@ng.pentagon.mil'
Cc: J-3 DDA/T/HD JDOMS NEWS GROUP
Subject: MOD 8 to EXORD for DoD Support FEMA

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

9/3/2005
All,

Please review MOD 8 to EXORD for DoD Support FEMA and provide concurrence/comments MLT 0500, 3 SEP 05.

Send response to JDOMS@isp.pentagon.mil

Please keep in mind, that the $1 Billion mission assignment is initially for detailed planning, and upon CICS approval of the plan, execution will occur.

Thanks and VR, John

MAJ John E. Wood
JDOMS, Current Operations
(703) 697-9439/0400
DSN: 227-9439
Room: 1E1008
September 2, 2005

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve 180 days of military duty in Title 32 USC 901 status for soldiers and airmen serving on state active duty in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection.

Hurricane Katrina struck Alabama, our neighbors in Mississippi and Louisiana on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered over 3,000 Alabama National Guard soldiers and airmen to state active duty to provide security, medical, engineers and communication support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. None of the soldiers or airmen are serving in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of vital infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, I-10, water and power distribution systems which are all vital to the recovery of the entire Gulf coast area.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Bob Riley
Governor
September 4, 2005

Honorable, Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
c/o Mr. Haynes - DoD General Counsel — via fax @ 703-693-7278  

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve up to 180 days of military duty, retroactive to August 29, 2005, in Title 32 U.S.C. § 901 stans for soldiers and airmen serving on State Active Duty in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection.

Hurricane Katrina struck Mississippi and our neighbors in Louisiana and Alabama on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered several thousand Mississippi National Guard soldiers and airmen to State Active Duty to provide security, medical, engineering and communication support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. None of those soldiers or airmen is serving in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of vital infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, I-10, water and power distribution systems — all of which are vital to the recovery of the entire Gulf Coast area.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Haley Barbour  
Governor of the State of Mississippi

cc: COL Parker - NGB General Counsel — via fax @ 703-697-3682
September 5, 2005
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I ask you to approve 180 days of military duty in Title 32 USC 901 status for all National Guard soldiers and airmen serving in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As you are aware, Title 32 status will allow the soldiers and airmen supporting Hurricane Katrina to receive military retirement points, health insurance and disability protection. Further, this action will ensure equitable compensation across the supporting National Guard forces.

As you are aware, Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana, our neighbors in Mississippi and Alabama on Monday, August 29, 2005. I ordered over 3,000 Louisiana National Guard soldiers and airmen to state active duty in order to provide security, medical, engineering and communication support to relief efforts. None of these soldiers are in a federal status.

Currently, our soldiers and airmen are engaged in the protection of critical infrastructure to include medical facilities, fuel distribution, water and power distribution systems which are all vital to the recovery of the entire region.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

SEP - 7 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts

I approve Federal funding for use of the National Guard in Title 32 U.S. Code status to support Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts retroactive to August 29, 2005.

The Secretary of the Army and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force shall coordinate the exercise of this authority with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

cc: CJCS
USD(C)
USD(P&R)
GC, DoD
ASD(HD)
Chief, NGB
From: Rhodes, Patrick  
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 6:46 PM  
To: Long, Casey; Altshuler, Brooks  
Subject: RE: Request for Assistance  

What is F7 thx

From: Long, Casey  
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 6:42 PM  
To: Rhode, Patrick; Altshuler, Brooks  
Subject: FW: Request for Assistance  

FYI - Just in case this gets raised on the next VTC - we've given direction on how OSILCP can engage/enroll law enforcement resources.

From: Wells, Tod [mailto:]  
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 3:51 PM  
To: 'McCarron, Christy'  
Cc: 'Filler, Joshua'; Long, Casey  
Subject: RE: Request for Assistance  

Christy,

Thanks. When you speak with Sheriff Bouchard again relay to him that he needs to get the Jefferson Parish Sheriff to contact the State EOC to make this request for help too. The process is for a locality to request help from the State, then the state makes the request through EMAC for other States. Jefferson Parish has to make their needs known to the State in order for the State to request or deploy the resources needed. Jefferson Parish may have already done this, but this is the process that will be able to get the needed resources on the ground.

Tod

From: McCarron, Christy [mailto:]  
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 3:46 PM  
To: Wells, Tod  
Subject: FW: Request for Assistance  

Tod, FYI

From: McCarron, Christy  
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 3:42 PM  
To: travisou  
Subject: Request for Assistance  

Col. Majaus, Sheriff Bouchard from Michigan and Sheriff Hale from Alabama are at the Louisiana border right now at the request of Sheriff Lee of Jefferson Parish who is desperate for law enforcement assistance. The Sheriff's cannot get an okay to help because their EOC of Michigan and Alabama say there has been no request from La. EOC for assistance. We cannot reach you by phone. It is absolutely imperative that the state request go to those state EOC. Those sheriffs have been there all day.

CHRISTY A. MCCARRON

9/20/2005  

DHS 0006730
Total Estimated EMAC Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
(Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, NCT, and RCT):

50,387 Personnel Deployed*
17,106 Civilian
33,270 National Guard

$576.1M Estimated Cost*

*Notes: Still have pending missions awaiting signatures — have 30 days from verbal agreement to signature. Costs and Personnel Numbers are Finalized in Reimbursement.
Hurricane Katrina

Current 10/4/2005

Louisiana

8/28 - EMAC A-Team deployed
8/29 – Katrina made landfall

680 Requests for Assistance
27,383 Personnel deployed*
7,291 Civilian
20,091 National Guard
$201.8M Estimated cost*

Mississippi

8/27 - EMAC A-Team deployed
8/29 – Katrina made landfall

723 Requests for Assistance
18,905 Personnel deployed*
7,244 Civilian
10,073 National Guard
$314.1M Estimated cost*

Total Estimated EMAC Response to Katrina (LA & MS):
1403 Requests for Assistance

46,288 Personnel Deployed
14,535 Civilian
21,098 National Guard

$515.9M Estimated Cost

*Notes: Still have pending missions awaiting signatures – have 30 days from verbal agreement to signatures.
Costs and Personnel Numbers are Finalized in Reimbursement
Examples of Resources Deployed:

- **Fire**: Firefighters, EMTs, Search and Rescue, & HAZMAT
- **Law Enforcement**: State Police, Sheriffs, Fish and Wildlife, Corrections
- **Health and Medical**: Ambulances, EMT personnel, Medical Doctors, Registered Nurses, & Coroners
- **Human Services**: WIC personnel
- **Agriculture and Forestry**: Livestock inspectors
- **Transportation and Highways**: Bridge inspection & airport maintenance
- **National Guard Troops**
Hurricane Rita

Louisiana

112 Requests for Assistance
3,819 Personnel deployed*
815 Civilian
2994 National Guard
$52.4M Estimated cost*

Texas

38 Requests for Assistance
234 Personnel deployed*
158 Civilian
76 National Guard
$1.9M Estimated cost*

Total Estimated EMAC Response to Rita (LA & TX):
150 Requests for Assistance
4,053 Personnel Deployed
973 Civilian
3,070 National Guard

$54.3M Estimated Cost

*Notes: Still have pending missions awaiting signatures — have 30 days from verbal agreement to signature. Costs and Personnel Numbers are Finalized in Reimbursement.

Image courtesy of NOAA
Operational Response
EMAC Operational Units

- National Coordination Group
- Regional Coordinating Teams
- National Coordinating Team
- Full time administrative support - NEMA
- National Coordination Group
- Collateral Responsibility of the Chair of the Operations Sub-Committee
- Activates EMAC Operational Process on Short Notice
- Provides Oversight of EMAC Operations
A-Team

- Deploys at Request of Impacted State
- Operates from Impacted State’s EOC or Command and Control Center
- Serves as Liaison Between Responding States, Other EMAC Assisting States and the Impacted State
- Coordinates Assistance Requests Between Impacted State and Other Member States
## A-Teams do and don’t

### A Teams Do:
- Upon receipt of a request for assistance, the A-Team facilitates the request between the impacted state and any responding states.
- Review the impacted state resource request.
- Complete the EMAC interstate mutual aid request (REQ-A).

### A Teams Do NOT:
- Have allocation authority.
- Authority to prioritize resource utilization.
- Ability to obligate state funds.
- Create a pool of resources to be distributed to states on a basis of need.
EMAC Response To Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Total Estimated EMAC Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
(Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, NCT, and RCT):

50,387 Personnel Deployed*
17,106 Civilian
33,270 National Guard

$576.1M Estimated Cost*

*Notes: Still have pending missions awaiting signatures – have 30 days from verbal agreement to signature. Costs and Personnel Numbers are Finalized in Reimbursement
## Hurricane Katrina

**Current 10/4/2005**

### Louisiana

- **8/28** - EMAC A-Team deployed
- **8/29** - Katrina made landfall
- 680 Requests for Assistance
- 27,383 Personnel deployed*
- 7,291 Civilian
- 20,091 National Guard
- $201.8M Estimated cost*

### Mississippi

- **8/27** - EMAC A-Team deployed
- **8/29** - Katrina made landfall
- 723 Requests for Assistance
- 18,905 Personnel deployed*
- 7,244 Civilian
- 10,073 National Guard
- $314.1M Estimated cost*

### Total Estimated EMAC Response to Katrina (LA & MS):

- 1403 Requests for Assistance
- 46,288 Personnel Deployed
- 14,535 Civilian
- 21,098 National Guard
- $515.9M Estimated Cost

*Notes: Still have pending missions awaiting signatures - have 30 days from verbal agreement to signature. Costs and Personnel Numbers are Finalized in Reimbursement.
Examples of Resources Deployed:

- **Fire**: Firefighters, EMTs, Search and Rescue, & HAZMAT
- **Law Enforcement**: State Police, Sheriffs, Fish and Wildlife, Corrections
- **Health and Medical**: Ambulances, EMT personnel, Medical Doctors, Registered Nurses, & Coroners
- **Human Services**: WIC personnel
- **Agriculture and Forestry**: Livestock inspectors
- **Transportation and Highways**: Bridge inspection & airport maintenance
- **National Guard Troops**
**EMAC**

**Hurricane Rita**

Current 10/4/2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Louisiana</th>
<th>Texas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>112 Requests for Assistance</td>
<td>38 Requests for Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,819 Personnel deployed*</td>
<td>234 Personnel deployed*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>815 Civilian</td>
<td>158 Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2904 National Guard</td>
<td>78 National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$52.4M Estimated cost*</td>
<td>$1.9M Estimated cost*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Image courtesy of NOAA

**Total Estimated EMAC Response to Rita (LA & TX):**

150 Requests for Assistance

4,053 Personnel Deployed

973 Civilian

3,070 National Guard

$54.3M Estimated Cost

*Notes: Still have pending missions awaiting signatures – have 30 days from verbal agreement to signature. Costs and Personnel Numbers are Finalized in Reimbursement.
EMAC Span of Control

**Operation Levels**
- Level 3
- Level 2
- Level 1

**Disaster Operation Components**
- **National Coordinating Group (NCG)**
  Located in the state of the EMAC
  OPSUBCOM Chair
- **EMAC A-Team**
  Co-located with State/Federal Personnel
  In the appropriate requesting state EOC
- **National Coordinating Team (NCT)**
  Co-located with FEMA EST at the NEOC
  DHS/FEMA HQ, Washington, D.C.
- **Regional Coordinating Team (RCT)**
  Co-Located with Federal ESF’s at the
  DHS/FEMA Regional OPS Center

**Functions**
- Control
- Action
- Coordination
  Functions
EMAC Operational Units

- National Coordination Group
- A-Team
- Regional Coordinating Teams
- National Coordinating Team
- Full time administrative support - NEMA
National Coordination Group

- Collateral Responsibility of the Chair of the Operations Sub-Committee
- Activates EMAC Operational Process on Short Notice
- Provides Oversight of EMAC Operations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Teams Do:</th>
<th>A Teams Do NOT:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Upon receipt of a request for assistance, the A-Team facilitates the</td>
<td>• Have allocation authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>request between the impacted state and any responding states</td>
<td>• Authority to prioritize resource utilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Review the impacted state resource request</td>
<td>• Ability to obligate state funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Complete the EMAC interstate mutual aid request (REQ-A)</td>
<td>• Create a pool of resources to be distributed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

September 9, 2005

To All State and Federal Law Enforcement Officers:

Pursuant to the authority, powers and duties conferred upon me by the Mississippi Legislature in my capacity as the Governor of the State of Mississippi at Section 33-15-1 et seq. know as the Mississippi Emergency Management Law, specifically, the authority granted at Section 33-15-11(10), I do hereby in an exercise of that authority, request and authorize law enforcement assistance from any and all federal law enforcement agencies whose law enforcement officers are authorized to effect an arrest for a violation of the United States Code and who are authorized to carry a firearm in the performance of those law enforcement duties.

Any such law enforcement officer dispatched by his/her respective federal agency pursuant to this request is hereby deemed to be working in cooperation with the local law enforcement officers of the area to which said federal officer may be located, and as such is hereby granted the authority to bear arms, make arrests and to make searches and seizures, in addition to any other power, duty, right and privilege as is afforded forces of the State of Mississippi.

This grant of authority shall remain valid and in effect until such time as the same is expressly revoked by me, or at the termination of the state of emergency, whichever comes first.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Haley Barbour
Governor
September 7, 2005

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Office of the Governor
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9004

Dear Governor Blanco:

I received your request of September 6, 2005, for law enforcement assistance from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is dedicated to providing the necessary resources to assist in the Hurricane Katrina recovery and reconstruction effort in the days and weeks ahead, including your critical law enforcement needs. Our law enforcement personnel have been working tirelessly to provide assistance in New Orleans and around the State of Louisiana. Please be assured that we will continue to provide assistance in close coordination with you and your State and local authorities.

Sincerely,

Michael Chertoff

cc: Attorney General Gonzales

www.dhs.gov
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

September 9, 2005

To All State and Federal Law Enforcement Officers:

Pursuant to the authority, powers and duties conferred upon me by the Mississippi Legislature in my capacity as the Governor of the State of Mississippi at Section 33-15-1 et seq. known as the Mississippi Emergency Management Law, specifically, the authority granted at Section 33-15-11(10), I do hereby in an exercise of that authority, request and authorize law enforcement assistance from any and all federal law enforcement agencies whose law enforcement officers are authorized to effect an arrest for a violation of the United States Code and who are authorized to carry a firearm in the performance of those law enforcement duties.

Any such law enforcement officers dispatched by higher respective federal agency pursuant to this request is hereby deemed to be working in cooperation with the local law enforcement officers of the area to which said federal officer may be located, and as such is hereby granted the authority to bear arms, make arrests and to make searches and seizures, in addition to any other power, duty, right and privilege as is afforded forces of the State of Mississippi.

This grant of authority shall remain valid and in effect until such time as the same is expressly revoked by me, or at the termination of the state of emergency, whichever comes first.

Sincerely,

Haley Barbour
Governor
September 7, 2005

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Office of the Governor
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9004

Dear Governor Blanco:

I received your request of September 6, 2005, for law enforcement assistance from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is dedicated to providing the necessary resources to assist in the Hurricane Katrina recovery and reconstruction effort in the days and weeks ahead, including your critical law enforcement needs. Our law enforcement personnel have been working tirelessly to provide assistance in New Orleans and around the State of Louisiana. Please be assured that we will continue to provide assistance in close coordination with you and your State and local authorities.

Sincerely,

Michael Chertoff

cc: Attorney General Gonzales
Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.  
ORDER NO. 2779-2005  

AUTHORIZING THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL  
TO TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATED TO HURRICANE KATRINA  

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Attorney General by law, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 500, 510, 564, and 566, and 42 U.S.C. § 10501, I hereby direct the Deputy Attorney General, during and in relation to the law enforcement emergency described by the Governor of Louisiana in her request of September 3, 2005, received today, to take all necessary and appropriate steps within available resources to provide the assistance so requested by the Governor.

Department of Justice law enforcement personnel who are engaged in this mission shall have the authority to enforce the laws of the United States and to assist law enforcement officials in the State of Louisiana to enforce the laws of that State. All such officers engaged in this mission shall coordinate with their state and local counterparts to make appropriate arrangements as necessary to ensure the most effective law enforcement assistance efforts in the State of Louisiana. In addition, all such officers shall be subject to the supervision of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana, who may delegate operational authority to appropriate Department of Justice officials. The assistance provided pursuant to this order shall continue for 30 days unless extended by the Attorney General.

Sept 4, 2005

Alberto R. González
Attorney General

JMD 000000057
September 4, 2005

The Honorable Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor
State of Louisiana
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9004

Dear Governor Blanco:

I have received today your request for assistance of Deputy United States Marshals or other Department of Justice personnel in the State of Louisiana in support of law enforcement requirements created by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. This is to advise you that your request is approved and that I have directed the Deputy Attorney General immediately to take all necessary and appropriate steps within available resources to provide the assistance so requested, in coordination with you and other appropriate state and local authorities. Any Department personnel providing this assistance will be operating under the supervision of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and will be coordinating with their state and local counterparts to make all necessary arrangements to ensure appropriate authority to conduct their assistance efforts in the State of Louisiana. The assistance will continue for 30 days unless extended. In addition, I have directed the Office of Justice Programs to identify any funds that may be available to Louisiana through Department of Justice grant programs to fund state and local efforts related to Hurricane Katrina.

I recognize the extraordinary emergency situation with which you and the other citizens of Louisiana are dealing in the aftermath of the hurricane. Please be assured that the Department of Justice will be providing all the assistance it can to support your security and law enforcement efforts.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Alberto R. Gonzales
September 6, 2005

The Honorable Alberto Gonzales
US Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, DC

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C.

Dear Attorney General Gonzales and Secretary Chertoff:

This letter is to officially request the deployment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers, Customs and Border Protection personnel and/or other Department of Homeland Security personnel to the following parishes: Assumption, Lafourche, Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and Washington in support of the law enforcement challenges created by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. The request is made under the Emergency Law Enforcement Assistance provisions of the Justice Assistance Act of 1974 (hereafter the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§10501-10503, which authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a state. In accordance with 28 C.F.R. §55.31, I hereby inform you of the following:

(a) Hurricane Katrina struck the state of Louisiana causing severe flooding and damage to the southeastern part of the state, which have threatened the safety and security of the citizens of the affected areas of the state of Louisiana. Shortly thereafter, looters broke in the patch of Orleans exacerbating the flooding, and posing further threats to the safety and security of the citizens of the affected areas;

(b) Scores of people have been rescued, however, there are many more persons waiting for rescue and evacuation. The state of Louisiana’s law enforcement manpower currently available to the state to respond to this emergency are insufficient in numbers to meet the demands of this natural disaster, and there is a dire need to immediately supplement the law enforcement presence in the area of the disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina. Human lives are at stake;

(c) We request the immediate assistance of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, US Customs and Border Patrol and other components of the Department of Homeland Security, including funds, equipment, training, intelligence information, and personnel as appropriate; and

(d) We are, at the time, receiving assistance from the U.S. Marshal’s Office under this Act.

JMD 000000061
I assure you that the state will comply with the other requirements of the Act, including provisions regarding nonappropriation, nondiscrimination, and confidentiality of information.

Coordination of our law enforcement effort is being organized by LTC Joseph T. Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State Police. Please contact their office at our Emergency Operations Center at [redacted] or [redacted].

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Kathleen Babineaux Blanco

JW
September 3, 2005

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales:
U.S. Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, DC

Dear Attorney General Gonzales:

This letter is to officially request the deployment of Deputy U.S. Marshals and/or other Department of Justice personnel to the following parishes: Assumption, Lafourche, Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and Washington in support of law enforcement requirements created by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. The request is made under the Emergency Law Enforcement Assistance provisions of the Justice Assistance Act of 1974 (hereafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1851-10503, which authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a state, in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 55.31, I hereby inform you of the following:

a) Hurricanes Katrina struck the state of Louisiana causing severe flooding and damage to the southeastern part of the state, which have threatened the safety and security of the citizens of the affected areas of the state of Louisiana. Shortly thereafter, levees broke in the parish of Orleans exacerbating the flooding, and posing further threats to the safety and security of the citizens in the affected areas;

b) Scores of people have been rescued, however, there are many more persons waiting for rescue and evacuation. The state of Louisiana’s law enforcement manpower currently available to the state to respond to this emergency are insufficient in numbers to meet the demands of this natural disaster, and there is a dire need to immediately supplement the law enforcement presence in the area of the disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina. Human life is at risk;

c) We request the immediate assistance of the U.S. Marshals Services and other components of the Department of Justice, including funds, equipment, training, intelligence information, and personnel as appropriate and;

d) We are, at the time, unaware of any other assistance the state has, or may receive under the Act.
I assure you that the state will comply with the other requirements of the Act, including provisions regarding non-appropriation, nondiscrimination, and confidentiality of information.

Coordination of our law enforcement effort is being organized by Louisiana State Police. Such office may be reached at our Emergency Operations Center at (XXX) XXX-XXXX.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

Katrina Babineaux Blanco

jw
September 3, 2005

Via Facsimile

The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
U.S. Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear Attorney General Gonzales:

This is to officially request deployment of Deputy U.S. Marshals to the State of Mississippi to support of law enforcement requirements created by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. This request is made under the Emergency Law Enforcement Assistance provisions of the Justice Assistance Act of 1984 ("the Act"), 42 U.S. C. §§ 15001 – 15013, which authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a state. In accordance with 28 C.F.S. § 65.31, I inform you of the following:

(a) Due to Hurricane Katrina, the State of Mississippi has suffered widespread damage to property, power outages, fuel shortages, looting, and extensive loss of life.

(b) State and local law enforcement do not have sufficient resources to handle this emergency alone and sufficiently protect the citizens of Mississippi.

(c) We request the assistance of the U.S. Marshals Service and other components of the Department of Justice, including funds, equipment, training, intelligence information, and personnel, as appropriate.

(d) We are, at this time, unaware of any other assistance the State has, or may receive, under the Act.

POST OFFICE BOX 120 • JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205 • TELEPHONE: (601) 359-3120 • FAX: (601) 359-2741 • WWW.GOVERNOR.MS.MS
Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales
September 3, 2005
Page Two

(c) I assure you that the state will comply with the other requirements of the Act, including provisions regarding nonduplication, nondiscrimination, and confidentiality of information.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Governor Haley Barbour
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

September 3, 2005

The Honorable Haley Barbour
Governor
State of Mississippi

Dear Governor Barbour:

I have received your request of today for assistance of Deputy United States Marshals in the State of Mississippi in support of law enforcement requirements created by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. This is to advise you that your request is approved and that I have directed the Director of the United States Marshals Service ("USMS") immediately to take all necessary and appropriate steps within available resources to provide the assistance so requested, in coordination with you and other appropriate state and local authorities. In providing this assistance, the USMS personnel will be operating under the supervision of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Mississippi, and will be coordinating with their state and local counterparts to make all necessary arrangements to ensure appropriate authority to conduct their assistance efforts in the State of Mississippi. The assistance will continue for 30 days unless extended. In addition to the assistance to be provided by the USMS, I have directed the Office of Justice Programs to identify any funds that may be available to Mississippi through Department of Justice grant programs to fund state and local efforts related to Hurricane Katrina.

I recognize the extraordinary emergency situation with which you and the other citizens of Mississippi are dealing in the aftermath of the hurricane. Please be assured that the Department of Justice will be providing all the assistance it can to support your security and law enforcement efforts.

Sincerely,

Alberto R. Gonzales
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

ORDER NO. 2778-2005

AUTHORIZING THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE, TO TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATED TO HURRICANE KATRINA

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Attorney General by law, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 564, and 566, and 42 U.S.C. § 10501, I hereby direct the Director, United States Marshals Service, during and in relation to the law enforcement emergency described by the Governor of Mississippi in his request of September 3, 2005, to take all necessary and appropriate steps within available resources to provide the assistance so requested by the Governor.

Deputy United States Marshals who are engaged in this mission shall have the authority to enforce the laws of the United States and to assist law enforcement officials in the State of Mississippi to enforce the laws of that State. All such officers engaged in this mission shall coordinate with their state and local counterparts to make appropriate arrangements as necessary to ensure the most effective law enforcement assistance efforts in the State of Mississippi. In addition, all such officers shall be subject to the supervision of the United States Attorney in the Southern District of Mississippi, who may delegate operational authority to appropriate Department of Justice officials. The assistance provided pursuant to this order shall continue for 30 days unless extended by the Attorney General.

Sept 3, 2005

Date

Alberto R. González
Attorney General

JMD 00000053
MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

FROM: The Attorney General

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Response to Hurricane Katrina

The Department of Justice is committed to providing all resources possible to help maintain law and order in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina in and around the City of New Orleans. As President Bush declared yesterday, “there ought be zero tolerance of people breaking the law during an emergency such as this.”

I appreciate the efforts your agencies already have undertaken to provide assistance to state and local law enforcement. I ask each of you to continue to coordinate with state and local law enforcement officials to identify areas where federal law enforcement might be of assistance. In particular, I ask:

- The Federal Bureau of Investigation to continue to deploy agents (including SWAT agents) and tactical assets (including helicopters, boats, and technical/communications assets) to the affected area;
- The Drug Enforcement Administration to prepare to deploy Mobile Enforcement Teams, special agents, and tactical assets (including helicopters and other aircraft) to the affected area;
- The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to establish a Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with related VCIT personnel and assets, to address any rise in criminal activity in that city; and
- The United States Marshals Service (1) to continue to deploy Deputy U.S. Marshals and Court Security Officers to conduct prisoner transport operations and provide additional court security and (2) to prepare to utilize the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS) to deploy law enforcement personnel to airports around the country as needed.

I know that Department of Justice personnel in Louisiana — from special agents to Deputy U.S. Marshals to support staff — already have logged many hours in difficult circumstances. Unfortunately, the recovery efforts in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina will take weeks and months, not days. In past natural disasters and emergencies, Department of Justice employees have demonstrated a tremendous quick in assisting those in need. I know that you will rise to the occasion again. Thank you again for your contribution to this important effort.
What is EMAC?

EMAC, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, is a Governor's state mutual aid compact that facilitates the sharing of resources, personnel, and equipment across state lines during times of disaster and emergency. EMAC is formalized into law by member parties.
EMAC History

- **1992** - Concept of Emergency Management Compact Conceived by Southern US Governors
- **1993** - Adopted as Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact
- **1995** – Agreement broadened to EMAC
- **1996** – Endorsed by National Governor’s Association & FEMA for Nationwide Use
- **1996** - Ratified by US Congress and Signed into Law (PL 104-321)
Facilitate the efficient and effective sharing of resources between member states during times of disaster or emergency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMAC does:</th>
<th>EMAC does NOT:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Maximizes use of all available resources</td>
<td>• Replace federal support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinates deployment of EMAC resources with National Response Plan</td>
<td>• Alter operational direction and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resources</td>
<td>• Move resources from county to county, city to city, or locality to locality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expedites and streamlines delivery of assistance between member states</td>
<td>All EMAC resources must be from state to state. County, local, and other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protects state sovereignty</td>
<td>personnel/resources must work through the state emergency management office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides management and oversight</td>
<td>• Endorse self-deployments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Who are the members of EMAC?

49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted EMAC legislation.
EMAC Endorsements

- The Southern, Midwestern, Western, New England and National Governors’ Associations
- Adjutants Generals Association of the U.S.
- The Midwestern Legislative Conference
- National Guard Bureau
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- Department of Homeland Security
1. Governor issues state of emergency
2. Authorized Representative from the affected state alerts EMAC National Coordinating Group (NCG)
3. Affected State requests A-Team Deployment or uses in-house EMAC A-Team trained personnel

4. A-Team works with state; Determine needs and requests assistance via EMAC Operations System
5. A-Team helps state determine costs and availability of resources
6. States complete requisitions and negotiation of costs
7. Resources are sent to affected state

8. Responding state requests reimbursement
9. Responding state reimbursed

EMAC Activation (simplified)
EMAC Applications

- State/Local EOC Support
- Damage assessment
- Disaster recovery
- Logistics
- Donations management
- Security
- Communications
- Firefighting
- Aviation support
- Biological/chemical events
- Medical personnel/resources

any capability of member states can be shared with member states
Why is EMAC Successful?
Why IS EMAC Effective?

- Administrative Oversight and support staff
  - Formal Business Protocols
- Solves Problems Upfront – Provisions in Compact’s Language
  - Reimbursement, Licensure, Liability
- Continuity of Operations
  - Standard Operating Procedures
- Continual Improvement – 5 year Strategic Plan
  - Critiques/Training/Exercises/Meetings
- Customized Technology Development
- Active membership
EMAC Key Provisions

- "...the state rendering aid may withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for such state."

- "...licenses, certificates, or other permits...shall be deemed licensed, certified, or permitted by the state requesting assistance."
EMAC Key Provisions

- "Employees . . . rendering aid . . . shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes"

- " . . . any party state rendering aid . . . shall be reimbursed by the party state receiving aid for any loss or damage to or expense incurred . . ." (requesting state)
Member State Responsibilities

- Educate Emergency Staff & State Agencies on the EMAC Process
- Train A-Team Members on EMAC Operations
- Develop and Maintain Procedures for A-Team Activation
- Develop and Maintain Procedures for Requesting/Providing Assistance
- Evaluate Procedures Through Exercises

EMAC is administered by NEMA, the National Emergency Management Association
EMAC Success Stories

EMAC has met the needs of citizens during time of disasters through a unified effort among the member states.
EMAC has met the needs of citizens during time of disasters through a unified effort among the member states

2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
2004 Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne
2003 Hurricane Isabel
2001 Terrorist Attacks
Passed to Nat Guard as they, not DoD, are law enforcement in NO

Sent from my Blackberry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode...@Eldredge.com>
To: Lowerer, Michael <Michael.Lowerer@Eldredge.com>; Lokey, William <William.Lokey@Eldredge.com>; Wells, Scott <Scott.Wells@Eldredge.com>; Althahler, Brooks <Brooks.Althahler@Eldredge.com>; Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath@Eldredge.com>
Cc: Heath, Michael <Michael.Heath@Eldredge.com>
Sent: Thu, Sep 01 15:41:25 2005
Subject: Please pass this along to DoD Security

-----Original Message-----
From: *Jocann Chiles* <jchiles@eldredge.com>
Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2005 16:36:44
To: 
Subject: RE:

There are doctors on top of the Taikas Hospital trying to get rescued. The looters are taking the doctors hostage and trying to get drugs. Please send some help.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark
Attorneys at Law
400 West Capitol, Suite 2000
Little Rock, AR 72201
E-Mail: jchiles@eldredge.com
Direct Phone:
Direct Fax:
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

between

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Department of Public Safety and Corrections

and

The United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Prisons
United States Penitentiary, Coleman-II, Florida

Pursuant to authority contained in the Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C. §170a and b, and as directed by the pertinent Mission Assignment(s) issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"), this Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU" or "Agreement") is entered into between the United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("State"), who hereby agree as follows:

1. PERFORMANCE:

   A. Subject to the availability of suitable space at the United States Penitentiary, Coleman-II, Florida ("USP Coleman II"), BOP agrees to accept from the State up to a maximum of 1000 sentenced State prisoners serving felony sentences with no less than six (6) months remaining on their sentences, referred to herein as "State inmates," and to undertake their secure custody, housing, safekeeping, subsistence and care.

   B. Said State inmates shall not be mentally ill or have any serious or unstable medical conditions which would result in...
anticipated hospital admissions or routine visits, e.g. for dialysis, AIDS or cancer treatments. Each State inmate with a chronic illness must be able to take care of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), not require 24-hour nursing care, monitoring or assistance, and not have a pacemaker.

2. **PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE/TERMINATION:**

   A. This Agreement shall become effective upon the date of final signature of both parties and remain in effect for the duration of FEMA Mission Assignment #1603DS-LA-USDI-10, Amendment #1, attached as Attachment A and incorporated herewith, and any pertinent subsequent FEMA Mission Assignment(s), or until amended, superseded, or terminated, as provided herein.

   B. This Agreement may be terminated at any time by mutual consent or by either party upon thirty (30) days written notice to the other party before expiration of the FEMA Mission Assignment(s). Within a reasonable time of the giving or receipt of such notice, the State shall retake custody of all State inmates transferred to the BOP under this Agreement.

3. **FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES:**

   A. Reimbursement to BOP for the BOP’s performance under this MOU shall be determined by the terms of the pertinent FEMA Mission Assignment(s).

   B. Where noted herein that the State is to make all arrangements necessary for certain actions, those arrangements may include subsequent separate agreements between the parties on a case-by-case basis.

   C. In accordance with the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341, nothing contained herein may be construed to obligate the BOP to any expenditure or obligation of funds in excess of, or in advance of, appropriations.

4. **APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER:**

   A. The State shall clearly identify each State inmate and submit the following with each State inmate:
(1) Copies of all relevant documents which relate to
the inmate's case history, physical and clinical record;

(2) Certified copies of all judicial/administrative
rulings and orders relating to the inmate and the sentences
pursuant to which confinement is to be had or continue;

(3) Sentence computations showing correct release
date;

(4) Medical records, if available; and

(5) as much background information as possible,
including separatee status, discipline/family history.

B. The BOP shall retain the discretion to reject any
State inmate for any reason when BOP determines that such
rejection would be in the best interest of the BOP.

5. DELIVERY OF INMATES/TRANSPORTATION COSTS:

A. All State inmates to be housed at USP Coleman II have
been delivered to BOP pursuant to the terms of FEMA Mission
Assignment #1603DR-LA-USBJ-11, attached as Attachment B and
incorporated herewith.

B. In the absence of subsequent Mission Assignments issued
by FEMA to BOP, the state shall make all necessary arrangements
to transport State inmates released from BOP custody.

6. TRANSFER OF INMATE FUNDS AND PROPERTY: Upon the State
inmate's release from BOP custody and written application by the
inmate, the State shall make all arrangements necessary for the
transmittal of inmate funds and personal property to the State.

7. MEDICAL SERVICES:

A. State inmates shall receive the same degree of medical
care and attention regularly provided by the BOP.

B. For State inmates in need of non-emergency "special or
extraordinary medical services", BOP shall notify the State and
the State shall make all the necessary arrangements, including
transportation, guard service, medication, equipment, and
surgical or nursing care. The BOP shall have sole discretion in
determining the need for non-emergency "special or extraordinary
medical services."

C. In the event of an emergency, BOP shall proceed
immediately with necessary medical treatment and notify the
State as soon as practicable regarding the nature of the State
inmate's illness or injury and type of treatment provided. The
State shall be responsible for making all necessary arrangements
to continue any further medical services, including
transportation, guard service, medication, equipment, and
surgical or nursing care.

8. DISCIPLINE: BOP shall have physical control over, and
power to exercise disciplinary authority upon, all State
inmates. While in the custody of BOP, State inmates shall be
subject to Federal laws/regulations consistent with the sentence
imposed.

9. ESCAPE: If a State inmate escapes, BOP shall promptly
notify the State and have primary responsibility and authority
to direct the pursuit and retaking of such escaped inmate. BOP
shall use all reasonable means to recapture the escaped inmate
and bear all reasonable costs in connection therewith.

10. DEATH OF INMATE:

A. In the event of the death of a State inmate, BOP shall
immediately notify the State of the death, furnish information
as requested, and follow appropriate instructions with regard to
the disposition of the body. The body shall not be released
except upon written order of the State. The State shall make
all arrangements necessary for the preparation and disposition
of the body, as well as the duty to notify the nearest relative
of the deceased State inmate.

B. The provisions of this section shall govern only the
relationship between the BOP and the State, and shall not affect
the responsibility of relatives or other persons for the
disposition of the deceased and for expenses connected
therewith.

11. INTER-INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER: The BOP may relocate a
State inmate from one facility under its control to another
whenever it deems such action is appropriate. Notice of such transfer shall immediately be sent to the State.

12. RETAKING OF STATE INMATES UPON RELEASE: Upon the lawful termination of a State inmate's commitment, the State shall make all necessary arrangements, including clothing, transportation, and gratuities, for the inmate to be discharged, conditionally or otherwise, at a mutually agreed upon location.

13. MODIFICATION: This Agreement may be modified or amended only by the written mutual consent of both parties.

14. OTHER CONTRACTS UNAFFECTED: This Agreement shall not affect any independent relationships or obligations between the parties or between the parties and any third party or parties.

15. LIABILITY/INDEMNITY.

A. Each party shall be responsible for any liability arising from its own conduct. Neither party agrees to insure, defend, or indemnify the other.

B. Each party shall cooperate with the other party in the investigation/resolution of administrative actions/litigation arising from responsibilities and procedures addressed herein.

20. MAILING ADDRESSES: All notices, reports, applications, and correspondence shall be sent as follows:

A. for Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections:

Richard L. Stalder, Secretary
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
Post Office Box 94304
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821

- Telephone
- Facsimile

B. For Federal Bureau of Prisons:

Carlyle I. Holder, Warden
USP Coleman II
FCC Coleman
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned duly authorized officers have subscribed their names on behalf of the State of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons:

State of Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections

Richard L. Stalder, Secretary

__________________________
Date

Federal Bureau of Prisons

Carlyle I. Holder, Warden
USP Coleman II

__________________________
Date

Concurred:

__________________________
R.R. Holt
Regional Director

__________________________
Date
-----Original Message-----
From: O'Connor, Ralph
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 7:42 AM
To: EOC Hurricane 2005; EOC Report
Subject: FW: Secretary's Operations Center Flash Report #20 Update - Hurricane Katrina

----Original Message----
From: Navin, Phillip
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 7:36 AM
To: O'Connor, Ralph
Subject: FW: Secretary's Operations Center Flash Report #20 Update - Hurricane Katrina

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
Phil Navin
Acting Director, Division of Emergency Operations
CDC

----Original Message----
From: Jones, Lakeshia (OS)
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 7:30 AM
To: Wash, John (OS)
Cc: Banks, Ron (OS)
    Sella, Jack (RSC/OS)
    Helmons, Lewis (OS)
    "Lewinsonto...
    "boden, william"
    "brunn, brenda"
    "cassidy, diane (OS)"
    "carr, steve a. (HIH)"
    "clark, sherry (DOA)"
    "cobb, clara (OS)"
    "oviello, daniel"
    "cratty, james (CMS)"
    "dallinboust, bernie (INS)"
    "deering, donald a. (ACT)"
    "diniz, robert (SANSHA)"
    "doherty, june (OS)"
    "parker, martin (INS)"
    "mcclintock, joshua (OS)"
    "milano, angela (OS)"
    "parker, pamela (OS)"
    "parker, pat (OS)"
    "platts, dan (SANSHA)"
    "koyama, stephen (RSC)
    "garvey, kay (RSC)"
    "gilbert, robert (RSC)"
    "gordon, vinetta (OS)"
    "hardin, karl (OS)"
    "hassett, seth (SANSHA)"
    "hebert, rich a. (OS)"
    "hhs-fda 2"
    "hhs-fda 1"
    "thomas, marvin (INS)"
    "martinelli, angela (OS)"
    "hargan, eric (OS)"
    "hall, bill (OS)"
    "wolfson, marc (OS)"
    "creata, diana (OS)"
    "hhs-region1hha"
    "konopko, deborah

CDC562
Secretary's Operations Center

Flash Report $20 Update - Hurricane Katrina

Updated as of 0700 EST, Tuesday

September 6, 2005

Incident Update for HHS Headquarters

Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 has established an integrated interagency management structure at the Robert H. Humphrey building (Washington, DC) and continues to work in conjunction with both the Secretary’s Emergency Response Team (SERT) in the affected areas. The establishment of medical care sites, the assessment of public health and medical needs (in the affected area and at relocation sites) and the logistics surrounding the entire response efforts continue to be the focus of operations. Mortuary services and mental health support have become high priorities.

CDC563
Requests in process and Mission Assignments received since previous report:

Louisiana
* Request for 4 mental health providers to aid in crisis counseling
* Mission assignment has been sub-tasked to
  o Mental health screening services for responders and victims in LA
  o Occupational health screening services for responders and victims
  o CDC/ATSDR support to respond to environmental issues
Mississippi
* Request for 2 water purification units for area hospitals

ESP#8 update:

DOD
* Hospital Ship USNS COMFORT is being diverted to New Orleans
  o Mission assignment for change of 1,000 beds - N02 1,000 medical/surgical beds:
    750 beds to house response personnel; 250 beds for medical needs/support.
  o 745 hospital beds available at New Orleans International Airport: (26), USNS
    RATAAN (360) and USS IWO JIMA (360)
  o The issue regarding the use of DoD credentialing system for health care
    providers has been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for action.

VA
* Identifying 12 mental health personnel to support possible mission in Biloxi
  * Rostered 108 personnel to support an FMS

NEMSS
* See separate NEMSS status report
* SMART mission is operational at St. Gabriel. There are two DPMEs there with 3
  SMART Teams (96 personnel). An additional 400 people will do body recovery.
  * Body Recovery
  * Plan' awaiting State approval. Dr. Cataldye the newly appointed State medical
  * examiner in the approval of State. The newly appointed State medical examiner, was
  * appointed at the Parish level.

There are 20 Mortuary Refrigeration trucks on location with more on call if needed. There
* is also a refrigeration boat being sent.
  * NEMSS teams are redeploying to surrounding parishes, will define needs as they
    go.
  * NEMSS stated at the 1800 FHS meeting that were prepared to sustain mission for
    up to 45 days.
Region IV

Summary
Priorities are now shifting to the decompression of special needs shelters and moving individuals to the Federal Medical Shelters at Meridian Naval Air Station and Key Field Air National Guard Base in Meridian, Mississippi. The Federal Medical Shelters have established shuttle services so that individuals in general shelters can visit family in Federal Medical Shelters and stationed ambulances at the 24/7 and the Federal Medical Shelter to transport patients that decompensate. Thus far all Federal Medical Shelters in Mississippi are staffed with Public Health Service Officers and NHS personnel.

NHS response activities

State
Description
Comments

MS
JFO scheduled to stand up Thursday
Imperial Palace Hotel, Biloxi

Addressing diarrhea outbreak in Gulf Coast shelters
CDC and the MS Health Department are not aware of any cases of dysentery, a bacterial illness, there have been clusters of diarrhea, likely viral in cause and self-limited

Exploring another 500-bed FMS in Jackson, MS for dialysis patients when they are not being dialyzed

Currently 126 shelters opened, and additional 16 ARC shelters on standby to be opened as needed. The current total population registered is 15,362 as of 1530 hrs 9/05/05 with total capacity of opened shelters at 30,506.

NHS personnel status

State
Description
Ndms Serves The Needs Of Hurricane Victims

Release Date: December 8, 2005
Release Number: 1603-207

Baton Rouge, La. – The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). National Disaster Medical System's (NDMS) mission is to maintain a national capability to deliver quality medical care to the victims and responders of a domestic disaster. NDMS has medical, veterinary, and mortuary assistance teams located around the country. There are more than 8,000 NDMS personnel nationwide who were all used following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The team has supported six hospitals, three special needs shelters and eight additional sites throughout the state.

NDMS consists of several specialized teams including:

- 48 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), which consist of a group of professional and para-professional medical personnel capable of providing medical care following disasters;
- 11 Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT), which consist of private citizens with specialized training and experience to help in the recovery, identification and processing of deceased victims;
- Four National Medical Response Teams, to deal with the medical consequences of incidents potentially involving chemical, biological or nuclear materials;
- Five Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams, which include clinical veterinarians, pathologists, animal health technicians, microbiologists and others who assist animal disaster victims and provide care to search dogs; and
- Three International Medical Surgical Response Teams – highly specialized team, trained and equipped to establish a fully capable field surgical facility anywhere in the world.

Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, NDMS staged nine DMATs in the area. Some of the NDMS responses have been the first team to treat patients before landfall. The team was also the first team in the Ice Arena during landfall on Aug. 29. Eight DMAT teams worked around the clock at the airport during the peak of patient movement operations.

The DMAT teams have provided care in nine parishes overall. Presently, NDMS is still providing primary care to three parishes: Cameron, Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes with a 184 personnel and logistics staff.

During the course of this disaster, NDMS has treated more than 63,163 patients, and more than 68,654 patients have been immunized.

NDMS' DMORTs have processed 905 human remains, 658 have been identified, 244 have not been identified, 507 have been released to their families and 147 are waiting to be released. As of Sept. 16, DMORT's staff was 235 but has since decreased to 136. NDMS expects to demobilize by the middle of December. This has been the longest deployment for the NDMS team than any other disaster.

FEMA prepares the nation for all hazards and manages federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates mitigation activities, trains first responders, works with state and local emergency managers, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program.

Last Updated: Thursday, 09-Dec-2005 17:26:40

Return to the article


1/28/2006
October 2005

DoD Provides Care To Spell Hurricane Relief - Sandra Basu

WASHINGTON-As Hurricane Rita gathered strength last month and thousands evacuated Texas and Louisiana to prepare, recovery from Hurricane Katrina was still going on in the Gulf area. The U.S. military joined a massive relief effort with other federal agencies along the hurricane-battered Gulf coast last month in the midst of sharp criticism from elected officials that the federal government's response to the disaster-stricken states was too slow. Active duty troops and National Guard poured into Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama to provide humanitarian assistance for residents that had not left the Hurricane Katrina ravaged areas.

DoD, which was one of several agencies to provide help under the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) new National Response Plan, provided assistance as directed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the government's lead agency for disasters under DHS.

One aspect of assistance that DoD provided in the days after the disaster was to help provide immediate health care to the thousands of homeless evacuees in the Gulf region. The U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the lead DoD organization for the Hurricane Katrina response, set up Joint Task Force-Katrina on Aug. 31 at Camp Shelby, Miss., as DoD's hub to support FEMA. As of the middle of last month, military personnel were still in the region with other agencies to provide health care to the victims of the hurricane, soldiers and aid workers.

Joint Task Force-Katrina Command Surgeon Col. Edward Lindeke, MC, USA, who oversaw the military's medical relief in the region, said that as in other military missions that it performs around the world, the military adapted its assets and resources to work in the damaged region that was still badly flooded in some areas days after the hurricane had struck.

"We are able to tailor our assets to meet the mission. We are extremely adaptive. We meet missions as they change and we are used to that," he told U.S. MEDICINE on Sept. 13.
The effort to provide health care was not without its challenges, according to Col. Richard Bachmann, USAF, MC, who directed the Air Force's medical assistance to the Gulf region, as it involved many governmental agencies.

"Coordinating all those agencies isn't a simple thing and [is] very difficult to practice. We sit down and do tabletops and exercises where we go over who's going to do what, but a disaster of this magnitude is something that is very difficult to simulate or really practice. So, we rely on really well-trained, capable people that can adapt and adjust to whatever the situation is and get the job done. We never practiced hospital care in an airport terminal without tents or [having] equipment being overwhelmed by thousands of patients in the dark without air conditioning, so it was a remarkable thing that those folks did," Dr. Bachmann told U.S. MEDICINE on Sept. 13.

**Military Joins Relief**

As of mid-September, 68,451 active and reserve component personnel were on the ground or aboard ships supporting relief operations, and included Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air National Guard, according to DoD. Approximately 789 beds were available in field hospitals on Navy ships and in other areas, such as the New Orleans International Airport.

The Army had several medical assets on the ground last month, including the 14th Combat Support Hospital, a level three facility that was capable of providing surgical procedures, at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport.

Capt. Martin Snyder, MC, USN, Deputy Surgeon for the Joint Forces Maritime Component Command to Joint Task Force-Katrina who spoke to U.S. MEDICINE last month, said that the Navy provided health care to deployed military and displaced civilians in the affected region and its ships were able to provide bed space for aid workers and those that needed health care. Navy ships that were in the Gulf region in mid-September included the assault ships USS BATAAN, USS IWO JIMA, dock landing ship USS TORTUGA, amphibious transport dock USS SHREVEPORT and the USNS COMFORT. Additionally, naval physicians and health care workers were dispatched to the ground to provide assistance.

"We have a robust force here and are spread out over numerous places. We also have a number of mental health teams doing crisis action, trying to help both the military and civilian populations overcome the trauma of some of the things they have been exposed to. We've also deployed a number of preventive medicine teams to do surveillance of the environment to support our people in the area as well as civilians, as requested by state officials," Dr. Snyder said.

One of the initial logistical challenges for the Navy, he said, was getting its ships to the port areas that were damaged.

"Before you could bring in the ships to the port areas, you had to make sure the port was physically able to provide the services the ship needs-power, sanitation and the actual infrastructure-and a lot of those things had been damaged by the storm. Was the channel deep enough to support the draft of that particular ship? Those things had to be resurveyed by the Coast Guard before you could bring your ship in," Dr. Snyder said.

Dr. Bachmann said that one of the areas where the Air Force provided medical assistance

http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=1168&issueID=80

1/28/2006
was at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, a major hub where displaced residents were taken. He said the Air Force deployed medical personnel and a 25-bed mobile hospital known as EMEDS (Expeditionary Medical Support), and set up in one of the airport's terminals. The 4th EMEDS and Contingency Aeromedical Staging Facility was composed of personnel from a variety of bases.

Dr. Bachmann said that the task of the Air Force medical personnel at the airport was to assist other government agencies and civilian medical teams to provide health care to those individuals that came to the airport and to provide aeromedical evacuations.

"The EMEDS is set up to rapidly treat, stabilize and then air evacuate people out. It's a 25-bed hospital, but we took care of 2,500 people in two days, so the number of beds is essentially irrelevant, because we weren't holding them and providing long-term treatment. We were managing their illness and rapidly moving them out of the way. If you had to keep those people until they were well enough to go home, you would have had to have had thousands of beds," Dr. Bachmann said.

The medical personnel slept in the terminal on cots for the first couple of weeks after the hurricane. As of Sept. 11, Dr. Bachmann said the Air Force personnel had taken care of approximately 14,317 patients in conjunction with other agencies, with the vast majority of the patients being cared for at the airport.

"Our air medical staging facility is where they go after they have gotten medical care. They are held there in a waiting area where they are monitored until they are loaded onto airplanes. They moved 2,556 patients by aeromedical evacuations [to other cities]." he said.

Dr. Bachmann said that the Air Force team did not see many trauma-related injuries, but saw many people who were already in poor health and were having more health problems as a result of not having their medications. "A lot of hypertension, diabetes, pulmonary disease that was deteriorating because they had not taken their medicine, or had a pretty rigorous experience," he said.

One of the logistical difficulties Dr. Bachmann said the Air Force faced upon arriving at the airport was that patients were already arriving at the same time that the military help was arriving at the airport. "We stepped off the airplanes and got to work. They really didn't have hours and days to set things up. They just jumped into things. So we actually didn't set up very much of our equipment. The Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) had already gotten there and were already seeing folks, so we just joined them and added to the manpower and had at it," he said.

Dr. Bachmann said that for a disaster, such as a hurricane, it is difficult to have equipment set up in the area before the event strikes. "For something like a hurricane, you really can't preposition a lot of trailers or airplanes or anything else in the path of the storm. They have to be evacuated for the same storm that you are trying to help. On Thursday [after the hurricane hit] we had our people at the airport," he said.

The sheer enormity of the destruction was something that some military personnel said they had not encountered before.

*I have not personally seen that level of destruction in my history. Everything a half mile
wide for 50 miles was destroyed on the Gulf coast, massive, violent destruction. One memory that sticks out in my head is a homeowner [had] built a home with steel girders and that was in fact the only thing left. The wind had stripped every perishable thing off its frame," said Joint Task Force-Katrina Surgeon Office National Guard Medical Liaison Maj. Rich Stitzer, MS, USA, who had been to Biloxi and Gulfport, Miss.

**Damaged Hospital And Displaced Beneficiaries**

In addition to helping civilian victims of the storm, the military also was recovering from damages it suffered to a major medical facility. Keesler Medical Center at Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Miss., which serves more than 56,000 DoD health care beneficiaries within a 40-mile catchment area, suffered extensive damage to its facility, due to floodwaters, and was closed last month. The pharmacy on the base was also destroyed, with approximately $6 million lost in pharmaceuticals. Keesler Air Force Base spokesperson Lt. Col. Steve Murray, USAF, told U.S. MEDICINE in mid-September that it could be six months before the medical center would be able to be reopened.

Lt. Col. Murray said that about 10,000 of the 16,000 people on the base had been evacuated before the storm hit. Patients were also evacuated by medical personnel from Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland AFB, Texas, in the days following the storm. Patient records at Keesler were kept safe from flooding that damaged their original location, since they were transferred to a new location before the storm hit.

Military health care personnel from the base, as well as from other agencies, were set up at the base to provide health care to the community and the base after the hurricane.

"There are about 4,000 people on the base right now, and about one-quarter of them are relief workers from the Red Cross and FEMA and other agencies supporting our effort of humanitarian and medical relief in the community and also the reconstitution of the base," Lt. Col. Murray said in September.

In addition to dealing with the damages incurred at Keesler, DoD was helping the estimated 136,000 beneficiaries who were displaced by the storm. TRICARE Management Activity (TMA), the DoD agency that administers the military's health plan, said that as of mid-September fewer than 20 uniformed service beneficiaries had been identified in shelters. TRICARE was working to find the locations of the displaced beneficiaries and provide them with health care information.

TRICARE also said it was sending staff to a number of sites to provide face-to-face counseling for affected beneficiaries. The staff would advise displaced beneficiaries how to access care and answer questions about their health benefit options. In addition, TRICARE also extended the waiver of pharmacy copays through Sept. 30, 2005, for beneficiaries affected by Katrina who were unable to pay the copay. These beneficiaries were also being told that they could request that their prescription records at military treatment facilities in the Gulf region be transferred to other military or retail pharmacies in the country. In addition, affected beneficiaries who participate in the TRICARE mail order pharmacy program were told they could get their prescriptions from retail pharmacies if they could not get them by mail.

[Back to the article list](http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=1168&issueID=80)
• Quality Access Priorities In VA Cancer Care - Stephen Spotwood
• DoD Provides Care To Spell Hurricane Relief - Sandra Basu
• Officials Examine Federal Response Preparedness - Sandra Basu
• BRAC Accepts DoD Plan To Close Walter Reed, Relocate Services - Sandra Basu
• House Tries To Get Handle On VA IT - Stephen Spotwood
• VA Emergency Care Bill Draws Fire For Comparison Study Provision - Stephen Spotwood
• FDA Criticized In Delaying Plan B Decision - Stephen Spotwood
• Flu Vaccine Gets Swift FDA Approval - Stephen Spotwood
• HIS Budget Receives Modest Increase For FY 2006 - Sandra Basu
• New CRADO Begins Charting VA Research Future - Stephen Spotwood
• HIS Assists Native Americans And Other Victims Of Hurricane Katrina - Sandra Basu
• Katrina Forces VA To Evacuate Patients From Its New Orleans Facility - Stephen Spotwood
• NASA Centers Offer Medical Support In Wake Of Katrina - Daisy Spangler
• NCI Team Formed To Target Lung Cancer - Stephen Spotwood
• Prostate Cancer Remains High Priority For DoD - Sandra Basu
• DoD Program To Store Cancer Tissue For Research - Sandra Basu
• CDC Helps States Track, Target Cancer - Daisy Spangler
• Program Aims To Improve Cervical Cancer Screening In Vietnamese Women -
• Task Force Recommends DNA Testing For Cancer In Some Women -
• CDC Report Shows Smoking-Related Health Costs Rose Over Last Decade -
• DNA Vaccine For Animals Could Open Door For Humans -
• Health Care Disparities Shown In MEPS -
• NASA Claims IoM Report On Health Program Incomplete - Daisy Spangler
Mr. McHale,

I just spoke to Mr. Casey Decker in the Emergency Operations Center. I discussed the need for clarity between the three different requests we received today regarding medical surge capability: initial request for 1,000; subsequent request for 2,000, and your call with Mr. Simonson for 500 beds and personnel.

I asked Casey to clarify which one of these we should complete and whether the request was for actual assistance or information for planning.

Casey let the phone to check with his leadership and the answer was to answer the original request for personnel to assist in manning a 1,000 bed mobile hospital. This request should be considered for information (planning) only. When I asked Casey if he could make Mr. Simonson aware of our concerns and that we would focus our efforts on the 1,000 bed request for information, he provided this additional information.

This request for assistance is pending from the State of Louisiana but not yet approved by FEMA. DHHS expects it to come through the system later. However, DHHS is trying to decide which health care approach is better: 1) activate NDMS and move the patients out of the State or 2) move medical beds and personnel into the affected area and treat there. DHHS medical planners are meeting with Mr. Simonson at 6pm to discuss and decide which course to accept. If the decision is to move the patients via NDMS, then DHHS will activate the NDMS system. If the decision is to treat in state, then we should expect a formal RFA for ~500 beds and personnel to support.

In response to DHHS’ first request for information on the 1,000 bed hospital, the Joint Staff sent out a message at 4:32pm today to the Service’s medical planners asking them to complete the spreadsheet outlining each federal partner’s available medical personnel. We expect to provide a response back to DHHS by tomorrow.

v/r

Mark

MARK S. ROUPAS
US Army Corps of Engineers Liaison Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

Washington, DC
From: Austin, Brad (HHS/OS)
Sent: Sunday, September 04, 2005 1:55 PM
To: Norwood, Ann (HHS/OS)
Subject: RE: Status and Recommendation on Mortuary Affairs Response to Katrina Relief.

Would you like me to call him today to see if he can come in? Or, call him and suggest he come in tomorrow? What's your pleasure?

CDR Brad Austin, USPHS
Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

-----Original Message-----
From: Norwood, Ann (HHS/OS)
Sent: Sunday, September 04, 2005 1:57 PM
To: Austin, Brad (HHS/OS); 'paul.sledz@'
Subject: RE: Status and Recommendation on Mortuary Affairs Response to Katrina Relief.

The major thing is to work on helping set up a coordinated way to collect and share information. I'mm going Paul SledzikWho I hope will be able to come over to HHH and help me and the DHS rep. He's got a great grasp of what needs to be done. His cell is ___________

Sent from my Blackberry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: Austin, Brad (HHS/OS) <Brad.Austin@>
To: Norwood, Ann (HHS/OS) <Ann.Norwood@>
Sent: Sun Sep 04 13:10:12 2005
Subject: Re: Status and Recommendation on Mortuary Affairs Response to Katrina Relief.

Thank you!

Currently, Bob Jevix and another person from FEMA/NDMS are here. The first subject is how to create an integrated ESF6 response. Evidently, Buddy has been deployed.

Bob Claypool has given me a few questions that we might want to see if we can adress today. Can you think of overarching questions/subjects that you'd like us to work on today?

-----Original Message-----
'From: Norwood, Ann (HHS/OS) '
To: Austin, Brad (HHS/OS) <Brad.Austin@>
Sent: Sun Sep 04 12:59:32 2005
Subject: Fw: Status and Recommendation on Mortuary Affairs Response to Katrina Relief.
Fyi
Sent from my Blackberry Wireless Handheld

----Original Message----
From: Nesler John T Contractor CIV JTFCS J4
To: Millard,Bill
CC: Fdp1995

315

Joyce.delong<Joyce.delong>; DDowney<DDowney>; Marcella.ferrone<Marcella.ferrone>; jifich<br>
Lori.Harding<Lori.Harding>; Donald W
GS-12 NORAD USNORTHCOM, J4P (NORTHCOM); mckieh;mckieh;
knolty;Shiyan;Paul
Paul
Sent: Sun Sep 04 12:56:50 2005
Subject: Status and Recommendation on Mortuary Affairs Response to Katrina Relief.

Dear Buddy Bell,

I am writing this letter in response to analysis of the quickly developing mass fatality crisis from Hurricane Katrina. After several days of daily contact with numerous subject matter experts in the fields of mass fatality management and logistics I am coming up with the following facts and assumptions:

* It appears the local and State government mortuary affairs officials have been significantly affected to where they can not provide effective mass fatality assets to conduct operations, guidance and assistance oversight.
* HHS has in practicatly transferred operational responsibility to DMORT in managing and conducting the mortuary affairs mission.
* The DHS NDMS DMORT’s were not developed for and generally not capable of conducting long-term search and recovery operations.
* This mission is likely going to expend most of the deployable DMORT personnel pool for one term in less than 45 days.
* It will likely be several months before the majority of the fatalities are found and recovered.
* Identification of many of these remains will be difficult. Finger print and dental comparisons will be unlikely leaving DNA analysis as the primary means of identification.
* There is little evidence of the development of an integrated missing persons/family assistance centers. Delays in the establishment of this operation will significant impact the timely identification of the dead.

If this analysis is correct, it’s not if, but when and how DOD will be asked to assist in the mortuary affairs response. JTF KATRINA – JTF-CS is currently developing potential plans on what kinds of requirements will be needed and how DOD can provide response support. Currently we have identified the potential missions of search and recovery, remains transport to established human remains collection points, and assistance with DNA capture and analysis.
I would like to recommend the following:

- I have a council of mortuary affairs SME from the government and commercial sectors to develop a master plan for the mortuary affairs operations under the authorized state representatives. Members to this planning group could include:
  - Selected ME/C from states that have volunteered or have unique experience like NYC with DNA gathering and analysis.
  - Commercial entities like Kenyon International, BioSeal, Global, and GE
  - DOD experts like the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Mortuary Affairs Center Director, Cynthia Gavin, writer of the Mortuary Affairs Capstone Document
  - The top mortuary affairs officials that can represent and make decisions for the two States (LA & MS)
  - The Federal leaders from DHS, HHS, FEMA and DMORT.

This meeting should be conducted immediately with the purpose of creating the operational mortuary affairs plan. It is imperative that we get this right early. Again, NYC can be valuable in sharing their experience and insights.

Starting today USNORTHCOM and JTF KATRINA conduct daily telephonic meetings with you (DMORT PM or designated rep) to synchronize anticipated DOD mortuary affairs requirements.

Buddy, thank you and thank the men and women of DMORT for your sacrifice and effort. Please let me know if I can be of assistance. I will call you in the next hour.

VF
John Mcinerney

OPHEP4833
--- Original Message ---
From: Kim Hunter Reed
Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 1:46 PM
To: Jeanine Wright
Subject: FW: Urgent Need
Importance: High

Please pass on to Terry. Kim

--- Original Message ---
From: Strottman, Kathleen (Landrieu) <Kathleen_Strottman>
To: reedkh@lno <reedkh@lno>
CC: Stephanie Leger <lgerer> Sabiston, Norma Jane (Landrieu)
     <NormaJane_Sabiston>
     Keith, Thaddeus (Landrieu) <Thaddeus_Keith>
     Johnson, Tannor (Landrieu) <Tannor_Johnson>
     Gesser, Herman (Landrieu) <Herman_Gesser>
Sent: Tue Aug 30 13:06:16 2005
Subject: Urgent Need

Kim:

We have been trying to get this information into the hands of those who can expedite the evacuation of individuals who are reporting to us that they are stuck in the hospitals downtown. Here is the information:

Tulane Hospital reported 150 people -- contact Vic Campbell
LSU reported 300 people -- Doctor Holly Loche
Lakeview Medical Center -- unknown number of people -- David Jannet, his wife Stephanie a nurse at hospital.

It has become apparent that you all are faced with major communications issues and lack of resources in general. If we can be of any assistance on either front please reply and we will do whatever you need us to do from this end.

No 225 or 504 numbers are functional at this point. (hence why people are reporting these emergencies up here)

We have gotten the above info to FEMA as well

Kathleen Strottman
Legislative Director
Senator Mary Landrieu
744 Hart Senate Office Bldg.
Washington D.C. 20510

73
From: Brown, Michael D
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 11:56 AM
To: FEMA OPERATIONS CENTER
Subject: RE: Ron Sherman request Mr. Brown to contact Gov Riley at

Done.

FOC: Cell phones are erratic, at best. Messages left on my cell phone last night (from others, not you guys) are just now showing up this a.m. As long as I'm down here, you might remind people of that in case they call through you and want to leave a voice mail on the cell phone.

MD

-----Original Message-----
From: FEMA OPERATIONS CENTER
To: Brown, Michael D; Sanders, Marshall
Sent: 8/31/05 19:36 AM
Subject: Ron Sherman request Mr. Brown to contact Gov Riley at

Ron Sherman request Mr. Brown to contact Gov Riley at
From: Brown, Michael D  
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 11:22 AM  
To: Atshuler, Brooks; Lowder, Michael  
Subject: FW: Medical Help

Can we use these people?

From: carolyn [mailto: __________________]  
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 5:57 PM  
To: Michael D Brown; Michael D Brown  
Subject: Medical Help

Mike,

Mickey and other medical equipment people have a 42 ft trailer full of beds, wheelchairs, oxygen concentrators, etc. They are wanting to take them where they can be used but need direction. Mickey specialises in ventilator patients so can be very helpful with acute care patients. If you could have someone contact him and let him know if he can be of service, he would appreciate it. Know you are busy but they really want to help. His number is __________.

Carol
Between the super dome and the convention center it looks like about 200 homicide bodies.

-----Original Message-----
From: Wells, Scott
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 11:43 AM
To: Wells, Scott; Craig, Daniel; Bulken, Edward; Lokey, William
Subject: RE: Spot Report

Just got a report from the state there are over 100 bodies in the super dome. DMORT is working with the locals. Know this will be a sensitive issue; will keep you posted.
Durkin, Charles P.

From: Patel, Neil S.
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2005 1:49 PM
To: Durkin, Charles P.
Subject: FW: housing update for policy time
Importance: High

Scooter: Please see below. The trailer idea is worse that I originally thought. Per the data below, the last batch of the trailers that we are now purchasing will be coming off the production line in approximately 3.5 years.

Thanks,
Neil

From: Fishpaw, Marie K.
Sent: Friday, September 09, 2005 1:41 PM
To: Patel, Neil S.
Subject: housing update for policy time
Importance: High

Neil

Steve of Carol's shop just got a FEMA noon update, and the housing issue came up.

FEMA have set up arrangements to order 200,000 units of trailers (and mobile homes) and committed up to $500 million to do so. They want to get 30,000 units (79% of the existing market) soon. FEMA plans to order another 100,000 units. OMB and OVP staff remain skeptical about this strategy. The nation can produce 6,000 units per month. There is probably some capacity for expansion (possibly by about 10%) to meet increased demand, but we don't know how much. That means most of these units won't be available for use for months. Further, some states, including Louisiana, are balking at the idea of large (25,000 units, as proposed by FEMA) trailer parks. We got all this info from OMB career staff.

Steve and Marie

Marie Fishpaw
Special Assistant to the Vice President

9/8/2005
## Small/Local Business Update

**USACE Direct Contracts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Dollars Awarded</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Contract Dollars</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$2,282,908,623.12</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td>23.00%</td>
<td>$606,559,166.75</td>
<td>26.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Disadvantaged Business (includes 8(a) and Minority-owned)</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>$254,097,740.35</td>
<td>11.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman-owned Business</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>$66,321,745.06</td>
<td>2.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUBZone</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>$111,827,148.46</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Disabled Veteran-Owned</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>$103,481,336.40</td>
<td>4.53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Contract Dollars to Local Businesses and Percent of Total Dollars Awarded**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dollars Awarded</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Contract Dollars to Alabama</td>
<td>$92,620,762.50</td>
<td>4.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contract Dollars to Louisiana</td>
<td>$452,755,431.82</td>
<td>19.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contract Dollars to Mississippi</td>
<td>$80,713,307.07</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contract Dollars To Local Businesses</td>
<td>626,089,501.39</td>
<td>27.43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*One Corps Serving The Army and the Nation*
Andrews, Nicol D - Public Affairs

From: Passey, David
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 7:16 PM
To: Taylor, Cindy; Groff, Stacie; Brach, Patricia; Widomski, Michael; Andrews, Nicol D - Public Affairs; Rule, Natalie; McIntyre, James; Ellis, Barbara; Cable, Kathryn
Subject: Potential hot issue

Although FEMA does not oversee evacuation and sheltering, we may feel the effects of local decisions pretty soon. The current population at the Superdome in New Orleans is 25,000. That’s a large crowd during a normal event. Among the shelter population are 400 special needs evacuees and 45-50 sick individuals who require hospitalization. The on-hand oxygen supply will likely run out in the next few hours. According to the ESF8 folks, the local health officials have struggled to put meaningful resource requests together. They have now requested 75-100 oxygen containers to handle these additional 300 by Tuesday. This will likely be difficult to fill due to impending transportation limitations, but I will check to see if the request is filled.

Seven trucks (5 water and 2 MREs) are less than 2 hours away from the Superdome. There were transportation problems that temporarily stopped the convoy. Police escorts now accompany the trucks.

Bottom line: Did FEMA fill requests from the state and local officials.

Dave
From: Rhode, Patrick
Sent: Sunday, September 04, 2005 8:16 PM
To: Lowder, Michael; Buikema, Edward
Cc: "Ken.Burris"; "brooks.altabuler"
Subject: RE: Please say no commodity situation is improving

Please make sure that Carville is telling Governor about diversions - we fix this we can turn the corner there - and potus is on ground tomorrow

-----Original Message-----
From: Lowder, Michael <Michael.Lowder>
To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode>
Cc: "Ken.Burris"; "brooks.altabuler"
Sent: Sun Sep 04 20:07:50 2005
Subject: RE: Please say no commodity situation is improving

Yes, but it is slow. The supply side is slowing starting to get closer to catching up with the demand. It is better, but slow not what we want.

We continue to have issues with truck being "diverted" which is slowing the deliveries. Many of the diversions are by law enforcement officers. We have to put security on the trucks, and they also cause delays.

-----Original Message-----
From: Rhode, Patrick
Sent: Sunday, September 04, 2005 8:02 PM
To: Buikema, Edward; Lowder, Michael
Cc: "Ken.Burris"; "brooks.altabuler"
Subject: Please say no commodity situation is improving

Thanks
### Commodities Delivered – Cumulative

(As of 0600 September 7)

**Louisiana**
- 9,200,000 lbs of ice
- 9,450,000 liters of water
- 7,266,816 MREs
- 30,240 tarps
- 51 generators

**Alabama**
- 7,600,000 lbs of ice
- 2,466,000 liters of water
- 1,378,944 MREs
- 17,640 tarps
- 17 generators

**Mississippi**
- 28,960,000 lbs of ice
- 9,306,000 liters of water
- 3,305,088 MREs
- 28,224 rolls of plastic sheeting
- 22,680 tarps
- 77 generators

**GRAND TOTALS:**
- 45,760,000 lbs of ice
- 21,222,000 liters of water
- 11,950,848 MREs
- 28,224 rolls of plastic
- 70,560 tarps
- 145 generators
December 6, 2005

Dear Chairman Davis and Representative Melancon:

I am writing in response to your letter to Andrew Card dated December 1, 2005, concerning requests by the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (the “Committee”) for documents from the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”).

As you know, the Administration has already provided substantial information in response to the Committee’s requests. That effort, which is still ongoing, has encompassed the production of approximately 250,000 pages of documents from the departments and agencies charged with the operational response to Hurricane Katrina, which you identified as the Committee’s principal substantive concern. The Administration has also made numerous witnesses available for testimony or interviews before the Committee. By any measure, the Administration’s ongoing response has been substantial and rapid.

As part of this administration-wide response, the EOP also has provided significant information to the Committee, and is prepared to continue its accommodation of your request by producing additional documents and making individuals available to provide the background you have requested. As we have communicated to your staff, it was not practical for the EOP to respond to the Committee’s September 30, 2005 request, which would have involved searching over 71 million electronic records and thousands of boxes of hard copy records dating back to January 2001. Accordingly, in response to the Committee’s original requests we began our production by providing you with, among other things, a compilation of various operational and situational reports, updates, and assessments addressing the issues of priority identified by your letter and used to inform the officials identified in your letter. These documents are significant materials, and encompass many of the principal sources of information received by the White House concerning the areas of the Committee’s focus.

In connection with the EOP’s November 3, 2005 production, we asked the Committee to provide us with a narrower and prioritized set of requests for information that would enable us to provide information in ways that would not be overly burdensome or unduly impinge on the separation of powers of the Legislative and Executive Branches. Your response of December 1, 2005 was very helpful with respect to these issues because, among other things, it identified your
principal areas of concern. In an effort to avoid an unnecessary inter-branch confrontation, we are prepared to continue to accommodate the Committee by providing additional information responsive to those priorities, as outlined below.

First, we are prepared to offer a background briefing by one or more senior Administration officials, to be conducted as early as next week. The briefing would encompass the areas of priority identified in your December 1 letter, including the structure of the EOP and identification of components within it that have responsibilities relating to the federal response to a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina and the roles played by those components in the immediate preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina. While the briefing is intended to address the overall role of the EOP in the response to Hurricane Katrina, we expect it to encompass prioritized areas of inquiry such as EOP involvement in the Administration’s efforts to provide food, water and shelter to victims; to provide public safety and law enforcement resources to affected areas; to provide relief and evacuation to victims at the Superdome, Convention Center and cloverleaf; to mobilize active duty and reserve forces; and to provide medical assistance in affected areas. We believe that such a briefing is the best way to quickly provide the Committee with the most relevant information relating to the areas you have prioritized. We will be in contact with your staff to pursue providing this additional information and to work through any practical details and conditions for such a briefing.

Second, in an effort to be responsive to the Committee’s interests and priorities, we have identified officials from the Homeland Security Council staff who were centrally involved in the EOP’s activities during the core period of preparation and response (August 26 through September 2). These officials, who are appropriately situated to provide the information you have requested, were central to the Administration’s response to the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. We are currently in the process of reviewing documents (including e-mails) from the files of these officials with the objective of making an additional production of documents next week. We believe that providing information of this nature and source is consistent with prior accommodations we have made.

Finally, we have identified additional materials from the White House Situation Room that reflect reports concerning situational and operational information in the aftermath of the Hurricane landfall, including reports addressing the topics identified in your letters. These additional materials are being produced today under separate cover.

We believe the ongoing response of the Administration — including the substantial productions of documents and other information by the departments and agencies and the initial production by the EOP — will be helpful in addressing the Committee’s request for information
from the Executive Branch. We are seeking to address remaining areas of concern through the briefing and production processes outlined above, and stand prepared to work with the Committee to provide additional information as appropriate that the Committee may determine is required after reviewing the ongoing White House and agency productions of information. We look forward to working with you towards the common goal of ensuring that our Nation’s response to future disasters is as effective as is possible.

Sincerely,

William K. Kelley
Deputy Counsel to the President

The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for
and Response to Hurricane Katrina
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Charles Melancon
Ranking Member
Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for
and Response to Hurricane Katrina
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
The Honorable Tom Davis  
Chairman  
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation  
For and Response to Hurricane Katrina  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC  20515-4611  

Mr. Chairman:

Upon review of testimony provided to your committee and subsequently entered into public record, I noted one area that I believe to be inaccurate and ask for your assistance to correct.

On page 121 of the final report titled, "A Failure of Initiative," the report states that according to Mr. Parr, the team in the Superdome devised a plan involving the use of helicopters to airlift "virtually all of the evacuees from the Superdome at that time in about 30 hours. The next day Parr learned that Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, Lt. General Russel L. Honoré had stopped the plan as he came to Louisiana to lead Joint Task Force Katrina."

Mr. Parr’s testimony is factually incorrect. At no time before or after my arrival was there ever a plan presented to me to evacuate the Superdome using air assets, nor did I suspend any planning efforts to evacuate the Superdome by air. On the morning of August 31, 2005, local, state and federal officials reviewed with me a collaborative plan to conduct a ground evacuation of the Superdome using FEMA supplied buses. During that meeting, local and state leaders did discuss the use of air assets, but they quickly discarded that option as not feasible. That day, I met with Governor Blanco and the Louisiana Adjutant General, Major General Landreneau, and requested that the Governor mobilize local and state school bus assets to assist in the evacuation which the Governor did. Additionally, I directed Brigadier General Graham to assist the Louisiana National Guard and State Staff in planning the evacuation of New Orleans.

Brigadier General Graham and his staff assisted in refining the ground evacuation plan for the Superdome (police security requirements, assembly points, routes, and way-points to support follow-on displacement sites) in support and coordination with local, state and National Guard leadership. The priority of effort on August 31st, as established by Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco, was Search and Rescue; air evacuation of the sick and elderly; evacuation planning; and establishing communications. In accordance with that priority of work, aerial rescue and evacuation of stranded, sick and ambulatory citizens continued throughout the city, including the Superdome.

Local and state officials, National Guard leaders, on-site military rescue personnel and first responders used all available capabilities at their disposal to evacuate their fellow citizens from the Superdome. To suggest they did otherwise would be a disservice to the on-site leaders and the heroic men and women who saved lives and mitigated further suffering.

I respectfully request that this statement be submitted for the record in order to correct the inaccurate account of events portrayed in Mr. Parr’s testimony.

Sincerely,

Russel L. Honoré  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Commanding
The Honorable Tom Davis  
Chairman  
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation  
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I commend you and the Select Committee for your investigation into the  
preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. Many of the deficiencies identified  
by the Committee were also identified by DoD during earlier internal after-action  
reviews. These findings will be incorporated into DoD action plans to improve our  
Department’s support to civil authorities during future catastrophic incidents.

Upon review of the Military section of the report, I noted three areas where  
inaccurate or misleading statements could lead to incorrect conclusions.

On page 204, I am quoted in an interview with Mark Sappenfield of the Christian  
Science Monitor: “During Katrina, the federal military remained under FEMA’s  
control.” The referenced article inaccurately stated my comments, which in the original  
article did not appear in quotes. The Federal military was never under FEMA’s control  
during Hurricane Katrina. Rather, consistent with law and policy, military forces  
remained under the control of the US Northern Command commander, the Secretary of  
Defense and the President. What I conveyed to Mr. Sappenfield was that DoD Federal  
military forces were always engaged in missions in support of FEMA. This is a critical  
distinction for both legal and policy reasons.

Also on page 204, the report details what it characterizes as a lengthy and  
cumbersome process to communicate Requests for Assistance (RFAs) to DoD. The  
process described is incorrect. While our Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO)  
informally notify their chain of command of impending RFAs, the actual RFA process  
is much more direct and rapid. The FEMA Federal Coordination Officer, after consulting  
with the DCO, forwards the RFA to FEMA HQ which then passes the request to DoD.  
The Joint Staff determines availability of forces and the impact on readiness. A  
coordinated recommendation is then made to the Secretary of Defense or, in his absence,  
the Deputy Secretary. This process is not slow, cumbersome or bureaucratic. In fact,  
we often worked with verbal or draft requests from FEMA, obtaining approval from the  
Secretary prior to receipt of the official request. Mr. Scott Wells, Deputy FCO for  
Louisiana, stated in his December 8 testimony to the Committee regarding DoD response  
to RFAs: “I need to say, parenthetically, that in Katrina we did not see that lag that we
normally see in most disasters. And they were fairly responsive.” Fortunately, the RFA process described in the report is factually incorrect.

Finally, the report on page 203 and 204 faults DoD and DHS coordination. It describes communications reflecting a “lack of information sharing, near panic, and problems with process.” Having reviewed the cited emails, we don’t agree with this characterization. More importantly, as the text of the report makes clear, when DoD recognized that RFAs from FEMA were not being generated at a rate and with the substantive capabilities required, DoD proactively began drafting the needed RFAs in cooperation with FEMA. To reference this as a deficiency in the Military section of the report gives the impression that DoD was the problem, when in fact, consistent with our sense of urgency, we provided the solution.

Thank you again for your leadership of the Bipartisan Select Committee. Please let me know if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Paul McHale
SUBPOENA

BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To Michael D. Brown

You are hereby commanded to be and appear before the __________
Select Bipartisan Committee
To Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
of the House of Representatives of the United States at the place, date and time specified below.

☑ to testify touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to
depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee.

Place of testimony: 2154 Rayburn House Office Building
Date: February 13, 2006
Time: 10:00 a.m.

☐ to produce the things identified on the attached schedule touching matters of inquiry committed to said
committee or subcommittee, and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee.

Place of production:
Date:
Time:

To U.S. Marshall's Service or any authorized staff member

______________________________
to serve and make return.

Witness my hand and the seal of the House of Representatives of the United States,
at the city of Washington, this 10th day of February, 2006.

Attest: [Signature]
Chairman or Authorized Member

Clerk [Signature]
BY Deputy Clerk
PROOF OF SERVICE

Subpoena for Michael D. Brown

Address: Wherever found

before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,

U.S. House of Representatives
109th Congress

Served by (print name) J. Keith Ausbrooks
Title Special Counsel, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
Manner of service In person, outside of Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510
Date February 10, 2006
Signature of Server J. Keith Ausbrooks
Address 2157 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515
SUBPOENA

BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense. Serve: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

You are hereby commanded to be and appear before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina of the House of Representatives of the United States at the place, date and time specified below.

☐ to testify touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee.

Place of testimony: 

Date: ___________________________ Time: ___________________________

☑ to produce the things identified on the attached schedule touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee.

Place of production: 2157 Rayburn House Office Building

Date: December 30, 2005 Time: Noon

To J. Keith Ausbrooks or any staff member to serve and make return.

Witness my hand and the seal of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the city of Washington, this 14th day of December, 2005.

Attest: ___________________________ Chairman or Authorized Member

Clerk

[Signature]
PROOF OF SERVICE

Subpoenas for the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Serve: William J. Haynes II
Address 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310

before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
and Response to Hurricane Katrina
U.S. House of Representatives
109th Congress

Served by (print name) J. Keith Ausbrook
Title Special Counsel
Manner of service facsimile by agreement to (703) 697-8299

Date December 14, 2005
Signature of Server J. Keith Ausbrook
Address 2154 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Schedule Instructions

1. In complying with this Subpoena, you are required to produce all responsive records that are in your possession, custody, or control, whether held by you or your past or present agents, employees, and representatives acting on your behalf. You are also required to produce records that you have a legal right to obtain, that you have a right to copy or to which you have access, as well as records that you have placed in the temporary possession, custody, or control of any third party. No records, documents, data, or information called for by this request shall be destroyed, modified, removed, transferred, or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.

2. In the event that any entity, organization, or individual denoted in this subpoena has been, or is also known by any other name than that herein denoted, the subpoena shall be read also to include them under that alternative identification.

3. Each record produced shall be produced in a form that renders the record capable of being copied.

4. Record produced in response to this subpoena shall be produced together with copies of file labels, dividers or identifying markers with which they were associated when this subpoena was served.

5. It shall not be a basis for refusal to produce records that any other person or entity also possesses non-identical or identical copies of the same record.

6. If any of the subpoenaed information is available in machine-readable form (such as punch cards, paper or magnetic tapes, drums, disks, or core storage), state the form in which it is available and provide sufficient detail to allow the information to be copied into a readable format. If the information requested is stored in a computer, indicate whether you have an existing program that will print the records in a readable form.

7. If compliance with this subpoena cannot be made in full, compliance shall be made to the extent possible and shall include an explanation of why full compliance is not possible.

8. In the event that a record is withheld on the basis of privilege, provide the following information concerning any such record: (a) the privilege asserted; (b) the type of record; (c) the general subject matter; (d) the date, author, and addressee; and (e) the relationship of the author and addressee to each other.

9. If any record responsive to this subpoena was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody, or control, identify the record (stating its date, author, subject
and recipients) and explain the circumstances by which the record ceased to be in your possession, custody, or control.

10. If a date or other descriptive detail set forth in this subpoena referring to a record is inaccurate, but the actual date or other descriptive detail is known to you or is otherwise apparent from the context of the request, you should produce all records which would be responsive as if the date or other descriptive detail were correct.

11. The time period covered by this subpoena is included in the attached schedule(s).

12. This request is continuing in nature and applies to any newly-discovered information. Any record, document, compilation of data or information, not produced because it has not been located or discovered by the return date, shall be produced immediately upon location or discovery subsequent thereto.

13. All records shall be bates-stamped sequentially and produced sequentially.

14. Two sets of records shall be delivered, both sets to the Majority Staff. When records are produced to the Select Committee, production sets shall be delivered to the Majority Staff in Room 2157 Rayburn House Office Building.

**Definitions for Schedule**

1. The term "record" means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any nature whatsoever, regardless of how recorded, and whether original or copy, including, but not limited to, the following: memoranda, reports, expense reports, books, manuals, instructions, financial reports, working papers, records notes, letters, notices, confirmations, telegrams, receipts, appraisals, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, prospectuses, interoffice and intra office communications, electronic mail (e-mail), contracts, cables, notations of any type of conversation, telephone call, meeting or other communication, bulletins, printed matter, computer printouts, teletypes, invoices, transcripts, diaries, analyses, returns, summaries, minutes, bills, accounts, estimates, projections, comparisons, messages, correspondence, press releases, circulars, financial statements, reviews, opinions, offers, studies and investigations, questionnaires and surveys, and work sheets (and all drafts, preliminary versions, alterations, modifications, revisions, changes, and amendments of any of the foregoing, as well as any attachments or appendices thereto), and graphic or oral records or representations of any kind (including without limitation, photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotape, recordings and motion pictures), and electronic, mechanical, and electric records or representations of any kind (including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, disks, and recordings) and other written, printed, typed, or other graphic or recorded matter of any kind or nature, however produced or reproduced, and whether preserved in writing, film, tape, disk, videotape or otherwise. A record bearing any notation not a part of the original text is to be considered a separate record. A draft or non-identical copy is a separate record within the meaning of this term.
2. The term "communication" means each manner or means of disclosure or exchange of information, regardless of means utilized, whether oral, electronic, by document or otherwise, and whether face-to-face, in a meeting, by telephone, mail, telexes, discussions, releases, personal delivery, or otherwise.

3. The terms "and" and "or" shall be construed broadly and either conjunctively or disjunctively to bring within the scope of this subpoena any information which might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. The singular includes plural number, and vice versa. The masculine includes the feminine and neuter genders.

4. The terms "person" or "persons" means natural persons, firms, partnerships, associations, corporations, subsidiaries, divisions, departments, joint ventures, proprietorships, syndicates, or other legal, business or government entities, and all subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, departments, branches, and other units thereof.

5. The terms "referring or relating," with respect to any given subject, means anything that constitutes, contains, embodies, reflects, identifies, states, refers to, deals with or is in any manner whatsoever pertinent to that subject.
SCHEDULE

All records and communications, including internal communications, referring or relating to the Department of Defense's efforts to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina including, but not limited to, efforts: to provide food, water, and shelter to victims of Hurricane Katrina; to provide public safety and law enforcement resources to the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina; to provide relief, including evacuation, to victims at the Louisiana Superdome, the New Orleans Convention Center, and the area known as the cloverleaf; to mobilize active duty and reserve forces to support relief efforts; and to provide medical assistance in the affected areas, which were received, sent or reviewed between August 23, 2005 and September 15, 2005, by the following persons:

1. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense;

2. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense;


4. Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense;

5. Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command;

6. General Russell Honore, Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina;

7. Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau;

8. Col. John J. Jordan, military assistant to former Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Michael Brown; and

September 9, 2005

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

The House Committee on Government Reform has obtained from the Department of Homeland Security a document describing the “Scope of Work” of a contract issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for the development of a “Southeastern Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan.” We are writing to request any plans and other documents that were developed under this contract.

FEMA’s Scope of Work contemplated that a private contractor, Innovative Emergency Management, Inc. (IEM), would complete the work under the contract in three stages.1 “Stage One” called for a simulation exercise involving FEMA and the state of Louisiana that would “feature a catastrophic hurricane striking southeastern Louisiana.”2 “Stage Two” called for “development of the full catastrophic hurricane disaster plan.”3 And “Stage Three” involved unrelated earthquake planning.

A task order issued under the contract called for IEM to execute “Stage One” between May 19 and September 30, 2004, at a cost of $518,284.4 On June 3, 2004, IEM issued a press release announcing that it would “lead the development of a catastrophic hurricane disaster plan for Southeast Louisiana and the City of New Orleans under a more than half a million dollar contract with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management

2 FEMA, *Scope of Work*, supra note 1 at p. 7.
3 FEMA, *Scope of Work*, supra note 1 at p. 2.
Agency (FEMA). A second task order issued on September 23, 2004, required IEM to “complete the development of the SE Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane plan.” The cost of this task order was $199,969.

The “Background” section of the Scope of Work stated that “the emergency management community has long feared the occurrence of a catastrophic disaster,” which the document describes as “an event having unprecedented levels of damage, casualties, dislocation, and disruption that would have nationwide consequences and jeopardize national security.” According to the background discussion, the emergency management community was concerned that “existing plans, policies, procedures and resources” would not be adequate to address such a “mega-disaster.”

According to the Scope of Work, the contact “will assist FEMA, State, and local government to enhance response planning activities and operations by focusing on specific catastrophic disasters: those disasters that by definition will immediately overwhelm the existing disaster response capabilities of local, State, and Federal Governments.” With respect to southeastern Louisiana, the specific “catastrophic disaster” to be addressed was “a slow-moving Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane that ... crosses New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain.” The Scope of Work explained:

Various hurricane studies suggest that a slow-moving Category 3 or almost any Category 4 or 5 hurricane approaching Southeast Louisiana from the south could severely damage the heavily populated Southeast portion of the state creating a catastrophe with which the State would not be able to cope without massive help from neighboring states and the Federal Government.

---


7 Id.

8 FEMA, Scope of Work, supra note 1 at p. 4.

9 Id.

10 FEMA, Scope of Work, supra note 1 at p. 1.

11 FEMA, Scope of Work, supra note 1 at p. 5.

12 Id.
The Scope of Work further stated: “The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) believe that the gravity of the situation calls for an extraordinary level of advance planning to improve government readiness to respond effectively to such an event.”13

The specific disaster scenario contemplated under the contract is strikingly similar to the actual disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina. The contract envisioned that “a catastrophic hurricane could result in significant numbers of deaths and injuries, trap hundreds of thousands of people in flooded areas, and leave up to one million people homeless.”14 The Scope of Work expressly directed the contractor to plan for the following specific conditions:

- “Over one million people would evacuate from New Orleans. Evacuees would crowd shelters throughout Louisiana and adjacent states.”

- “Hurricane surge would block highways and trap 300,000 to 350,000 persons in flooded areas. Storm surge of over 18 feet would overflow flood-protection levees on the Lake Pontchartrain side of New Orleans. Storm surge combined with heavy rain could leave much of New Orleans under 14 to 17 feet of water. More than 200 square miles of urban areas would be flooded.”

- “It could take weeks to ‘de-water’ (drain) New Orleans: Inundated pumping stations and damaged pump motors would be inoperable. Flood-protection levees would prevent drainage of floodwater. Breaching the levees would be a complicated and politically sensitive problem: The Corps of Engineers may have to use barges or helicopters to haul earthmoving equipment to open several hundred feet of levee.”

- “Rescue operations would be difficult because much of the area would be reachable only by helicopters and boats.”

- “Hospitals would be overcrowded with special-needs patients. Backup generators would run out of fuel or fail before patients could be moved elsewhere.”

- “The New Orleans area would be without electric power, food, potable water, medicine, or transportation for an extended time period.”

---

13 Id.
14 Id.
The Honorable Michael Chertoff  
September 9, 2005  
Page 4

- “Damaged chemical plants and industries could spill hazardous materials.”
- “Standing water and disease could threaten public health.”
- “There would be severe economic repercussions for the state and region.”
- “Outside responders and resources, including the Federal response personnel and materials, would have difficulty entering and working in the affected area.”

It appears that IEM completed the task order for “Stage One,” the hurricane simulation. An exercise known as “Hurricane Pam,” was conducted by FEMA and IEM in July 2004, bringing together emergency officials from 50 parish, state, federal, and volunteer organizations to simulate the conditions described above and plan an emergency response. As a result of the exercise, officials reportedly developed proposals for handling debris removal, sheltering, search and rescue, medical care, and schools.

It is not clear, however, what plans or draft plans, if any, IEM prepared to complete “Stage Two,” the development of the final catastrophic hurricane disaster plan. The task order for “Stage Two” provided that the “period of performance” was September 23, 2004, to September 30, 2005.

The basis for the award of the planning work to IEM is also not indicated in the documents we received. The task orders were issued to IEM by FEMA under an “Indefinite Delivery Vehicle” (IDV) contract between IEM and the General Services Administration. According to the Federal Procurement Data System, FEMA received only one bid (from IEM) for the task orders.

The documents from the Department raise multiple questions about the contract with IEM and the planning for a catastrophic hurricane in southeastern Louisiana. To help us

12 FEMA, Scope of Work, supra note 1 at p. 6.
17 Id.
19 Federal Procurement Data System, GSA Schedule GS10F0178L, February 15, 2001 (data obtained from FPDS on Sept. 8, 2005).
20 Federal Procurement Data System, FEMA Awards Referencing GSA Schedule GS10F0178L (data obtained from FPDS on Sept. 8, 2005).
The Honorable Michael Chertoff  
September 9, 2005  
Page 5

understand these issues, we request that the Department provide the following documents and information:

(1) Any documents relating to the “Stage One” simulation exercise, including documents prepared for exercise planners and participants, transcripts or minutes of exercise proceedings, participant evaluations, and after action reports;

(2) Any final or draft plans for a catastrophic hurricane in southeastern Louisiana prepared under “Stage Two” of the contract, including any final or draft Catastrophic Hurricane Disaster Plan, Basic Plan Framework, Emergency Support Function Annex, or Support Annex; and

(3) An explanation of the procurement procedures used in selecting IEM for the contract and task orders, as well as a description of IEM’s qualifications and the justification for selecting IEM.

We recognize that Department officials are engaged in ongoing relief efforts, and we do not want to impair those efforts in any way. For this reason, we have tailored our request to the discrete set of documents and information set forth above. To expedite your response to this request, we have enclosed copies of the Scope of Work, task orders, and other documents cited in this letter.

Sincerely,

[Signatures]

Rep. Tom Davis  
Chairman  

Rep. Henry A. Waxman  
Ranking Minority Member

Enclosure
September 30, 2005

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

As part of the Select Bipartisan Committee’s investigation into the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, we are writing to request important documents from the Department of Homeland Security.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the Department of Homeland Security or any of its constituent agencies relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the Department of Homeland Security or any of its constituent agencies relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005, by officials of the Department of Homeland Security or any of its constituent agencies relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of the Secretary and the Office of the Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response. We are not requesting at this time documents or communications between officials of the Department of Homeland Security or any of its constituent agencies and individual members of the general public.
The Honorable Michael Chertoff
September 30, 2006

Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many demands on
your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Select Committee,
however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason, we ask that you respond
to this letter within two weeks if possible.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis
Chairman

Charles Melancon
Member of Congress
September 30, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Select Committee is examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are writing to request documents from your office relating to this topic.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the Department of Defense or any of its constituent agencies relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications; received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the Department of Defense or any of its constituent agencies relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005, by officials of the Department of Defense or any of its constituent agencies relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of the Secretary and Joint Task Force Katrina. We are not requesting documents or communications received, prepared, or sent by the
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
September 30, 2005  
Page 2  

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as we have written separately to General Strock to request these items. We also are not requesting at this time documents or communications between officials of the Department of Defense or any of its constituent agencies and individual members of the general public.

Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many demands on your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Select Committee, however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason, we ask that you respond to this letter within two weeks if possible.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis  
Chairman

Charles Melancon  
Member of Congress
September 30, 2005

Lt. General Carl A. Strock
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
441 G Street NW
Washington, DC 20314

Dear General Strock:

The Select Committee is examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are writing to request documents from the Army Corps of Engineers relating to this topic.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the Army Corps of Engineers relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the Army Corps of Engineers relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005, by officials of the Army Corps of Engineers relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

4. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials of the Army Corps of Engineers relating to the construction, maintenance, or capacity to withstand a hurricane or flooding of the 17th Street, London Canal, or Industrial Canal levees and storm walls.

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in your office. We are not requesting at this time documents or communications between officials of the Army Corps of Engineers and individual members of the general public.
Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many demands on your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Select Committee, however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason, we ask that you respond to this letter within two weeks if possible.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis
Chairman

Charles Melancon
Member of Congress
The Honorable Michael O. Leavitt
Secretary
Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20201

Dear Secretary Leavitt:

The Select Committee is examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are writing to request documents from your office relating to this topic.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the Department of Health and Human Services or any of its constituent agencies relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the Department of Health and Human Services or any of its constituent agencies relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005, by officials of the Department of Health and Human Services or any of its constituent agencies relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.
The Honorable Michael O. Leavitt
September 30, 2005
Page 2

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of the Secretary, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Office of the Surgeon General, and Office of the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. We are not requesting at this time documents or communications between officials of the Department of Health and Human Services or any of its constituent agencies and individual members of the general public.

Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many demands on your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Select Committee, however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason, we ask that you respond to this letter within two weeks if possible.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis
Chairman

Charles Melancon
Member of Congress
September 30, 2005

Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Card:

The Select Committee is examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are writing to request documents from your office relating to this topic.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the White House relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the White House relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005, by officials of the White House relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of the President, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of the White House Chief of Staff, and the Office of the Homeland Security Advisor. We are not requesting at this time documents or communications between officials of the White House and individual members of the general public.
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
September 30, 2005
Page 2

Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many demands on
your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Select Committee,
however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason, we ask that you respond
to this letter within two weeks if possible.

Tom Davis
Chairman

Sincerely,

Charles Melson
Member of Congress
The Honorable Kathleen Babineaux Blanco  
Governor of Louisiana  
Office of the Governor  
900 3rd Street  
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9004  

Dear Governor Blanco:

The Select Committee is examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are writing to request documents from your office relating to this topic.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the Louisiana coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 13, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of Governor, Office of the Directors of the
The Honorable Kathleen Babineaux Blanco  
September 30, 2005  
Page 2  

Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the  
Adjutant General. We are not requesting at this time documents or communications  
between officials of the State of Louisiana and individual members of the general public.  

Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many  
demands on your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The  
Select Committee, however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason,  
we ask that you respond to this letter within two weeks if possible.  

Sincerely,  

[Signature]  
Tom Davis  
Chairman  

[Signature]  
[Signature]  
Orleans Melancon  
Member of Congress
September 30, 2005

The Honorable Haley Barbour
Governor of Mississippi
Office of the Governor
501 N. West St, 15th Fl
Jackson, MS 39201

Dear Governor Barbour:

The Select Committee is examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are writing to request documents from your office relating to this topic.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking the Mississippi Gulf coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 13, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of Governor, Office of the Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and Office of the Adjutant General. We
are not requesting at this time documents or communications between officials of the State of Mississippi and individual members of the general public.

Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many demands on your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Select Committee, however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason, we ask that you respond to this letter within two weeks if possible.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis
Chairman

Charles Melancon
Member of Congress
The Honorable Robert Riley  
Governor of Alabama  
Office of the Governor  
600 Dexter Avenue  
Montgomery, Alabama 36130  

Dear Governor Riley:

The Select Committee is examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. We are writing to request documents from your office relating to this topic.

Specifically, we request:

1. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent before August 23, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Alabama Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the threat posed by a hurricane striking the Alabama Gulf coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

2. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 23 and August 29, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Alabama Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses;

3. Documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005, by officials of the Office of the Governor, Alabama Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the Adjutant General relating to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations, or emergency responses.

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of Governor, Office of the Directors of the Alabama Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Office of the
The Honorable Robert Riley
September 30, 2005
Page 2

Adjutant General. We are not requesting at this time documents or communications between officials of the State of Alabama and individual members of the general public.

Thank you for your assistance with this request. We are aware of the many demands on your time as you cope with the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Select Committee, however, has been given a short deadline for its work. For this reason, we ask that you respond to this letter within two weeks if possible.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis
Chairman

Cheney Melancon
Member of Congress
October 20, 2005

The Honorable Michael Chertoff  
Secretary of Homeland Security  
Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

I wrote to you on September 23 about my concerns about the $236 million contract between FEMA and Carnival Cruise Lines to provide housing for hurricane evacuees aboard three Carnival ships for six months. Since then, I have obtained new information about the operating expenses of the three Carnival ships involved. A comparison of this information to the federal contract raises serious questions about whether the Carnival contract is a responsible use of taxpayer funds.

The information I have obtained comes from an internal "Financial Review" prepared by Carnival in January 2002 that discloses the revenue received and expenses incurred for Carnival Cruise Lines and the three Carnival ships now under federal contract: the Sensation, the Ecstasy, and the Holiday. This financial data reveals that the federal government appears to be paying Carnival significantly more under the federal contract than the ships earned on their own, while Carnival’s expenses appear to be significantly less under the federal contract than the ships normally incur. The net result is a contract that looks lucrative for Carnival but exceptionally expensive for the taxpayer.

In the first two months of fiscal year 2002, the period covered by the financial review, the revenue for the three ships was approximately $25 million per month. Extrapolating to six months, the duration of the federal contract, the total revenue would be just $150 million, substantially less than the $236 million the company will receive under the federal contract, even after taking inflation into account. At the same time, there will be over 800 fewer Carnival employees working on the ships under the federal contract, further boosting Carnival profits. For example, Carnival’s expenses in the internal financial review included salaries and accommodations for 175 bar staff, 110 entertainers, 99 casino staff, 31 “Carnival” staff, 28

employees in photo labs, and 25 shore excursion staff. None of these expenses is being incurred under the federal contract.

Even if the federal contract were more fairly priced, its merits would be dubious. Under the contract, the taxpayer is required to compensate Carnival for lost revenues from services that have nothing to do with the relief mission, such as millions of dollars in gambling proceeds and liquor sales. Moreover, it is not clear that Carnival would have been able to earn its usual revenues during the period covered by the federal contract. One of the ships (the Sensation) is based out of New Orleans, and a second ship (the Holiday) operates from Mobile, Alabama. Given the devastation wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Carnival would certainly have needed to make costly schedule adjustments and may not have been able to maintain an ordinary cruise schedule.

Your Department does not have a good record on federal procurement contracts. As investigative reports and government audits have identified, the Department has squandered billions on poorly designed and ineptly managed homeland security contracts. The nation cannot afford to repeat such mistakes in the relief and recovery efforts following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I therefore urge you to release additional information about this contract and the basis on which it was negotiated.

The Carnival Contract

Under its contract with FEMA, as negotiated and managed by Military Sealift Command, Carnival Cruise Lines has docked three of its ships — the Sensation, the Ecstasy, and the Holiday — in the Gulf Coast for use as temporary living arrangements for evacuees, emergency workers, and others.

Carnival provides three meals per day to each person on the ship, as well as weekly laundry and cleaning service. Many of the expenses ordinarily incurred by Carnival, however, are not being incurred under the federal contract. These include the costs of providing entertainment, gambling, and bar services, as well as the maintenance and wear and tear on ship engines experienced when the vessels are at sea.

The passenger capacity of the three ships is 7,116, and the contract cost is $236 million for six months, with one optional three month extension. On a per-person basis, the cost to the federal taxpayer would be about $35,500 per month if the ship were kept at full capacity. To house a family of five for the full six months of the contract, the cost would be over $165,000.

---


3 Id
At present, the ships are significantly below full occupancy. The Sensation and Ecstasy are currently docked in New Orleans. As of October 12, the Sensation had about 2,000 registered guests and the Ecstasy had about 2,100 guests. The Holiday is docked in Mobile and had about 1,400 registered guests on board. If this level of occupancy were to continue for the next six months, the cost to the taxpayer to provide housing aboard the ships for a family of five would be $214,500. For this price, the taxpayer could purchase or build a permanent home for the family.

Carnival’s Internal Financial Review

Carnival Cruise Line representatives have stated repeatedly that this contract will enable the company to earn as much profit as it would have earned had it operated normally, replacing lost revenues and covering increased expenses. A recent letter from Carnival Cruise Lines CEO Bob Dickinson to members of Congress states that the contract is “profit neutral” and based on “good faith estimates of vessel costs.”

I have obtained an internal “Financial Review” from Carnival that calls these assertions into serious doubt. This internal financial review reveals the revenues Carnival received from the Sensation, the Ecstasy, and the Holiday during a two-month period at the start of the 2002 fiscal year. This review shows that the ships earned $25 million in one month, which is equivalent to $150 million over a six-month period. The $236 million being paid by the federal government is 57% higher than the revenue earned by the three ships four years ago.

Since 2002, inflation has increased by 2.6% annually, a cumulative increase in the cost of living of 8%. Even taking this into account, the federal contract price is $74 million more than Carnival’s revenues from four years ago.

Avoided Expenses

The 2002 financial review also provides a breakdown of Carnival’s operating expenses for the three ships. It reveals that these expenses will be much lower under the federal contract.

---

4 Email from Kenneth Allen, Military Sealift Command, to Government Reform Committee Minority Staff (Oct. 14, 2005).


6 Carnival Cruise Lines Operating Company, Financial Review (Jan. 2002). Data for the Holiday and the Sensation are from January 2002. The Ecstasy was in operation for only one week in January 2002; data for this ship is from December 2001.

than they are when the ships are providing actual cruises. Yet it does not appear that these
reduced expenses were taken into account when the federal contract was negotiated.

One significant reduced expense is the reduction in necessary staff. Under the federal
contract, Carnival has no need for entertainment, bar, casino, and shore excursion staff and
should not be incurring the expense of these employees' salaries, food, and lodging. Based on a
comparison of the most recent crew counts on the three ships with January 2002 staff counts, it
appears that the ships have reduced their crew by about 865 employees during the period of the
federal contract.8

The 2002 data provides some insights into the specifics of these savings. In January
2002, there were 175 bar staff, 110 entertainers, 59 casino staff, 31 "Camp Carnival" staff, 28
employees in the photo labs, 25 shore excursion staff, and 25 cruise staff on the Sensation, the
Ecstasy, and the Holiday.9 Using Carnival data, it appears that these nearly 500 employees
would have been paid more than $3 million over the course of six months.10 Pay for entertainers
alone on these three ships over six months is estimated to have been more than $1.5 million.11
Moreover, Carnival does not need to provide food or lodging to these employees, further
increasing its cost savings.

There are a number of other expenses relating to the operation of a cruise ship that
Carnival will not be required to pay while the ships are under charter to the federal government.
In its 2002 financial documents, Carnival lists entertainment expenses per operating day that
averaged $989 for its "fantasy class" ships, including the Sensation and the Ecstasy, and $700 for
the Holiday. These avoided entertainment expenses could equal almost $500,000 over six
months for the three ships. In addition, the pools, bars, and casino areas do not require daily
maintenance, the engines are not enduring the same wear and tear, and there are no navigational
expenses. Yet none of these savings appear to be accounted for in the contract.

---

8 Carnival Cruise Lines Operating Company, Financial Review, p. 60 (Jan. 2002); Email
from Kenneth Allen, Military Sealift Command, to Government Reform Committee Minority
Staff (Oct. 14, 2005).


payroll estimates are based on the actual payroll and head counts across the Carnival fleet. No
information regarding pay rates was provided for casino or shore excursion staff. These pay
rates were estimated to be the same as food service staff.

11 Id.
The Honorable Michael Chertoff
October 20, 2005
Page 5

**Questionable Reimbursements**

Even if the Carnival contract were more reasonably priced, its underlying premises would be questionable. The contract has been designed to require the taxpayer to compensate Carnival for both the revenues the company would have earned under normal operations and any additional expenses that Carnival incurs under the contract. This means that the taxpayer does not reimburse Carnival for just the services it actually provides. The taxpayer is also responsible for paying for revenues the company would have received from its casino operations, liquor and drink sales, and on-shore excursions, even though these costs have nothing to do with the primary relief mission.

The cumulative cost of these questionable reimbursements is significant. Extrapolations from the 2002 financial data show that Carnival could expect to receive approximately $12.5 million in casino revenue and $10.5 million in bar revenue from the three ships over six months. When other extraneous revenue sources, such as on-shore excursions, are included, it appears that 20% of the cost of the contract can be attributable to reimbursements that have no connection to services actually provided by Carnival.

Given our mounting federal debt and the devastation wrought by the hurricanes, few Americans would support compensating Carnival for lost gambling and liquor proceeds. Yet this appears to be exactly what the contract does.

The primary justification provided by Carnival executives for these reimbursements is that the company should recoup what the company would ordinarily earn from the three ships. However, it is doubtful that Carnival would have earned normal revenues from these ships in the aftermath of the hurricanes. One of the ships under charter (the Sensation) was operating out of the New Orleans port. Another (the Holiday) was based in Mobile. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita would surely have disrupted Carnival's operations even if the ships were not chartered to the federal government.

Yet another questionable reimbursement under the contract is the provision that Carnival will be paid $35 million for reimbursement of federal taxes. The rationale for this reimbursement appears to be that Carnival traditionally uses legal maneuvers (such as sailing its ships under foreign flags) to evade U.S. taxes. Rewarding Carnival for successfully avoiding federal taxes is not only unfair but also seems like sound public policy.

---

12 *Id.*

13 *Id.* Total onboard revenues over six months are estimated to be $48 million.


Conclusion

A provision was recently added to the federal contract requiring Carnival Cruise Lines to return any contract payments that create a surplus profit over what the company would have earned in normal operations as "estimated in good faith" by Carnival. The late insertion of the provision may be an admission of the flaws in the contract, but it does little to ameliorate my concerns. Under this provision, the responsibility for determining whether Carnival is overcharging the taxpayer has been turned over to the company itself, which offers the taxpayer scant hope of relief.

Instead of this meaningless provision, what we need to do is to restore transparency and accountability to federal contracting. Both Carnival and the Department need to justify to the Congress and the taxpayer why this contract is reasonable. And if an adjustment in the contract price is required, it should be made soon.

In order to assist in congressional oversight of this contract, I request that you provide the following additional information without delay:

- All documentation regarding the calculations of lost revenue provided by Carnival Corporation to the Military Sealift Command, FEMA, or other government agency to justify the cost of the contract;
- All documentation regarding the calculations of expenses incurred under normal operations and under the charter contract that were provided by Carnival Corporation to the Military Sealift Command, FEMA, or other government agency to justify the cost of the contract;
- All documentation regarding the decision to reimburse Carnival for federal taxes owed while under the charter contract; and
- Any documentation regarding the development of the provision calling for return of excessive profits by Carnival.

I would appreciate receiving these documents by November 3.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member

---

Congressman Tom Davis
Chairman
House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Davis:

I am respectfully requesting that the Katrina Select Committee hold a hearing on
the unmet need for housing of displaced persons along the Gulf Coast.

It is inconceivable that two months after Hurricane Katrina a backlog of over
14,000 applications for temporary housing in Mississippi is still unmet. In the past seven
days FEMA placed 1575 travel trailers. At this rate the agency will not be able to place
everyone in need of temporary housing by the end of the year. Many of my constituents
are still living in tents, and thousands of others are forced to live with family members or
are being housed at government expense in hotels across the nation. It is my
understanding that our neighbors in Louisiana are also experiencing similar difficulties
with respect to housing for displaced persons. This is simply unacceptable.

Since the hurricane hit, 11,838 FEMA travel trailers have been set up for families
in Mississippi. This represents less than half of the total need. It is clear that FEMA is
failing to meet the most basic needs for many of the victims of Katrina. It is my hope
that by bringing this situation to the attention of our colleagues that we can find a solution
to this problem that will result in a significant increase in the number of families that are
moved into a safe and dry environment. Hopefully we can prevent similar problems in
the future.

Thank you for your leadership of the Katrina Select Committee, and I look
forward to working with you in the future.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

GENE TAYLOR
Member of Congress

GT:ri
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

November 1, 2005

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing to express serious concern with the Department’s failure to complete a confidential, operational annex to the National Response Plan before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast on August 29.

The National Response Plan issued last January by Secretary Ridge established broad lines of authority for agencies responding to catastrophic events. It stated that a “more detailed and operationally specific” annex would set forth in detail the precise role of each agency involved in federal response efforts. Although the National Response Plan was issued over nine months ago, we have been informed that the operational annex remains incomplete to this day.

During your testimony on October 19, 2005 before the House of Representatives, you acknowledged that “there are a lot of things that didn't work well with the response” to Hurricane Katrina. You attributed these deficiencies overwhelmingly to the failure to properly plan for the federal response, stating, “I think 80 percent or more of the problem lies with the planning.”

You illustrated this point by highlighting major coordination problems with the Defense Department. You testified that the absence of a plan “goes to how well we work with the military when the military has large numbers of assets they can bring to bear on a problem, how fluid we are with them. I think that's an area where had we had sufficient time ... that would have made the single biggest difference in terms of allowing us to respond hours and maybe even days earlier.”

While your testimony appears to be an accurate reflection of the critical problems experienced on the ground, it does not explain why your Department has failed over the past nine months to complete this planning and issue the operational annex. Had you done so, perhaps the various federal agencies inside and outside your Department would have responded in a more coordinated and effective manner.

Background

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In addition to establishing a new Department of Homeland Security,
The Honorable Michael Chertoff  
November 1, 2005  
Page 2

Congress charged the new Secretary of the agency with “consolidating existing Federal  
Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan.”

On January 6, 2005, your predecessor, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge,  
unveiled the National Response Plan. It was the product of coordination among 32 federal  
agencies and departments. At the press conference introducing the new plan, Secretary Ridge  
said: “The National Response Plan embodies our nation’s commitment to the concept of one  
team, one goal — a safer and more secure America.” He also said the plan was “one of my  
department’s highest priorities” and called its issuance “a bold step forward in bringing unity in  
our response to disasters and terrorist threats and attacks.”

Although the National Response Plan established broad lines of authority for agencies  
responding to catastrophic events, it did not provide precise operational responsibilities for  
officials responding on the ground. Instead, the plan was intended to provide “a core operational  
plan for all national incident management.” The plan combined and superseded various existing  
plans, including the Federal Response Plan, the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic  

In order to address this lack of operational specificity, the National Response Plan  
required the development of a much more detailed annex. As the National Response Plan states:  
“A more detailed and operationally specific NRP [National Response Plan] Catastrophic Incident  
Supplement (NRP-CIS) that is designated ‘For Official Use Only’ will be approved and  
published independently of the NRP Base Plan and annexes.”

**Status of Detailed Operational Annex**

We have been informed that your Department did not complete the detailed, operational  
annex prior to Hurricane Katrina striking the Gulf Coast. In fact, it is our understanding that the  
annex still has not been completed to this day, more than nine months after the National

---


2 Office of the Press Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of  
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge Announces Completion of the National Response Plan  
(Jan. 6, 2005).

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Id.

Response Plan was issued. According to information provided to our staff, a draft annex was reportedly circulated in September, but concerns about an accompanying Memorandum of Agreement between the relevant agencies delayed its issuance.

This new information raises significant questions about your testimony on October 19, 2005, before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. During your testimony, you made clear that you believed there were major problems with the federal response. You also made clear that you believed the most significant cause of these deficiencies was a failure to properly plan.

For example, during your opening statement, you observed that "we did not have the kind of integrated planning capabilities that you need to deal with the kind of catastrophe we faced in Katrina." You explained that you were referring to "not only our own planning but our ability to plan with others, including state and local government and including the military."7

When you were questioned by Rep. Pelosi about this issue, you elaborated on your assessment. You stated: "you can't plan in a crisis environment. If we at DHS fell down, it was largely in the area of planning. I think that the challenge of dealing with this kind of ultra-catastrophe is one that requires a lot of work beforehand, months beforehand. It doesn't require work — 48 hours before the event, you're past planning. You've got to be executing."8

You made similar statements to other members. For example, in response to a question from Rep. Shuster, you stated: "To the extent I think there was a flaw in the execution, I think the flaw lay in planning what to do."9 And in response to a question from Rep. Jefferson, you stated: "the largest problem here was attributable to planning . . . If you start to plan in the emergency, you're not planning. You're improvising."10

Over and over again, you pointed to a lack of planning as the key to the federal government's response failures. As you stated to Rep. Thornberry: "I think 80% or more of the problem lies with the planning . . . [I]t doesn't come naturally to civilian agencies for the most part to do the kind of disciplined planning for a complicated operation."11

7FDCH Political Transcripts, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Holds a Hearing on Department of Homeland Security Relief Response (Oct. 19, 2005).
8Id.
9Id.
10Id.
11Id.
12Id.
TheHonorableMichaelChertoff
November1,2005

Page4

Given your numerous statements about the importance of planning, it is unclear why your
Department did not complete the detailed operational annex, which would have provided
precisely the type of planning you believe was missing in your agency’s response to Hurricane
Katrina. As Secretary of Homeland Security, you are the federal official responsible for this
planning function. Although Secretary Ridge completed the National Response Plan over nine
months ago, it was your responsibility to complete the operational annex.

Lack of Coordination with the Defense Department

Without the detailed operational annex to guide federal response efforts, there was
tremendous confusion and an utter lack of coordination among federal agencies involved in the
response efforts. As you mentioned in your testimony on October 18, no example illustrated
these problems more clearly than the failure of the Department of Homeland Security to
coordinate and communicate at the most basic levels with the Department of Defense.

In your testimony, you explicitly recognized that the failure to properly plan related
directly to “how well we work with the military when the military has large numbers of assets
they can bring to bear on a problem, how fluid we are with them.” You testified, “I think that’s
an area where had we had sufficient time … that would have been the single biggest difference
in terms of allowing us to respond hours and maybe even days earlier to some of the issues that
were addressed on a Thursday and a Friday that might have been addressed on a Tuesday or a
Wednesday.”

Internal emails appear to support this aspect of your testimony. They document a
complete breakdown in coordination between the top military official on the ground, Lieutenant
General Russell Honore, and the head civilian official in the field, former FEMA Director
Michael Brown. You testified that on the Wednesday two days after the hurricane, you
instructed Mr. Brown to “[g]et hold of General Honore and make sure you two guys are lashed at
the hip.” You explained the importance of this unified command: “What that means is
everybody who has got command responsibility has to be in one place.”

However, an email sent the next day shows that General Honore and Michael Brown still
had not connected. In the email, General Honore asks FEMA officials to get Michael Brown’s
satellite phone number. The officials wrote: “He wants to speak with Mike very badly.”

---

13 Id.
14 Id. (emphasis added).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Email from “Todd” at FEMA-R01-ROC-DIR to William Carwile et al. (Sept. 1, 2005).
Brown, however, was not even in the same state. The reply to the email explained that Mr. Brown was “[r]iot here in MS. Is in LA, as far as I know.” As a result, a full four days after the hurricane, the top civilian and military field commanders still had not spoken.

Another example of failures at the most basic levels between the Homeland Security and Defense Departments was the lack of coordination on the deployment of response assets. On September 6, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated at a press conference that no federal civilian government officials had requested assistance from the military by Tuesday, August 30, the day after the hurricane struck. He said:

[W]e started working issues before we were asked. And on Tuesday, at the direction of the secretary and the deputy secretary, we went to each of the services. I called each of the chiefs of the services, one by one, and said we don’t know what we’re going to be asked for yet.19

This situation apparently persisted for days. On Wednesday, August 31, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco made a request for 40,000 troops.20 But it was not until Friday, September 2, that FEMA officials finally sent an email requesting the Defense Department to “support the planning and execution of the full logistical support to the Katrina disaster.”21 Inexplicably, the Defense Department response rejected the request on the grounds that bureaucratic protocol had not been followed. According to the email message, the Pentagon rejected FEMA’s request for assistance because it had not “come from Secretary to Secretary.”22

This statement, which was attributed to Col. Chaves in the office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, revealed an ignorance of the National Response Plan and the authority of the Principal Federal Official, who at the time was Mr. Brown. It elevated mindless protocol over urgently needed help for those in need. And it highlighted your own lack of involvement, which may have delayed unnecessarily the delivery of this critical assistance.

18 Email from William Carwile to Jesse Munoz and FEMA-R04-ROC-DIR (Sept. 1, 2005).
19 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Department Operational Update Briefing (Sept. 6, 2005).
21 Email from Ken Burris to Mathew Broderick, Michael Brown, Patrick Rhode, Edward Buikema, Brooks Altshuler, Michael Heath, and David Trissell (Sept. 2, 2005).
22 Id.
The Honorable Michael Chertoff  
November 1, 2005  
Page 6

**Conclusion**

Throughout your testimony on October 19, you referred to former FEMA Director Michael Brown as your "battlefield commander on the ground." You claimed that you had given him "all the legal authority to gather cooperation from other federal agencies in terms of supplies and manpower to be available to assist the state and local government dealing with the emergency." You judgment in relying on Mr. Brown as your "battlefield commander" can be called into serious question. But putting that aside, it was your responsibility — not Mr. Brown's — to complete the detailed operational annex to the National Response Plan, which would have set forth in clear terms the precise responsibilities of each agency involved in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. In effect, you sent an unqualified battlefield commander into the field without an adequate battle plan.

For these reasons, we request that you report on the current status of the detailed operational annex and explain how you intend to address the specific coordination problems between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense that occurred after Hurricane Katrina.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Waxman  
Ranking Minority Member  
Committee on Government Reform

Charlie Rangel  
Member of Congress

---


24 Id.
Hurricane Katrina Document Analysis: The E-Mails of Michael Brown


To date, the Department of Homeland Security has provided few of the documents requested by Reps. Melancon and Davis. One exception, however, involves the e-mails of Michael Brown, the former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Although it does not appear that the Department has provided a complete set of e-mails involving Mr. Brown, the Department has produced more than 1,000 pages of e-mail correspondence from Mr. Brown's office. About 100 pages of these e-mails were produced on October 14, 2005. The remainder, about 900 pages of e-mails, were produced on October 18, 2005.

At the request of Rep. Melancon, this staff analysis summarizes some of the key e-mails involving Mr. Brown. These e-mails paint a portrait of Mr. Brown that differs significantly from Mr. Brown's testimony before Congress about his actions. In his appearance before the House select committee, Mr. Brown described himself as an effective leader. He said, "I get it when it comes to emergency management. I know what it's all about." The e-mails, however, reveal that Mr. Brown made few decisions and seemed out of touch. In the midst of the crisis, Mr. Brown found the time to exchange e-mails about his appearance, his reputation, and other nonessential matters. But few of his e-mails demonstrated leadership or a command of the challenges facing his agency.

Although the Brown e-mails provide a unique window into FEMA's decision-making process, they do not appear to be a complete set of Mr. Brown's e-mails. Mr. Brown testified before the select committee that he "exchanged e-mails" with White House officials, including White House chief of staff Andrew Card, yet none of these e-mails are included. There are also no e-mails between Mr. Brown and Secretary Chertoff. Moreover, despite the requests of Reps. Melancon and Davis, the select committee has not received any of the relevant e-mails and

1 House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Testimony of Michael D. Brown, Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005).
THE E-MAILS OF MICHAEL BROWN

communications involving Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, Army Corps of Engineers Commander Carl Strock, Health and Human
Services Secretary Michael Leavitt, and White House chief of staff Andrew Card. The continued
failure of Administration officials to comply with these document requests will impede
congressional oversight of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina.

Mr. Brown's Testimony

On September 27, 2005, Michael Brown appeared before the House select committee to defend
his response to Hurricane Katrina. At the hearing, Mr. Brown testified that "FEMA pushed
forward with everything that it had, every team, every asset that we had, in order to help what we
saw as being a potentially catastrophic disaster."

He testified that he had made only two mistakes:

First, I failed initially to set up a series of regular briefings to the media about what
FEMA was doing throughout the Gulf Coast region. ... Second, I very strongly
personally regret that I was unable to persuade Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin to sit
down, get over their differences and work together. I just couldn't pull that off.³

Mr. Brown also testified to his own leadership skills. Asked what credentials he brought to his
job as FEMA Director, he said, "Management skills. ... Organizational skills. ... You need to be
able to lead people, put the right people in place, put good people around you ... not yes people
but people who are going to argue and give you the pros and cons of the decisions that you have
to make, and then be willing to make those decisions and carry forward with it."⁴

Mr. Brown's E-Mails

The e-mails from Mr. Brown paint a different picture of Mr. Brown than Mr. Brown conveyed
during the hearing. They reveal that Mr. Brown made few decisions and seemed out of touch. A
number of the e-mails address nonessential matters such as what Mr. Brown should wear, how
he could defend his reputation, and even who would care for his dog. Other e-mails are devoted
to banter with Mr. Brown's staff. There are few e-mails that show Mr. Brown taking charge or
issuing tasking orders.

1. Failure to Make Decisions

There are almost no e-mails from Mr. Brown in which he makes decisions and communicates
them to his subordinates. In the e-mails, Mr. Brown receives incoming messages about specific
problems, but rarely reacts.

³ Id.
⁴ Id.
The E-mails of Michael Brown

On Wednesday, August 31, 2005, at 12:20 p.m., Marty Bahamonde, one of the only FEMA employees on the ground in New Orleans, sent a desperate message to Mr. Brown:

Sir, I know that you know the situation is past critical. Here are some things you might not know.

Hotels are kicking people out, thousands gathering in the streets with no food or water. Hundreds still being rescued from homes.

The dying patients at the DMAT tent being medivac. Estimates are many will die within hours. Evacuation in process. Plans developing for dome evacuation but hotel situation adding to problem. We are out of food and running out of water at the dome, plans in works to address the critical need.

FEMA staff is OK and holding own. DMAT staff working in deplorable conditions. The sooner we can get the medical patients out, the sooner we can get them out.

Phone connectivity impossible.5

Mr. Brown responded to Mr. Bahamonde at 12:24 p.m. This is Mr. Brown’s full response:

Thanks for the update. Anything specific I need to do or tweak?6

This indecisive response is not uncommon. Two days later, on Friday, September 2, 2005, Mr. Brown received a message with the subject “Medical help.” At the time, thousands of patients were being transported to the New Orleans airport, which had been converted to a makeshift hospital.7 Because of a lack of ventilators, medical personnel had to ventilate patients by hand for as long as 35 hours.8 The text of the e-mail read:

Mike, Mickey and other medical equipment people have a 42 ft trailer full of beds, wheelchairs, oxygen concentrators, etc. They are wanting to take them where they can be used but need direction. Mickey specializes in ventilator patients so can be very helpful with acute care patients. If you could have someone contact him and let him know if he can be of service, he would appreciate it. Know you are busy but they really want to help.9

---

5 E-mail from Marty Bahamonde to Michael D. Brown (Aug. 31, 2005).
6 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Marty Bahamonde (Aug. 31, 2005).
8 Going Back For More, Corvallis Gazette-Times (Sept. 17, 2005).
9 E-mail from “Carolyn” to Michael D. Brown (Sept. 2, 2005).
THE E-MAILS OF MICHAEL BROWN

Mr. Brown, however, did not respond to this message until four days later, when he finally forwarded it to FEMA Deputy chief of staff Brooks Altshuler and Deputy Director of Response Michael Lowder. The text of Mr. Brown’s e-mail read: “Can we use these people?”

On other occasions, Mr. Brown did not appear to respond at all to reports of problems he received from FEMA staff. For example, on Thursday, September 1, FEMA officials were exchanging reports of severe shortages of ice and water in Mississippi. The next day’s delivery was reported as 60 trucks of ice and 26 of water, even though the requirements were for 450 trucks of each. Robert Fenton, a FEMA regional response official, wrote: “We have not yet met any of our requirements even with two days’ notice. If we get the quantities in your report tomorrow we will have serious riots.” William Carville, FEMA’s coordinator in Mississippi, confirmed this assessment: “Will need big time law enforcement reinforcements tomorrow. All our good will here in MS will be very seriously impacted by noon tomorrow. Have been holding it together as it is.” FEMA Deputy Director of Response Michael Lowder forwarded this chain of messages to Mr. Brown. Yet there is no response from Mr. Brown in the e-mails produced by the Department.

In the 1,000 pages of e-mails, there are few e-mails from Mr. Brown that task FEMA officials to perform specific tasks or respond to pressing problems. One exception occurred on September 8, over a week after the hurricane. After receiving a message from a member of the public, complaining about FEMA’s policy of not allowing evacuees to bring pets with them, Mr. Brown sent an immediate message to his staff:

I want us to start planning for dealing with pets. If evacuees are refusing to leave because they can’t take their pets with them, I understand that. So, we need to facilitate the evacuation of those people by figuring out a way to allow them to take their pets. Bill and Ron, this may not be an issue for you in AL and MS, but it is a huge issue in L.A. Please get some sort of plan together to start handling the pets. Thanks. MB

2. Misinformation about the Levee Break

A key question that has emerged is when federal officials learned that the levees in New Orleans actually breached and began flooding the city. In statements by senior Administration officials in the days after Hurricane Katrina, President Bush, Secretary Chertoff, and Chairman of the

---

10 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Brooks Altshuler and Michael Lowder (Sept. 6, 2005).
11 E-mail from Robert Fenton to William Carville (Sept. 1, 2005).
12 E-mail from Robert Fenton to “FEMA-LRC-Deputy-Chief” et al. (Sept. 1, 2005).
13 E-mail from William Carville to Michael Lowder et al. (Sept. 1, 2005).
14 E-mail from Michael Lowder to William Carville, Michael D. Brown, Patrick Rhode et al. (Sept. 2, 2005).
15 E-mail from Carol Springerman to Michael D. Brown et al. (Sept. 8, 2005).
16 E-mail from Michael Brown to William Loken et al. (Sept. 8, 2005).
17 President George W. Bush, White House, President Tours Biloxi, Mississippi Hurricane Damaged Neighborhoods (Sept. 2, 2005).
THE E-MAILS OF MICHAEL BROWN

Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Meyers\textsuperscript{19} stated that the 17th Street and London Canal levees, which flooded much of northern New Orleans, did not breach until Tuesday, August 30. In fact, the levees actually broke on Monday, August 29.\textsuperscript{20} The delay by federal officials in understanding when the levees broke has been criticized as a major failing in the federal response.

The e-mails reveal that Mr. Brown was apprised early on Monday of the levee failure and the dire consequences for New Orleans. For example, Mr. Brown received the following stream of e-mails on Monday, August 29:

- At 9:39 a.m., Mr. Brown received a message stating: "Report that the levee in Arabi has failed next to the industrial canal."\textsuperscript{21}

- At 9:53 a.m., Mr. Brown received a message stating: "A LEVEE BREACH OCCURRED ALONG THE INDUSTRIAL CANAL AT TENNESSE[E] STREET. 3 TO 8 FEET OF WATER IS EXPECTED DUE TO THE BREACH ... LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO ARABI AND 9TH WARD OF NEW ORLEANS"\textsuperscript{22}

- At 10:20 a.m., Mr. Brown received a message stating:

> From Marty Bahamonde in the New Orleans EOC (next to the superdome)
> - Severe flooding on the St. Bernard/Orleans parish line. Police report water level up to second floor of two story houses. People are trapped in attics.
> - Pumps starting to fail. The city has now confirmed four pumps are off line.
> - Windows and parts of the east side of the Amaco building blown out.
> - New Orleans shopping center (next to superdome) destroyed.
> - Windows and parts of the East side of the Hyatt Hotel have been blown out. Furniture is blowing out of the hotel.
> - Top floors of the Entergy building have been blown out.
> - Area around the Superdome is beginning to flood.
> We should have pictures shortly.\textsuperscript{23}

- At 11:57 a.m., Mr. Brown received a message stating: "New Orleans FD is reporting a 20 foot wide breach on the lake ponchatrain levy. The area is lakeshore Blvd and 17th street."\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{18} Meet the Press, NBC News (Sept. 4, 2005).
\textsuperscript{19} Gen. Meyers, Department of Defense, Defense Department Operational Update Briefing (Sept. 6, 2005).
\textsuperscript{20} Katrina: Failure at Every Turn, Knight-Ridder (Sept. 11, 2005) (citing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reports).
\textsuperscript{21} E-mail from Michael Lowder to Michael D. Brown et al. (Aug. 29, 2005).
\textsuperscript{22} Id.
\textsuperscript{23} E-mail from Michael Heath to Michael D. Brown (Aug. 29, 2005).
\textsuperscript{24} E-mail from Michael Lowder, supra note 21.
379

THE E-MAILS OF MICHAEL BROWN

The e-mails indicate that Mr. Brown responded to only one of these messages. At 12:09 p.m., Mr. Brown responded to the 11:57 a.m. report of the "20 foot wide breach on the lake ponchatrain levy" by dismissing the report. He wrote: "I'm being told here water over not a breach." The e-mails do not indicate who told Mr. Brown this misinformation. There is also no indication in the e-mails that Mr. Brown recognized the seriousness of his mistake or took actions to correct it. There are no further e-mails from Mr. Brown that day about the levees.

3. E-MAILS ABOUT APPEARANCE, REPUTATION, AND DOG-SITTING

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters to strike the United States. Mr. Brown emphasized the scope of the disaster in his testimony, saying that Katrina was far worse than any other disaster FEMA had handled during his tenure. He said, "the geographical size of it, the urban area nature of it, the extent of the devastation, the total destruction of the infrastructure. I mean, those are big, big items." Yet in the midst of the overwhelming damage caused by the hurricane and enormous problems faced by FEMA, Mr. Brown found time to exchange e-mails about superfluous topics such as his appearance, his reputation, and problems finding a dog-sitter.

On Friday, August 26, Mr. Brown e-mailed his press secretary, Sharon Worthy, about his attire, writing: "Tie or not for tonight? Button down blue shirt?" On Monday, August 29, between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m. on the day the hurricane struck, Mr. Brown exchanged additional e-mails about his attire with Cindy Taylor, FEMA deputy director of public affairs. Ms. Taylor wrote Mr. Brown: "I know its early, but ... My eyes must certainly be deceiving me. You look fabulous — and I'm not talking the makeup!" Mr. Brown's reply was: "I got it at Nordstroms. ... Are you proud of me?" An hour later, Mr. Brown added: "If you'll look at my lovely FEMA attire you'll really vomit. I am a fashion god."

Several days later, Mr. Brown received yet another e-mail about his attire. This time, Ms. Worthy instructed Mr. Brown: "Please roll up the sleeves of your shirt ... all shirts. Even the President rolled his sleeves to just below the elbow. In this crisis and on TV you just need to look more hard-working ... ROLL UP THE SLEEVES.

Mr. Brown also found time to send multiple e-mails about his reputation. Alerted by a friend, Howard Pike, that the media was investigating his tenure at the International Arabian Horse

---

23 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Michael Lowder (Aug. 29, 2005).
24 Testimony of Michael D. Brown, supra note 1.
25 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Sharon Worthy (Aug. 26, 2005).
26 E-mail from Cindy Taylor to Michael D. Brown (Aug. 29, 2005).
27 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Cindy Taylor (Aug. 29, 2005).
28 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Marty Bahamonde, Cindy Taylor, and Michael Widomski (Aug. 29, 2005).
29 E-mail from Sharon Worthy to Michael D. Brown (Sept. 4, 2005).
The E-mails of Michael Brown

Association, Mr. Brown asked Mr. Pike to direct the media to people who would defend him: “Baxy and Sheila would be perfect. Can you make the connections?” Mr. Brown then forwarded Mr. Pike’s message to Natalie Rule, a DHS press contact, and Lea Ann McBride, Vice President Cheney’s press secretary, saying: “Howard Pike is the former head of the Air Line Pilots Association and a good friend of mine. I’ll get on my laptop and get his contact info shortly.” Mr. Brown also sent a message to Andrew Lester, an Oklahoma lawyer, asking him to call reporters about this issue.

There are even e-mails about finding a sitter for Mr. Brown’s dog, for whom Mr. Brown’s wife was apparently having difficulties locating care. On Tuesday, August 30, the day after the hurricane struck, Mr. Brown sent this e-mail to his assistant, Tillie James: “Do you know of anyone who dog-sits? Bethany has backed out and Tamara is looking. If you know of any responsible kids, let me know. They can have the house to themselves Th-Su.”

Some of these e-mails from Mr. Brown convey the impression that he may have been overwhelmed by his responsibilities. In his e-mail to Ms. Taylor on the morning the hurricane struck, Mr. Brown wrote, “Can I quit now? Can I come home?” A few days later, Mr. Brown wrote to an acquaintance, “I’m trapped now, please rescue me.”

The Need for Additional Documents

The e-mails received from Mr. Brown’s office reveal valuable insights into what went wrong during the critical days following Hurricane Katrina. They also highlight the need to receive a complete set of e-mails from Mr. Brown and similar documents from other key officials. To date, however, Administration officials have failed to respond to the document requests from Rep. Melancon and Rep. Davis.

1. Gaps in the Brown E-Mails

On September 30, Rep. Melancon and Rep. Davis sent a letter to Secretary Chertoff asking for “documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in … the Office of the Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response,” which is the office held by Mr. Brown. The letter requested that these documents be provided by October 14, 2005.

---

32 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Howard Pike (Sept. 5, 2005).
33 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Natalie Rule and then to McBride at vcp.cop.gov (Sept. 5, 2005).
34 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to “alanb@dlslaw.com” (Sept. 5, 2005).
35 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Tillie James (Aug. 30, 2005).
36 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to Jonathan Meese (Sept. 3, 2005).
37 E-mail from Michael D. Brown to “galumaa@concast.net” (Sept. 2, 2005).
THE E-MAILS OF MICHAEL BROWN

Although the Department has provided many e-mails from Mr. Brown, it does not appear that all of Mr. Brown's e-mails have been produced by the Department. In his congressional testimony, Mr. Brown referenced e-mails that he sent to the White House. Mr. Brown stated: "I exchanged e-mails and phone calls with Joe Hagin, Andy Card and the President." 39

However, no e-mail messages between Mr. Brown and Joe Hagin, who is White House deputy chief of staff, or Andrew Card, who is White House chief of staff, have been provided by the Department. There have also been no e-mails produced between Mr. Brown and President Bush or other senior White House officials. Moreover, it does not appear that any e-mails between Mr. Brown and Secretary Chertoff have been produced. These are significant gaps in the Department's compliance with the congressional document request.

2. Failure of Secretary Chertoff to Provide Documents

Secretary Chertoff has also failed to provide e-mails and other communications involving the Secretary or other officials in the Secretary's office. These documents were requested in the same letter that requested Mr. Brown's e-mails. 40

At an October 19, 2005, hearing with Secretary Chertoff, Rep. Melancon expressed his concern that the select committee had not received any documents or communications from Secretary Chertoff or his office. Rep. Melancon asked Secretary Chertoff directly for a commitment to providing the documents requested by October 27, 2005, and he agreed. The transcript reads:

Mr. Melancon: My understanding is that Chairman Davis had given you until October 27 to respond to our request. Are you committed to making that deadline?

Mr. Chertoff: Yes. 41

The Department did produce additional documents on October 27, 2005, and still more documents on October 28, 2005. However, these documents do not appear to include e-mails or other communications involving Secretary Chertoff or his immediate office.

3. Failure of Other Administration Officials to Provide Documents

In addition to the letter sent to Secretary Chertoff on September 30, Reps. Melancon and Davis sent similar document request letters to Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, 42

39 Testimony of Michael D. Brown, supra note 1.
THE E-MAILS OF MICHAEL BROWN

Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense,\textsuperscript{43} Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, the Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,\textsuperscript{44} and Michael Leavitt, the Secretary of Health and Human Services.\textsuperscript{45} Similar document requests were also sent to the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. These letters requested an initial response within two weeks, a deadline of October 14, 2005. Rep. Davis extended the deadline to October 27, 2005.

Although the extended deadline has now passed, responsive documents have not been received from any of these officials.

Conclusion

The e-mails of former FEMA Director Michael Brown provide telling insights into the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. They depict a leader who seemed overwhelmed and rarely made key decisions. Many of the e-mails address superficial subjects—such as Mr. Brown’s appearance or reputation—rather than the pressing response needs of Louisiana and Mississippi. Few of the e-mails show Mr. Brown taking command or directing the response.

The credibility and thoroughness of the congressional investigation into the response to Hurricane Katrina will hinge on access to key documents and communications. To date, there are significant gaps in the e-mails involving Mr. Brown that have been provided to Congress. Other key officials—including Secretary Chertoff, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Leavitt, and White House chief of staff Andrew Card—have not provided any of their communications. The select committee will not be able to fulfill its objectives if these documents are not produced in a timely manner.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

November 9, 2005

The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On November 2, 2005, the Select Committee held a hearing on "Hurricane Katrina: The Federal Government's Use of Contractors to Prepare for and Respond to Catastrophic Events." Unfortunately, the government and contractor witnesses who testified were unable to answer many basic questions about the scope, price, and terms of contracts awarded after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast.

Over two dozen times, the witnesses stated that they would research the information and provide it to the Committee as soon as possible – in some cases by the end of the day. Recognizing that their lack of information was beginning to "frustrate this committee," one witness promised: "I will assure you that people are in this room taking notes on what is being asked.” To date, however, we have not received any follow-up responses.

It is essential that we obtain the requested information in order to conduct a full and thorough investigation of the problems associated with the massive contracts that were awarded in Katrina’s wake. For this reason, I request that the Committee send written Questions for the Record to each witness who committed to providing information. For your convenience, I am attaching a list of 27 specific requests and commitments made at the hearing, along with relevant excerpts from the hearing transcript.

I appreciate your cooperation on this matter.

Sincerely,

Charlie Melancon
Member of Congress

Attachment
Transcript Excerpts:
Select Committee Hearing on Katrina Contracting
November 2, 2005

WITNESS: COLONEL NORBERT DOYLE
ACTING PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTRACTING
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

1) CHAIRMAN DAVIS: [0]In Friday, September 2, former FEMA Director Brown received an e-mail that showed that Mississippi would be getting 60 trucks of ice and 26 trucks of water, but their requirements were for 450 trucks of ice and 450 trucks of water. Why wouldn't they be getting their requirement, because some of this was -- we had everything ready, we knew what the need was, and they just didn't get it. Do they not have contracts to get those kind of requirements? Could there have been operational difficulties? And are you aware of difficulties getting water and ice to Mississippi at that time, this is September 2, and the efforts that they had to overcome? ...

DOYLE: Sir, I'm not familiar with this specific incident, but I know we ordered and delivered literally thousands of trackloads of ice and water.

CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Well, this was on Friday. Let me just give it to you again. This is September 2, for the storm, that they'd need 60 trucks of ice and 26 trucks of water were coming, but the requirements were for 450 each. Why wouldn't they have been able to get those requirements there early? Do you know what logistically could have happened or anything? And who was the contractor we were using at that point to get the ice and the water?

DOYLE: Sir, the contractor for the ice mission, I believe, was IAT (ph), but I would need to get back to the record to double check that.

CHAIRMAN DAVIS: I'll let you get back to the record.

2) REP. ROGERS: I'm referring to an October 25 story in the New Orleans Times Picayune newspaper that relates to the local contractors being allowed to have contracts for the removal of debris. According to the story, there are several New Orleans parishes that made contracts with local contractors to remove debris, and they're paying, I think, around $14 or so a ton, and the Corps of Engineers, I'm told, is being paid roughly 30 or so dollars a ton to contractors for the Corps of Engineers, and now the Corps, according to the story, is going to the local parishes saying, "You need to go through us and void your contracts with the local contractors.'

Well, the difference between $14 and $30 a ton ain't chicken feed. Now, is this true or is it not true? Colonel?

DOYLE: Sir, I'm not familiar with that article, but we'll take it and check it to see if it's true or not.

3) REP. ROGERS: I want to know, though, what is the difference between what you're paying contractors to remove debris compared to what the parishes are paying direct
contractors to remove debris?

DOYLE: Sir, it's hard to answer because I don't know what that story said, and I don't know if those quotes are accurate or not.

REP. ROGERS: No, no. Do you know what you're paying -- what are you paying...

DOYLE: Sir, what I know right now is we're paying our Mississippi debris contractors $17 a cubic yard. I don't know if that pertains to the debris contractors in Louisiana.

REP. ROGERS: Well, who does know?

DOYLE: I'll have to get back to our contracting officers in the field and get back to you, sir.

4) DOYLE: Sir, we are reimbursed for our labor to support our customers.

REP. MELANCON: Is it a percentage of the cost of the contract?

DOYLE: No, sir.

REP. MELANCON: How is that determined?

DOYLE: Through labor rates for our district offices, administrative expenses that support those personnel.

REP. MELANCON: And do you know what the average of that cost is per district office?

DOYLE: No, sir, but I can get it back to you with our resource management folks.

REP. MELANCON: If you could.

DOYLE: Yes, sir.

5) REP. BONILLA: According to one report, the government is paying an average of $2,480 for in many cases less than two hours of work, even though the government is providing the blue sheeting for free. The government pays by the square foot. The Shaw Group is getting paid the most to install the tarp at $1.75 per square foot. The other two contractors are Simon Roofing, getting $1.72 per square foot, and LJC, getting $1.49 per square foot. Shaw is also billing the government at $155 per hour for its operation manager while Simon bills at $150 and LJC at $65.

Is that what it costs? It seems, I would think, especially to the average person, that this is an incredibly large amount of money per roof, even, again, assuming or recognizing that the government is supplying the material.

DOYLE: Yes, sir. Our contracting officers in the field are under an obligation to get with those contractors, and they do have to verify their costs. As for those specifics, we would have to get back with the contracting officer to make sure those are the specifics that they have been told.
6) REP. MYRICK: [H]ow do you justify almost $2,500 for two hours of work to put a blue tarp on a roof when the government furnishes the blue tarp anyway? I don't know if that's the Corps, for FEMA or who this is. I mean, doesn't it just ring a bell with somebody that this is an excessive amount of money? Who in the world at home would pay that kind of money to have two hours of work done?

I mean, you know, putting on a tarp, yes, it's hard, but a lot of us have done it before and it isn't $2,500 hard. I mean, I'm just really -- the frustration, I guess, I'm expressing is, doesn't anybody look and say, "Hey, gee, this seems like it's a lot of money," other than the inspector general after the fact?

DOYLE: No, ma'am; you're absolutely correct. That does seem like a lot of money, and what I'm going to do is go back to our program people and our contracting people and have a paper put together to explain what we think the average cost per roof really is to verify that number that seems to be bantered about.

7) REP. MYRICK: The advanced contracting initiative for quicker response, what kind of time requirement do you set out in the beginning for people who are supposed to provide the ice or the water or the roofing or whatever it is? Do you have specific requirements that they have to follow, and if they don't follow them, are there any penalties for not following them?

DOYLE: Ma'am, are you referring to, like, delivery times and how fast they have to be mobilized and working or deliver a truckload of ice? Is that...

REP. MYRICK: Right, to finish, from start to finish.

DOYLE: Yes, ma'am. I'm sure there are delivery times in each of those aspects, in mobilization ramp-up times. What they are off the top, I don't know off the top of my head.

REP. MYRICK: Can you find that out, please...

DOYLE: Yes, ma'am.

REP. MYRICK: [A]nd let me know, as well as if there are any penalties if they don't do it?

8) REP. TAYLOR: I think what you're going to find based on experience is a couple things. In some instances, you're just putting a small blue tarp over a small patch that lost the shingles. There will be other instances that actually involve putting the plywood down over what's left of the frame, patching a hole. Remember, the reason a lot of these roofs are gone is that a tree fell into someone's house, so you've got the tree removal. It's certainly complicated whether a flat roof, got a slight pitch or a very steep pitch, which makes it a heck of a lot harder to stay on there.

So I would hope that the Corps has a sliding scale of pricing based on all these different possibilities, but I would hope the colonel would get back to us.

Again, we deserve to know. If it's just putting out an 8-by-12 tarp for $2,500, obviously, we, as a nation, have been taken advantage of, but if the incidents you make reference to
involves removing the tree, replacing the plywood, possibly even fixing the frame, then
that might justify it. But I'm sure hopefully the colonel would get back to us with all that.

DOYLE: Sir, we will get back to you. I mean, that $2,500 could be an average figure
they used for planning purposes.

9) REP. MCCaul: One, I wanted to go back to the Operation Blue Roof issue. The news
reports I've read suggest that the government was paying close to $3,000 for these plastic
blue tarps, when the going rate, according to these news reports, was about $300. So
that's about a tenth of what the government's paying. When you calculate that with
300,000 homes, you're looking at a cost differential of $900 million versus $90 million.
That's extraordinary.

And what I'm looking for you to tell me is that that's not accurate. Can you answer that
question?

DOYLE: Sir, I can't tell you whether that's accurate or not, but what I have committed to
is we will do a paper that lays out how those costs were established and how we set that
average cost or where that average cost number comes from.

10) REP. TAYLOR: Mr. Rothwell, one of the remaining unmet needs is both the Biloxi
Bridge that links Biloxi and Ocean Springs and the bridge that links Bay St. Louis and
Pass Christian along U.S. Route 90 that were destroyed in the storm. Under ideal
circumstances, they'll be replaced in two years.

My question is, whose job is it to try to establish some sort of ferry service, either for
automobiles or passengers between those two points for the two years? Does that fall
under FEMA or does that fall under the United States Department of Transportation?

DOYLE: Sir, I don't know. I mean, you're really asking a question -- this is a great
question.

REP. TAYLOR: Would you get back to me?

DOYLE: I will. I will try to find you an answer and get back to you, sir.

WITNESS: GREG ROTHWELL
CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER
HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT

11) REP. TAYLOR: I see just the opposite with the sprouting of the travel trailers. It's like
these guys are going to be paid by the hour rather than by the task, and they have
absolutely no urgency to get it done, and I've got 14,000 people begging for a place to
stay. So what is going to happen hopefully in the near term to fix that?

Yes, we ought to be using every single manufacturer that's available in the states, even if
means recontracting just on short order.
But I don't see that. And I see a lot of people who are willing to let this drag out past January. And, again, I really would invite you to come down and see the thousands of people who are still living in two-men igloo tents, and I think this nation ought to be able to do better than that for these folks. So if you're not in a position, I accept that. And Ms. English isn't in a position to fix that. Then who is?

ROTHWELL: Well, again, I'm going to ask Mrs. English to respond, but I will assure you that people are in this room taking notes on what is being asked. To the extent that we can get answers back to you on these questions, we absolutely will.

12) REP. ROGERS: Well, the question is, does it cost us more, us taxpayers more, for the Corps to insist that all removal contracts go through the Corps and be reimbursed at 100 percent or is it better that we let local parishes contract with local contractors who have their equipment on hand to remove this debris?

ENGLISH: I really don't know if it's costing us more, if we should use local contractors. I'm just not familiar with that.

REP. ROGERS: Is anybody at the table familiar with it?

DOYLE: Sir, may I add? As I said, the Corps is officially neutral. I mean, counties and parishes are allowed to do their own debris removal. As for the cost, I don't know...

REP. ROGERS: But they're only reimbursed at 75 percent after November 29, correct?

DOYLE: There is a sunset clause. I don't know if it's November 29.

REP. ROGERS: Yes. And the Corps is reimbursed at 100 percent. If you contract with the Corps, you're reimbursed at 100 percent. So if you're a contractor, local contractor, looking for a contract, are you wise to take a chance and contract directly with the parish and maybe only get 75 percent of your money or would you go through the Corps and be assured of 100 percent? …

REP. ROGERS: Yes. My time has expired, but, Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the FEMA people to respond, and all of you to respond, the Corps as well, to respond to other questions raised in the news account that I just cited to you, and I'll be happy to give you a copy of the story [See quote 2].

CHAIRMAN DAVIS: Without objection. Is there any problem with getting that, Mr. Rothwell?

REP. ROGERS: And, finally, I want to ask the FEMA people as well, and I'll be talking to the director about it personally, I want to know if the policy is going to change, and if so, when? And why can't you change it for a disaster beyond anyone's expectations? This debris is going to take two or three years. Normally, you have a few days to clean out the debris with a regular storm. But this is extraordinary and we're talking about saving $4 or $5 billion by changing this crazy policy. Can you respond to that?

ROTHWELL: No, sir. I think we will agree to get back to you and try to figure out how to respond to it.
13) REP. MELANCON: Mr. Pickering, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Jindal and I wrote to FEMA -- and, of course, this will go to the FEMA people too -- on October 24 to ask for a clarification on the fact that the Corps or the FEMA people were coming in and saying, "If you don't task the Corps for the cleanup work, then you'll have to pay a 90-10 share of the cleanup after the date of the expiration of the extension that has just been done."

Is that in fact the case? Is that written somewhere that those parishes, those counties that task their own contractors have been -- and I can verify that they've been told -- that their contractors will have to be paid 90 percent by the feds, 10 percent by the parish or the county after the extension if they don't task the Corps' prime contractor or tier 1 contractor? ....

REP. ROGERS: I have a copy of the guidance number 4150-E of FEMA, issued September 26, 1995, which sets out this policy, which I am told was in the process of being changed as Katrina hit to correct the discrepancy that I've described so that local counties, local officials could contract directly for debris removal or other things and be reimbursed equally, as would the overall contractor of the Corps of Engineers.

And all it would require changing would be to add four words, which I can discuss with you, but those four words are worth $1 billion apiece. And I don't see why you can't change that now. In fact, this policy, in my judgment, is contrary to the Stafford Act itself and therefore null and void. So if you want to get into a discussion of that, step outside. ....

ROTHWELL: No, I will just have to get back. This is a very important issue. We've just not the right panelists to be responding to it, but we have written this down. I've got it written right here, 4150-E. We promise to get back to Chairman Rogers on it and to the rest of the committee.

14) REP. MELANCON: On another issue, in a similar situation where the parish officials or government officials were told if they didn't task the Corps, they would have to pay a percentage of cleanup, this particular parish, for fear that they didn't have the money, which they don't, tasked the Corps and has consequently since the beginning been asking them for an accounting of what it is costing to dispose of and do the cleanup, to which they have not gotten an answer.

To the extent that the parish president of one of my parishes had to, under the Freedom of Information Act, make a request to get that information and has still not received it, and that's several weeks old, why is it that we can't and they can't get simple information of how much it is costing? By now they know how many trailers are coming in, you know how many cubic yards of debris has gone out, you know how much you've expended on those items. Isn't it possible, even parish by parish, to get that information?

ROTHWELL: We will try to get you that information as quickly as possible.

15) REP. TAYLOR: How soon do you think you might be able to get us some information about these two... [percentage of workers from each state -- Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama -- who are working on contracts down there now and the percentage of contractors from each state, from Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, working under the aegis of DHS]

ROTHWELL: I believe by the end of next week we could probably get you that
information.

REP. TAYLOR: That would be great.

ROTHWELL: I will tell you that we’ve actually started asking that information from our companies. So I’m sure we could get it to you by the end of next week.

16) REP. MCCAUL: One other criticism out there that I’d like for you to address, and I hope disprove, is with respect to the Carnival Cruise Line. The approximate cost is $120,000 for a family of four, for six months. It’s reported that an average house in New Orleans has a value of about $87,000.

Also, it was reported that the profit under the government contract is higher than what they actually received per passenger on a regular cruise line.

And then, finally, it was reported the EU said that Greece had offered us, the United States, to donate two cruise ships to deal with this, but we turned that down.

Could you, perhaps, Colonel, of whoever is in the best position to answer that — actually, Mr. Rodwell is probably in the best position to address those allegations.

ROTHWELL: I guess I’m in the best position to respond. This was a contract negotiated by NAVSEA. The Department of the Navy negotiated that. We, in our department, will commit to get you answers to that, but this was negotiated by NAVSEA, and you do have the company actually going to be here in the following panel. But we will get you an answer back.

WITNESS: PATRICIA ENGLISH
SENIOR PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVE
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

17) ENGLISH: I can address your issue as it relates to, to some degree, setting up the trailers. Going forth, what we’re going to do is when we do the recompete of these major contracts, the setup of the trailers, the maintenance of the trailers, the deactivation of trailers, everything, will be on a fixed unit price.

So we will negotiate a fixed price, and this is what you have to do, and it’s going to be performance based where we will have also time standards in there, and there will be penalties for non-performance. In the current contracts, we don’t have those.

But what we did do under the current contracts...

REP. TAYLOR: Ms. English?

ENGLISH: Yes.

REP. TAYLOR: Can we change the current contracts to require that? Because, again, I’m seeing too many folks who take a flushed toilet for granted, who take electricity for granted, who take a bed to sleep under and not getting reined on, not being cold at night.
I'm seeing a room full of people who take all those things for granted. Every weekend when I go home I'm seeing folks who would consider that a luxury and aren't being told that this is going to get fixed for over 60 days.

So how do we change that? I understand what you just said, but is there room in that contract for this to be changed so that somebody will fix that?

ENGLISH: Sir, there's room, and we'll look into seeing what we can do to change it. I will work with our housing folks to see how we can change this and make things happen a little faster.

REP. TAYLOR: OK. Can someone get back to me today?

ENGLISH: I will try.

18) ENGLISH: Those contracts are the ones that setting up the mobile homes, those contracts are the ones that are helping hopefully getting the victims back on their feet. We didn't have those contracts in place.

But for the most part, we had contracts in place. Did we have them to the magnitude that we could have adequately responded to this disaster? No.

REP. JEFFERSON: Because you didn't, a lot of these had to put in place in a hurry. Were a lot of these done by just oral orders over the telephone and that sort of thing?

ENGLISH: No, not really, sir. What happened is, we did put those contracts in place very quickly, but let me tell you how we did that. We were in the process of looking at putting individual technical assistance contracts in place. We were conducting market research. We were meeting with contractors, talking about the contracts, so we were well on the procurement process.

Then the hurricane hit, and we recognized immediately that we needed these type of contracts in place. What we did, the companies that we had conducted market research with we were familiar with, we knew that they could do the work, and we also knew that they could hit the ground running. So we did contact those companies, made arrangements for them to prepare themselves to hit the ground for us.

We did not actually verbally tell them to go immediately. We gave them what was called preauthorization notices. That way they had contract notices to proceed, go to the areas of devastation, work with our folks on the ground and define clearly what was needed to get the job done, to get it done immediately.

REP. JEFFERSON: OK. For the ones that had to put together in this way, how much of the work that was to be done was taken up by these sort of contracts? I mean, what percentage of the work had to be taken up on this emergency basis by contracts that weren't taken care of by the contingency contracts? More than half of the work or less than half of the work? What would you guess?

ENGLISH: I would say less than half, but to be sure, let me check into that and I'll get back to you.
19) CHAIRMAN DAVIS: How many of the travel trailers have been delivered to FEMA but are at a staging area and not delivered to the hurricane victims? Do you have any idea?

ENGLISH: No, sir, but I can get back to you on that.

20) REP. PICKERING: Should we expect, as we look at all of our numbers, that a government overhead is going to be somewhere between 20 and 25 percent?

ENGLISH: I really can't address that. When you asked me about the Corps, I only gave you that data because that was what we were getting from our financial folks, that it was around 21 percent, and I heard that just recently, just prior to coming to a meeting.

As far as our overhead is concerned, I really don't know, but I can certainly check into it and get back to you.

21) REP. PICKERING: Ms. English, you can renegotiate contracts. You currently do not have a time incentive or performance incentive with Bechtel on the housing. If you wanted to renegotiate that, how long would it take you to put an incentive?

And, Colonel Doyle, how long would it take you to make sure that all of the current contracts have incentives for local hires with specific benchmark targets and enforcement mechanisms in those contracts? How long does that take you to do?

ENGLISH: Right now, we're in the process of negotiating with Bechtel. That's something we could try to incorporate into our current negotiations.

REP. PICKERING: And so you would complete that negotiation, change that, and it could be done next week, two weeks, Christmas, January, February, perhaps winter, spring, when?

ENGLISH: No, I'll have to get back to you on that, and the reason is, right now we have several task orders outstanding with Bechtel that have to be negotiated. So I would have to go back and look at those task orders, look at the ones that directly impact the housing to see what we can do about those.

22) ENGLISH: Right after the disaster when we started to buy trailers very early in September, it was very difficult to get through to a lot of vendors and so forth in the disaster-prone area. So we did go outside of the area.

Right now, though, we are only buying trailers from the disaster-prone area. We are buying trailers in Mississipi and Louisiana and Texas. Just about a week ago, we had a requirement for over 3,000 units. We bought all of those units out of the state of Louisiana.

REP. MELANCON: If I could get a list of the dealers that you've dealt with.

ENGLISH: Yes.

23) REP. MELANCON: There were thousands of trailers bought, I believe, last year for Florida. Is it true that FEMA auctioned off a number of those trailers after they were
finished being used?

ENGLISH: Yes, sir; that is true.

REP. MELANCON: Is there some reason we don’t — I mean, as said earlier, this is not going to be disaster every five or 10 years. We’ve got them every year. Is there some reason we don’t clean them up and stockpile them or hold them, as they did with ice at some of the military bases? We probably auctioned them off, and people would die for them right now.

ENGLISH: We do stockpile a certain number, sir. I don’t know that exact number. And why we don’t stock more, I really don’t know, but I can try to find out for you.

REP. MELANCON: If we can look into policy and see that...

ENGLISH: Sure.

24) REP. TAYLOR: And folks are grateful for getting the trailers, believe me, but there have been, apparently, in the speed to build these there have been some quality problems. I’m hearing this quite often. Could you please get for me, for Congressman Melancon, Congressman Jefferson, all the other affected areas, a list of those manufacturers so that if someone calls up, and I won’t name the name, but I’ll just say Trailer X Company, that we can put the people in touch with them, because there are more complaints along that than I think any of us would like to hear.

ENGLISH: OK.

WITNESS: RICHARD SKINNER
INSPECTOR GENERAL
HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT

25) REP. MCCaul: Mr. Skinner, do you have any information [with regard to quote 16]?

SKINNER: Congressman, we are in fact looking at that as well with the DOD IG. The DOD IG is looking at it from a compliance with federal acquisition regs perspective. We’re looking at it from a program perspective. We anticipate having both reports cut within the next 30 to 45 days as to whether, one, was it a wise decision, and, two, did we follow the proper procurement mechanisms to award that particular contract? And did we take into consideration such as the offer from the government of Greece to provide ships free of charge?

26) REP. TAYLOR: Mr. Skinner, my question to you is, I do appreciate that at least FEMA tried to be creative in getting a heck of a lot of people into housing in short order with the cruise contract. It was way too expensive, but what I’m told that is the most troubling to me is that the contracts were written in a way that automatically excluded American suppliers, like the Delta Queen, the Mississippi Queen, the American Queen, that the contracts were written to require that the ship had thousands of berths rather than hundreds of berths, and just that simple phrasing automatically excluded American flag,
American-owned, American crude vessels in favor of foreign flag, foreign-owned, foreign crude. Why is that?

SKINNER: We're looking at that.

REP. TAYLOR: OK. Again, this isn't the last storm we're every going to have.

SKINNER: Yes, and we're aware of that. And, yes, those terms were in those contracts, and those are the questions that we're asking as well.

WITNESS: TERRY THORNTON
VICE PRESIDENT, MARKETING-PLANNING
CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES

27) REP. BUYER: Mr. Thornton, there's a question with regard to whether or not, in negotiations on the contracts, whether Carnival Cruise Lines had requested from the government to waive 10 years of fines? Is that true or not true?

THORNTON: Early on in the negotiations, the very first day, Thursday before we got too far into this, and based really on our lack of knowledge about how this was going to work from a contracting standpoint, we sent general business terms of what we constructed as he deal to an official at FEMA -- without contract price at that point in time, just general business terms. And we did include in that a waiver of Jones Act fines. But as we went forward with the official contract with the MSC, that provision was never pursued.

REP. BUYER: What is your outstanding Jones Act fine?

THORNTON: I'm not aware of that number right off the top of my head, but I could get back to you with that.

REP. BUYER: Must be a pretty big number.

THORNTON: Well, we've had a couple of incidents, specifically in the New Orleans area, related to the river being closed, and having to terminate cruises in a different port that we've left from. They've all been because of catastrophic kind of events, where we had to move ships, and technically violate the Jones Act to accommodate really getting people on and off the ships.
THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM

PREPARED FOR

REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN
REP. BENNIE G. THOMPSON
REP. CHARLIE MELANCON

WWW.DEMOCRATS.HOUSE.REFORM.GOV
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. BACKGROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE 2002 HHS REPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE TRANSFER OF NDMS TO DHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE 2004 AFTER-ACTION REPORTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Inadequate Planning and Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Inadequate Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Inadequate Communications Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE 2005 DHS REPORT ON MEDICAL READINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. THE HHS REPORT ON HURRICANES FRANCES AND IVAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. THE FLAWED NDMS RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Oregon DMAT After-Action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Interviews with DMAT Commanders and Physicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other Accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. THE TRANSFORMATION OF NDMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Strong Medical Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Command and Control Over Medical Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Adequate and Stable Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. CONCLUSION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report examines a crucial component of the nation’s emergency response system: the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). NDMS has the primary responsibility for providing emergency medical care after a national disaster. In recent years, however, a combination of poor management, bureaucratic reshuffling, and inadequate funding have crippled the capacity of NDMS to provide an effective medical response to disasters.

This examination of NDMS — and the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) that form its core — is based on internal reports prepared by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services, a review of “after-action” reports filed by DMATs, and interviews with current and former officials. These reports and sources depict an agency that was struggling in 2002, saw its effectiveness plummet after its transfer to the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, encountered troubles responding to the hurricanes in Florida in 2004, and experienced major lapses in its response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

As it is currently constituted, NDMS cannot respond rapidly or effectively to major disasters. This jeopardizes the nation’s ability to provide timely emergency medical care in response to a major disaster like Hurricane Katrina. Although individual doctors and emergency response personnel serving on DMATs often work heroically under adverse conditions, their individual efforts cannot overcome the systemic problems undermining NDMS effectiveness.

Key findings of the report include the following:

- **Administration officials were warned about NDMS deficiencies as early as 2002.** An internal HHS report in 2002 identified major gaps in the medical readiness of NDMS, including poor management practices, inadequate funding, and a lack of relevant doctrine and standards.

- **The transfer of NDMS to the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 further undermined NDMS effectiveness.** Prior to 2003, NDMS was part of the Department of Health and Human Services, where it was headed by the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness who reported directly to the Secretary. After passage of the Homeland Security Act, NDMS was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security, where it is now run by an official four levels below the Secretary. According to one Homeland Security source, “Here in DHS almost everyone is in law enforcement, and as a result, the right thing to do for medical support and operations is not understood. It is just lost.” Since its transfer to DHS in 2003, the budget of NDMS has been frozen, millions of dollars of NDMS funding have been
siphoned off to support “unidentified services,” and NDMS has lost two-thirds of its staff.

- "After-action" reports from the 2004 hurricane season documented serious breakdowns in planning, supply management, communications, and leadership. Problems included deployment of teams with inadequate staff and supplies. Some response teams lacked essential drugs and equipment such as antibiotics, pain medications, and IV fluids. Others experienced communication failures.

- Two internal reports in 2005 raised more alarms about the capabilities of NDMS. A 2005 report prepared by the medical advisor to former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge concluded that “the nation’s medical leadership works in isolation” and “its medical response capability is fragmented and ill-prepared to deal with a mass-casualty event.” A 2005 report prepared by HHS concluded that NDMS suffered from poor coordination with other federal agencies and a lack of adequate tracking and communication systems.

- When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, NDMS was unprepared to respond. An after-action report from an Oregon-based disaster medical team revealed fractured oversight and constant breakdowns in communication between medical teams and FEMA officials. Among other problems, the report cited "considerable friction" and "lack of trust" between responders and federal managers at the New Orleans Airport, which "compromise[d] the efficiency of operations" and undermined patient care. Doctors who served in the response described inadequate supplies of essential medicines and equipment, as well as a lack of preparation for the shelter conditions resulting from the mass evacuation.

The findings in this report indicate that the United States does not have an effective national capacity to provide emergency medical services after a major disaster. Transforming the capability of NDMS to meet the demands of its mission will require fundamental reforms, including an increase in funding, establishment of strong medical leadership, and clear internal control over medical assets.
The National Disaster Medical System was formed in 1984 as part of the Public Health Service. Its original mission was to support state and local health agencies during natural disasters and to provide back-up support to Department of Defense and Veterans Administration medical systems during times of overseas conflict. In recent years, its mission has expanded to include providing the national medical response to a terrorist attack and pre-staging for “National Security Special Events” such as political party conventions.

The system is a partnership of federal, state, and local governments and health care providers. At the core of NDMS are the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), regional teams of doctors, nurses, and other health professionals. DMATs are typically sponsored by local entities such as hospitals and universities. The personnel who serve on DMATs are paid by the federal government for the time that they are federally deployed. The teams must find other funding sources or ask their personnel to volunteer for the additional time necessary to train, prepare, and maintain readiness.

DMATs deploy to disaster sites with equipment “caches.” These caches are supposed to contain essential medical supplies, such as antibiotics, pain medications, IVs and ventilators. The supplies and equipment used by DMATs during federal deployments are supposed to be paid for by the federal government, but the system lacks clear written policies on this issue.

The Homeland Security Act moved NDMS into the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Prior to that, the system was located in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), where it was headed by the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness. This Assistant Secretary reported directly to the Secretary of HHS.

---

3 Id.
II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

Since Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, national attention has focused on the inadequate response of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Much less attention has been paid to another crucial component of the nation's emergency preparedness: the National Disaster Medical System.

This report, which was prepared by the Special Investigations Division at the request of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, and Rep. Charlie Melancon, examines the current capabilities of the National Disaster Medical System. In the course of the investigation, Special Investigations Division staff obtained access to a series of internal reports on NDMS, including: an internal HHS report issued in 2002 on gaps in NDMS capability; an internal DHS summary of “after-action reports” prepared by NDMS teams that responded to major hurricanes in 2004; an internal HHS report issued in 2005 on the medical response to two major 2004 hurricanes; and an internal DHS report on federal medical readiness prepared by a special medical advisor to the Secretary. With the exception of portions of the DHS report on medical readiness, none of these documents has been reported on previously.

The Special Investigations Division also interviewed current and former officials with knowledge of NDMS.

III. THE 2002 HHS REPORT

Three years ago, an internal report prepared for HHS discovered major gaps in the readiness of NDMS.8 Although Department officials had estimated that 70 DMATs were ready and available, the report found only 29 were operational.9 Among those 29 DMATs, only 16 could meet the staff and supply requirements to deploy a full team in response to a national disaster.10 In addition, the report found that although the nature of DMAT deployments had changed, managers had developed no new standards to evaluate teams’ readiness for these missions, making assessment impossible.11

Based on a review of administrative data and extensive team interviews, the report identified three major problem areas.12 First, the review found that NDMS “lacks sufficient doctrine and policy guidance. The few standards and guidelines that do exist are often not relevant to the current missions that NDMS response

---

8 The CNA Corporation, Assessing NDMS Response Team Readiness: Focusing on DMATs, NDRRTs, and the MST (Oct. 2002).
9 Id. at 25.
10 Id. at 1 – 3, 25.
11 Id. at 1 – 5, 92.
12 Id. at 8 – 9.
teams are asked to fulfill.)) Second, the report faulted management practices, noting that the system "shows strong preferences for which teams it chooses to deploy" and that these preferences were based not on readiness, but on how "connected" the teams were to those making the deployment decisions.)) Since the teams "need to feel that they are a part of the system and that they have an opportunity to use their skills," the report concluded that preferential deployment "chips away at readiness" and created problems with morale and recruitment.)) Third, the report found that NDMS lacked the data and tracking systems necessary to evaluate its own readiness, which in turn prevented meaningful feedback and improvement within the system.

The review identified further deficiencies in the areas of communications, training, and transport but could not fully assess readiness, since the system "does not have any documented standards for these resources and does not track or assess these capabilities.")) The report also described "easily discernable tensions" between response teams and members of the Management Support Teams (MSTs), special teams charged with providing on-site direction and logistical support to medical teams during a deployment. These tensions were caused by a lack of training and relevant experience among MST personnel, as well as differences in the command and control structures used by the two groups.))

The report's conclusions raised concerns about the future effectiveness of NDMS. Although the report found "a very significant reservoir of capability that is available to respond in an emergency," it also found that severe deficiencies in the system were hindering that capability and compromising medical readiness.)) To maintain current capabilities and counter deficiencies, the report recommended major changes to NDMS doctrine and standards, management practices, and performance assessment.

IV. THE TRANSFER OF NDMS TO DHS

A major change involving NDMS occurred in 2003, when the agency was moved from the Department of Health and Human Services and placed in the Department of Homeland Security. This transfer was mandated by passage of the Homeland Security Act in November 2002.)) The Bush Administration, which proposed the

---

13 Id. at 87.
14 Id. at 50.
15 Id. at 50 – 51, 91.
16 Id. at 91.
17 Id. at 33 – 34.
18 Id. at 70 – 72.
19 Id. at 1 – 5.
20 Id. at 87 – 92.
transfer, argued that moving NDMS out of HHS would allow integration of federal emergency medical response assets with the preparedness and intelligence functions of the new Department of Homeland Security.  

At the time that the Homeland Security Act was under consideration by Congress, many experts expressed concern that moving NDMS would interfere with existing relationships between federal, state, and local personnel or would create problems of coordination among the federal agencies involved in providing emergency medical response. Edward Plaugher, Executive Agent of the Washington Area National Medical Response Team, warned that “long-range relationships have been developed [among federal, state and local authorities], and they are vital to the success of the program. ... Sacrificing any part of this long-term relationship building and seamless response” in the transfer to DHS would be a “giant step backward.” Similar warnings came from Janet Heinrich, then-Director of Health Care and Public Health Issues at the Government Accountability Office, who expressed concern that “the lines of authority of the different parties in the event of emergency still need to be clarified” beyond what the Administration had proposed.

Senior Administration officials dismissed these concerns about inter-agency coordination and conflicting authority. Then-Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services Claude Allen stated: “We don’t anticipate it [the move] would create problems in terms of the ultimate function” of NDMS, medical readiness.

As signed into law, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 removed NDMS from HHS. Under the new organization, NDMS is now one section within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is part of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of DHS. NDMS is overseen by the NDMS Section Chief. The NDMS Section Chief reports to the Operations Branch Chief, who reports to the Response Division Director, who in turn reports to the Director of FEMA, who as Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness

---

25 Testimony of Claude Allen, supra note 21 at 64.
and Response is one of five undersecretaries reporting to the Secretary of Homeland Security. In effect, NDMS is separated from the Secretary of Homeland Security by four levels of bureaucratic review.

Since the transfer, the annual budget of NDMS has been frozen at $34 million. Of this amount, however, $20 million has been diverted to “unidentified services.” In the proposed fiscal year 2006 budget, the White House again requested flat funding for the system.

DHS officials did not respond to requests for further information on the NDMS budget, but agency documents provide additional detail about the diversion of NDMS funds. In 2005, the $20 million diverted from the NDMS budget was allocated to “Enhancing Biodefense,” specifically “planning and exercises associated with medical surge capacities.” Increasing “surge capacity” relates primarily to increasing hospital bed availability in a national emergency, not the provision of emergency medical care to victims at or near a disaster site.

The transfer of NDMS and the budget diversions have taken a significant toll on NDMS. In 2005, NDMS had only one third of its previous staff. And other offices within DHS took much of the system’s furniture and supplies.

V. THE 2004 AFTER-ACTION REPORTS

In the 2004 hurricane season, NDMS faced its first major challenge since moving to DHS. During August and September 2004, the system sent 35 DMATs to respond to four major hurricanes in Florida, South Carolina, and other East Coast

33 DHS Medical Readiness Report, id.; Biodefense Spending Misses the Mark, Says FP Expert, supra note 27; NDMS Suffers Culture Shock, supra note 27 at 22; Interview of Dr. Jake Jacoby by Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 26, 2005); Interview of Dr. Jonathan Jui by Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 4, 2005).
and Gulf Coast states. These teams provided “after-action” reports that were summarized in a May 2005 document entitled 2004 Hurricane AARs. This summary of the after-action reports describes serious problems with planning and logistics, supplies, and communications.

A. Inadequate Planning and Logistical Support

According to the after-action reports, many teams experienced poor planning and inadequate logistical support that hindered their operations. Teams from Florida and Alabama reported that they needed more staff in order to cover 24-hour operations. Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio teams noted that they were unprepared to care for “special needs” patients during shelter operations. They called for better planning on how to treat elderly and chronically ill patients and how to co-mingle such patients with family members. Those serving on a management support team in the response to Hurricane Charley, which struck Florida in August 2004, reported that NDMS officials had tasked some logistics personnel to work extended shifts, resulting in unsafe conditions.

Deployment and travel plans were also a problem. FEMA ordered a team from New Mexico to deploy without its cache of medical supplies, causing difficulties when it arrived to join operations. Poor planning delayed a California team when a rental company asked for a large personal deposit on transport vehicles and the team’s flight had inadequate freight capacity to move the load, forcing them to leave members behind to escort the gear.

B. Inadequate Supplies

The after-action reports also reveal that FEMA deployed many teams without adequate medical equipment and drugs. In the case of two teams from North Carolina and Ohio, FEMA had ignored earlier requests to restock supplies. Nine separate teams complained of deficient or unavailable medical caches, while all caches that were delivered directly by FEMA were incomplete. Pharmaceuticals were a major problem: Florida and New Mexico teams reported insufficient pain medication, antibiotics, tetanus, and IV fluids. Michigan and Minnesota teams emphasized that their caches lacked supplies necessary to conduct shelter operations, such as wheelchairs, oxygen machines, a safe power supply, and pads for elderly and bedridden patients using cots.

35 Id.
36 Id. at 24.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id. at 21.
39 Id. at 22.
40 Id. at 14.
41 Id. at 17-19.
42 Id. at 24.
THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM

C. Inadequate Communications Systems

Teams also reported a host of communications problems. Teams from Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, and California stated that FEMA forced them to rely on failed and inadequate communications equipment, causing problems in coordinating among team members, other response personnel, and management officials. Two of these teams were forced to use personal cell phones to accomplish their missions but then were refused reimbursement by FEMA.

Many of these problems were conveyed directly to NDMS management. Yet team members reported that they saw little or no improvement in response.

VI. THE 2005 DHS REPORT ON MEDICAL READINESS

Urgent warnings about weaknesses in NDMS were set forth in an internal January 2005 report on federal medical readiness. The report was written by Dr. Jeffrey Lowell, Senior Medical Advisor to Tom Ridge, who was then the Secretary of Homeland Security. Dr. Lowell’s report evaluated medical preparedness within the Department of Homeland Security and focused extensively on NDMS. The full 103-page report has not previously been disclosed.

This report found that “the nation’s medical leadership works in isolation, its medical response capability is fragmented and ill-prepared to deal with a mass-casualty event, and ... DHS lacks an adequate medical support capability for its field operating units.” Looking specifically at NDMS, Dr. Lowell found that the system:

- Lacked the medical leadership and oversight “required to effectively develop, prepare for, employ, and sustain deployable medical assets”;
- Lacked sufficient funding, staff, and control over medical assets to achieve its medical mission;
- Relied on an overtaxed volunteer network to meet increasing demands outside the system’s original purpose and experienced “critical shortfalls in doctrine,

42 Id. at 10.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 DHS Medical Readiness Report, supra note 31.
46 On September 26, 2005, the Associated Press reported on Dr. Lowell’s review and released a portion of report. Review Warned of Medical Gaps Before Hurricanes, Associated Press (Sept. 26, 2005).
47 DHS Medical Readiness Report, supra note 31 at 2.
48 Id. at 6, 6-7.
49 Id. at 2, 3, 6.
training, logistics support, and coordination" with other emergency responders and federal agencies.\footnote{Id at 6, 6-2, 6-8.}

Dr. Lowell found that "NDMS is losing functional effectiveness under FEMA's inflexible and inappropriate management for medical response circumstances."\footnote{Id at 5-9.}

As a result, he concluded that NDMS "is no longer capable of supporting the new demands being placed on the system" and warned that "immediate attention is required to revitalize a degrading system."\footnote{Id at 2, 6-9.}

As part of the investigation into NDMS, Dr. Lowell and his staff interviewed dozens of NDMS officials, including many members of medical response teams. He was told of serious problems inside the agency. For example:

- One official stated: "Here in DHS almost everyone is law enforcement, and as a result, the right thing to do for medical support and operations is not understood. It is lost."\footnote{Id at 3-11.} Another reported: "We just put together a catastrophic incident plan. It's just a plan. But do we have the capability of carrying out the plan? No."\footnote{Id at 5-2.}

- Others stated: "Right now, we're in a crisis. Some teams are being evicted (DMAT teams) from warehouses — where all their stuff is stored ... because FEMA hasn't paid the bills. ... In California, one team leader put the whole team's expenses on a personal credit card so they could get their mission done. It was $11,000 — so the team would have what they needed, and he couldn't get paid back."\footnote{Id at 5-9, 5-10}

- Officials also stated: "There are no nationwide protocols on what to do or how to do it ... In FEMA, rules take priority over getting the job done. ... We are the glue that is supposed to facilitate communication and coordination [but] there is no system in place at this point in time. ... Morale is awful. We have lost about 10% more professionals than in any other time in history."\footnote{Id at 5-5, 5-10, 5-17, 5-20.}

Dr. Lowell called for a "radical transformation" of NDMS.\footnote{Id at 6-8.} He recommended immediate appointment of strong medical leadership, development of clear mission objectives, and substantial investment in the medical resources, infrastructure, personnel and materials necessary to carry them out.\footnote{Id at b-3 -- 6-8.} Without these changes, the report warned, "the nation's only federal emergency medical
response system will continue to degrade and will not achieve the response level required by the National Response Plan ... and the National Incident Management System.\footnote{Id at 6-3.}

Dr. Lowell emphasized that the system could not fulfill its mission without dramatically increased funding. Implementing the report's recommendations, he concluded, "will require a substantial resource investment, for both personnel and material," including funding for "the development, recruitment and support of both a full-time and reserve medical corps ... [and for] fixed and portable facilities and medical equipment, and supplies."\footnote{Id at 5-4 - 6-5.}

For fiscal year 2005, Dr. Lowell recommended immediate new funding in the amount of $4.11 million to establish a core of strong medical leadership at DHS, including high-level managers with medical expertise and a dedicated medical logistician for NDMS.\footnote{Id at 8-1 - 8-3.} For fiscal year 2006, the report recommended $217.46 million in new funding, over and above the current NDMS budget.\footnote{Id at 3-1.} The recommended 2006 budget included $22.5 million for 150 new staff positions at NDMS, $75 million for specialized mobile treatment facilities, and $100 million for NDMS supplies, equipment, and training.\footnote{Id}

Before finalizing his findings, Dr. Lowell shared the draft report with Michael Brown, who was then the Director of FEMA. According to Dr. Lowell, Mr. Brown attacked the report and told Dr. Lowell that he should not present the report to Secretary Tom Ridge.\footnote{Interview of Dr. Jeffrey Lowell by Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 3, 2005); Review Warned of Medical Gaps Before Hurricane, Associated Press (Sept. 26, 2005).} Dr. Lowell said that Mr. Brown angrily rejected the report's conclusions and recommendations.\footnote{Id} According to Dr. Lowell, however, Secretary Ridge, who had hired Dr. Lowell to prepare the report, welcomed its findings and recommendations.\footnote{Id}

Secretary Ridge left his post on February 1, 2005. Dr. Lowell resigned from his position as Senior Medical Advisor at the end of that month. As a result, the Department was without a chief medical officer until Dr. Jeff Runge took office in mid-September, after Hurricane Katrina struck.\footnote{Review Warned of Medical Gaps Before Hurricane, supra note 65.}
THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM

VII. THE HHS REPORT ON HURRICANES FRANCES AND IVAN

An internal HHS report issued in February 2005 also warned of gaps in NDMS capability. The report examined the federal health and medical response to two major hurricanes in early September 2004, in which NDMS had deployed four DMATs and several specifically needed personnel. The report was commissioned by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Public Health Emergency Preparedness within HHS and therefore focused primarily on the performance of HHS personnel and resources. As a review of the overall federal medical response, however, the report also examined actions by HHS partners, including NDMS, to the extent that they interacted with HHS.

The report identified several weaknesses in the response that involved NDMS. One major problem stemmed from the relationship between NDMS and HHS: "The response to these hurricanes shows that the separation of NDMS from HHS has adversely impacted the coordination of ESF#8." "ESF#8" stands for "Emergency Support Function #8 — Public Health and Medical Services" and refers to the health and medical component of federal disaster response. The report stated that the necessary transfer of responsibilities from NDMS to HHS during the response "was a difficult process that was complicated by a poor working relationship between HHS and NDMS.

In addition, DMAT members interacted very little with other personnel: "NDMS teams usually planned and executed activities on their own and were not well integrated into the overall ESF#8 response." The report concluded that "[b]ecause it is a critical health and medical resource, NDMS should become a part of HHS again." At a minimum, the report recommended, "HHS should work with NDMS to unify the management of ESF#8.

The report emphasized that another major gap in NDMS readiness was the lack of team experience and training in providing care to special needs patients in a shelter operation. Noting that teams had no experience in setting up and operating a shelter, the report further observed that "DMATs are designed to respond to mass casualty incidents by providing emergency care under austere conditions.

---

64 The CNA Corporation, Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery of HHS and ESF#8 Support (Feb. 2005).
65 Id. at 6, 11.
66 Id. at 10.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 25.
70 Id. at 54.
71 Id. at 48.
72 Id.
73 Id.
Caring for special needs patients is a much different scenario." In its recommendations, the report stated that federal responders were "likely to see future requests to operate special needs shelters" and concluded that "HHS and its ESF/8 partners need to address how to handle similar requests in the future." 79

VIII. THE FLAWED NDMS RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

Against this backdrop, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August 2005. As described in an after-action report, interviews with DMAT physicians, and other accounts, NDMS had been severely degraded and was unprepared for this devastating national disaster. Despite the often-heroic efforts of team personnel, the medical response was hindered by poor planning, inept logistics oversight, deficient and delayed supplies, and failed or inadequate communications systems.

A. Oregon DMAT After-Action Report

The Special Investigations Division requested and obtained a copy of an after-action report from a DMAT team from Oregon. 80 The report was prepared by the Oregon-2 DMAT, which was formed in 1999 and has participated in five major NDMS deployments. 81 On August 30, 2005, the team was activated to respond to Hurricane Katrina. On August 31, its team of 33 professionals, including doctors, nurses, pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, and logistics and communications personnel deployed to the region. 82 On Thursday, September 1, the full team arrived at the New Orleans International Airport for a mission that lasted through September 10. 83

In its after-action report, the team described the scene at the New Orleans Airport as "extremely chaotic" and reported that the unstructured medical operation there was severely hindered by poor planning, ineffective management, and regular breakdowns in communication. 84 The report found that NDMS was not adequately prepared to serve in the "first response role" that it was asked to fill in New Orleans. 85 Because the system "is built upon an older model of responding
to an incident 48 to 72 hours post-event," the team lacked adequate communications systems, supplies, and staff.\textsuperscript{66}

According to the after-action report, NDMS did not adequately assess the facility and the situation before deploying teams.\textsuperscript{67} Managers failed to establish any organized internal command and control structure once teams were at the airport.\textsuperscript{68} The overwhelming demand for patient care and extreme lack of resources were compounded by the mistakes of area FEMA/NDMS managers who had no training in logistics oversight or emergency medical response. Ultimately, the report concluded, "management decisions were being made that were not based on the best interests of the patients."\textsuperscript{69}

NDMS management officials forced team members to make individual travel arrangements to Houston, which was the initial reporting location. Because of this requirement, team members arrived in Houston over a 18-hour period, which delayed the entire team's departure for New Orleans.\textsuperscript{70} During travel to New Orleans, team members communicated with other teams at the airport who stated that the Oregon-2 DMAT was urgently needed due to the overwhelming number of patients. Yet managers insisted that the team report to Baton Rouge first. Once there, the team was held up by a management official for nearly two hours. At one point, this official threatened to take the team off of the mission and order them not to go.\textsuperscript{71}

Throughout the deployment, the team reported "considerable friction" with NDMS management officials. The after-action report stated that "an 'us and them' attitude was prevalent. ... The friction ... has been ongoing for quite some time. This continues to compromise the efficiency of operations due to a lack of trust between both parties."\textsuperscript{72}

At the airport, there was little or no communication between on-site management officials and those in Baton Rouge, which left team members unaware of the status and timing of patient arrivals and unable to communicate urgent needs.\textsuperscript{73} The operation also lacked the infrastructure to track patients and resources.\textsuperscript{74} Supplies were a major problem. When the team deployed, NDMS managers refused to transport the team's cache by air, which caused a five-day delay in the

\textsuperscript{66} id.
\textsuperscript{67} id.
\textsuperscript{68} id.
\textsuperscript{69} id.
\textsuperscript{70} id.
\textsuperscript{71} id.
\textsuperscript{72} id.
\textsuperscript{74} AAR, supra note 80.
THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM

cache’s arrival.\textsuperscript{94} Without its own cache, the team relied on outdated and
deficient caches that lacked critical medical equipment, such as ventilators.\textsuperscript{95} NDMS managers failed to fill orders for essential drugs through four days of
urgent requests, insisting on faxed supply forms when the teams had no fax
machines.\textsuperscript{97} Ultimately, the critical drugs and medical supplies arrived only when
the U.S. Air Force and a private organization stepped in to help.\textsuperscript{98}

B. Interviews with DMAT Commanders and Physicians

The problems described in the Oregon after-action report were confirmed in
interviews with three team leaders and doctors who were deployed to the airport
and the Superdome: Dr. Jake Jacoby, Emergency Physician and Team
Commander of California-4 DMAT;\textsuperscript{99} Dr. Jonathan Jui, Medical Director of
Emergency Medical Services in Multnomah County, Oregon and Deputy Team
Leader of Oregon-2 DMAT;\textsuperscript{100} and Bill Engler, Team Commander of
Washington-1 DMAT.\textsuperscript{101}

Dr. Jacoby and Dr. Jui reported that teams at the airport lacked basic supplies to
treat predictable post-disaster medical conditions. They also stated that prior
requests for restocking of team caches had been ignored or denied by NDMS
managers and that their teams “almost always deploy with an insufficient
cache.”\textsuperscript{102} All team members reported making urgent requests for food, water,
and medical supplies in the first days of the operation, without success. By the
time sufficient quantities of food and supplies were delivered by the U.S. Air
Force and Forest Service, team members had begun to give away their own
rations to patients and evacuees. According to team commander Bill Engler, “we
were down to one meal a day.” “If not for the military and the Forest Service,” he
stated, “I don’t know how many people would have died.”\textsuperscript{103}

These team members also reported failures in communication systems that left
them isolated. Cell phones supplied by NDMS failed because they depended on
local infrastructure and the agency had not provided adequate satellite phones or
other back-up means of communication.\textsuperscript{104} In one case, team members tried for
days to reach a logistics official through official channels, with no success.

\textsuperscript{94} Id.
\textsuperscript{95} Id.
\textsuperscript{96} Id.
\textsuperscript{97} Id.
\textsuperscript{98} Id.
\textsuperscript{99} Interview of Dr. Jake Jacoby by Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform
          (Sept. 26, 2005).
\textsuperscript{100} Interview of Dr. Jonathan Jui by Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform
          (Oct. 4, 2005).
\textsuperscript{101} Interview of Bill Engler by Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 25,
          2005)
\textsuperscript{102} Interviews of Dr. Jake Jacoby, Dr. Jonathan Jui, supra notes 99 and 100.
\textsuperscript{103} Interview of Bill Engler, supra note 101.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview of Dr. Jonathan Jui, supra note 100.
Agency radios were not interoperable with state and local authorities or local emergency services. Until the Forest Service supplied interoperable radios, teams were completely unable to reach their own members, other agencies, and on-site security personnel. At the airport, Commander Bill Engler was pulled away from his own team to serve as one of two staff on the Management Support Team. He stated that during a normal deployment, the MST consists of at least 24 people. With so few staff, he reported, the MST was unable to keep track of team members or rotate teams out for critical rest periods.

Many team members reported that NDMS managers handle these problems by forbidding team personnel to talk to anyone outside the system without going through the agency bureaucracy. Dr. Jui stated: “There is a real gag mentality imposed by FEMA about talking to the press or to Congress. To be honest, I saw people die, and I don’t really care if my comments are made public.” Another doctor who deployed after Hurricane Katrina asked not to be identified for this report, fearing retaliation by management officials. “If I say too much,” the doctor stated, “my team will never get deployed again.”

C. Other Accounts

The problems described in the Oregon after-action report and the interviews with the Oregon physicians appear to have hindered the operations of many other DMATs. According to other accounts:

- A DMAT from Rhode Island was ordered to drive from city to city without a mission, while makeshift hospitals treating thousands of patients struggled to operate with inadequate staff.
- Medical teams sent to the Superdome had no communications, inadequate supplies, and minimal security. In the first few days after the storm, a single New Mexico team and then a replacement team from California tended to the medical needs of tens of thousands of evacuees, fearing for their own safety and struggling to provide care with inadequate resources. One doctor recalled: “People literally were dying all around us, but we couldn’t do anything about it.” On September 1, after a National Guard officer was

---

105 Interviews of Bill Engler, Dr. Jake Jacoby, Dr. Jonathan Jui, supra notes 99, 100, 101.
106 Interview of Bill Engler, supra note 101.
107 Interview of Dr. Jonathan Jui, supra note 100.
shot and a California doctor was robbed, federal officials ordered the team to get out "quickly and quietly."110 The team abandoned nearly half a million dollars in equipment and left the building in small groups, with no protection from the National Guard or other security officers.111 Yet a Rhode Island DMAT was deployed to the Superdome the very next day. With only one team providing essential care from that point on, one Rhode Island doctor reported that he worked for over 70 hours without sleep, stepping through garbage and human waste to treat patients.112

- During the disaster, urgent requests for pain medication, IV lines, catheters, and other equipment were held up for days.113 Without ventilators, patients who needed help breathing were "hand bagged" by team members using manual resuscitation masks, in one case for 35 hours.114 A Texas doctor stated, "We were so short on wheelchairs and litters we had to stack patients in airport chairs and lay them on the floor."115 The Strategic National Stockpile contains large quantities of medicine and medical supplies to be used during a public health emergency in which local supplies are exhausted.116 The stockpile is designed so that supplies can reach any state within 12 hours, yet supplies from the stockpile did not begin arriving until three days after the hurricane struck, and even then were insufficient.117 At the same time, some officials turned away donated supplies, citing FEMA policies against the use of non-FEMA materials.118

IX. TRANSFORMING NDIS

Earlier this year, Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff conducted a review of the Department’s structure and operations and proposed significant changes to its organization.119 Under the Department’s new “Six-Point Agenda,” Secretary Chertoff plans to create an Undersecretary for Preparedness, which will include

109 Marin Doctor Tells of Chaos, supra note 107.
110 Id.
113 Going Back for More, supra note 57.
114 Physicians’ E-mails Document Post-Katrina Horrors, Government Health IT (Sept. 12, 2005).
116 Id., HHS Ships Medical Supplies, Opens ‘Medical Shelters’ at Military Bases, Associate Press (Sept. 1, 2005); Interview of Dr. Jonathan Jul, supra note 100.
117 In the wake of Katrina: A surgeon’s first-hand report of the New Orleans tragedy, Medscape General Medicine 7(3) (Sept. 19, 2005).
the Chief Medical Officer (CMO). Under the reorganization, however, NDMS will remain within FEMA. It will not be overseen by the Chief Medical Officer.

The Secretary’s proposed changes do not appear likely to improve the capabilities of NDMS. Contrary to the recommendations of Dr. Lowell, the Chief Medical Officer would not provide medical leadership within NDMS or give teams control over their medical assets. Instead, the CMO will reside in a separate preparedness division and NDMS will continue to lack integrated medical oversight.

Recent statements by the new CMO, Dr. Jeff Runge, also suggest that the Administration does not plan to provide NDMS with the increased funding and support necessary to fulfill its mission. The 2005 DHS report on medical readiness recommended large increases in NDMS funding. But in a September interview with the Associated Press, Dr. Runge said that he would like to improve the federal medical response by “creating a network of trained volunteers” and will seek an “economical way to harness the enormous volunteerism among medical professionals.” He added: “The taxpayers already have a burden to supply a lot of these assets and we need to make sure that we don’t overtax them for that purpose and yet have access to people who could actually kick in in times of need.” It is unclear how such a network would resolve the problems faced by NDMS.

As part of this report, the Special Investigations Division interviewed independent experts about ways to improve the medical capabilities of NDMS. Three measures were most frequently recommended: establish strong medical leadership, restore command and control over medical assets, and provide adequate and stable funding. None of these three appears to be currently contemplated by the Administration.

A. Strong Medical Leadership

According to independent experts, the nation’s disaster medical system must be run by a medical official qualified in disaster medical response. In an interview, Jerry Hauer, former Acting Assistant Secretary of Public Health Emergency Preparedness at HHS, stated that one expeditious way of ensuring such leadership would be to transfer NDMS back to HHS where it could be overseen by a new Deputy Surgeon General. Such a move would ensure that the medical mission of

---

130 Id.
131 New DHS Medical Chief Seeking Volunteers, Associated Press (Sept. 24, 2005).
132 Id.
THE DECLINE OF THE NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM

NDMS is integrated within the agency that oversees all other medical preparedness and response activities at the federal level.  

Dr. Lowell, the former Senior Medical Advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, described an alternative structure for achieving the same goal: retain NDMS within the Department of Homeland Security under the direction of a newly established Assistant Secretary for Medical Readiness. As the Lowell report recommended, this Assistant Secretary could oversee NDMS with a singular focus on medical response capability.

B. Command and Control over Medical Assets

Another key reform is to ensure that the medical leadership of NDMS has control over the system’s medical assets and operations. In recent years, the separation of medical expertise from command authority has meant that the mission critical needs of medical teams were delayed or denied by bureaucratic interference. The effects were evident in the response to Hurricane Katrina: medical teams were deployed with inadequate personnel and supplies, sent to the wrong locations, separated from their equipment, and refused additional supplies. According to experts in providing emergency medical care, NDMS leadership must be given control over medical assets and operations to ensure that decisions are made in the best interests of patients and with the urgency that an emergency medical response requires.

C. Adequate and Stable Funding

The third critical component of restoring our nation’s disaster medical system to full capability is to ensure adequate and stable funding. Dr. Lowell’s report estimated the costs of establishing an Office of Medical Readiness to be $221.57 million over two years. These estimates were in addition to the existing NDMS budget, which has remained flat at $34 million since the transfer to DHS. The report noted that these additional costs “would be off-set with a much higher level of readiness and subsequent ability to meet health care needs” in a national crisis.

124 Interview of Jerry Hauer by Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 23, 2005).
125 Medical Readiness Responsibilities and Capabilities: A Strategy for Realigning and Strengthening the Federal Medical Response, supra note 32 at 3.
126 Interviews of Dr. Jeffrey Lowell, Dr. Jonathan Jui, Dr. Jake Jacoby, and Jerry Hauer, supra notes 64, 99, 100, 124.
127 Medical Readiness Responsibilities and Capabilities: A Strategy for Realigning and Strengthening the Federal Medical Response, supra note 32 at Appendix 8.
128 Id. at 6-4.
On September 8, Congress approved emergency funding to support hurricane response efforts, including $100 million for NDMS. Yet it does not appear that this money will be used to strengthen the capacity of NDMS. Administration officials have indicated that the additional NDMS funds will be used to cover continuing health care costs incurred by storm evacuees.

VI. CONCLUSION

The National Disaster Medical System is an essential component of the nation’s emergency preparedness. It bears the primary responsibility for emergency medical response in a national disaster. But as documented in a series of internal reports since 2002, the system’s effectiveness has been eroded by mismanagement, bureaucratic reshuffling, and inadequate funding. Restoring the effectiveness of NDMS will require major reforms, including strong medical leadership, internal control over resources, and greatly increased funding.

---

128 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Summary of Federal Payments Available for Evacuee Care, Nov. 29, 2005.
December 1, 2005

Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Card:

On September 30, 2005, we wrote to you requesting documents from the White House relating to Hurricane Katrina. We asked that in responding to the request, you give priority to providing communications involving officials in the offices of the President, the Vice President, the Homeland Security Advisor, and yourself. We asked for your initial response within two weeks.

Today, our staffs met with representatives from the White House Counsel’s office to discuss the White House response to our request. White House officials informed us that providing the documents identified in the September 30 letter would take more than a year and involve reviewing more than 71 million email messages sent or received by White House staff. We were also informed that providing the priority communications imposed a lesser, but still very substantial, burden and raised other concerns as well.

Although we disagree with your interpretation regarding the burden of responding to our priority request, we are writing to further specify the timeframe, the individuals, and the topics covered by that request. Specifically, we request that you produce all documents or communications, including internal communications, relating to certain subjects, received, sent, or reviewed between August 23, 2005, and September 15, 2005, by Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, Homeland Security Adviser Frances Townsend and her deputy, Ken Rapuano, and two senior staff in each of their immediate offices who were involved with the Administration’s efforts relating to Hurricane Katrina during that time period.

We ask that these documents and communications refer or relate to the preparations for, impacts of, or response to Hurricane Katrina, including the Administration’s efforts to provide food, water, and shelter to victims of Hurricane Katrina, to provide public safety and law enforcement resources to the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, to provide relief, including evacuation, to victims at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the area known as the cloverleaf, to mobilize active duty and reserve forces to support relief efforts, and to provide medical assistance in the affected areas.
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Page 2

As you know, the Select Committee has a very short deadline for completing its work, and we would like to avoid the issuance of subpoenas. We therefore ask that you produce these priority documents by the close of business on Tuesday, December 6, which is over two months after our initial request was sent.

After the production of these priority documents, we would like to have further discussions with you or your representative about how to prioritize a complete response to our September 30 request.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis
Chairman
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina

Charles Melancon
Member of Congress

[Signature]
Dear Chairman Davis and Representative Melancon:

I am writing in response to your letter to Andrew Card dated December 1, 2005, concerning requests by the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (the “Committee”) for documents from the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”).

As you know, the Administration has already provided substantial information in response to the Committee’s requests. That effort, which is still ongoing, has encompassed the production of approximately 250,000 pages of documents from the departments and agencies charged with the operational response to Hurricane Katrina, which you identified as the Committee’s principal substantive concern. The Administration has also made numerous witnesses available for testimony or interviews before the Committee. By any measure, the Administration’s ongoing response has been substantial and rapid.

As part of this administration-wide response, the EOP also has provided significant information to the Committee, and is prepared to continue its accommodation of your request by producing additional documents and making individuals available to provide the background you have requested. As we have communicated to your staff, it was not practical for the EOP to respond to the Committee’s September 30, 2005 request, which would have involved searching over 71 million electronic records and thousands of boxes of hard copy records dating back to January 2001. Accordingly, in response to the Committee’s original requests we began our production by providing you with, among other things, a compilation of various operational and situational reports, updates, and assessments addressing the issues of priority identified by your letter and used to inform the officials identified in your letter. These documents are significant materials, and encompass many of the principal sources of information received by the White House concerning the areas of the Committee’s focus.

In connection with the EOP’s November 3, 2005 production, we asked the Committee to provide us with a narrower and prioritized set of requests for information that would enable us to provide information in ways that would not be overly burdensome or unduly impinge on the separation of powers of the Legislative and Executive Branches. Your response of December 1, 2005 was very helpful with respect to these issues because, among other things, it identified your
principal areas of concern. In an effort to avoid an unnecessary inter-branch confrontation, we are prepared to continue to accommodate the Committee by providing additional information responsive to those priorities, as outlined below.

First, we are prepared to offer a background briefing by one or more senior Administration officials, to be conducted as early as next week. The briefing would encompass the areas of priority identified in your December 1 letter, including the structure of the EOP and identification of components within it that have responsibilities relating to the federal response to a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina and the roles played by those components in the immediate preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina. While the briefing is intended to address the overall role of the EOP in the response to Hurricane Katrina, we expect it to encompass prioritized areas of inquiry such as EOP involvement in the Administration’s efforts to provide food, water and shelter to victims; to provide public safety and law enforcement resources to affected areas; to provide relief and evacuation to victims at the Superdome, Convention Center and cloverleaf; to mobilize active duty and reserve forces; and to provide medical assistance in affected areas. We believe that such a briefing is the best way to quickly provide the Committee with the most relevant information relating to the areas you have prioritized. We will be in contact with your staff to pursue providing this additional information and to work through any practical details and conditions for such a briefing.

Second, in an effort to be responsive to the Committee’s interests and priorities, we have identified officials from the Homeland Security Council staff who were centrally involved in the EOP’s activities during the core period of preparation and response (August 26 through September 2). These officials, who are appropriately situated to provide the information you have requested, were central to the Administration’s response to the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. We are currently in the process of reviewing documents (including e-mails) from the files of these officials with the objective of making an additional production of documents next week. We believe that providing information of this nature and source is consistent with prior accommodations we have made.

Finally, we have identified additional materials from the White House Situation Room that reflect reports concerning situational and operational information in the aftermath of the Hurricane landfall, including reports addressing the topics identified in your letters. These additional materials are being produced today under separate cover.

We believe the ongoing response of the Administration — including the substantial productions of documents and other information by the departments and agencies and the initial production by the EOP — will be helpful in addressing the Committee’s request for information.
from the Executive Branch. We are seeking to address remaining areas of concern through the briefing and production processes outlined above, and stand prepared to work with the Committee to provide additional information as appropriate that the Committee may determine is required after reviewing the ongoing White House and agency productions of information. We look forward to working with you towards the common goal of ensuring that our Nation’s response to future disasters is as effective as is possible.

Sincerely,

William E. Kelley
Deputy Counsel to the President

The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for
and Response to Hurricane Katrina
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Charles Melancon
Ranking Member
Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for
and Response to Hurricane Katrina
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
December 7, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

On September 30, 2005, we wrote to you requesting documents from the Department of Defense relating to Hurricane Katrina. We asked that in responding to the request, you give priority to providing communications involving officials in the Office of the Secretary and Task Force Katrina. We asked for your initial response within two weeks.

This week, our staffs met with representatives from the Department to discuss the response to our request. Department officials informed us that the Assistant Secretary McFaul had requested all relevant documents and emails from staff in mid-November, and that the Committee would begin to receive the first set of priority documents next week.

We are writing to further specify the timeframe, the individuals, and the topics to be considered as priority requests. Specifically, we request that you produce all documents or communications, including internal communications, relating to certain subjects, received, sent, or reviewed between August 23, 2005, and September 15, 2005, by:

- Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
- Paul McFaul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
- Gordon England, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense,
- Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense,
- Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command,
- General Russel Honore, Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina,
- Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau,
- Col. John J. Jordan, military assistant to former Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Michael Brown, and
- Col. Anthony Dukovich, Defense Coordinating Officer in Louisiana.

We ask that these documents and communications refer or relate to the preparations for, impact of, or response to Hurricane Katrina, including the Department’s efforts to provide food, water, and shelter to victims of Hurricane Katrina, to provide public safety and law enforcement...
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
December 7, 2005
Page 2

resources to the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, to provide relief, including evacuation, to
victims at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the area known as the cloverleaf, to
mobilize active duty and reserve forces to support relief efforts, and to provide medical
assistance in the affected areas.

As you know, the Select Committee has a very short deadline for completing its work,
and we would like to avoid the issuance of subpoenas. We therefore ask that you produce these
priority documents by the close of business on Monday, December 12, 2005, which is more than
ten weeks after our initial request was sent.

After the production of these priority documents, we would like to have further
discussions with you or your representatives about how to prioritize a complete response to our
September 30 request.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Tom Davis
Chairman
Select Bipartisan Committee to
Investigate the Preparation for
and Response to Hurricane Katrina

[Signature]

Charles Melancon
Member of Congress
December 7, 2005

Mr. David Addington
Chief of Staff
Office of the Vice President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Addington:

On September 30, 2005, we wrote to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card requesting documents from the White House relating to Hurricane Katrina. Our request to Mr. Card included a request for documents from the Office of the Vice President. At your request, Chairman Davis subsequently wrote directly to you to request documents from the Office of the Vice President.

As you know, more than two months have passed since that initial request, and the production of priority documents from the Office of the Vice President remains incomplete. We are writing to request immediate production of certain essential documents.

Specifically, we request that you produce all documents or communications, including internal communications, relating to certain subjects, received, sent, or reviewed between August 23, 2005, and September 15, 2005, by, Chief of Staff I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, you, Carol Kuntz, Bruce Miller, Neil Patel, and Ramsen Besharad who, you have informed us, were involved with the Administration’s efforts relating to Hurricane Katrina during that time period.

We ask that these documents and communications refer or relate to the preparations for, impacts of, or response to Hurricane Katrina, including the Administration’s efforts to provide food, water, and shelter to victims of Hurricane Katrina, to provide public safety and law enforcement resources to the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, to provide relief, including evacuation, to victims at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the area known as the cloverleaf, to mobilize active duty and reserve forces to support relief efforts, and to provide medical assistance in the affected areas.

As you know, the Select Committee has a very short deadline for completing its work, and we would like to avoid the issuance of subpoenas. We therefore ask that you produce these priority documents by the close of business on Monday, December 12, 2005, which is more than ten weeks after our initial request was sent.
David Addington  
December 7, 2005  
Page 2

After the production of these priority documents, we would like to have further discussions with you or your representative about how to prioritize a complete response to our request.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis  
Chairman  
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina

Charles Melancon  
Member of Congress
MEMORANDUM

December 13, 2005

To: Members of the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina

Fr: Rep. Charlie Melancon

Re: Motion to Subpoena White House and Other Agencies

On Wednesday, December 14, 2005, at 10 a.m. in 2154 Rayburn, the Select Committee will hold its final hearing of the year on Hurricane Katrina. At last week’s hearing, I served notice that I will offer a motion at the hearing to subpoena the White House and other agencies that have not produced requested documents. This memo explains why I believe a subpoena is necessary to fulfill the Select Committee’s mandate.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On September 30, 2005, Chairman Davis and I sent document requests to the White House, FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Defense Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the three states affected by the storm, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. These requests were broad, but we identified priority documents, including emails, internal memos, and other communications from top decision-makers in each office. We asked for an initial response within two weeks.

In the two and half months since we sent these document requests, we have received many boxes of documents from these agencies and the states. The staff is in the process of reviewing these responses and determining where additional documents should be provided. Already, however, it is clear that there are at least three major gaps in the document production. We have not received key documents and communications from (1) the White House, (2) the Secretary of Defense, (3) the Governors of Mississippi and Alabama. With the February 15, 2006, deadline for the completion of the Committee’s work fast approaching, we should not delay any longer in issuing subpoenas for these documents.

The White House Subpoena

The first subpoena I request will seek the documents and communications related to Hurricane Katrina received, sent, or reviewed between August 23, 2005, and September 15, 2005, by four key individuals in the White House: Chief of Staff Andrew Card, his deputy Joe Hagin, Homeland Security Advisor Francis Townsend, and her deputy Ken Ragusa. These documents and communications are essential to the Committee’s investigation.
The testimony of Michael Brown, the former FEMA Director, establishes that Mr. Card and his deputy, Mr. Hagin, played a crucial role in shaping the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Mr. Brown told the Committee on September 27, 2005, that “the White House was fully engaged” and “working behind the scenes ... to make things happen.” Mr. Brown testified that he “exchanged emails and phone calls with Joe Hagin, Andy Card, and the president”; that he may have spoken with or emailed these White House officials as many as 30 times during the key days before and after the hurricane struck; and that he informed Mr. Card that “we needed help.” In an interview with the New York Times, Mr. Brown further stated that he “ask[ed] the White House explicitly to take over the response.” These urgent communications—and how Mr. Card, Mr. Hagin, and other White House officials responded—are one of the keys to understanding what went wrong in the immediate federal response.

Equally important, documents that the Committee has recently obtained reveal striking discrepancies between what the White House knew about conditions in New Orleans and what the President and other senior Administration officials communicated to the public and members of Congress. The Committee needs to review the flow of White House communications to assess whether these disparities reflect a lack of competence at the highest levels of the Administration or, even worse, a lack of candor.

In the days after Hurricane Katrina struck, the President, Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff, and other senior Administration officials repeatedly explained the slow federal response by stating that they believed New Orleans had “dodged a bullet” on Monday, August 29, the day hurricane struck. They also said they were surprised when “the levees broke on Tuesday.” As Secretary Chertoff characterized it, “that second catastrophe really caught everybody by surprise.” Speaking at a press conference in New Orleans on September 12—two weeks after the hurricane—President Bush stated: “When that storm came through at first, people said, ‘whew. There was a sense of relaxation. ... And I, myself, thought we had dodged a bullet. You know why? Because I was listening to people, probably over the airways, say, the bullet has been dodged. ... There was a sense of relaxin... in the moment, a critical moment.”

Yet documents the Committee has recently obtained contradict these assertions. They show that the gravity of the situation in New Orleans was promptly communicated to both Secretary Chertoff and the White House. According to these documents:

(1) Secretary Chertoff’s chief of staff received an email at 9:27 p.m. on Monday, August 29, the day the hurricane struck, stating that the conditions in New Orleans were much worse than being reported. The email stated: “the first (unconfirmed) reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and more stranded people than they had originally thought.”

(2) Within an hour, at 10:30 p.m. on Monday, a “spot report” was sent to the White House Situation Room from the Department of Homeland Security, stating unequivocally that there was a large break in the 17th Street levee that was flooding New Orleans. This spot report stated that “Marty Bhemont [sic] of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial over flights of the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005,” during
which he observed “a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to flow into the City.”

It is possible that the decision-makers in the White House and the Department of Homeland Security ignored or did not appreciate the significance of these Monday warnings, thereby delaying the urgently needed federal response. It is also possible that top Administration officials publicly contradicted these internal reports to justify the slow federal response. Either way, the implications are serious and need to be examined by the Committee.

I have tried — without success — to avoid the need for the issuance of a subpoena to the White House. I raised my concerns about the failure of the White House to comply with the document request at Committee hearings on October 19, November 2, and November 8, 2005. At the hearing on November 8, Chairman Davis stated that he would set a “firm deadline” of November 18. He also promised that “if the documents aren’t produced by that date, I’m ready to proceed with subpoenas. The clock is ticking.”

It is now apparent, however, that the White House will not comply voluntarily with the Committee’s request. Many of the documents that the White House has provided to the Committee are virtually useless, such as over 1,000 pages already available on the Internet, including press briefings, press releases, and transcripts of “Ask the White House” sessions printed directly from the White House website. When our staffs finally met with White House officials on December 1, 2005, these officials made the ludicrous argument that complying with our request would take over a year and require the review of 71 million emails. The officials also asserted a vague “separation of powers” claim, and one stated bluntly: “You’re not getting Andrew Card’s emails.”

We are thus left with no alternative but to proceed with the issuance of the subpoena.

The Defense Department Subpoena


These documents and communications are also essential to the Committee’s investigation. Just two weeks ago, Bill Lokey, the FEMA official who was the designated “Federal Coordinating Officer” for Louisiana, told the Committee staff that he proposed requesting immediate assistance from the military on Tuesday, August 30. Yet significant military forces did not arrive until Monday, September 5, nearly a week later.
A key question the Committee must investigate is why the military response was delayed so long. And this question cannot be answered until we receive the documents and communications from the nine officials at the center of the Defense Department’s response.

The Subpoenas to the Mississippi and Alabama Governors

The third and fourth subpoenas I request will seek documents and communications related to Hurricane Katrina received, sent, or reviewed between August 23, 2005, and September 15, 2005, by individuals in the offices of the Governors of Mississippi and Alabama. As we did with the federal agencies that responded to Hurricane Katrina, Chairman Davis and I sent document requests on September 30, 2005, to the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Although Louisiana provided more than 100,000 pages of documents, including emails, internal memos, and other communications from top officials in Governor Blanco’s office, we received no internal communications from the offices of Governor Barbour or Governor Riley.

When asked about this at the hearing on December 7, Governor Barbour testified that officials in his office did not send or receive any emails during this timeframe because there was no electricity. This does not appear credible. The request covers a time period prior to the storm — and well afterwards — when email communication was presumably working. It also covers other forms of communication that might have been used instead of email. Although Governor Barbour said he would revisit this issue with his staff and report back to the Committee, we have received no further documents from his office. Although officials from Governor Riley’s office have not claimed that they did not use email during this time, we have not received these communications.

The Congressional Precedent

There is abundant congressional precedent for my subpoena requests. During the Clinton Administration, the House Government Reform Committee, which Chairman Davis now chairs, issued over 1,000 subpoenas to investigate the White House and the Democratic National Committee. Multiple White House Chiefs of Staff were called before the Committee for staff-level depositions and to provide sworn testimony in open hearings. The Committee obtained literally millions of pages of documents, including communications involving the President, the Vice President, and White House Chiefs of Staff. There should not be different standards for different presidents.

The 9-11 Commission also provides guidance for the Committee. I and other Democrats have been calling for an independent commission to investigate Hurricane Katrina modeled on the 9-11 Commission. The Republican response has been that the Select Committee will be able to conduct as thorough an investigation as an independent commission could. The 9-11 Commission, however, obtained access to many internal White House documents, including copies of classified Presidential Daily Briefs. If the Select Committee intends to be as thorough as the 9-11 Commission was, it will also need to obtain the relevant internal White House documents and communications that my subpoenas seek.
I. SELECT COMMITTEE MANDATE TO “CONDUCT A FULL AND COMPLETE INVESTIGATION”

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, widespread criticism was leveled at local, state, and federal officials for their inability to respond adequately to the urgent needs of Gulf Coast residents. Images of agony and ruin were carried live for weeks on national television, making clear to the entire world that U.S. preparation and response efforts since the attacks of September 11, 2001, were severely deficient.

Recognizing this fact, President Bush traveled to the French Quarter of New Orleans to deliver a prime-time speech on September 15, 2005. Standing before Andrew Jackson’s statue at the foot of historic St. Louis Cathedral, he stated:

Four years after the frightening experience of September 11th, Americans have every right to expect a more effective response in a time of emergency. When the federal government fails to meet such an obligation, I, as President, am responsible for the problem, and for the solution.1

In accepting responsibility, the President pledged to work with Congress to investigate the reasons behind this fundamental failure. As he stated:

The United States Congress also has an important oversight function to perform. Congress is preparing an investigation, and I will work with members of both parties to make sure this effort is thorough.2

On the same day, the House of Representatives passed Resolution 437 establishing a new Select Committee to investigate “the local, state, and Federal government response to Hurricane Katrina.”3 The resolution directed the Select Committee to “conduct a full and complete investigation” and “report its findings to the House not later than February 15, 2006.”4 Rep. Tom Davis was appointed chair of the Committee.

The House minority leadership and virtually all Democrats voted against the resolution, favoring instead the creation of “an independent commission, based on the rigorous and effective example of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission,” with an equal number of Democrats and

---

2 Id.
3 H.Res. 437, at sec. 3 (Sept. 15, 2005).
4 Id.
Republicans.\footnote{Office of the House Democratic Leader, \textit{Pelosi Statement on Partisan Select Committee on Katrina Response} (Sept. 21, 2005). \textit{See also} H.R. 3764 (creating an independent commission).} For this reason, no Democratic members were officially appointed to the Select Committee.

Nevertheless, Chairman Davis sent invitation letters to several Democratic members from the Gulf Coast region, including myself, asking us to join the Committee’s investigation. He wrote in those letters: “I believe we must now move forward, together, to undertake this important task.”\footnote{Letter from Chairman Tom Davis to Rep. Charlie Melancon (Sept. 21, 2005).} At the Committee’s first hearing on September 22, 2005, Chairman Davis assured us that the investigation would be even-handed and inclusive:

> The American people want the facts, and they’re watching. They alone will judge whether the review we begin today is thorough and fair. Our final exam will be the report we are tasked with completing. We want both Republicans and Democrats at the table to do this job right. The more voices asking tough questions, the better.\footnote{\textit{Id.}}

Chairman Davis stated that we would “investigate aggressively what went wrong and what went right,” that we would “do it by the book,” and that we would “let the chips fall where they may.”\footnote{\textit{Id.}} Based on these assurances, and recognizing the grave concerns of my own constituents, I agreed to participate.

Since that time, I have attended six hearings, been formally recognized to make opening statements and question witnesses, made motions that have been adopted by the Committee, and sent 13 letters requesting information or documents. By any definition, I have been an active participant in the Committee’s work.

### II. CURRENT STATUS OF FEDERAL AND STATE DOCUMENT PRODUCTION

One of my first actions in the Select Committee was to join Chairman Davis in sending document request letters to the federal and state agencies involved in responding to Hurricane Katrina. On September 30, 2005, the Chairman and I sent letters to the White House, FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Defense Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the three states affected by the storm — Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

Our requests were broad, encompassing the full range of documents relevant to the Committee’s inquiry. However, we identified a narrow subclass of documents in which we had a special interest. These high priority documents included emails, internal memos, and other
communications to and from top decision-makers in each office. For example, our letter to White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card stated:

In responding to this request, we ask that you give first priority to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of the President, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of the White House Chief of Staff, and the Office of the Homeland Security Advisor. 9

We asked for an initial response within two weeks of sending our letters.

Responses to the September 30 document requests were mixed. While very few priority communications were produced initially, persistence by myself and Chairman Davis paid off in some circumstances. For example, in October, FEMA delivered to the Committee more than 1,000 pages of communications from the Office of its former director, Michael Brown. These communications were extremely valuable to the Committee’s work. They showed that Mr. Brown’s actions in the aftermath of the hurricane differed significantly from the way he described them in his testimony to the Committee. In the midst of the crisis, Mr. Brown found time to exchange emails about his appearance, his reputation, and other extraneous matters, but few of his emails demonstrated leadership or a command of the challenges he faced. 10

Several other agencies have provided at least some priority communications. On November 7, the Army Corps of Engineers provided several DVDs containing priority communications from top commanders, including Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, commander of the Army Corps of Engineers, and Col. Richard Wagenaar, commander of the New Orleans district. On December 6, the Department of Homeland Security provided two boxes of communications from several top officials in the office of Secretary Michael Chertoff, including Chief of Staff John Wood, Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, Senior Counselor to the Secretary Scott Weber, and Counselor to the Secretary Adam Isles. On December 7, 2005, the Department of Health and Human Services provided two CDs containing communications from Secretary Leavitt’s office.

The most thorough response to date has been from the Office of Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco. On December 2, 2005, the Governor provided to the Committee over 100,000 pages of documents, including emails, internal memos, and handwritten notes from herself and top officials on her staff. Although she is a state chief executive, Governor Blanco did not assert any legal privilege or separation of powers claim to withheld documents. She also produced documents from her counsel that might otherwise be considered attorney-client work product. In addition to providing these documents to the Committee, the Governor’s office posted them on an Internet website, and they have been made available to the public. 11

---


11 See, e.g., The Katrina Files: Governor Blanco’s Katrina Documents, New Orleans Times-Picayune (online at www.nola.com/katrina/view.ssf).
Committee staff are in the process of reviewing these submissions to determine whether they are complete or whether the Committee should insist on additional productions. Already, however, it is apparent that the Committee has not received key documents from (1) the White House, (2) the Secretary of Defense, and (3) the Governors of Mississippi and Alabama.

III. THE NEED TO SUBPOENA WHITE HOUSE DOCUMENTS

A. What the White House Has Produced

In two productions, on November 3 and December 7, 2005, the White House provided a total of 4,720 pages of documents to the Committee. Some of these documents are relevant to the Committee’s investigation. For example, the White House provided 188 pages of reports by the White House Task Force on Hurricane Katrina Response from September 1 through 14, which include agency reports on Katrina-related work. The White House also provided 754 pages of materials from the White House Situation Room, including reports from the Homeland Security Operations Center, FEMA Region VI, and the State of Louisiana, and other agencies from August 25 to September 4, 2005. These documents begin to provide the Committee with a rudimentary understanding of what information the White House received during this time.

However, many of the documents produced by the White House were already publicly available and added little value to the investigation. For example, the White House provided 1,051 pages of materials that were available on the Internet. Approximately 470 pages were transcripts of formal press briefings and informal press “gaggles” available on the White House website. Approximately 205 pages were printouts of White House press releases from August 28 to October 28. And 40 pages were photocopies of official proclamations and other documents signed by the President following Katrina.

There are also 63 pages of transcripts of “Ask the White House” sessions printed directly from the White House website. These include a September 1 session hosted by Secretary Chertoff; a September 6 session with Education Secretary Margaret Spellings; a September 8 session with USA Freedom Corps Director Desiree Sayle; a September 9 session with Surgeon General Richard Carmona; and a September 19 session hosted by Lynne Cheney.

The Committee also received 469 pages of emails from the White House and DHS communications offices to broad lists of recipients. More than half of these, 273 pages, forward information that is publicly available on the Internet, including press releases, transcripts of press briefings and speeches, fact sheets, and excerpts from press reports favorable to the President.

The bulk of the remaining documents provided by the White House were reports from federal agencies involved in the response efforts. They include: 766 pages of FEMA Situation Report slides from September 1 to 15; 80 pages of FEMA Housing Area Command Report slides from September 8 to 15; 300 pages of National Guard briefing slides from August 23 to September 14; 193 pages of Department of Energy updates from August 26 to September 14; 706 pages of DHHS Situation Reports from August 26 to September 15; 178 pages of HHS Flash Reports from August 31 to September 12; and 147 pages of Red Cross Disaster Operations
Summary Reports from August 25 to September 15. It is unclear who in the White House reviewed these documents or when they received them.

B. What the White House Has Not Produced

What the White House has not produced, however, are the most important documents: communications involving the key White House decision-makers. In particular, we have not received the communications received, sent, or reviewed by four key individuals: White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, his deputy Joe Hagin, Homeland Security Advisor Francis Townsend, and her deputy Ken Rapuano.

These documents are needed to answer two fundamental questions that have been raised by the Committee's investigation: (1) What were the communications between former FEMA Director Michael Brown and White House officials and how did the White House respond? And (2) what accounts for the significant discrepancies between the reports the White House was receiving from New Orleans and the public statements of the President and senior Administration officials?

1. The White House Communications with Michael Brown

A key gap in the record before the Committee is how White House officials responded to multiple communications from former FEMA Director Michael Brown. During his testimony before the Committee on September 27, 2005, Mr. Brown stated that the White House played a central role in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, he testified:

I think this committee really needs to understand that the White House was fully engaged. The White House was working behind the scenes...to make things happen. And in this case they were working to make certain that DOD was providing what was needed.12

Mr. Brown also testified that he had multiple communications with White House officials regarding the hurricane. When asked when he first contacted the President, Mr. Brown replied: "On Saturday and Sunday, I started talking to the White House."13 When asked who else he spoke with, he replied that he "exchanged e-mails and phone calls with Joe Hagin, Andy Card, and the president."14 When asked how many times he spoke with the White House during this period, Mr. Brown replied: "I mean, 30 times, I mean, I don't know."15 And when asked how many times he talked to the president personally, he said: "The president was on one of the

13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
conference calls, talked to the president personally numerous times, several times. A couple of phone calls from the president, a phone call to the president.  

According to Mr. Brown, he had extensive access to the highest officials in the White House. For instance, he testified at the hearing, "I mean, you know — look, I have no problem picking up the phone and getting a hold of Chertoff or Andy Card or Joe Hagin or the President. I don’t have those problems." He elaborated: “I mean, look, the way it works: If I need to speak to the chief of staff or the President, I make the phone call.”

In testimony before the Committee, Mr. Brown testified that he told Mr. Card and others that “we needed help.” In an interview with the New York Times, Mr. Brown claimed that he made a “blur of calls” warning Mr. Card that “I can’t get a unified command and control established” and that “things were going to hell in a handbasket.” He also stated that on August 30, he “ask[ed] the White House explicitly to take over the response from FEMA and state officials.”

This testimony from Mr. Brown raises obvious questions that the Committee needs to investigate. Mr. Brown was the federal official whom President Bush and Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff placed in charge of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. His testimony is that he communicated frequently and extensively with the White House and that the White House was "fully engaged" and "working behind the scenes" to coordinate the federal response. Without access to the documents and communications of the key White House officials with whom Mr. Brown communicated, including Mr. Card and Mr. Hagin, the Committee will never know exactly what Mr. Brown told the White House or how the White House responded.

In addition to Mr. Card, who we know played a significant role, the Committee also needs to obtain communications from the President’s homeland security adviser, Frances Fragos Townsend, who should have played a significant role given her position. Ms. Townsend was reportedly vacationing when the hurricane struck, but returned to the White House by Wednesday. According to press accounts:

\[\text{Id.}\]
\[\text{Id.}\]
\[\text{Id.}\]
\[\text{Id.}\]
\[\text{Id.}\]
\[\text{Ex-FEMA Chief Tells of Frustration and Chaos, New York Times (Sept. 15, 2005).}\]
\[\text{Id.}\]


\[\text{Put to Katrina's Test, Los Angeles Times (Sept. 11, 2005).}\]
Early Wednesday morning, Blanco tried to call Bush. She was transferred around the White House for a while until she ended up on the phone with Fran Townsend, the president’s Homeland Security Adviser, who tried to assure her but did not have many specifics.  

Strangely, Ms. Townsend then left the country on “a previously scheduled trip for Saudi Arabia.” According to one press report, the President “urged Townsend to make the trip despite the crisis at home as a ‘signal to … the enemy’” that the hurricane had not distracted his attention from terrorists, one aide said.  

2. **Discrepancies Between the Information Flow Into and Out of the White House**

The documents and communications of Mr. Card, Mr. Hagin, Ms. Townsend, and Mr. Rupano are also needed to address a key question raised by the documents that the Committee has recently received: the discrepancy between the information sent to the White House and other senior Administration officials about the grave conditions in New Orleans on Monday, August 29, the day the hurricane struck, and the repeated insistence by President Bush, Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff, and other senior officials that they thought New Orleans had “dodged a bullet.”

On September 2, 2005, after touring Biloxi, Mississippi, in his first visit to the Gulf Coast, President Bush tried to justify why the federal government was so slow to respond after Hurricane Katrina. According to the President, “New Orleans got hit by two storms, one the hurricane, and then the flood.” He said that although the hurricane struck on Monday, August 29, “[t]he levees broke on Tuesday in New Orleans.” He then said: “On Wednesday … and Thursday we started evacuating people.”

On September 12, 2005, during a press conference in New Orleans, President Bush was asked whether staff had misinformed him about the levees. He responded as follows:

> When that storm came by, a lot of people said we dodged a bullet. When that storm came through at first, people said, whew. There was a sense of relaxation, and that’s what I

---

25 *Put to Katrina’s Test*, Los Angeles Times (Sept. 11, 2005) (noting that Ms. Townsend was vacationing when Katrina struck, but that she later “attended several meetings in Washington, then left on a previously scheduled trip for Saudi Arabia”).
26 Id.
27 Id.
29 Id.
was referring to. And I, myself, thought we had dodged a bullet. You know why? Because I was listening to people, probably over the airways, say, the bullet has been dodged. And that was what I was referring to. Of course, there were plans in case the levee had been breached. There was a sense of relaxation in the moment, a critical moment.\textsuperscript{30}

Secretary Chertoff provided essentially the same account on \textit{Meet the Press}, where he stated: “what happened is the storm passed and passed without the levees breaking on Monday.”\textsuperscript{31} He asserted that on “Tuesday morning, I opened newspapers and saw headlines that said ‘New Orleans Dodged The Bullet,’ which surprised people.”\textsuperscript{32} He also made the “second catastrophe” argument, stating: “I think that second catastrophe really caught everybody by surprise.”\textsuperscript{33}

General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, provided a similar justification for the delayed federal response. At a September 6 briefing, he stated:

The headline, of course, in most of the country’s papers on Tuesday were “New Orleans dodged a bullet,” or words to that effect. At that time, when those words were in our minds, we started working issues before we were asked. And on Tuesday, at the direction of the secretary and the deputy secretary, we went to each of the services. I called each of the chiefs of the services, one by one, and said we don’t know what we’re going to be asked for yet. The levees and the flood walls had just broken.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Meet the Press}, NBC News (Sept. 4, 2005).

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.} See also Department of Homeland Security, \textit{Press Conference with Officials from the Department of Homeland Security, Justice Department, Defense Department, the National Guard Bureau, U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA} (Sept. 1, 2005) (“[T]his has been a unique disaster in that we really had two disasters one after the other. We had the storm, but then before we could come in and begin the rescue effort and the evacuation effort and the effort to address people’s needs, we had a second catastrophe. That was the levee breaking and the flood coming in”).

\textsuperscript{34} Department of Defense, \textit{Defense Department Operational Update Briefing} (Sept. 6, 2005). See also Department of Defense, \textit{New Orleans “Unwatering” Task Force Speeds Progress} (Sept. 15, 2005) (“Since Hurricane Katrina flooded the city [on Tuesday] Aug. 30, engineers and workers have been feverishly damming up breached levees, strengthening canal walls and getting huge pumps on line”); Department of Defense, \textit{82nd Airborne Division Becomes “Waterborne“ in New Orleans} (Sept. 21, 2005) (“About 80 percent of the Crescent City was flooded after levees broke [on Tuesday] Aug. 30”); \textit{New Orleans Is Dry, Says Corps of Engineers}, American Forces Press Service (Oct. 11, 2005) (“About 80 percent of New Orleans became flooded after the levees gave way [on Tuesday] Aug. 30, a day after Category 4 Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast”).
Administration officials also made these claims directly to members of the Select Committee. Chairman Davis led a congressional delegation to the Gulf Coast on September 18, 2005, during which Coast Guard Vice Admiral Thad Allen briefed the delegation. He claimed that the levees were not breached until Tuesday. He stated that when Hurricane Katrina first passed through New Orleans, the winds pushed the water in Lake Ponchartrain north, away from the city. According to Admiral Allen, it was not until later that the winds reversed and pushed the water south, breaching the levee that usually drains into Lake Ponchartrain and flooding the city. Admiral Allen also claimed that he believed on Tuesday morning that New Orleans had “dodged the bullet.”

Contrary to these statements by the President and other top Administration officials, however, it now appears that both the White House and the Department of Homeland Security received warnings on Monday, August 29, the day the storm struck, reporting major breaches in the levees and providing dire assessments of the massive flooding.

A new document obtained by the Committee shows that on 9:27 p.m. on Monday, Secretary Chertoff’s chief of staff, John Wood, and others in the Secretary’s office at the Department of Homeland Security, received an email from Brian Besanceney, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. This email warned the officials that conditions in New Orleans were significantly worse than being reported. According to the email:

[The first (unconfirmed) reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and more stranded people than they had originally thought — also a number of fires. FYI in case tomorrow’s sit reps seem more “severe.”]

A second document shows that within an hour, at 10:35 p.m. on Monday, a “spot report" was sent to the White House Situation Room from the Department of Homeland Security. This spot report stated unequivocally that there was a large break in the 17th Street levee that was flooding New Orleans. According to the spot report:

Marty Bahamonde [sic] of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial over flights of the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005. … His observations include the following … There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Ponchartrain allowing water to flow into the City.”

About a half-hour later, FEMA Deputy Director Patrick Rhode also sent an email to DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson. At 11:05 p.m. on Monday night, he wrote: “We just spoke with our first rep on the ground in New Orleans who did a helo tour and describes a 200 yard

35 Email from DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Brian Besanceney to DHS Chief of Staff John Wood et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (DHS-FRNT-0006-0000023).

collapse of the levy on the south side of the lake which is accounting for much of the additional flooding.”

In addition to these reports to top officials at the White House and the Department of Homeland Security, other documents reported levee breaches and massive flooding much earlier in the day on Monday. For example, at 8:14 a.m. on Monday morning, the New Orleans office of the National Weather Service issued a bulletin warning: “a levee breach occurred along the Industrial Canal at Tennessee Street.” In addition, at 9:54 a.m., Edward Buikema, acting Director of Response at FEMA emailed Michael Brown and other top FEMA officials with the news that WWL TV was reporting that “a levee breach occurred along the industrial canal at Tennessee Street. 3 to 8 feet of water is expected due to the breach.” There were also other contemporaneous state, local, and media accounts of severe breaches and massive flooding.

The discrepancies between the information flowing into the White House and Department of Homeland Security and the Administration’s public statements are striking and hard to comprehend. One explanation could be incompetence: the senior leadership at the Department of Homeland Security and the White House may have failed to grasp the significance of these dire warnings. Another explanation could be that the top Administration officials made public statements that contradicted these internal reports to help explain the botched federal response. In either case, the implications are serious and require rigorous scrutiny by the Committee.

C. The Need for a Subpoena

The record demonstrates that the Select Committee has made extraordinary efforts to accommodate the interests of the White House, that we have provided more than fair warning of our requirements and intentions, and that we have exhausted all voluntary methods of obtaining the priority communications requested on September 30. A compulsory subpoena remains the only appropriate course of action left for the Committee to fulfill its oversight role.

I first expressed concern with the failure of various agencies to provide documents at the Select Committee’s hearing with Secretary Chertoff on October 19, 2005. Because priority

---

37 Email from FEMA Deputy Director Patrick Rhode to Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Jackson (Aug. 29, 2005).
39 Email from, FEMA Acting Director of Response Edward Buikema to FEMA Director Michael Brown, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005).
40 See, e.g., Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco Discusses Steps Being Taken to Prepare for the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, The Today Show, NBC News (Aug. 29, 2005) (quoting Governor Blanco as stating at 7:33 a.m. on Monday: “I believe the water has breached the levee system, and is -- is coming in”); Rescuers Can't Get to Those Who Are Stranded, New Orleans Times-Picayune (2 p.m., August 29, 2005) (reporting that “City Hall confirmed a breach of the levee along the 17th Street Canal” at 2 p.m.).
communications had not been provided, the Committee was not able to review emails and memos from Secretary Chertoff's office prior to questioning him about what information he received about the hurricane and what actions he took. As I stated:

Reviewing emails and other communications would have shed a lot of light on these issues and enabled us to prepare for the hearing, but instead we have no documents from [Secretary Chertoff's] office. ... I want to trust that when we ask for all the documents we'll get them all. I would hope that we would not have to go to subpoenas to get those documents. 41

I next raised concern with the lack of compliance with priority document requests at the hearing on November 2, 2005, and I asked about the possibility of subpoenas:

Key administration officials have failed to comply with document requests that we sent over a month ago. ... We also have no communications from the White House, even though Mr. Brown testified that he exchanged multiple e-mails with White House officials, including Chief of Staff Andrew Card. We have nothing from HHS, we have nothing from the Pentagon, we have nothing from the Army Corps. Lack of compliance with congressional requests is always a problem, but it is especially egregious when a committee goes out of business in just a few months like this one will. Do you think we should issue subpoenas to the agencies that have not complied with the document request? 42

In response, Chairman Davis said that he shared my concern:

It's my understanding that we'll be receiving on Thursday a substantial production from the White House, responsive to that prioritized request. ... I just want to commit to you and the other members of the committee, I'm going to seek a firm final deadline on all the prioritized requests. We need to get those documents to continue our work, and if they're not met — and I'll work on those deadlines with all of you. If we don't get them, I'm not hesitant to issue subpoenas; we have that power. 43

I raised the failure to comply with the priority requests for a third time at the hearing on November 9, 2005:

We ... have no communications from top White House officials, even though Mr. Brown testified that he exchanged multiple emails with White House officials, including chief of


43 Id.
staff Andy Card. And we have received no documents from Secretary Rumsfeld's office at DOD or Secretary Leavitt's office at HHS. 44

At this hearing, I asked that draft subpoenas be placed into the hearing record, and this motion was adopted. I also asked for a firm date by which the Committee would issue subpoenas if we still had not received the priority communications. Chairman Davis responded as follows:

I'm comfortable setting a firm deadline for the prioritized documents we outlined on September 30th. I would think Friday, November 18th, the final day before we recess, is a reasonable date, and if the gentleman would agree, if the documents aren't produced by that date, I'm ready to proceed with subpoenas. The clock is ticking. 45

Having not received these priority communications from the White House more than two months after the initial request, our staff met with representatives from the White House Counsel's office on December 1, 2005. 46 Although other agencies had managed to comply with our request for priority communications, the White House Counsel's office asserted that their compliance would be impossible. They said it would require the review of 71 million email messages and take over one year. They could not explain, however, why they had not begun producing the priority communications of at least the key individuals identified in the September 30 request letter.

During the meeting, officials from the White House Counsel's office also raised vague concerns about "separation of powers," claiming that it would be inappropriate and unprecedented for Congress to obtain the documents the Committee was seeking. When asked whether they were asserting a legal claim of executive privilege, they said they were not. But when staff provided multiple examples of past precedents for this type of request — particularly from sitting White House Chiefs of Staff during the Clinton Administration — an official from the White House responded bluntly: "You're not getting Andrew Card's emails." 47

Later that day, I joined Chairman Davis in writing to the White House objecting to these arguments. 48 To further limit our request, we identified an even smaller set of documents the


45 House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005).

46 Staff Meeting with Richard Klinger, Associate Counsel to the President, Robert F. Hoyt, Associate Counsel to the President, and Alex M. Mistri, Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs (Dec. 1, 2005).

47 Id.

White House should produce immediately. The letter requested communications from just a handful of individuals: Chief of Staff Andrew Card and his deputy Joe Hagin, Homeland Security Adviser Frances Townsend and her deputy Ken Rapuano, and two senior staff in each of their immediate offices. The request was further limited to communications from August 23 to September 15, 2005. The letter asked for these documents by December 6, 2005.

On December 6, the White House wrote back refusing to provide the requested documents. Instead, the White House offered to arrange a “background briefing” by an unnamed Administration official subject to unspecified “conditions.” Although the White House said it would produce some emails from unspecified Homeland Security Council staff, there was no mention of the specific individuals identified in the December 1 request letter. To date, even the promised briefing and emails have not been provided.

There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from this drawn-out chronology: the White House has persistently refused to provide the key documents that the Committee needs to complete its investigation. A subpoena is now our only option.

IV. THE NEED TO SUBPOENA DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

Another major gap in the documents and communications produced to the Committee involves the actions of key decision-makers at the Defense Department. Information provided to the Committee to date raises serious questions about whether the Pentagon’s response to Hurricane Katrina was timely and effective.

According to the National Response Plan, the federal government’s overall plan for responding to natural disasters and terrorist attacks, the Defense Department is charged with providing support “to Civil Authorities in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents to include terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.” As the Plan states: “Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage.” But this did not happen after Hurricane Katrina.

In an interview with Committee staff on December 2, 2005, Bill Lokey, the FEMA official who was acting as the Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, reported that he asked Michael Brown to seek immediate assistance from the military on Tuesday, August 31. He stated, “On Tuesday, I went to Brown and said something to the effect of, ‘this is beyond the state, this is beyond us, we need the military.’” His plea followed a similar request from Maj.

---

49 Letter from William K. Kelly, Deputy Counsel to the President, to Chairman Tom Davis and Rep. Charlie Melancon (Dec. 6, 2005).
51 Id. at Catastrophic Incident Annex p.3.
52 Committee Staff Interview with William Lokey (Dec. 12, 2005).
Gen. Bennett Landreneau, the head of the Louisiana Guard, who "specifically requested a division of federal ground forces, in particular to evacuate stranded people from the city."33

Mr. Lokey also expressed particular concern that FEMA's already weakened logistical supply system would crumble without the involvement of the Defense Department. He told the Committee staff that Michael Brown had downsized FEMA's regional response teams as an "economy measure" and that the hurricane had caused such devastation that FEMA officials were now "working on a multi-billion dollar tasking to mission assign logistics delivery to DOD."34

Yet despite Mr. Lokey's urgent request for Defense Department assistance, active-duty forces from the Army's 82nd Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions did not arrive in significant numbers until Monday, September 5, a week after the hurricane struck.35 Moreover, their deployment seemed to require a formal order from the President, which he signed in a "rare Saturday appearance in the Rose Garden before live television cameras."36

Other evidence before the Committee raises similar concerns about the delayed Defense Department response. Michael Brown testified that on Tuesday, August 30, "Secretary Chertoff had conversations with Secretary Rumsfeld and we agreed that we were going to do a blanket mission assignment to the Army ... because we knew that we could not do it."37 Yet an email provided to the Committee shows that on Friday, September 2, the Defense Department objected to a request from FEMA for "support for the planning and execution of the full logistical support to the Katrina disaster" because the request did not "come from Secretary to Secretary."38

The Committee has been trying to obtain relevant documents about the military response since September 30, when Chairman Davis and I requested a wide range of documents from the Department of Defense. At that time, we asked that first priority be given "to providing responsive documents or communications, including internal communications, received,

33 Politics Delayed Troops Dispatch to N.O., New Orleans Times-Picayune (Dec. 11, 2005).
34 Committee Staff Interview with William Lokey (Dec. 12, 2005).
35 Id. See also Political Breach Creates Parallel Recovery Operations, Newhouse News Service (Sept. 5, 2005) (reporting that "7,000 active-duty troops ... began arriving Monday under the command of the regular Army and the president").
36 As Anxiety Over Storm Increases, Bush Tries to Quell Political Crisis, New York Times (Sept. 4, 2005).
38 E-mail from FEMA Deputy Director of Operations Ken Burris to DHS Director of Operations Mathew Broderick, et al. (Sept. 2, 2005).
prepared, or sent by officials in the Office of the Secretary.\textsuperscript{59} These priority communications were not provided, however.

On December 5, staff met with Defense Department personnel regarding the Department’s failure to produce the requested documents. They informed us that Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, had personally requested from Pentagon staff all relevant documents and emails and that the Committee would begin to receive the first set of priority documents in the next week.\textsuperscript{60}

On December 7, 2005, Chairman Davis and I wrote a second letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, narrowing our request to communications between August 23 and September 15, 2005, involving nine specified officials: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense Peter Verga, U.S. Northern Command Commander Admiral Timothy Keating, Joint Task Force Katrina Commander General Russell Honore, National Guard Bureau Chief Lt. General Steven Blum, military assistant to the FEMA Director Col. John J. Jordan, and the Defense Coordinating Officer in Louisiana Col. Anthony Daskevich.\textsuperscript{61}

The letter asked for these documents by December 12, 2005. To date, we have not received the requested documents. Given the Committee’s short remaining time, and the Department’s failure to act in a responsive manner, we must issue a subpoena to compel compliance with our requests.

V. THE NEED TO SUBPOENA DOCUMENTS FROM MISSISSIPPI AND ALABAMA

The experiences and communications of officials in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama are critical to understanding how well the federal, state, and local governments worked together in responding to Hurricane Katrina. The three states were affected differently. Louisiana suffered widespread and persistent flooding after a breach of the levees, while destructive winds and a powerful storm surge caused catastrophic damage in Mississippi. Alabama also suffered significant hurricane damage, but due to the relatively devastating impact of the hurricane on neighboring states, it quickly became an aid donor, as well as a recipient.

Although each state experienced different effects from the hurricane, they appear to have experienced similar challenges in responding to the urgent needs of their citizens and in dealing

\textsuperscript{59} Letter from Chairman Tom Davis and Rep. Charlie Melancon to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (Sept. 30, 2005).

\textsuperscript{60} Meeting of Committee Staff with Col. David Rhodes, Staff Director, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Review Task Force, and Army Legislative Liaison Lt. Col. Roger Carstens (Sept. 5, 2005).

\textsuperscript{61} Letter from Chairman Tom Davis and Rep. Charlie Melancon to Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (Sept. 7, 2005).
with the federal government. The Committee has received documents and testimony from FEMA’s top official in Mississippi, William Carville, who wrote in the days after the hurricane that the "system appears broken." He described the same problems as officials in Louisiana, including a dysfunctional distribution system and inadequate supplies: "We were ordering 425 trucks of ice and 425 trucks of water a day and you’re giving us 40."\(^{63}\)

In order to fully and fairly evaluate these similarities and differences among each state’s response efforts, our document requests to the three states were identical. Our priority requests were for documents and communications from each state’s governor’s office, emergency management agency, and adjutant general’s office. All three states have provided a significant number of documents from their emergency management officials, including detailed emergency and evacuation plans, situation reports about Hurricane Katrina, and deployment orders for state National Guard troops.

However, there are significant disparities in the documents produced by the three governors. Louisiana has been the most responsive, providing over 100,000 pages of documents, including extensive emails, internal memos, and handwritten notes. These documents have provided valuable insights into the timing and substance of critical decisions. For example, Governor Blanco’s documents show concern over an attempt by the White House to federalize state National Guard troops. They also reveal shortcomings in FEMA’s ability to secure mass transportation and distribute commodities in a timely manner. In contrast, Mississippi and Alabama have provided no communications from either governor’s office.

I first raised concern with the failure of Governor Riley and Governor Barbour to produce internal communications from their offices at the Committee’s hearing on November 2, 2005, stating: "we have not received any response from Mississippi, Alabama thus far."\(^{64}\)

During the Committee’s hearing on Mississippi’s response to Hurricane Katrina on December 7, 2005, Governor Barbour was specifically asked why he had not produced any internal communications from his office. In response, he testified that officials in his office sent and received no emails during this timeframe because there was no electricity. As he stated:

We were out of our offices. The state office building where my office is didn’t have electricity. … I don’t carry a blackberry, I really am a low-tech kind of governor … so

\(^{62}\) Email from FEMA Coordinating Officer William Carville to FEMA Deputy Director of Response Michael Lowder, et al. (Sept. 2, 2005).


\(^{64}\) House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Statement of Rep. Charles Melancon, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005).
there are not, I don’t have any emails from me, I don’t do a lot of email. I do some, but
only when I’m in the office.\footnote{House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, \textit{Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, 109th Cong.} (Dec. 7, 2005).}

This answer was puzzling since our request covered a time period prior to the storm, and
well afterwards, when email communication was surely working. It also covered staff in the
governor’s office, and other forms of communication that might have been used instead of email.
Although Governor Barbour testified that he would revisit this issue with his staff and report
back to the Committee, we have received no further response from his office.

Unlike Governor Barbour, Governor Riley has not claimed that his office generated no
emails or other internal communications during the timeframe covered by our document request.
To the contrary, the Chairman’s staff reports that they may have obtained some emails from
officials in Governor Riley’s office. My staff has asked to see copies of these documents and
attempted unsuccessfully to contact Governor Riley’s office.

Because we have not received significant internal communications from Mississippi or
Alabama, it is more difficult for the Committee to assess whether the problems experienced in
those states were similar to those in Louisiana. If we are to conduct a credible investigation, we
must obtain essential documents from the governors of all three states. If Governor Blanco was
able to fully comply with our requests, despite the massive problems confronting Louisiana,
certainly Governor Barbour and Governor Riley can comply without facing an undue burden.
Since they have not done so to date, however, a compulsory subpoena is necessary to obtain this
information.

VI. THE PRECEDENT FOR THE SUBPOENAS

There is ample precedent for these subpoena requests from congressional oversight of the
Clinton Administration.

During the Clinton Administration, the House Committee on Government Reform
launched numerous investigations of the White House, from campaign finance probes to an
examination of the White House Christmas card list. The Government Reform Committee
issued over 1,000 subpoenas during the course of these investigations, including 46 subpoenas to
White House officials or former officials. In response, the Clinton Administration produced
internal White House communications involving the President, Vice President, and various
White House Chiefs of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The Government Reform Committee
received millions of pages of documents, including internal memoranda and emails sent to four
of President Clinton’s chiefs of staff: Thomas “Mack” McLarty, Leon Panetta, Erskine Bowles,
and John Podesta. The Committee also received communications between President Clinton and
his advisors, as well as between Vice President Gore and his staff.
Indeed, the Committee even required three White House Chiefs of Staff to testify before the Committee or appear for staff-level depositions. On July 12, 1996, White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty came before the Committee for 5 hours and 15 minutes in a deposition conducted by staff. On September 5, 1997, Mr. McLarty came before the Committee for 5 1/2 hours in a second deposition conducted by staff. On May 5, 1998, White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles came before the Committee for 2 hours and 20 minutes in a deposition conducted by staff. And on March 1, 2001, White House Chief of Staff John Podesta testified before the Committee in open session. During this testimony, he described his personal communications with President Clinton.

The example of the 9-11 Commission is also relevant precedent. The Commission had access to the key decision-makers in the Administration. On April 29, 2004, President Bush and Vice President Cheney answered questions from Commission members in the Oval Office for over three hours. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Richard Clarke testified before the 9-11 Commission in public hearings. The 9-11 Commission also obtained access to relevant internal White House documents, including copies of classified Presidential Daily Briefs and internal memos from Richard Clarke to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. If the Select Committee intends to be as thorough as the 9-11 Commission was, the Committee will need to obtain the relevant White House documents as the 9-11 Commission did.

Against this backdrop, any claim by the Administration that it would be unprecedented for Congress to obtain the communications of senior White House officials is inaccurate.

---

66 House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Deposition of Thomas Franklin McLarty (July 12, 1996).
67 House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Deposition of Thomas Franklin McLarty (Sept. 7, 1997).
68 House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Deposition of Erskine Bowles (May 5, 1998).
71 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Hearings on Counterterrorism Policy (Mar. 24, 2004); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Hearing with Testimony from Condoleezza Rice (Apr. 8, 2004).
73 See, e.g., Memorandum for Condoleezza Rice from Richard A. Clarke (Jan. 25, 2001)
VII. CONCLUSION

The House resolution creating the Select Committee has established a short deadline of February 15, 2006, for completion of the Committee's work. Even with full cooperation, this deadline would be difficult to meet. It becomes impossible for the Committee to fulfill its mandate responsibly if the White House and other agencies are permitted to withhold key documents and run out the clock on the investigation.

On multiple occasions, I have raised my concerns with the Committee that the White House and other agencies appear to be stonewalling the investigation. The Committee should not permit this to continue. I urge all members of the Committee to support my subpoena requests tomorrow.
The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

December 15, 2005

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are writing to renew my request for a White House subpoena and to urge you to schedule a hearing at which we can hear from White House officials in public session.

A briefing was held today from 11:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. with Ken Rapuano, the Deputy Homeland Security Advisor. The briefing was cut short, and we did not learn about White House actions after August 29, the day Hurricane Katrina struck. But what we did learn was (1) that there was a massive failure in virtually all aspects of the federal response and (2) that Congress will never understand why the federal response failed unless we obtain access to the emails and communications of Andrew Card and other senior White House officials.

The Preliminary White House Findings

During the briefing, Mr. Rapuano described the preliminary findings from the White House review of Hurricane Katrina. His presentation, which was accompanied by a series of slides, was stunning in that it showed that virtually every aspect of the federal response had deep flaws.

The preliminary findings in the slides identified an enormous number of failures and deficiencies in the federal response. Mr. Rapuano would not leave a copy of the slides with the members, but staff transcribed over 60 of the specific findings. They are included in an appendix to this letter.

The preliminary White House findings found problems with planning, military response, emergency communications, logistics, coordination with the private sector, training, public communications, environmental issues, shelter and housing, public health, and law enforcement. Key findings included the following:

- "National Response Plan command and coordination were slow and incomplete."
- "The National Response Plan did not function as planned."
- "The bureaucratic process delayed the Federal response."
- "A unified national homeland security planning structure does not exist."
- "Lack of comprehensive communications strategy and plans impeded response."

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
The Honorable Tom Davis
December 15, 2005
Page 2

- "Federal departments and agencies did not effectively talk to command and control structure."
- "Lack of comprehensive national strategy and plans to unite communications plans, architectures, and standards."
- "Priority needs were not met expeditiously."
- "Federal response did not inform nongovernmental organizations what resources were required and how to connect local, State, and Federal emergency managers."
- "Insufficient cooperation, coordination, and planning between nongovernmental and governmental entities."
- "Focus on terrorism rather than all hazards."
- "TOPOFF schedule will take half a century to exercise the remaining 50 States."
- "Federal agencies hampered the restoration of goods and services by taking uncoordinated actions without understanding their national impact."
- "Plans and policies for relocating evacuees did not adequately provide for their shelter or housing."
- "Inadequate coordination of Federal health assets."

Need for White House Documents and Testimony

What the briefing did not answer is how these enormous failings could have occurred. We will not know the answer to these questions unless we subpoena the documents and emails that the White House is refusing to supply.

Mr. Rapuano emphasized that a major cause of the problems was that the federal response plan relied on state and local officials to take the lead in organizing and coordinating the response. In response to one question, he indicated that if federal officials did not hear from a local county in Mississippi, the federal agencies assumed that this meant that everything was under control, even if the county was so devastated that communications were impossible.

What Mr. Rapuano could not explain is why the White House and the Department of Homeland Security did not anticipate that state and local officials would be overwhelmed by the hurricane. The Committee has obtained documents from the Department of Homeland Security that indicate that federal officials had predicted before Hurricane Katrina that the state and local authorities would be overwhelmed. For example, one 2004 document states a major hurricane hitting New Orleans would "quickly overwhelm the State's resources" and "create[e] a catastrophe with which the State would not be able to cope without massive help from
neighboring states and the Federal Government." The Hurricane Pam exercise reached the same conclusions. But Mr. Rapuano could not explain why White House officials were unaware of these reports and their significance.

The presentation included several caveats that it was not comprehensive, and Mr. Rapuano emphasized that it was "not an attempt at a full accounting." For example, Mr. Rapuano said that he compiled the "key events" timeline by sitting down and asking people what they remembered, which he acknowledged was not a scientific process.

One problem with Mr. Rapuano’s presentation was that it omitted key facts and appeared misleading on key points. The timeline for Monday, August 29, the day the hurricane hit, stated that news media were reporting that New Orleans had "dodged a bullet." It also included a situation report from 7:04 p.m. that stated: "reported levees have NOT been breached."

But the chronology inexplicably omitted a situation report sent to the White House at 10:30 p.m. that summarized the observations of a FEMA official, Marty Bahamonde, who flew over New Orleans on the afternoon of August 29. This document reported:

- "There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Ponchartrain allowing water to flow into the City."
- "An estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water."
- "Some homes were seen with water to the first floor and others completely underwater."
- "The Coast Guard is flying rescue missions for people stuck on roofs. They reported seeing about 150 people but said that as they lifted people out, they saw others breaking through the roofs of adjacent homes."
- "A few bodies were seen floating in the water."

When Mr. Rapuano was asked why this critical situation report was omitted from the briefing, he said he was not sure if he saw the situation report or appreciated its significance. Multiple members expressed concern with this omission.

Another major problem with Mr. Rapuano’s briefing is that he consistently refused to provide any specifics about conversations that he and others had with top officials, such as Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, and Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff. When asked whether the President had been aware before landfall of the magnitude of the threat facing New Orleans, he said, "I’m really not here to discuss specific information that was passed to the President." Mr. Rapuano did say that he had been in constant contact with Deputy Homeland Security Secretary Michael Jackson during the

critical two days before landfall, but declined, on advice of counsel, to say whether Secretary Chertoff had been in the loop during those critical days. White House officials explained that the “rules of the road” that the majority had negotiated for the briefing were that such questions need not be answered.

Conclusion

The White House briefing made it clear that there were major flaws in the federal response. But the briefing did not explain why these failures occurred and who should be held accountable. Every time specific questions were asked about the role of key White House officials, Mr. Rapano either declined to answer or gave only a general answer that provided no details.

We therefore renew our request for a subpoena for the emails and communications of four key White House officials: White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, his deputy Joe Hagin, Homeland Security Advisor Francis Townsend, and her deputy, Mr. Rapano. We also believe the Committee should schedule another hearing at which these officials would testify.

Sincerely,

Charlie Melancon
Member of Congress

Gene Taylor
Member of Congress
APPENDIX:
PRELIMINARY WHITE HOUSE FINDINGS ON
HURRICANE KATRINA RESPONSE
(Pursuant to White House Briefing on December 15, 2005)

Problems with Planning
- “National Response Plan command and coordination were slow and incomplete.”
- “The Joint Field Office led a disjointed federal response.”
- “The Joint Field Office Coordinating Group never established.”
- “The Principal Federal Officer did not have enough authority over Federal resources.”
- “Time and resources were lost to ‘on-the-job’ Incident Command Structure training.”
- “The Joint Field Office was established late and lacked adequate staffing and operational procedures.”
- “The National Response Plan did not function as planned.”
- “The bureaucratic process delayed the Federal response.”
- “Interagency Centers did not provide adequate situational awareness or coordination, nor allocate resources in a timely manner.”
- “Federal agencies did not effectively synchronize.”
- “Interagency Incident Management Group was not staffed with trained, senior agency personnel and was not focused on appropriate missions.”
- “A unified national homeland security planning structure does not exist.”

Problems with Military
- “NORTHCOM was not fully aware of its deployed assets for the first 48 hours after landfall.”
- “The National Response Plan’s structure prevented best use of Title 10 Department of Defense assets.”
- “This structure is not sufficient for a catastrophic event.”

Problems with Emergency Communications
- “Lack of comprehensive communications strategy and plans impeded response.”
- “Federal departments and agencies did not effectively talk to command and control structure.”
- "Lack of comprehensive national strategy and plans to unite communications plans, architectures, and standards."
- "No guidance for worst case effects to the communications infrastructure."

Problems with Logistics

- "The Federal logistics system failed to provide certain resources in an efficient and timely manner in order to meet the needs of victims and response personnel."
- "Priority needs were not met expeditiously."
- "Lack of integrated procurement, supply, and distribution system."
- "Poor coordination and planning between Federal, State, local, private sector, and nongovernmental resource managers."
- "Lack of real-time asset tracking system."
- "Inadequate planning for evacuations."

Problems with NGO/Private Sector

- "Resources from nongovernmental organizations were underutilized."
- "The lack of planning and coordination prevented the efficient use of nongovernmental assistance."
- "Federal support to the private sector for protection and restoration of critical infrastructure must be prioritized."
- "Federal response did not inform nongovernmental organizations what resources were required and how to connect local, State, and Federal emergency managers."
- "Insufficient cooperation, coordination, and planning between nongovernmental and governmental entities."

Problems with Foreign Assistance

- "Lack of coordination and integrated planning resulted in inefficient management and use of foreign assistance."
- "Fundamental disconnect exists between planning and actual practice."
- "National Response Plan based on the assumption that the U.S. would request assistance from foreign governments/international organizations only after domestic resources exhausted."
- "Disparity between actual and perceived needs for assistance."
Problems with Training and Exercises

- “Training and exercise programs did not prepare all levels of government.”
- “Federal, State, and local entities were neither properly trained nor exercised.”
- “Training was designed to respond to WMD incidents.”
- “Focus on terrorism rather than all hazards.”
- “No true National Exercise Program.”
- “TOPOFF schedule will take half a century to exercise the remaining 50 States.”
- “Limited State and local senior officials participate in training and exercises.”
- “No national exercise methodology.”
- “Fragmented training programs.”
- "No Agency Remedial Action Management Program."

Problems with Public Communications

- “The public communications plan ... was unable to inform, guide, and reassure the American public during the immediate aftermath.”

Problems with Environmental Issues

- “Responders and victims entered potentially hazardous areas without proper protective equipment.”
- “There was a lack of standards ... to identify and communicate environmental risk to responders and general populations.”
- “Environmental assessment teams were not prepositioned to respond.”
- “Incompatible data formats used by the laboratory network delayed evaluation.”
- “Local officials misunderstood the debris removal process, especially the process to remove debris from private property.”

Problems with Critical Infrastructure

- “Federal agencies hampered the restoration of goods and services by taking uncoordinated actions without understanding their national impact.”
- “There was no Federal coordinating entity with a complete understanding of the interdependency of critical infrastructure sectors.”
- “There was no mechanism to coordinate the conflicting needs of various sectors for both protection and restoration.”
- “There are no protocols to address the relationship between protection and restoration of the infrastructure. Protection efforts were not coordinated with restoration efforts.”
Problems with Shelter and Housing

- "Plans and policies for relocating evacuees did not adequately provide for their shelter or housing."
- "Relocation and sheltering of evacuees was haphazard and inadequate."
- "No comprehensive database to identify suitable and available shelters."
- "Failure of coordination across the interagency."
- "Cumbersome restrictions prevented maximum use of available housing."
- "Failure to involve Department of Housing and Urban Development early enough in the process."

Problems with Public Health

- "Public health and medical support services were effectively but inefficiently delivered to the region."
- "Healthcare and mortuary services were substantially delayed and poorly coordinated."
- "Inadequate pre-storm risk communications regarding public health and medical emergencies."
- "Inadequate pre-storm planning for the utilization of private sector volunteers."
- "Inadequate coordination of Federal health assets."

Problems with Law Enforcement

- "Federal law enforcement assets from certain agencies were underutilized."
- "National Guard was not deployed as effectively as it could be."
- "Incomplete evacuation left large population in New Orleans."
- "Apparent absence of law enforcement emboldened criminal behavior."
- "National Guard did not deploy to effectively respond to lawlessness."
The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to request that the Select Committee obtain from the Department of
Homeland Security the operational annex to the National Response Plan, which we requested on
September 30, 2005, but which the Department still has not provided. This is one of the core
documents the Select Committee should have for its investigation.

Security Secretary Michael Chertoff asking why the Department had not yet completed an
operational annex to the federal government’s National Response Plan for natural disasters and
terrorist attacks. 1 As we stated in our letter, Secretary Ridge issued the National Response Plan
last January to establish broad lines of authority for agencies responding to catastrophic events.
But the Plan stated that a “more detailed and operationally specific” annex would set forth in
detail the precise role of each agency involved in federal response efforts.2

When Hurricane Katrina struck, this operational annex — which is called the
Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) — still had not been completed. In our letter to
Secretary Chertoff, we asked for an explanation, especially given the Secretary’s repeated
statements that, in his opinion, the government’s failure to properly plan was the primary flaw in
the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. For example, on October 19, 2005, Secretary Chertoff

Secretary Michael Chertoff (Nov. 1, 2005).

2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident
Annex (December 2004), at p. CAT-1 (issued on Jan. 6, 2005).
The Honorable Tom Davis  
January 4, 2006
Page 2

Testified before the Select Committee that "80 percent or more of the problem lies with the
planning."3

On December 20, 2005, the Department sent a response to our letter.4 This response
revealed that the CIS was completed on September 6, 2005 — just seven days after Hurricane
Katrina struck. However, the Department's response did not explain why this operational annex
was delayed for over seven months, or why it was not completed prior to Hurricane Katrina.

The Department's letter did suggest that at least part of the reason for the delay involved
unspecified objections by the Defense Department. The letter stated that the CIS was not
completed until the Defense Department agreed to a Memorandum of Agreement, which was not
signed until September 6, 2005. According to the response, this MOA "was essential to
obtaining DOD approval of the CIS."5 In testimony before the Committee, Secretary Chertoff
also highlighted coordination problems with the Department of Defense, stating that the absence
of adequate planning "goes to how well we work with the military when the military has large
numbers of assets they can bring to bear on a problem, how fluid we are with them."6

According to the National Response Plan, "[a] more detailed and operationally specific
NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) that is designated 'For Official Use Only'
will be approved and published independently of the NRP."7 Yet the Department's letter claims
that the federal response to Hurricane Katrina "would not have been improved by the use of the
CIS."8 The Department explains that the CIS is now limited only to a "no-notice event, such as a
terrorist attack or earthquake," although no such limitation is mentioned in the National
Response Plan itself.9

3 FDCH Political Transcripts, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Holds a Hearing on Department of

4 Letter from Pamela J. Turner, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of

5 Id.

6 FDCH Political Transcripts, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Holds a Hearing on Department of

7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident
Annex (December 2004), at p. CAT-1 (issued on Jan. 6, 2005).

8 Letter from Pamela J. Turner, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of

9 Id.
The Honorable Tom Davis  
January 5, 2006  
Page 3  

These conflicting statements are hard to understand. On one hand, the Department says it now has a plan to deploy federal assets in a more timely manner, but on the other hand, it says this plan would have made no difference for Hurricane Katrina. Without additional information, members of the Committee cannot gauge whether there has been any real improvement in federal planning for disasters like Hurricane Katrina.

Unfortunately, the Department has failed to produce a copy of the operational annex to inform this assessment. You and I requested the CIS on September 30, 2005, when we sent a document request to Secretary Chertoff asking 'documents ... prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005, by officials of the Department of Homeland Security or any of its constituent agencies relating to ... emergency preparations, or emergency responses.' Since the CIS was apparently completed on September 6, 2005, it should have been provided to the Committee.

For these reasons, I ask that the Committee now obtain from the Department of Homeland Security the following documents:

1. All draft and final versions of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement prepared between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2005;
2. All draft and final versions of the Memorandum of Agreement relating or referring to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement; and
3. All documents or communications, including internal communications, received, prepared, or sent by officials of the Department of Homeland Security or any of its constituent agencies relating to any draft of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement or Memorandum of Agreement, including edits, additions, deletions, or other comments by any agency or office.

Because these documents were requested more than three months ago, and given the little time the Select Committee has remaining for its work, I request that the Department provide these documents by January 17, 2005. I look forward to discussing this issue further with you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Rep. Charlie Melancon

---

January 23, 2006

The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In recent interviews, top FEMA officials informed the Select Committee that the Defense Department refused on multiple occasions to comply with civilian requests for assistance in the critical days after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. The FEMA officials also told us that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who is currently defying the Committee's subpoena to produce documents, insisted on personally reviewing these urgent FEMA requests.

These new accounts contradict the testimony of Defense Department officials that all civilian requests were approved. And they underscore why it is essential for the Committee to enforce its subpoena against Secretary Rumsfeld.

On January 5 and 6, 2006, Committee staff interviewed Ed Buikema, Acting Director of FEMA's Response Division, and Michael Lowder, FEMA Deputy Director of Response. Mr. Buikema and Mr. Lowder were the senior FEMA officials responsible for coordinating logistics in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Both FEMA officials stated that on Thursday, September 1, 2005, three days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, FEMA requested emergency assistance from the Defense Department pursuant to the National Response Plan. In particular, they stated that FEMA issued a massive "billion-dollar mission assignment" to the Defense Department to deliver food, water, ice, and other essential commodities and logistical support to all three states affected by the hurricane. The FEMA officials said that this urgent request included "logistical support," "initiative" assistance, and "commodity distribution." They characterized the request as a "blanket mission assignment" that was critical to a timely and effective emergency response.

Both FEMA officials stated that the Defense Department frustrated FEMA's attempts to get this aid delivered to the stricken region. The FEMA officials relayed the request to the
The Honorable Tom Davis
January 23, 2006
Page 2

Defense Department’s Joint Director of Military Support. This office told them that the Defense Department would not accept the mission assignment and that all requests for assistance by FEMA had to be personally approved by Secretary Rumsfeld. According to the FEMA officials, the Defense officials expressed concerns that the involvement of active duty troops in providing emergency supplies raised legal issues that the Department had not resolved.

The FEMA officials recounted that this unexpected rejection of their emergency request delayed critical assistance for days. They reported that the Defense Department’s rejection forced them to leave their command post at FEMA headquarters in order to negotiate with Pentagon attorneys about what assignments the Defense Department would and would not accept. These bureaucratic interagency negotiations continued throughout the weekend.

The FEMA officials did not personally communicate with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld during this period. But they told us that they were informed that during these protracted negotiations, Secretary Rumsfeld had to personally sign off on every mission assignment. This added an extra layer of bureaucracy and review. According to one of the FEMA officials, “all FEMA mission assignments to DOD had to go to the Secretary of Defense.” This official also said that “had DOD fully engaged earlier, that would have helped.”

According to the FEMA officials, a final agreement on the Defense Department’s mission assignment was not worked out until Monday, September 5 — one week after Hurricane Katrina struck. But even after a final agreement was reached, problems in the delivery of the emergency aid continued. Emails on Tuesday, September 6, show continuing problems with the delivery of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs). Mr. Buikema wrote to FEMA Deputy Director Patrick Rhode that the Defense Department claimed “we were cutting into their supply of MRE’s for their war fighting effort and that they would not supply the Red Cross. ... So much for mission assigning DOD the logistics support mission.” On the same day, Secretary Rumsfeld was asserting publicly that “[w]e have the forces, the capabilities and the intention to fully prosecute the global war on terror while responding to this unprecedented humanitarian crisis here at home. We can and will do both.”

These new accounts by top FEMA officials raise serious questions about the sworn testimony of Defense Department officials before the Committee. At the Committee hearing on October 27, 2005, top Pentagon officials testified under oath that they approved every request made by civilian authorities. For example, Admiral Timothy Keating, the Commander of Northern Command, stated: “The United States Northern Command met every request for

1 E-mail from Ed Buikema to Patrick Rhode et al. (Sept. 6, 2005).
2 DOD Response Begun Before Katrina Made Landfall, American Forces Press Service (Sept. 6, 2005).
support received by FEMA.\textsuperscript{10} Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale testified: “The Department of Defense received 93 mission assignments from FEMA and approved all of them.”\textsuperscript{11} Mr. McHale further testified that the Defense Department moved quickly to accept the mission assignment from FEMA to take over logistics. When asked whether any time was lost waiting for approval of civilian mission assignments by Secretary Rumsfeld, Mr. McHale said, “I don’t believe so. I think the time that elapsed was commensurate with the magnitude of taking on full logistical support throughout a three- or four-state area.”\textsuperscript{12}

The accounts also make it imperative that the Committee obtain the complete correspondence and other records of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Unfortunately, we have been trying — without success — to obtain Secretary Rumsfeld’s cooperation for months. On September 30, 2005, you and I sent a document request letter to Secretary Rumsfeld asking that he provide all documents and communications “received, prepared, or sent between August 29 and September 15, 2005” relating to “emergency preparations” and “emergency responses” to Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{13} We asked that Secretary Rumsfeld “give first priority” to providing documents from his office.\textsuperscript{14} When Secretary Rumsfeld failed to comply, we sent another letter on December 7, 2005, reiterating our request for all Katrina-related documents or communications from August 23 to September 15, 2005, that were received, sent, or reviewed by Secretary Rumsfeld.\textsuperscript{15} We noted that “we would like to avoid the issuance of a subpoena,” and we asked for the documents by December 12, 2005.\textsuperscript{16}

After Secretary Rumsfeld again failed to provide the requested documents, I made a motion to subpoena these documents at the Committee’s hearing on December 14, 2005. The Committee adopted my motion and issued a subpoena compelling Secretary Rumsfeld to produce “all records and communications, including internal communications, referring or

\textsuperscript{10} Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Hearings on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama (Oct. 27, 2005).

\textsuperscript{11} Id.

\textsuperscript{12} Id.

\textsuperscript{13} Letter from Chairman Tom Davis and Rep. Charles Melancon to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (Sept. 30, 2005).

\textsuperscript{14} Id.

\textsuperscript{15} Letter from Chairman Tom Davis and Rep. Charles Melancon to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (Dec. 7, 2005).

\textsuperscript{16} Id.
The Honorable Tom Davis  
January 23, 2006  
Page 4

relating to the Department of Defense's efforts to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{10}

Although the subpoena directed Secretary Rumsfeld to produce these documents by December 30, 2005, he again failed to comply. According to press accounts, Secretary Rumsfeld is refusing to provide these documents based on a claim of executive privilege.\textsuperscript{11} However, neither Secretary Rumsfeld nor any other Administration official has asserted this privilege to the Committee. Moreover, the Defense Department has not produced any kind of privilege log, which normally accompanies this legal claim.

This situation is not acceptable. The statements of the FEMA officials have serious implications that need to be fully explored. Secretary Rumsfeld's failure to cooperate thwarts the legitimate work of the Committee in examining the military's role in responding to Hurricane Katrina, and it shows contempt for Congress' oversight role.

For these reasons, I ask that you initiate steps to enforce the subpoena issued to Secretary Rumsfeld on December 14, 2005. Only in this way will the Committee obtain a complete record of the Defense Department's compliance with mission assignments issued by civilian authorities.

Sincerely,

Charlie Melancon  
Member of Congress

---

\textsuperscript{10} Subpoena from the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Dec. 14, 2005).

\textsuperscript{11} See, e.g., \textit{Pentagon May Not Hand Over Rumsfeld Papers}, Associated Press (Dec. 16, 2005) (quoting Assistant Secretary McHale as stating that the document production remains "subject to a continuing review of the communication for legitimate issues of legal privilege").
SUBPOENA

BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To The Honorable Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President

You are hereby commanded to be and appear before the Select Bipartisan Committee on the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina of the House of Representatives of the United States at the place, date and time specified below.

☐ to testify touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee.

| Place of testimony: | |
| Date: | Time: |

☐ to produce the things identified on the attached schedule touching matters of inquiry committed to said committee or subcommittee; and you are not to depart without leave of said committee or subcommittee.

| Place of production: 2157 Rayburn HOB, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515 |
| Date: December 21, 2005 | Time: 4:00 p.m. |

To _______________________________ to serve and make return.

Witness my hand and the seal of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the city of Washington, this 14__ day of December______, 2005.

Rep. Tom Davis
Chairman or Authorized Member

Attest:

Clerk
PROOF OF SERVICE

Subpoena for The Honorable Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President
Address The White House
Washington, DC 20500
before the Select Bipartisan Committee on the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina
U.S. House of Representatives
109th Congress

Served by (print name)
Title
Manner of service
Date
Signature of Server
Address
SCHEDULE

Subpoena Duces Tecum
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
United States House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Serve: The Honorable Harriet Miers
Counsel to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

The Committee hereby subpoenas Counsel to the President Harriet Miers, to produce certain records relating to the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. If you have any questions, please contact chief counsel J. Keith Ausbrook at (202) 225-5074.

Instructions

1. In complying with this subpoena, you are required to produce all responsive documents that are in your possession, custody, or control, whether held by you or your past or present agents, employees, and representatives acting on your behalf. You are also required to produce documents that you have a legal right to obtain, that you have a right to copy or to which you have access, as well as documents that you have placed in the temporary possession, custody, or control of any third party. No records, documents, data or information called for by this request shall be destroyed, modified, removed, transferred or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.

2. In the event that any entity, organization or individual denoted in this subpoena has been, or is also known by any other name than that herein denoted, the subpoena shall be read also to include them under that alternative identification.

3. Each document produced shall be produced in a form that renders the document capable of being copied.

4. Documents produced in response to this subpoena shall be produced together with copies of file labels, dividers or identifying markers with which they were associated when this subpoena was served. Also identify to which paragraph from the subpoena such documents are responsive.

5. It shall not be a basis for refusal to produce documents that any other person or entity also possesses non-identical or identical copies of the same document.
6. If any of the subpoenaed information is available in machine-readable form (such as punch cards, paper or magnetic tapes, drums, disks, or core storage), state the form in which it is available and provide sufficient detail to allow the information to be copied to a readable format. If the information requested is stored in a computer, indicate whether you have an existing program that will print the records in a readable form.

7. If compliance with the subpoena cannot be made in full, compliance shall be made to the extent possible and shall include an explanation of why full compliance is not possible.

8. In the event that a document is withheld on the basis of privilege, provide the following information concerning any such document: (a) the privilege asserted; (b) the type of document; (c) the general subject matter; (d) the date, author and addressee; and (e) the relationship of the author and addressee to each other.

9. If any document responsive to this subpoena was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody, or control, identify the document (stating its date, author, subject and recipients) and explain the circumstances by which the document ceased to be in your possession, custody, or control.

10. If a date or other descriptive detail set forth in this subpoena referring to a document is inaccurate, but the actual date or other descriptive detail is known to you or is otherwise apparent from the context of the request, you should produce all documents which would be responsive as if the date or other descriptive detail were correct.

11. The time period covered by this subpoena is included in the attached schedule.

12. This request is continuing in nature and applies to any newly-discovered information. Any record, document, compilation of data or information, not produced because it has not been located or discovered by the return date, shall be produced immediately upon location or discovery subsequent thereto.

13. All documents shall be Bates-stamped sequentially and produced sequentially.

14. Two copies of the documents, one set for the majority and one set for the minority, shall be delivered to the Committee at Room 2157, Rayburn House Office Building.

Definitions

1. The term "document" means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any nature whatsoever, regardless of how recorded, and whether original or copy, including, but not limited to, the following: memoranda, reports, expense reports, books, manuals, instructions, financial reports, working papers, records notes,
letters, notices, confirmations, telegrams, receipts, appraisals, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, prospectuses, interoffice and intra office communications, electronic mail (e-mail), contracts, cables, notations of any type of conversation, telephone call, meeting or other communication, bulletins, printed matter, computer printouts, teletypes, invoices, transcripts, diaries, analyses, returns, summaries, minutes, bills, accounts, estimates, projections, comparisons, messages, correspondence, press releases, circulars, financial statements, reviews, opinions, offers, studies and investigations, questionnaires and surveys, and work sheets (and all drafts, preliminary versions, alterations, modifications, revisions, changes, and amendments of any of the foregoing, as well as any attachments or appendices thereto), and graphic or oral records or representations of any kind (including without limitation, photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotape, recordings and motion pictures), and electronic, mechanical, and electric records or representations of any kind (including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, disks, and recordings) and other written, printed, typed, or other graphic or recorded matter of any kind or nature, however produced or reproduced, and whether preserved in writing, film, tape, disk, videotape or otherwise. A document bearing any notation not a part of the original text is to be considered a separate document. A draft or non-identical copy is a separate document within the meaning of this term.

2. The term “communication” means each manner or means of disclosure or exchange of information, regardless of means utilized, whether oral, electronic, by document or otherwise, and whether face-to-face, in a meeting, by telephone, mail, telexes, discussions, releases, personal delivery, or otherwise.

3. The terms “and” and “or” shall be construed broadly and either conjunctively or disjunctively to bring within the scope of this subpoena any information which might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. The singular includes plural number, and vice versa. The masculine includes the feminine and neuter genders.

4. The terms “person” or “persons” means natural persons, firms, partnerships, associations, corporations, subsidiaries, divisions, departments, joint ventures, proprietorships, syndicates, or other legal, business or government entities, and all subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, departments, branches, and other units thereof.

5. The terms “referring or relating,” with respect to any given subject, means anything that constitutes, contains, embodies, reflects, identifies, states, refers to, deals with or is in any manner whatsoever pertinent to that subject.
Subpoxnaed Items

Please provide the Committee with all documents received, sent, or reviewed between August 23, 2005, and September 15, 2005, by Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, or her deputy, Ken Rapuano, referring or relating to the preparations for, impacts of, or response to Hurricane Katrina, including but not limited to documents referring or relating to the Administration’s efforts:

(a) to provide food, water, and shelter to victims of Hurricane Katrina;
(b) to provide public safety and law enforcement resources to the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina;
(c) to provide relief, including evacuation, to victims at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the area known as the cloverleaf;
(d) to mobilize active duty and reserve forces to support relief efforts; and
(e) to provide medical assistance in the affected areas.
MEMORANDUM

Substitute

Move to accept the briefing from the White House and reserve the right to subpoena Defense Department documents requested in the Committee's December 7 letter.
Marty Bahamonde of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial over flights of the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005. As additional information becomes available it will be reported.

He concluded the two immediate major problems would be:

1. Access to the city because roads are flooded to the north and east.
2. Housing.

His observations include the following:

- The I-10 Twin Span bridges to the east of the City to Slidell are compromised in both directions for a stretch of five to seven miles. On the east side bridge sections are gone, on the west side bridge sections are buckled and askew.
- There is no way to enter New Orleans from the east Highway 11 appears generally in tact but is under water where it enters the City and will require some repair but appears to be a quick fix.
- The western 110/4610 junction connecting Jefferson and Orleans Parish is under water.
- Entrance from the north is not possible because as roads get into the city, they are under water.
- 110 to the west appears to have several underwater sections.
- The Airline Highway by the airport is above water.
- There is a quarter mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to flow into the City.
- The levee in Metairie is in tact.
- Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.
- In the neighborhoods there are many small fires where natural gas lines have broken.
- Flooding is greatest in the north and east in New Orleans, Metairie.
472

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

and north towards Slidell -- an estimated 2/3 to 3/4 of the city is under water.
- The flights did not go all the way north to Slidell so conditions there
are not reported.
- Some homes were seen with water to the first floor and others
completely underwater.
- Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a
major apartment complex in the city. The location has been provided
to City officials.
- Downtown there is less flooding Most buildings have windows blown
out but otherwise appear structurally sound.
- West and South of the City appear dry.
- Lake Front Airport by Lake Pontchartrain is under water.
- There is an oil tanker grounded in the Industrial Canal -- two tugs were
observed working with the ship.
- The Coast Guard reported two other tankers aground but they were
not observed.
- The Coast Guard is flying rescue missions for people stuck on roofs.
They reported seeing about 150 people but also said that as they lifted
people out, they saw others breaking through the roofs of adjacent
homes.
- The Coast Guard will use night vision devices and continue rescue
missions into the night.
- Search and Rescue will need boats, in some locations high wheeled
trucks may be useful. FEMA USR Teams are coordinating boat use
with Louisiana Fish and Game officials.
- The City reports about 300 people have been rescued by boat so far.
These rescue operations will continue through the night.
- Boat traffic is not restricted and movement of supplies by boat and
barge is feasible.
- The Inter Harbor Canal is not visible.
- A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots
also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or
numbers.

Significance:

Actions/Follow-Up: N/A

Miscellaneous: 

Prepared By: Matthew Thompson NBCC Planning Section Analyst
Natalie Rule, head of RA for FEMA called. Said the first (unconfirmed) reports they are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and more stranded people than they had originally thought — also a number of injuries.

**FRI in case tomorrow's sit reps seem more "severe"**

---

Sent from my Blackberry Wireless Handheld
From: Rhode, Patrick [Patrick.Rhode]
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2005 11:05 PM
To: mjackom
Subject: Update

Michael,

Just a quick update since our phone conversation this evening.

We just spoke with our first rep on the ground in New Orleans who did a helo tour and describes a 200 yard collapse of the levy on the south side of the lake which is accounting for much of the additional flooding. While significant, this was the only apparent collapse viewed.

He reiterates significant logistical challenges to the movement of teams and commodities by ground via east side of New Orleans. Says north is compromised as well, essentially leaving western as one of few potential options.

Describes approximately 60 percent of the city as under water to some degree.

Says a seven mile stretch of the twin span along I10 to Slidell is 100 percent compromised with many sections in need of repair.

Saw 1 oil tanker run aground and understand from coast guard that two more may have as well.

We understand that a robust search and rescue is underway in New Orleans and through the evening using night vision equipment. Reports of many successful rescues by air from tops of homes. Fish and wildlife boats are also contributing successfully to this effort. Approx 150 were estimated to be stranded as I write this.

Waterways are open via boat or barge for commodity planners to consider as alternate routes.

Our Oklahoma FEMAT team is moving the special needs population out of the superdome for better care now in Baton Rouge - this may range close to 1,000.

Our rapid needs assessment teams are scheduled to be on the ground by first light in the morning and will have immediate reach back to drones and us.

Only a few unconfirmed random body sightings at this time. Accuracy not reliable at this time.

Debris removal teams as engaged at this time and overnight on 1a and 11.

Lack visibility on MS as storm remnants kept assessments to a minimum this evening, although there are significant search and rescue assets engaged there as well. More visibility an entire scope of situation in am.

Thanks,

Patrick
THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE IN NEW ORLEANS HAS ISSUED A

FLASH FLOOD WARNING FOR...
ORLEANS PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
THIS INCLUDES THE CITIES OF...NEW ORLEANS
ST. HENRIED PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
THIS INCLUDES THE CITY OF CHALMETTE

UNTIL 215 PM CDT

A LEVEE BREACH OCCURRED ALONG THE INDUSTRIAL CANAL AT TENNESSEE STREET. 3 TO 8 FEET OF WATER IS EXPECTED DUE TO THE BREACH.

LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO ARABI AND 9TH WARD OF NEW ORLEANS.

DO NOT DRIVE YOUR VEHICLE INTO AREAS WHERE THE WATER COVERS THE ROADWAY. THE WATER DEPTH MAY BE TOO GREAT TO ALLOW YOUR CAR TO CROSS SAFELY. VEHICLES CAUGHT IN RISING WATER SHOULD BE ABANDONED QUICKLY. MOVE TO HIGHER GROUND.

A FLASH FLOOD WARNING MEANS THAT FLOODING IS IMMEDIATELY OCCURRING. IF YOU ARE IN THE WARNING AREA MOVE TO HIGHER GROUND IMMEDIATELY. RESIDENTS LIVING ALONG STREAMS AND CREEKS SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CROSS SNIFTLY FLOWING WATERS OR WATERS OF UNKNOWN DEPTH BY FOOT OR BY AUTOMOBILE.

LAT. LDN 2992 3912 2994 3903 2997 3901 3965
3004 3992 3008 3993 3002 3012

$8
Motions and Subpoenas

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Motion to Subpoena Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President (Dec. 14, 2005) (motion by Rep. Melancon to subpoena White House documents, rejected by majority).

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Substitute Motion to Accept a Briefing from the White House (Dec. 14, 2005) (handwritten motion adopted by majority in lieu of requested documents).

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Subpoena to Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (issued Dec. 14, 2005).

Documents Provided to the Select Committee


E-mail from Brian Besanceney, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Public Affairs, to John Wood, Chief of Staff, Department of Homeland Security, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (DHS-FRNT-0006-0000023) (regarding the severity of the storm).

E-mail from Patrick Rhode, Deputy Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security (Aug. 29, 2005) (regarding the severity of the storm).

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

HSOC SPOT REP

SPOT REP #: 0013
Date/Time (EDT): 08/29/05 @ 2230
Reference: New Orleans Helicopter Overflight
Source of Information: FEMA Teleconference – observations from Marty Bahamonte, FEMA Public Affairs. Participants included Patrick Rhode, Mike Lowder, Bill Locke, Mike Pawlowski and Mary Anne Lyle
Type of Incident: Hurricane Katrina

Update

Marty Bahamonte of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial overflights the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005. As additional information becomes available it will be reported.

He concluded the two immediate major problems would be:

1. Access to the city because roads are flooded to the north and east.
2. Housing

His observations include the following:

- The I-10 Twin Span bridges to the east of the City to Slidell are compromised in both directions for a stretch of five to seven miles. On the east side bridge sections are gone; on the west side bridge sections are buckled and askew.
- There is no way to enter New Orleans from the east. Highway 11 appears generally in tact but is under water where it enters the City and will require some repair but appears to be a quick fix.
- The western I10/I610 junction connecting Jefferson and Orleans Parish is under water.
- Entrance from the north is not possible because as roads get into the city, they are under water.
- I10 to the west appears to have several underwater sections.
- The Airline Highway by the airport is above water.
- There is a quarter-mile breach in the levees near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Ponchartrain allowing water to flow into the City.
- The levee in Metairie is in tact.
- Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.
- In the neighborhoods there are many small fires where natural gas lines have broken.
- Flooding is greatest in the north and east in New Orleans, Metairie.
and north towards Slidell - an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.

- The flights did not go all the way north to Slidell so conditions there are not reported.
- Some homes were seen with water to the first floor and others completely underwater.
- Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the city. The location has been provided to City officials.
- Downtown there is less flooding. Most buildings have windows blown out but otherwise appear structurally sound.
- West and South of the City appear dry.
- Lake Pontchartrain is under water.
- There is an oil tanker grounded in the Industrial Canal - two tugs were observed working with the ship.
- The Coast Guard reported two other tankers aground but they were not observed.
- The Coast Guard is flying rescue missions for people stuck on roofs. They reported seeing about 130 people but also said that as they lifted people out, they saw others breaking through the roofs of adjacent homes.
- The Coast Guard will use night vision devices and continue rescue missions into the night.
- Search and Rescue will need boats, in some locations high wheeled trucks may be usable. FEMA USR Teams are coordinating boat use with Louisiana Fish and Game officials.
- The City reports about 300 people have been rescued by boat so far. These rescue operations will continue through the night.
- Boat traffic is not restricted and movement of supplies by boat and barge is feasible.
- The Inter Harbor Canal is not visible.
- A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or numbers.
**UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO**

## HSOC SPOT REP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPOT REP #:</th>
<th>0013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date/Time (EDT):</td>
<td>08/29/05 @ 2230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference:</td>
<td>New Orleans Helicopter Overflight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of Information:</td>
<td>FEMA Teleconference – observations from Marty Bahamonde, FEMA Public Affairs. Participants included Patrick Rhode, Mike Lowder, Bill Locker, Mike Pawlowski and Mary Anne Lyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Incident:</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Update**

Marty Bahamonde of FEMA Public Affairs made two aerial over flights of the New Orleans area the afternoon of Monday, August 29, 2005. As additional information becomes available it will be reported.

He concluded the two immediate major problems would be:

1. Access to the city because roads are flooded to the north and east.
2. Housing

His observations include the following:

- The I-10 Twin Span bridges to the east of the City to Slidell are compromised in both directions for a stretch of five to seven miles. On the east side bridge sections are gone, on the west side bridge sections are buckled and askew.
- There is no way to enter New Orleans from the east. Highway 11 appears generally in tact but is under water where it enters the City and will require some repair but appears to be a quick fix.
- The western 110/610 junction connecting Jefferson and Orleans Parish is under water.
- Entrance from the north is not possible because as roads get into the city, they are under water.
- 110 to the west appears to have several underwater sections.
- The Airline Highway by the airport is above water.
- There is a quarter-mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Ponchartrain allowing water to flow into the City.
- The levee in Metairie is in tact.
- Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.
- In the neighborhoods there are many small fires where natural gas lines have broken.
- Flooding is greatest in the north and east in New Orleans, Metairie

**UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO**

Page 1 of 2
and north towards Slidell – an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.

- The flights did not go all the way north to Slidell so conditions there are not reported.
- Some homes were seen with water to the first floor and others completely underwater.
- Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs of a major apartment complex in the city. The location has been provided to City officials.
- Downtown there is less flooding. Most buildings have windows blown out but otherwise appear structurally sound.
- West and South of the City appear dry.
- Lake Front Airport by Lake Pontchartrain is under water.
- There is an oil tanker grounded in the Industrial Canal – two tugs were observed working with the ship.
- The Coast Guard reported two other tankers aground but they were not observed.
- The Coast Guard is flying rescue missions for people stuck on roofs. They reported seeing about 150 people but also said that as they lifted people out, they saw others breaking through the roofs of adjacent homes.
- The Coast Guard will use night vision devices and continue rescue missions into the night.
- Search and Rescue will need boats, in some locations high wheeled trucks may be usable. FEMA US&R Teams are coordinating boat use with Louisiana Fish and Game officials.
- The City reports about 300 people have been rescued by boat so far. These rescue operations will continue through the night.
- Boat traffic is not restricted and movement of supplies by boat and barge is feasible.
- The Inner Harbor Canal is not visible.
- A few bodies were seen floating in the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no details on locations or numbers.

**Significance:**

**Actions/Follow-Up:** N/A

**Miscellaneous:**

**Prepared By:** Mathew Thompson NRCC Planning Section Analyst
Motions and Subpoenas

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *Motion to Subpoena Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President* (Dec. 14, 2005) (motion by Rep. Melancon to subpoena White House documents, rejected by majority).

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *Substitute Motion to Accept a Briefing from the White House* (Dec. 14, 2005) (handwritten motion adopted by majority in lieu of requested documents).

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *Subpoena to Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense* (issued Dec. 14, 2005).

Documents Provided to the Select Committee


E-mail from Brian Besanceney, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Public Affairs, to John Wood, Chief of Staff, Department of Homeland Security, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (DHS-FRNT-0006-0000023) (regarding the severity of the storm).

E-mail from Patrick Rhode, Deputy Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security (Aug. 29, 2005) (regarding the severity of the storm).

From: Besanceny, Brian
Sent: Monday, August 29, 2005 9:27 PM
To: Wood, John P; Bergman, Cynthia; Karolis, Jeff; Krocke, William R; Boudreaux, Chad; Carnall, Ashley
Subject: FYI from FEMA

Natalie Rule, head of PA for FEMA called. Said the first (unconfirmed) reports they are getting from social surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and more stranded people than they had originally thought - also a number of fires.

FYI in case tomorrow's sit reps seem more "severe"

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
Motions and Subpoenas

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Motion to Subpoena Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President (Dec. 14, 2005) (motion by Rep. Melancon to subpoena White House documents, rejected by majority).

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Substitute Motion to Accept a Briefing from the White House (Dec. 14, 2005) (handwritten motion adopted by majority in lieu of requested documents).

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Subpoena to Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (issued Dec. 14, 2005).

Documents Provided to the Select Committee


E-mail from Brian Besanceney, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Public Affairs, to John Wood, Chief of Staff, Department of Homeland Security, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (DHS-FRNT-0006-0000023) (regarding the severity of the storm).

E-mail from Patrick Rhode, Deputy Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security (Aug. 29, 2005) (regarding the severity of the storm).

Michael,

Just a quick update since our phone conversation this evening.

We just spoke with our first rep on the ground in New Orleans who did a helo tour and describes a 200 yard collapse of the levy on the south side of the lake which is accounting for much of the additional flooding. While significant, this was the only apparent collapse viewed.

He reiterated significant logistical challenges to the movement of teams and commodities by ground via east side of New Orleans. Says north is compromised as well, essentially leaving western as one of few potential options.

Describes approximately 60 percent of the city as under water to some degree.

Says a seven mile stretch of the twin span along I10 to Slidell is 100 percent compromised with many sections in need of repair.

Saw a oil tanker run aground and understands from coast guard that two more may have as well.

We understand that a robust search and rescue is underway in new orleans and through the evening using night vision equipment. Reports of many successful rescues by air from tops of homes. Fish and wildlife boats are also contributing successfully to this effort. Approx 150 were estimated to be stranded as I write this.

Waterways are open via boat or barge for commodity planners to consider as alternate routes.

Our Oklahoma DMAT team is moving the special needs population out of the superdome for better care now in baton rouge – this may range close to 1,000.

Our rapid needs assessment teams are scheduled to be on the ground by first light in the morning and will have immediate reach back to crews and user.

Only a few unconfirmed random body sightings at this time. Accuracy not reliable at this time.

Debris removal teams are engaged at this time and overnight in la and ms.

Less visibility on MS as storm elements kept assessments to a minimum this evening, although there are significant search and rescue assets engaged there as well. More visibility on entire scope of situation in am.

Thanks,

Patrick
Motions and Subpoenas

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *Motion to Subpoena Harriet Miers, Counsel to the President* (Dec. 14, 2005) (motion by Rep. Melancon to subpoena White House documents, rejected by majority).

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *Substitute Motion to Accept a Briefing from the White House* (Dec. 14, 2005) (handwritten motion adopted by majority in lieu of requested documents).

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *Subpoena to Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense* (issued Dec. 14, 2005).

Documents Provided to the Select Committee


E-mail from Brian Besanceney, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Public Affairs, to John Wood, Chief of Staff, Department of Homeland Security, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (DHS-FRNT-0006-0000023) (regarding the severity of the storm).

E-mail from Patrick Rhode, Deputy Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security (Aug. 29, 2005) (regarding the severity of the storm).

MUTUAL - HAS ACTIVATION REQUESTED
FLASH FLOOD WARNING
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NEW ORLEANS LA
816 AM CDT MON AUG 29 2005

THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE IN NEW ORLEANS HAS ISSUED A

* FLASH FLOOD WARNING FOR...
  ORLEANS PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
  THIS INCLUDES THE CITY OF...
  NEW ORLEANS ST.
  BERNARD PARISH IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA
  THIS INCLUDES THE CITY OF CHALMETTE

* UNTIL 215 PM CDT

* A LEVEE BREACH OCCURRED ALONG THE INDUSTRIAL CANAL AT TENNESSEE STREET. 3 TO 6 FEET OF WATER IS EXPECTED DUE TO THE BREACH.

* LOCATIONS IN THE WARNING INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO ARASI AND 9TH WARD OF NEW ORLEANS.

DO NOT DRIVE YOUR VEHICLE INTO AREAS WHERE THE WATER COVERS THE ROADWAY. THE WATER DEPTH MAY BE TOO GREAT TO ALLOW YOUR CAR TO CROSS SAFELY. VEHICLES CAUGHT IN RISING WATER SHOULD BE ABANDONED QUICKLY.

MOVE TO HIGHER GROUND.

A FLASH FLOOD WARNING MEANS THAT FLOODING IS IMMINENT OR OCCURRING.

IF YOU ARE IN THE WARNING AREA MOVE TO HIGHER GROUND IMMEDIATELY.

RESIDENTS LIVING ALONG STREAMS AND CREEKS SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CROSS SWIFTLY FLOWING WATERS OR WATERS OF UNKNOWN DEPTH BY FOOT OR BY AUTOMOBILE.

LAT...LON 2992 3012 2994 9003 2987 8987 3001 8985
3004 8982 3008 8993 3002 9012

**