The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking

Summary

The active and reserve components of the United States armed forces have a long and proud history of providing essential aid to the civilian populace of this country in the aftermath of natural disasters. There are several reasons the nation continues to rely on the military to perform this role. One is that the military is able to provide essential, life saving services more quickly and more comprehensively than any other entity when local and state response capabilities are overwhelmed, including the ability to provide helicopter and boat rescue, shelter, food, water, and medical support. Importantly, much of this capability is vested with the National Guard, and is thus an asset under the control of the governor of each respective state or territory and the District of Columbia.

As robust as the military capability is, there are limitations, many of which are highlighted in the specific findings below. The most important limit to the military's ability to manage domestic disaster response is the nation's traditional reliance on local control to handle incident response. The federal government, with the Department of Defense (DOD) serving as part of the federal response team, takes its directions from state and local leaders. Since that is our nation's tradition, DOD does not plan to be the lead agency in any disaster situation and expects to assist as local authorities request and direct. Furthermore, DOD lacks the detailed knowledge of local conditions essential to effective relief operations.

Even so, the element of the U.S. military with the longest tradition of service — the militia, now called the National Guard — is a particularly valuable asset to each state, territory, and the District of Columbia. Units can be called to active duty by the order of the governor and serve as the state's chief executive directs. Thus, the National Guard is responsive and will possess knowledge of local conditions. In contrast, the processes by which active military forces are brought to a region are lengthy and burdensome. When they arrive, these forces will not have detailed local knowledge and will be prohibited by law from performing law enforcement functions. In addition, there will be two distinct military chains of command — one for federal troops and one for National Guard troops under state command.

This dual chain of command structure, lengthy federal troop activation system, and, in the case of Katrina, devastated local authorities, contributed to a poorly coordinated federal response to Katrina. It would not be possible to anticipate all problems and prevent all the difficulties that ensued from a storm of this magnitude, but better planning, more robust exercises, and better engagement between active forces and the National Guard both before and during disaster response would have helped prevent human suffering.

Two new organizations created after September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD's Northern Command, are integral parts of this process, and the growing pains were evident to the Select Committee. Northern Command is charged with managing the federal military response to disasters and DHS is in charge of the overall federal effort. Northern Command has taken strides, but needs better integration with FEMA and with the National Guard effort at disasters and emergencies. Clearly, more needs to be done.

Even though there were problems, the military played an invaluable role in helping the citizens of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi respond to the devastation of Katrina and saved countless lives. Indeed, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale testified:

"The Department of Defense’s response to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the largest military deployment within the United States since the Civil War."
There is no doubt DOD resources improved the national response to Katrina. Although trained and equipped for war fighting, there is enough commonality of expertise and equipment that made for a significant military contribution to the majority of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) of the National Response Plan. DOD is the only federal department with supporting responsibilities in each of the fifteen ESFs.²

The Hurricane Katrina response also reinforced the National Response Plan’s designation of the National Guard as the military’s first responders to a domestic crisis.

“In contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992) in which National Guard forces constituted 24% of the military response, National Guard forces represented more than 70% of the military force for Hurricane Katrina.”³

Number of National Guard and active Duty Personnel in Joint Operational Area of Hurricane Katrina

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<tr>
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SOURCE: NORTHERN COMMAND TIMELINE

Despite the immediacy of required action, confusion created by multi-intergovernmental agency activities and dual military responses, the men and women of the armed services came when they were called. And whether on the ground, in the air, or on the water, they worked extremely hard to save and offer aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

There are a number of specific areas where better coordination mechanisms could have greatly improved the execution of military support during Hurricane Katrina. The protocols associated with sharing essential information, the coordinated movement of personnel and equipment, and prior joint planning and training are vital to an effective and comprehensive response.

Finding: The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex as written would have delayed the active duty military response, even if it had been implemented

The National Response Plan (NRP) creates confusion about federal active duty military involvement due to unresolved tension between the possible need for active duty military assistance when state and local officials are overwhelmed, and the presumption that a governor will use his or her understanding of the situation on the ground to decide whether and when to ask for active duty military support.

A foundational assumption of the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) is that local and surrounding jurisdictions’ response capabilities may be insufficient as they could be quickly overwhelmed by an event. Despite this guiding assumption, NRP-CIA policy assumes that state/local incident command authorities will be able to integrate federal resources into the response effort. The NRP-CIA fails to reflect whether in a catastrophic incident, DHS should rely upon the same principle — the presence of local and state first responders for the first 48-72 hours of an emergency — as the non-catastrophic incident portion of the NRP. This failure would have delayed the federal military response and prevented full integration of the National Guard and active duty missions, even if the NRC - CIA had been involved.
Whether there exists an effective local and state response for the first 48-72 hours of a disaster is a critical element in determining the need for and extent of military involvement. Some point out that in cases of a major catastrophe, the President through the Stafford Act can designate and deploy federal resources without following NRP procedures. This view does not address if the NRP procedures in place in the event of a major catastrophe — whether or not the President chooses to federalize the response — are sound.

Recognizing that federal resources might be required to augment overwhelmed state and local response efforts, the NRP-CIA establishes protocols to pre-identify and rapidly deploy essential resources that are urgently needed to save lives and contain incidents. Under the NRP-CIA, normal procedures for a number of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) may be expedited or streamlined to address urgent requirements. These include: medical teams, urban search and rescue teams, transportable shelter, medical and equipment caches, and communications gear. Standard procedures regarding requests for assistance may be, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended.

One of the planning assumptions of the NRP-CIA is that a detailed and credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours after the incident. As a result, the NRP-CIA calls for response activities to begin without the benefit of a complete situation and critical needs assessment. Moreover, under this Annex, notification and full coordination with states should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical federal resources.

Finding: DOD/DHS coordination was not effective during Hurricane Katrina

The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense share responsibility for ensuring the security and safety of America. Since the establishment of DHS after 9/11, both departments have sought to define their roles and responsibilities.

McHale testified at a recent congressional hearing that he was the Defense Department’s principal liaison with DHS. A memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOD assigns 64 DOD personnel to DHS to fill critical specialties, principally in the areas of communications and intelligence. There is also a Homeland Defense Coordination Office at DHS headquarters, as well as around-the-clock DOD presence in the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center.

Despite these efforts to integrate operations, gaps remained in DOD/DHS coordination. During a BRAC Commission hearing conducted August 11, 2005, a commissioner asked Peter F. Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), of the existence of any document issued by DHS that would help DOD determine the requirements for military assistance to civilian authorities. Verga replied: “To my knowledge, no such document exists.”

On August 30, an e-mail generated in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicated concern about the flow of information between DOD and FEMA and a lack of understanding of what was an official request for assistance and what was not. Another e-mail from DHS to DOD on this day indicated Secretary Chertoff was requesting updated information on the levees in New Orleans, shelter information, and search communications.

Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, during the immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near panic, and problems with process.
and rescue missions DOD was performing. The OSD response expressed wonder at why DHS was asking for this information, as FEMA had not yet even generated requests for these missions for DOD. Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, during the immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near panic, and problems with process. As time went on, and FEMA and DOD worked out Requests for Assistance (RFAs), and communications and information sharing did improve.

These problems are indicative of a dispute between DOD and DHS that still lingers. DOD maintains it honored all FEMA requests for assistance in the relief effort, refusing no missions. FEMA officials insist that notwithstanding the official paper trail, DOD effectively refused some missions in the informal coordination process that preceded an official FEMA request. Therefore, when DOD thought a mission was inappropriate, FEMA simply did not request the assistance from DOD.

The reliance of FEMA on DOD during the Hurricane Katrina response, although not anticipated in scope, became at its most basic, a takeover of FEMA's responsibilities as the logistics manager for the federal response. According to Secretary McHale:

During Katrina, the federal military remained under FEMA's control. It meant that the Defense Department, which had the resources to appraise the situation and prioritize its missions more quickly than could FEMA, actually drafted its own requests for assistance and sent them to FEMA, which copied them and sent them back to the Department of Defense for action.

Finding: DOD, FEMA and the state of Louisiana had difficulty coordinating with each other, which slowed the response

The process for requesting DOD active duty forces has several layers of review and is understandably not well understood or familiar to state officials who rarely would need to request DOD support. Even though state officials do not routinely work with DOD, requests for DOD assistance are generated at the state level. These go from the state to FEMA's Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who in turn requests assistance from the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The DCO passes these requests on to the joint task force, which routes them through Northern Command to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Secretariat, to the Joint Directorate of Military Support on the Joint Staff. At each stage, the request is validated to ensure it can be met and that it is legal to provide the assistance. Once vetted, the request is tasked to the services and coordinated with Joint Forces Command, and forces or resources are then allocated to the joint task force, which in turn gets the support down to the user level by way of the DCO. This process is in place not only to satisfy DOD internal requirements, but to ensure maximum coordination with both FEMA and the state.

DOD's process for receiving, approving, and executing missions was called bureaucratic by Louisiana officials. Despite the multiple layers of paperwork requirements described above, the Select Committee could not definitively determine the origin of the request for DOD to provide active duty forces. Louisiana officials said their Adjutant General made the request directly of General Russel L. Honoré — without coordinating the request through FEMA — the established process to request all federal assistance. This request outside of normal channels may reflect frustration with the bureaucratic process.

Current FEMA FCO Scott Wells told Select Committee staff this direct state request to DOD was indicative of Louisiana not having a unified command during Katrina and created coordination problems during the response and recovery efforts. Without a unified command, the system for requests for assistance was difficult. This difficulty was compounded by the scarcity of telephone

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communication capability remaining in Louisiana, resulting in a communications chokepoint at the EOC in Baton Rouge where the telephone was continuously busy.

Prior to the arrival of Honoré, senior FEMA officials were unable to get visibility on their requests. For example, former Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and FEMA Director, Michael Brown, testified that he did not know what happened to some of his requests for assistance.16

While DOD officials testified in October that DOD was “leaning forward” and taking quick action prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA officials said the DOD process appeared cumbersome.17 Louisiana Governor Blanco’s Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin said DOD was, in his opinion, slow and overly bureaucratic.18 It appears that although DOD may have been doing the best it could with the system it had, Hurricane Katrina was of such magnitude that more rapid response was necessary. Although acknowledging that General Honoré operated outside normal FEMA-led channels, FEMA FCO William Lokey praised him for getting things done that Louisiana and FEMA could not.19

Finding: National Guard and DOD response operations were comprehensive, but perceived as slow

National Guard response

“I am particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of the National Guard’s efforts in advance of Hurricane Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans rescuing people within four hours of Katrina’s passing. More than 9,700 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen were in New Orleans by the thirtieth of August. The National Guard deployed over 30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the passing of the storm.”20 Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau

When reports on the catastrophic damage in Louisiana and Mississippi began to flow in, the National Guard Bureau did not hesitate to act. The NGB took responsibility for coordinating the flow of Guard resources and personnel from all 50 states to speed up the process and increase efficient use of resources as requirements from coastal states grew beyond their ability to coordinate individual state-to-state compacts.21 The NGB Joint Operations Center (NGBJOC) worked closely with the Army National Guard Crisis Response Cell and the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team to source and move these forces into the Gulf Coast.

Initially, this operated via a “push” methodology with supporting states pushing available forces based on requirements identified by the Adjutants General in the supported states.22 As situational awareness improved, this gradually transitioned to a “pull” process whereby supported states submitted requests for forces through the NGBJOC to be sourced by the supporting states.

NGB operated its Joint Operations Center around the clock to coordinate all National Guard actions associated with information sharing between Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army and the Air Force, Northern Command, state emergency operations centers, and other DOD liaison officers. This coordination supported National Guard response activities in the affected states.23 One of the challenges of Katrina for the Department of Defense was the lack of protocols set by Northern Command for information flow between the separate DOD entities.24

On Tuesday, August 30, state Adjutants General reported the following troop deployments to the NGB: 5,149 to Louisiana, 2,826 to Mississippi, 1,066 to Alabama, and 753 to Florida for a total of 9,794.25 At this time, Louisiana and Mississippi were supplemented...
by Guardsmen from nine other states. In position and responding were 64 Army National Guard aircraft, that reported 186 search and rescue missions performed, 1,017 patients moved, 1,910 evacuees, 91 cargo movements, and 29 food and water movements.

On August 31, at 7:21 a.m., Lieutenant General Blum and Army National Guard Director Lieutenant General Clyde A. Vaughn placed a phone call to Louisiana State Adjutant General Landreneau. The following is a record of their conversation:

**General Blum:** Benny, how are things going?

**General Landreneau:** Sir, we’ve had a difficult night.

**General Blum:** What do you need?

**General Landreneau:** We need 5K soldiers to help out. The armory is flooded. My command and control is at the Superdome. We have a lot of undesirables here trying to cause trouble.

**General Vaughn:** Hey Benny, can we drive to the Superdome?

**General Landreneau:** No sir, we are cut off by the rising water, along with the armory.

**General Vaughn:** Where do you want us to send the incoming soldiers?

**General Landreneau:** Sir, send them to the intersection of Interstate 310 and State 10.

**General Blum:** Benny, when’s the last time you got any sleep?

**General Landreneau:** Well sir, I think two days ago.

**General Blum:** Listen, you need to get some rest, you sound exhausted.

**General Landreneau:** I’ll try Sir, but every time I lay down someone gets me up for a little emergency.

**General Blum:** Try and get some rest, this is an ongoing effort and we need your energy.

**General Vaughn:** Benny, we’re going to push help so be ready.

On Wednesday, August 31, Blum set up a teleconference with all state Adjutants General at noon to coordinate “full capabilities of National Guard to be deployed as rapidly as possible to save life and limb.” Every state Adjutant General reported their Guard forces deploying or available for deployment.

On Thursday, September 1 at 11:30 a.m., Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Blum met with President Bush to discuss the National Guard response. At this briefing, the President agreed with Rumsfeld that the National Guard was responding effectively to the disaster and chose not to federalize Guard troops. At 1:15 p.m., Blum was asked to be part of a DHS press conference with Chertoff and McHale, to discuss federal assistance to the Gulf. At 5:30 p.m., after coordinating with McHale and Rumsfeld, Blum departed for Belle Chasse, Louisiana, and immediately met with Louisiana State Adjutant General Landreneau at the Superdome. Later that evening, Blum met with Governor Kathleen Blanco to discuss troop and resource requirements in Louisiana.

Also during this time, federal officials considered ways to structure a unified command. According to Deputy Homeland Security Advisor Ken Rapuano, federal officials discussed with Blanco federalizing the National Guard. President Bush ultimately offered Blanco a “Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Authorization, Consent and Use of Dual Status Commander for JTF Katrina,” making Honoré, as commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, a member of the Louisiana National Guard. An excerpt from a DOD letter drafted for Governor Blanco to President Bush explained how the command would have been structured under the proposal:

In order to enhance Federal and State efforts, and if you grant permission, I would like to appoint the Regular Army officer commanding the Federal Joint Task Force Katrina to be an officer in the Louisiana National Guard. I would assign him to command the National Guard forces under my command.

Thus, President Bush’s proposal would not have put National Guard troops under federal control. Rather, the proposal would have put Honoré under Blanco’s command in the chain-of-command over National Guard troops in Louisiana. In this proposal, Honoré would
have served in two capacities — first, as the commander of federal troops ultimately answering to the President, and second, as the commander of the Louisiana National Guard, answering to Blanco. This proposal was intended to establish a single command for all military operations in Louisiana.

Blanco wrote to President Bush on September 3, declining this proposal. The Governor only agreed to the importance of creating a single military commander for federal forces that "could enhance the contribution of over 25 National Guard states currently being commanded by the Louisiana State Adjutant General." As a result, federal troops remained under one command — Honoré and Northern Command, while the National Guard remained under the separate command of Landreneau and the Governor.

Administrative matters proved to be a challenge as well for National Guard troops deploying under Emergency Management Assistant Compacts (EMAC) with various states. Since these forces were activated in state-to-state agreements they were on state active duty and subject to the rules and entitlements authorized by their respective home states. This plethora of statuses made administration problematic for the National Guard, and led to a request that these forces be activated under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. This federal status permits uniform administration while allowing continued command and control by the Governor. Numerous state Adjutants General suggested the National Guard Bureau request that guard troops be activated under Title 32. In response, the National Guard Bureau strongly advocated for the use of Title 32:

not only because it allowed Governors to retain control, but because it was the right thing to do for the soldiers and airmen. Each state has a different way of handling pay and benefits under State Active Duty. We had soldiers and airmen operating under 54 different payroll systems and receiving different benefits such as medical care and disability coverage. Our forces needed the protection provided by DOD entitlements.

Between September 2 and September 5, the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana sent letters to the Secretary of Defense asking for all National Guard assets to be put under Title 32. Blum then discussed putting the Guard on Title 32 status with McHale and together, they submitted a formal Title 32 request to Rumsfeld. On September 7, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England approved Title 32 status retroactive to August 29.

On September 8, the NGB noted 50 States, two territories, and the District of Columbia had contributed forces in support of operations in Louisiana and Mississippi. National Guard forces reached peak deployment numbers for Katrina relief with over 50,000 personnel mobilized on this day.

Army National Guard

"Four hours after landfall, Army National Guard helicopters are performing rescue missions, with 65 helicopters positioned in Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama." Northcom Timeline: Hurricane Katrina 1/3/06

The Army National Guard contributed heavily to the Katrina response, including the primary priority of search and rescue, evacuation, and commodity distribution. Distribution of water, ice, and food from military stockpiles in the days immediately following landfall was done at both designated and undesignated distribution sites. The Army Guard also provided much needed military transportation, helped clear debris from roads and residences, and provided assistance to law enforcement. Unlike their active duty counterparts, the National Guard is not restricted from performing law enforcement duties under federal law, and thus rendered considerable assistance to civilian law enforcement efforts. According to the daily log of Mississippi National Guard activities prepared for the Select Committee, the majority of the mission requests were for security, a mission that would only increase in the weeks following landfall.

The following chart contains the number of Army National Guard present in the Gulf States.
## Air National Guard

The Director of the Air National Guard, Lieutenant General Daniel James III, told the Select Committee the efforts of the Air National Guard during Hurricane Katrina represented “the largest military airlift operation supporting disaster relief in the United States.”48

But the Air National Guard brought more than evacuation, rescue, and airlift capabilities to the response. The Air National Guard also has an emergency medical capability. ANG medics treated over 13,000 patients by September 19.49 Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) units provided medical personnel and equipment to support up to 10 major trauma surgeries without re-supply.50 The Air National Guard also has a large civil engineering capability in its Rapid Engineer Deployable Operational Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE) Squadrons.

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<th>Number of Air Guard Personnel In Katrina Joint Operational Area</th>
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### Some of the highlights of ANG activity in the first few days following landfall include:

- **August 29**  
  Aero-medical Evacuation Squadron positioned to respond in Mississippi  
  50 ANG medical personnel at Naval Air Station New Orleans

- **August 30**  
  The ANG launches its first Air National Guard JTF Katrina mission. A C-17 crew assigned to the 172nd FW, Mississippi ANG flew its first sortie in support of Hurricane recovery. The mission lasted for three days.
They airlifted 85 civilians from Gulfport. All ANG Airlift and Tanker units put on alert and places all air crew on Title 32 status. Texas ANG starts reconnaissance, activates search and rescue personnel and security forces to Louisiana. ANG establishes Tanker Airlift Control Center.

August 31

ANG sources a NORTHCOM request for ANG Combat Weather Team to New Orleans. ANG reports 700 ANG Civil Engineer and 350 Red Horse personnel available. Tennessee and Oklahoma ANG help evacuate 143 patients from the New Orleans Veterans Hospital. The 259th ATCS Louisiana Air National Guard deploys their MSN-7 Mobile Control Tower to the Superdome.

September 1

First Air Force, composed of ANG wings across the country, is tasked to lead for planning, orchestrating and overseeing all Air Force support to Joint Task Force Katrina. Gulfport, Mississippi is designated the main operating base for sustained ANG Hurricane relief efforts, including evacuation. ANG Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) units, civil engineering units arrive in Mississippi and New Orleans. On this day ANG Para-rescuemen are credited with 48 air saves and 250 boat saves in New Orleans. ANG Combat Controllers provide air movement for 750 helicopter sorties where 3,000 people are evacuated. From September 1 through 9, ANG from Alaska and Oregon pushed through 3,169 military and civilian helicopter sorties at multiple landing zones in New Orleans. ANG aircraft and crew would fly 2,542 sorties, airlifting 21,874 people and 11,110 pounds of cargo in support of hurricane relief.

September 2

149th Air National Guard Surgical Team established field hospital in parking lot adjacent to New Orleans Convention Center.

The National Guards of other states also played key roles in the Hurricane Katrina response. Through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC), Louisiana and Mississippi were able to request and receive assistance from scores of states from across the country. While the EMAC process is a direct state-to-state relationship, both FEMA and the National Guard Bureau participated in negotiations to facilitate the identification and procurement of specific types of assistance from other states. There was a consensus among federal, state, and local officials that EMAC worked well. These troops served in Title 32 status, and were therefore commanded by the respective Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and paid with federal funds.

Louisiana

The Louisiana National Guard conducted roving patrols, manned checkpoints, and supported the New Orleans Police Department in the parishes. The Army National Guard also secured key infrastructure sites, including levees, and provided support for general purpose shelters and special needs shelters with medical personnel. One of the Guard’s largest missions was to provide security and other support at the Superdome. Approximately 250 Guardsmen were at the Superdome, searching entrants for weapons, providing them with food, water, and medical attention, and attempting to maintain law and order.

After Katrina hit, the National Guard was deeply involved in search and rescue operations to save people after the levees breached and many areas flooded. Their role included both helicopter and boat sorties to rescue people from roofs and floodwaters and take them to...
high ground. They were also part of the more deliberate post-flood activities to go house to house and search for survivors and victims.

The National Guard also had a law enforcement mission beyond the shelters (e.g., the Superdome) to help restore law and order through street patrols and other activities in support of the overtaxed New Orleans Police Department. One of the National Guard’s law enforcement missions was to secure the Convention Center and generally maintain order there as occupants were evacuated. They provided food, water, and medical treatment, and searched evacuees as they boarded buses. Because the National Guard was never federalized, they could fully participate in all law enforcement missions.

Finally, the National Guard played a key role in logistics and transportation, using their high-clearance vehicles and helicopters to ferry personnel and supplies into and out of flooded areas. For example, they transported and distributed food into the Superdome and supported the evacuation of its occupants.

The Louisiana National Guard received much assistance from many states across the country through EMAC. Examples of the specific deployments included 2,426 infantry from Pennsylvania, 1,016 military police from Puerto Rico, 580 security troops from Michigan, 500 support troops from Arkansas, 535 security troops from Massachusetts, 350 security forces from Tennessee, 315 transportation and logistics troops from Alabama, 310 maintenance troops from Illinois, 250 air traffic controllers from Texas, and 221 truckers from South Carolina. In total, Louisiana made 451 EMAC requests, and 29,502 National Guard troops responded from other states to undertake these missions.

Alabama

The Alabama National Guard headquarters began monitoring Hurricane Katrina on August 23 and actively engaged in discussions with the National Guard Bureau on August 25. When Katrina became a Category 3 hurricane on August 27, the Alabama Guard increased staff at the state emergency operations center. EOCs along the Alabama Coast for the 20th Special Forces Group, 711th Signal Battalion, and 16th Theater Support Command were opened and manned. When FEMA designated Maxwell Air Force Base as a federal staging area for supplies, the Alabama National Guard sent troops there to help prepare for distribution. Governor Riley declared a state of emergency on August 28, which formally activated the state National Guard.

On August 29, the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) received requests for commodities from Mobile, Baldwin, Butler, and Washington counties, and the Alabama Guard took control of all recovery and relief operations in coastal Alabama to include county distribution points. When AEMA requested special boat teams for search and rescue, and security, the Alabama National Guard responded. The Guard also performed damage assessment tasks. The Alabama National Guard had developed mission specific force packages for emergencies like hurricanes, snow and ice storms, and chemical and biological attacks. These force packages include security forces, engineers, medical, communications and logistical equipment, and trained personnel.

The Alabama National Guard deployed approximately 750 soldiers and airmen within Alabama, but also provided 2,000 soldiers to locations in Mississippi and Louisiana in response to immediate EMAC requests for support on August 29 and 30.

Mississippi

On August 29, in the rear area operations center in Jackson, it was recorded that the Mississippi National Guard had activated 2,736 Army National Guard soldiers, and 1,003 Air National Guard members to provide security, search and rescue, and debris removal operations. In his testimony before the Select Committee, Mississippi Adjutant General, Harold A. Cross, made the following observations:

During and immediately after landfall, National Guard search and rescue operations began on the Gulf Coast. My personnel night
ground reconnaissance on the 29th and aerial reconnaissance early the next morning clearly revealed a disaster of unprecedented proportion all along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi and significant damage as far as one hundred and fifty miles inland. After reporting this initial surveillance to Governor Barbour, I immediately directed my rear operations center to activate all remaining available Mississippi National Guardsmen and to execute the movement of pre-planned assistance from other states. In addition, I requested assistance through the National Guard Bureau from other states, up to division sized strength. Accordingly, the 4,533 Mississippi National Guard soldiers and airmen were ultimately augmented by 11,839 National Guard personnel from 36 states under EMAC agreements.65

The Mississippi National Guard personnel on standby at Camp Shelby moved forward after the storm had passed to a scene of unbelievable destruction. Hurricane Katrina was by all accounts the worst storm in nearly a century, but Cross was prepared.66 As soon as the storm abated somewhat, Mississippi National Guard personnel deployed from Camp Shelby into the devastated Mississippi coast to provide security, search and rescue and debris removal operations.67 Even so, Cross recognized his own resources would be insufficient to assist along the whole coast of the state and he needed help from the National Guard of other states. In that regard, General Cross said:

EMAC agreements negotiated with 40 states creating a division-sized force within 96 hours eliminated need for Title 10 forces. The first out of state National Guard units to arrive in Mississippi were units from Alabama. 483 soldiers arrived on 30 August with an additional 359 soldiers arriving on 31 August. This Alabama National Guard Force consisted of combat engineers, military police, security forces, and communications assets. Their quick response was due to the fact that the Alabama National Guard was already postured to respond to Katrina in the event it impacted Alabama. The personal relationship between the adjutants general of the two states allowed for the rapid response of forces.68
The initial requests for assistance from Cross were through personal relationships with other State Adjutant Generals.69 General Blum, held a video teleconference on August 31 to solicit assistance from each of the 54 states and territories for both Louisiana and Mississippi. States responded rapidly to the urgent need and decided to worry about the authorizing paperwork later. In most cases, EMAC documentation followed after individual states provided the assets requested by Louisiana or Mississippi.70 As noted earlier, all National Guard troops were retroactively placed in Title 32 status on September 7 by Deputy Secretary of Defense England.71

Out of state National Guard support in Mississippi through EMAC process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>National Guard Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>1,500 Security Forces, 7 Tactical planners and engineers, 2- CH47s with crew for S and R, 2-UH60s with crew for S and R, 300 Sleeping Bags and 80 cots, Engineering Brigade, MP Battalion, 1,450 personnel for TF, 37 personnel from Air Refueling Wing, CBCS Communications support, Ministry Team, Ground Safety Manager, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Family Assistance Personnel, Medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>100 soldiers, MP Company, 25 Heavy Trucks with 75 soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Fire Team, Aircraft Maintenance personnel, medical support personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>MP Company, 50 Signal company personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>MP Security Company, 100 personnel to assist command and control, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>4-UH60s, rescue teams, infantry battalion, 50 ambulances with crew, 15 cooks, OH-58 with crew, logistics aides, safety personnel, aircraft maintainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2- UH1s, 2 CH47s with crew, 1,500 Task Force personnel, Fire Vehicle, Cable/ Copper Repair personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Refuelers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Security Forces, EMEDS personnel, public health personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>2,300 soldiers, 40 tankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Medical Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Air Refueling personnel, Emergency Medical teams, Guard Fire Fighters, Ministry Team, Internist, 25 EMEDs personnel and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>50 Heavy trucks with 150 soldiers, 24 person refueling team, food service personnel, Medical Preventive Medicine personnel, communications and LNO personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Water Purification Equipment with Operators, Ministry Team, medical personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Preventative Medicine Team, Cable repair personnel, Security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>MP Security Company, 104 Personnel for S and R and ice and water distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Medical Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>MP Security Company, construction engineers, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Ministry Teams, Mental Stress Team, medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>2-C130 Aircraft with Crew, medical personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Public Affairs Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Security Forces, Priest, Ground Safety Manager, ARW personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>EMEDS personnel, bioenvironmental personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Medical Support Personnel, bioenvironmental personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8 UH6s, 2 CH7, 6 UH1 and 130 personnel, Rabbi, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>Water Purification Equipment with Operators, 72 personnel from fighter wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>119 soldiers for debris removal, etc., 1,300 Task Force soldiers, aviation assets, generators, 3 OH-58 with crew, aircraft maintenance personnel, food service personnel, EIS Management Team, tactical support personnel, EIS Management Team, Air wing personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>25 personnel/Air Mobility, Fire Vehicle, Medical Support personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Chief of Safety, Medics, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>SatCom with personnel, AVC ATS Company, Food Services, Medical Support Personnel, EMEDS personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Air wing personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Units to load and unload aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Bioenvironmental Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>ATS Co. with Tower, TTCS, 3 MP Security Companies, fixed wing support teams, engineering battalion, logistics control cell, Mobile Emergency Operations Center, EIS Teams, 26 personnel from air refueling wing, aviation assets, Forklift loader, Fire Vehicle, EIS Management Team, EIS Repair Team, 26 Security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Ministry Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Bioenvironmental personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>447 Light Infantry for security and recovery, EMEDs personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Airlift Wing support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cross also coordinated closely with all other state entities involved, including the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, in order to maintain a coordinated law enforcement effort. Cross noted that coordination between Guard engineering companies with various utility companies to clear roads and restore electricity and phone services was instrumental in getting power restored to the majority of coastal counties well in advance of projections. The National Guard provided immediate and continued support to the people of Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina. National Guard accomplishments included: 3,900 miles of roads cleared of fallen trees and debris; 1.2 million meals ready to eat (MRE) and 1 million gallons of water delivered via air (over 2,000 missions); 39 million pounds of ice, 56.4 million gallons of water, and 2.7 million MREs distributed to central distribution points in 37 counties; 200 presence patrols and more than 600 search and rescue missions conducted; law enforcement assistance provided, resulting in 72 arrests; aircraft logged over 1,995 hours and delivered 2.57 million pounds of cargo. Emergency medical assistance from the Air National Guard assisted hundreds of Mississippi citizens.

Department of Defense response

The day after Katrina made landfall, England led an early roundtable session to get damage assessments for DOD facilities and review resources that may be required of DOD to support hurricane relief. The Secretary of Defense was briefed on DOD’s response and Northern Command issued several more alerts in anticipation of requests for assistance.

While Honoré arrived on Wednesday, August 31, as the commander of the newly established Joint Task Force Katrina to supervise federal military operations, the first active duty Navy and Air Force personnel arrived in Louisiana late Thursday, September 1, and active duty Army personnel started to arrive early Friday, September 2. These active duty personnel helped the Louisiana National Guard and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) control the crowds during the evacuation of the Superdome, maintain law and order in the streets, and eventually conduct secondary searches, going door to door looking for survivors or bodies and assisting those who had not yet escaped.

The support provided by DOD was invaluable, according to a wide variety of officials. DOD active duty forces were involved in search and rescue, but generally after the initial rescues from roofs by helicopters and boats. They were involved in the more deliberate search activities where mixed teams, to include National Guard, law enforcement, Coast Guard, and DOD worked together going house to house and searching for hold-outs and dead bodies.

DOD also took over FEMA’s logistics distribution functions. According to FEMA Acting Director for Response during Hurricane Katrina, Edward G. Buikema, FEMA initially approached DOD about this mission on Thursday, September 1. On that date, Colonel Richard Chavez informed FEMA Acting Director of Operations Ken Burris the request "would require a Secretary DHS [sic] to Secretary DoD call to initiate and significant General Counsel input." The formal Mission Assignment was prepared the next day at 6:15 p.m. and by 7:41 p.m., McHale informed DHS Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson that "SecDef agreed to support your RFA for broad logistics support" and that DOD was "working on the specific language — and a planning staff to implement it." Execution of the mission apparently began the next day, September 3, according to written orders signed by Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Pete Verga.
In the same e-mail to Jackson, McHale also said, “We may actually be able to do more than you have requested.” This apparently led to further meetings and, according to McHale, an additional seven approved mission assignments on Monday, September 5.

Although Buikema and his FEMA colleague Deputy Director of Response Michael Lowder expressed their view that DOD acted slowly on the logistics request, the record reflects a prompt decision, followed by final resolution of details involving a billion dollar mission assignment. FEMA officials’ perception of a slow response from DOD reflected that they were (1) unaware of the planning already under way (as reflected in McHale’s e-mail) before final details were resolved and (2) possibly an unrealistic expectation that acceptance of such a massive mission would result in immediate action. This was not, however, just a single airlift of needed supplies — it was “planning and execution for the procurement, transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel and medical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi.”

This is not to say that all went smoothly with DOD support. For example, DOD apparently refused to allow the shipment of MREs on FEMA-provided transportation. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) apparently claimed DLA could only ship MREs on “DOD approved carriers” and DLA “would arrange transportation within the next 24-48 hours.” The September 4 e-mail lamenting this problem ended: “SEND MRE’S NOW.”

Finding: The Coast Guard’s response saved many lives, but coordination with other responders could improve

On August 29, the day Katrina made landfall, the U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans Incident Management Team was stood up in Alexandria, Louisiana. Outside of the forecasted area of impact, Coast Guard Disaster Assistance Teams from Ohio, Kentucky, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Miami were pre-positioned to the region to respond as soon as conditions permitted.

During normal conditions, there are 15 helicopters assigned within the Eighth Coast Guard District, along with four fixed-wing aircraft and 16 cutters. Within hours of Hurricane Katrina’s passing, the Coast Guard surged 31 cutters, 76 aircraft, 131 small boats, and over 4,000 personnel into the affected areas.

The first Coast Guard rescue occurred within a few hours after the storm made landfall. An HH-65 helicopter working out of the Coast Guard’s Air Station New Orleans located at Naval Air Station Bell Chasse rescued two adults and one infant, operating in 60-knot winds.

On August 30, all pre-positioned Coast Guard aircraft began conducting search and rescue missions, damage over-flight assessments, and logistical support, and the medium endurance cutter DECISIVE arrived offshore to conduct damage assessment of oil platforms.

To maximize the number of missions that could be flown, all of the helicopters refueled at Air Station New Orleans, which was also in charge of Coast Guard air asset coordination. When crew changes were to occur, the Mobile-based aircraft would return to Mobile. Tasking orders, such as directing a helicopter to pick up a particular group of people, were provided when the aircraft was located at a base, as well as any time communications were possible. Nevertheless, specific tasking orders were not necessary in the initial days after the storm because of the large volume of survivors throughout the region. Helicopters were able to rescue people without needing instructions.

Search and Rescue Communications

Communications were limited in many respects. Vital communications infrastructure was destroyed by the storm, and it was not possible for the Aviation Training
Center or Air Station New Orleans to communicate directly with the operations centers in the rescue area, nor could the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge be contacted. When aircraft left their base in Mobile, communication was limited to aircraft-to-aircraft transmissions; pilots were unable to speak with the Aviation Training Center. When aircraft flew over New Orleans, communication was possible with Task Force Eagle (the National Guard command center for air operations at the Superdome) and occasionally with Air Station New Orleans. Air Station New Orleans lost all power and telephone lines were inoperable. When power was restored, however, it was intermittent at times and continued to limit communications. By 5:00 p.m. on the first day of rescue operations, communication became more difficult because of the large volume of radio traffic in the area. Boats were able to communicate via limited range low-level radios, but these did not afford continuous coverage for airborne assets. On Monday August 29, a Coast Guard C-130 arrived to provide communications assistance; it could occasionally patch air communication to land lines (if operational) in St. Louis, Missouri and Alexandria, Louisiana (where Sector New Orleans had set up operations).

For the first three days, no air traffic control was available, and pilots relied solely on internal pilot-to-pilot communications and standardization of training to maintain order in the airspace. The Coast Guard practice of standardization allowed for easy communication between pilots who had never flown together before, and this proved to be critical to the success of search and rescue missions in the first days without air traffic control. A U.S. Customs and Border Protection P-3 aircraft arrived four days after landfall to provide air traffic control and ground communication.

On the day of the storm, helicopter crews monitored weather reports to determine locations in the region where the weather would permit them to begin rescue flight operations. Subsequently, crews proceeded to areas located at the edge of the storm. The first rescue occurred in 60-knot winds in Port Sulphur, Louisiana at approximately 3:00 p.m. One helicopter flew to Air Station New Orleans to drop off three personnel to clear the field of debris, activate the generators, and permit operations to resume at that location, while others conducted rescues in Grand Isle, Louisiana and St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Coast Guard helicopters from Mobile and Houston began rescuing people in New Orleans. At that time, the Coast Guard only rescued people from immediate danger and brought them to higher ground because of the tens of thousands of people in immediate danger and the limited fuel capacity of each helicopter. In the case of people with medical conditions which required treatment, helicopters transported them to the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (New Orleans Airport). Central drop-off locations were not set up until the next day, when large areas that were dry and close to operations were able to be identified.

Conduct of Coast Guard search and rescue operations

Upon the completion of each mission and arrival on the ground at either the Mobile or New Orleans Air Stations, pilots briefed the Operations Commander on their missions, including the number of people rescued. Given the time constraints of performing rescues, the Coast Guard did not record the names of those rescued, nor the locations where they were deposited. While the immediate life saving measures taken by the Coast Guard crews were laudable, the failure to systemically communicate the location of the rescued citizens to local authorities resulted in some rescued persons being effectively stranded, lacking food, water, and shelter for extended periods. There was no way to confirm whether survivors would remain in these locations, and specific information concerning a number of those rescued was communicated to other entities (EOCs and other Coast Guard stations) whenever communications were possible.

Within 24 hours of the storm, surface operations (boats) were conducted out of Zephyr Field (a local professional baseball stadium). According to the Coast Guard, a unified command for surface operations was established at Zephyr Field with the Coast Guard, FEMA,
While the immediate life saving measures taken by the Coast Guard crews were laudable, the failure to systemically communicate the location of the rescued citizens to local authorities resulted in some rescued persons being effectively stranded, lacking food, water, and shelter for extended periods.

The first heavy lift aircraft to arrive at the New Orleans Airport was a Coast Guard C-130. It brought water and food to the area on approximately August 31, which was subsequently forwarded to Zephyr Field, the Superdome, and Air Station New Orleans to be distributed by helicopters on their return flights to flooded areas. The Coast Guard initiated this effort because it recognized that victims placed on higher ground “islands” had not yet been completely evacuated and required water and food, as temperatures during the day were nearing one hundred degrees. Once again, the effort was laudable but fell short of the need, as some evacuees remained in distress.

On the afternoon of September 1, additional communications were re-established when Coast Guard Cutter SPENCER arrived on-scene in New Orleans. SPENCER took tactical control of Coast Guard surface forces in New Orleans and, on September 2 established a Vessel Traffic System (VTS) to control marine vessel traffic in the area. The SPENCER’s communications capabilities include satellite, medium frequency, high frequency, and very high frequency voice and data communications (surface – to - surface communications, and surface - to - air voice and data links).

On September 2 and 3, Joint Field Operations (JFOs) were established. In Louisiana, however, there were Coast Guard and urban search and rescue personnel at
the state EOC in Baton Rouge before the formalized JFO was established. A cadre of Coast Guard personnel from Port Arthur, and others, who had been evacuated from New Orleans, was already in the EOC handling search and rescue coordination.

By September 20, the Coast Guard had organized and coordinated the rescue or evacuation of 33,544 people.119 At the height of Katrina operations, over 33 percent of Coast Guard aircraft were deployed to the affected region.120 Despite coordination difficulties, the Coast Guard’s efforts were heroic and saved countless lives.

Finding: The Army Corps of Engineers provided critical resources to Katrina victims, but pre-landfall contracts were not adequate

The Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE” or “Corps”), another active duty military unit, provided critical resources to respond to Hurricane Katrina. The Corps provided relief and response support to FEMA in accordance with the National Response Plan as the lead federal agency for public works and engineering (Emergency Support Function #3). Some of the Corps’ specific missions related to Hurricane Katrina included providing water and ice to regional warehouses, providing emergency power, providing emergency roof repair, and removing debris.

During Katrina and the aftermath, USACE provided 112 million liters of water, 232 million pounds of ice, installation of about 900 large generators, repairs to 170,000 roofs, and removal of a million cubic yards of debris.121 USACE had pre-awarded competitively bid contracts for all of these functions to allow quick deployment of resources prior to and immediately after an event.122 These pre-awarded contracts are part of USACE’s Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI) which has been in place for six years.

Due to the magnitude of the destruction, USACE pre-awarded contracts for roofing repair and debris removal were not adequate, and additional contracts were advertised and awarded using shortened but competitive procedures.123 In addition, FEMA tasked USACE to provide structural safety evaluations of low-rise and non-public buildings in New Orleans and other locations. To date, USACE has completed assessments of 47,800 of an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 units.124 Given the large number of uninhabitable or unusable buildings, FEMA has recently tasked USACE with demolition of buildings.125 To date, USACE is still developing estimates and conducting planning for the demolition mission.

Finding: The Department of Defense has not yet incorporated or implemented lessons learned from joint exercises in military assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed for a more effective response to Katrina

The Department of Defense participates in several command and control exercises involving responses to domestic emergencies, ranging from the combatant command level to the national level.126 In the past these have included Northern Command exercises UNIFIED DEFENSE (2003, 2004), ARDENT SENTRY (2005), DETERMINED PROMISE (2003, 2004), VIGILANT SHIELD (2005), DILIGENT ENDEAVOR (2003), DILIGENT WARRIOR (2004), NORTHERN EDGE (2003), SCARLET SHIELD (2004), DARK PORTAL (2004) and TOPOFF (2003, 2005). Many of these exercise scenarios were designed to overwhelm local and state assets to evoke a response under the National Response Plan, including the employment of DOD assets.

Hurricane Katrina was a test of the recently established (post-9/11) United States Northern Command, and its ability to oversee and coordinate the largest use of active duty and Guard military in a domestic action in recent
history. Although Northern Command has conducted numerous exercises with the National Guard in state and local exercises, the lessons learned during these events were not consistently applied to the military response to Katrina.

NORAD/NORTHCOM ARDENT SENTRY 05 was a combined exercise with TOPOFF 3, conducted April 4-9, 2005. The overall goal of this exercise was to conduct a joint service and interagency exercise that would provide realistic training opportunities for all agencies in incident management. Canadian forces also participated as part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Another objective was to plan, deploy, and employ DOD forces in support of civilian authorities’ operations in accordance with the National Response Plan and DOD policy. The lessons learned during this exercise offered a preview of problems that would surface again during the Katrina response. Some of Northern Command’s recommendations for improvement were as follows:

Conduct strategic effects-based planning between DOD and DHS for each Incident Annex in the National Response Plan.

Investigate requirement for integrated “National Strategic Communications Plan” in coordination with interagency partners.

Develop national capability to electronically produce, staff, validate, approve and track mission accomplishment of mission assignments.

Determine requirements for a “National Common Operating Picture” in coordination with DHS, Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies.

TOPOFF 2 also contained findings that, if corrected, would have enhanced the federal response to Katrina. From uncertainty between federal and state roles to the lack of robust and efficient local emergency communications and the need to improve data collection from military agencies, TOPOFF 2 findings were telling predictors of some of the challenges the military faced.

Northern Command predicted in its ARDENT SENTRY/TOPOFF 3 Master Executive Summary, that “this exercise success is due in part to scenario constraints that could provide a false sense of security and lack of incentive to initiate or aggressively participate in the integrated regionally-based planning that is so essential.” Just over four months later, Katrina struck.

After Katrina, DOD officials reflected on the value of prior exercises. McHale commented that government training exercises “have not been sufficiently challenging.” Other Pentagon officials noted that in many cases, top officials, from Cabinet-level secretaries and generals to governors and mayors, do not participate and these simulations do not last long enough. The Government Accountability Office, in a November 29 briefing also noted key players are not always involved in drills, the lessons from previous training and exercises are not retained, and the training and exercises are more targeted at terrorist events than natural disasters.

The lack of implementation of lessons learned and the training necessary to learn them resulted in less than optimal response by all military components. Oxford Analytica took the following view:

Finding: The lack of integration of National Guard and active duty forces hampered the military response

“Title 10 versus 32 versus 14…again.”

Coast Guard Vice Admiral Jim Hull, NORTHCOM

“Advance planning between active-duty personnel and the Guard is vital – in contrast to the cooperation that . . . unfolded during Katrina ‘on the fly’ – albeit by ‘superb leaders’.”

Washington Post, October 13, 2005, quoting Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale

In a speech on October 21, McHale indicated planning by the National Guard was not well integrated with the
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE

overall military, and the Joint Staff did not have a grasp of the National Guard’s plans. Interestingly, a September 14 e-mail originating in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) offices commended the Bureau’s efforts to provide operational information to JCS. McHale stated that National Guard plans were not well integrated with overall DOD plans. The Joint Staff acknowledged that the NGB was providing timely and accurate reports, but Northern Command was apparently more focused on active operations and therefore did not have a well informed view of the significant National Guard effort in the region. The Joint Staff e-mail went on to say that Northern Command’s briefings are too active duty focused and lack unity of effort. In the same speech, McHale said DOD did not understand how to integrate with the plans of the National Guard. The reverse was also true, despite past lessons learned.

In the TOPOFF 3 exercise in April 2005, it was clear the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau would be part of a large scale emergency response. The New Jersey National Guard noted that “although TOPOFF 3 began as an exercise with minimal National Guard involvement, it quickly evolved into one that heavily relied upon Guard participation, and identified a need early on for assistance from the National Guard Bureau.”

At the time of Katrina landfall, however, the National Guard did not have adequate knowledge of DOD planning guidance developed at Northern Command, including concept of operations plans and functional plans for military support to civilian authorities. The National Guard After Action Report on TOPOFF 3 found that numerous members of the Guard operational leadership did not have adequate knowledge of these plans.

At an after action meeting of state Adjutants General, the Adjutants General agreed coordination between active duty and National Guard in the response operation needed to be improved. According to the meeting report, “There was a lack of coordination of Joint Task Force Katrina operation with the National Guard Headquarters in the supported states.”

The National Guard Bureau also reported lines of command, control, and communications lacked clear definition and coordination between federal military forces and National Guard forces operating under state control, resulting in duplicate efforts. For example, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division moved into a sector already being patrolled by the National Guard. The meeting report also stated:

Federal troops often arrived prior to being requested and without good prior coordination. This resulted in confusion and often placed a strain on an already overburdened disaster response system. A specific case in point was the Marine Corps amphibious units which landed in Mississippi without transportation, requiring National Guard transportation assets to move them to New Orleans increasing the burden on an already stretched support system.

The National Guard 38th Infantry Division, composed of smaller Guard units from many states, reported they never formally coordinated with Northern Command. Members of the 82nd Airborne Division, the first active duty personnel to arrival in New Orleans on September 3, had a similar experience. In a September 9 e-mail, a soldier in the 82nd indicated coordination of evacuation efforts in New Orleans was very poor.

We’re conducting boat patrols using Coast Guard boats but coordination is very difficult . . . . National Guard seems to move in and out of sectors doing what they want then just leaving without telling anyone . . . . And this is in 4 days of operations.

Despite the lack of integration in Washington, D.C. and in Louisiana, active and reserve forces worked well together in Mississippi. Notably, the Governor of Mississippi did not request active duty military assistance, relying instead on Mississippi and other National Guard personnel provided through EMAC.
However, in the DOD effort to lean forward, Honoré contacted Cross immediately to offer any help needed, and remained in contact with him daily in person or on the phone. On September 3, Northern Command and JTF Katrina received confirmation from the Secretary of Defense that JTF Katrina was to assume responsibility for logistical operations in Mississippi and Louisiana in response to FEMA’s request. All DOD operations in the state of Mississippi were conducted with Cross’ consent.

One of the most important roles played by DOD in Mississippi was the delivery of military stocks of food and water that started to arrive in Gulfport on September 1. In his testimony before the Committee, Cross noted:

By the end of the second day after landfall, my intelligence reports indicated that the previously assumed flow of food and water was severely restricted. Many pre-planned distribution points were inaccessible and many hundreds of people were stranded by flood waters, blocked roadways or lack of fuel for transportation. These desperate civilians were primarily observed by aerial reconnaissance in Hancock County. Upon realization that food and water was not going to arrive by normal means in time, I offered an immediate airlift of food and water utilizing our helicopters and our rations and immediately requested through US NORTHCOM an emergency airlift of military stocks of MRE’s. Within a day, massive amounts of MRE’s began arriving at Gulfport just in time to be disseminated to prevent starvation. Almost 1.7 million MRE’s were flown in to my position thanks to the quick reaction of Lieutenant General Joe Inge of Northern Command.

Air Force personnel and aircraft from the 920th Rescue Wing and 347th Rescue Wing, as well as Special Operations Command aircraft arrived at the Jackson Air National Guard Base the day after landfall, and along with National Guard, performed search and rescue mission in the first days.

The USS Bataan, the USS Truman, the USS Whidbey Island, and other vessels supported Navy and Marine Corps operations in Mississippi, delivering personnel, equipment, and commodities. The USS Bataan had six helicopters, one land craft, extensive logistics supplies, and trauma medical capabilities that were used for search and rescue in both Mississippi and Louisiana. According to a September 1 e-mail from Colonel Damon Penn, Mississippi’s Defense Coordinator, a total of 19 active duty and National Guard teams were conducting search and rescue missions on the Mississippi coast.

The Naval Construction Battalion Center at Gulfport was severely damaged during Katrina, and although most of the 800 “Seabees” were evacuated before the hurricane struck, remaining personnel and other Seabees deployed by the Navy helped with Hurricane Katrina recovery operations. Gulfport-based Seabees, who linked up with the National Guard at their Joint Operations Center in Gulfport, coordinated with the National Guard to clear roads and assisted in removing debris. The Seabees also set up logistics centers to distribute food and water and provide emergency medical services. Two active-duty Seabee battalions from Port Hueneme, California, their subordinate detachments from both coasts, and Reserve Seabee volunteers joined those already in Gulfport, Mississippi, forming a total Seabee force of about 3,000 sailors by September 9. The Seabees were also joined by 100 Mexican Marines and 215 Canadian Navy personnel who helped them work on FEMA temporary housing sites, nursing home repair, and repairs to public buildings, schools and construction sites.

On September 5, 1,000 Marines from the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Camp Pendleton, California, arrived at Biloxi, and 1,000 Marines from the II MEF Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, arrived at Stennis Space Center. These Marine units, commanded by Marine Corps Reserve Major General Douglas V. Odell, Jr., assisted in the transportation of large amounts of commodities, as well as providing personnel and
equipment to assist in recovery operations in Hancock County as directed by Cross. “Without concern for service lines and or 'Title of Authority,' [Major General] Odell accepted the mission and executed all requirements, until directed by his higher headquarters to move to New Orleans,” Cross said.

On September 8, the USNS Comfort arrived in Pascagoula to offer medical assistance and facilities. Four days later, the Northern Command suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Comfort be withdrawn because there was "very limited usage;" estimated at "fewer than a dozen patients."

According to Cross’ response to questions by the Select Committee, the Mississippi National Guard maintained a very good relationship with DOD forces. "Active duty units that responded always took a subordinate, support role and these units coordinated directly with the Mississippi National Guard Forward Operations Center.”

In Louisiana, airborne search and rescue was another area where National Guard and DOD integration was lacking. As noted in the National Guard Bureau’s After Action Report, National Guard and DOD active duty (as well as other) helicopters were conducting rescue missions over New Orleans with no preplanning for command and control. The different helicopters had different radios and used different frequencies, creating a dangerous situation for mid-air collisions in an area with little or no air traffic control. Beyond the safety issue, National Guard and DOD active duty assets operated under their own tasking orders, which sometimes led to duplication. Search and rescue coordination problems are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Another Louisiana example illustrating integration problems is the area of communication. The 35th Infantry Division, a National Guard unit, arrived at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station on September 6, and the 82nd Airborne Division, a DOD active duty unit, was to provide them with some communications support. Specifically, the 35th Infantry Division had forwarded its frequency and network requirements and the 82nd Airborne Division was to provide frequency management support – providing specific frequencies to use. However, after the arrival of the 35th, there was still confusion over what frequencies to use because many systems were already using the assigned frequency. The 35th Infantry Division did not have the proper equipment to de-conflict the frequency use, and could not obtain it until September 12, almost a week later. For more information on communication difficulties during Hurricane Katrina, see chapter on COMMUNICATIONS.

**Finding:** Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response

“There must be a strong agreement between state and federal leadership as to the operational objectives. State concerns about maintaining sovereignty must be respected.”

*General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau*

“Admiral Keating, who heads US NORTHCOM, a newly created military body overseeing homeland defense, has told lawmakers that active-duty forces should be given complete authority for responding to catastrophic disasters. . . . The head of the Washington State National Guard, General Timothy Lowenberg, suggested in emails to colleagues that Admiral Keating’s suggestion amounted to a “policy of domestic regime change.”

*Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2005*

On Friday, September 1, the President offered to place Honoré under the joint command of Northern Command and Governor Blanco. Under this proposal, Honoré would have commanded both active duty U.S. military forces and the Louisiana National Guard, subject to the command of the Governor with respect to the Guard and Northern Command with respect to the federal active duty troops. Governor Blanco declined this offer, leaving Honoré and Northern Command in charge of the federal active troops and Landrenau and Blanco in charge of the Louisiana National Guard.

The Governors of the Gulf states chose not to relinquish command of the National Guard units in their respective states. While better coordination of the military
effort may have resulted if one commander were in charge of all aspects of military support, the Governor had confidence in Landreneau and saw no need for an added layer of command.

The Department of Defense was eager to assist the Gulf states. The establishment of JTF Katrina to coordinate the military response and the command’s desire to help made state sovereignty an issue during the Katrina response. Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi declined active duty military assistance, but active duty units pre-positioning at active duty bases in Mississippi operated smoothly with the Mississippi National Guard. Therefore, the issue of federalism played out in Louisiana. Resolving this issue may have slowed the active duty military response and contributed to tension in the state-federal relationship. In the end, there was a dual military response to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. Honoré commanded the active duty military response, and Landreneau commanded the Louisiana National Guard response.

The failure of DOD, governors, and other state officials to actively participate in joint planning for emergencies, both natural and man-made, that occurred within Northern Command’s area of responsibility contributed to the tension. There were too few “civilian authorities” in DOD’s military assistance to civilian authority planning. As Northern Command lamented it did not have adequate insight into the states, the Gulf governors also lacked insight into the operations of Northern Command.

In Northern Command’s Master Exercise Summary Report on ARDENT SENTRY/TOPOFF 3, concern was expressed that Northern Command “does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities (responders, medical systems, National Guard, etc.) and other federal capabilities (contracts, FEMA, DHHs, etc.) . . . This lack of understanding could contribute to off-target planning for potential active duty DoD roles and missions.”

DOD understands the different capabilities of Transportation Command, Forces Command, 1st Army, 5th Army, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Navy and role and capabilities of Joint Forces Command, Northern Command and Joint Task Force Katrina, but the Governor of Louisiana did not. In a September 19 interview with Gannett News Service, Blanco commented on the difficulties of communicating her request for troops. She said others asked, “Did you ask for this; did you ask for that? It got to be a very difficult little game,” she said.

DOD and DHS have not adequately defined what is required for military assistance to civilian authorities during large disasters.

One cause of this misunderstanding is that DOD and DHS have not adequately defined what is required for military assistance to civilian authorities during large disasters. According to McHale, “It has never been the plan, nor has the Department of Defense been trained, resourced and equipped to provide a first responder capability.”

According to a September 2003 report to Congress on DOD’s role in supporting homeland security missions:

[The] Chairman [of the] Joint Chiefs of Staff, maintains visibility of National Guard assets performing homeland security missions. . . .
Moreover, NORTHCOM and PACOM must have insight into state-controlled National Guard operations to facilitate coordination between Title 10 and Title 32 or State Active Duty military operations, which might be occurring in the same area, at the same time, towards a common goal.
[emphasis added]

Honoré was not familiar with emergency operational procedures and personnel within the Katrina states. According to Blum, granting him a state commission without the knowledge and understanding of the state’s operational environment would not necessarily have added anything to the response. The Gulf coast governors, with their close relationships to state Adjutants General and common experiences with past emergencies, shared that view.

Admiral Keating, the Commander of Northern Command has acknowledged that there are advantages to having a National Guard officer in command of homeland response:

The advantages of using a National Guard officer during a disaster are: (1) the overwhelming majority of forces that respond to disasters are/will
be National Guard who will usually be on the scene in a state active duty status before DOD is requested to respond; (2) the NG is familiar with the local area and the local culture; (3) the NG usually has close ties with first responders such as local and state law enforcement, fire departments, etc.; and (4) the local community knows and relies upon the NG because they are part of the community. . . . NG personnel are more likely to have more experience working with local responders than the active component. A disadvantage of using a NG officer is: NG commanders might not be familiar with federal capabilities brought to the table, especially those from Navy and Marines.\textsuperscript{181}

Some of the Adjutants General from the Gulf states and around the country believe the much needed integration, trust, and increased understanding by state officials of what constitutes joint military assistance would improve if Northern Command were a National Guard Command, led by an experienced National Guard officer.\textsuperscript{182}

Northern Command’s mission is to “deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States.”\textsuperscript{183} It also has a mission to “provide defense support of civil authorities.”\textsuperscript{184} During a national emergency within the United States, NORTHCOM requires policies and procedures for interaction with state officials. The absence of these policies hampered the Katrina response.

The Select Committee does not believe there is a simple answer to improving state and federal integration. Local control and state sovereignty are important principles rooted in the nation’s birth that cannot be discarded merely to achieve more efficient joint military operations on American soil.

Finding: Even DOD lacked situational awareness of post-landfall conditions, which contributed to a slower response

The Department of Defense has significant assets for the collection of intelligence, as well as communications and satellite equipment needed in all military operations. These assets are at the very heart of conducting comprehensive and directed military operations around the world, and were not optimally used during the Katrina response. For example, the Select Committee found little evidence that DOD satellite imagery was used to great advantage to target relief to the hardest hit areas, nor was information resulting from DOD aerial damage assessment flights properly disseminated. Lack of a unified data collection system among DOD military and civilian personnel also forced the Department to rely on other sources.

Department of Defense documents indicated an unusual reliance on news reports to obtain information on what was happening on the ground in the days immediately following landfall. It appeared the Department also relied on the press for initial damage assessment in New Orleans. Reliance on often unsubstantiated press stories appeared to make DOD reactive instead of a leading participant in the response.

DOD e-mail and JTF Katrina Commander’s Assessments cited press as the source of the information on looting, the situation at the Superdome, other shelters, and the New Orleans Hyatt.\textsuperscript{185} E-mail from private sources to Honoré and McHale about people needing to be rescued at Xavier University and the Salvation Army Building in New Orleans were acted on. In the Xavier case, Honoré dispatched a reconnaissance team based on this
Finding: DOD lacked an information sharing protocol that would have enhanced joint situational awareness and communications between all military components

According to a National Guard assessment, JTF Katrina "had limited visibility on in-transit forces" being deployed. There was no system in place to track all active duty or Guard "forces and material from ports of embarkation" through distribution. For example, an August 29 e-mail generated in the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated concern over a Navy ship that announced its deployment without legal authority or Secretary of Defense approval.

Information flowing up from the National Guard state headquarters or the National Guard Bureau also did not always make its way to the JTF Katrina commander. An August 31 e-mail confirmed that 1st Army and 5th Army headquarters could not communicate directly with the Louisiana Defense Coordinating Officer, which prevented the JTF Katrina commander from knowing what Guard assets were streaming into New Orleans at the time. On September 1, a general officer at NORTHCOM complained he had not been getting e-mail from the DCOs for two days.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense also had problems keeping track of what DOD capabilities were being utilized and what tasks had been performed for the Homeland Defense Secretary. In a September 4 e-mail, some questions posed were:

- How many MREs have been made available by DoD? . . .
- What is the # of hospital beds on USN ships? . . .
- What is the status of aerial surveillance capability? . . .
- What is [the] status of the New Orleans Police Department?
- How linked up is the Guard with NOPD? . . .

There was also a request: "Need a daily DoD roll-up matrix: What we’re doing, Who’s doing it, [and w]hat’s the progress? . . .

During the TOPOFF 3 and ARDENT SENTRY 05 exercises, NORTHCOM learned that . . . the ground rules for the channel of communications between USNORTHCOM, NGB Joint [Operations] Center and State National Guard JOCs is largely undefined. There is not an agreement that delineates reporting responsibilities for force readiness and disaster response planning. Needed is a framework and an agreed on channel of communications to ensure the flow of information between USNORTHCOM, NGB and State National Guard JOCs is timely and complete.

Yet, during Katrina, the National Guard Bureau learned NORTHCOM did not standardize reporting guidelines. E-mails, logs, and daily briefings indicated a great flow of information between DOD component headquarters and the National Guard Bureau. There also appeared to be numerous mechanisms to assist in integrating federal and state operations. These included the establishment of a National Guard desk at the National Military Command Center, Guard representation in the Northern Command Joint Operations Center, web portals, daily conference calls, and e-mail situation updates to key leaders. However the Select Committee could find no
reporting requirements for sharing important information between DOD entities. Blum, however, noted that “these efforts, while effective, cannot be expected to overcome the inability of forces on the ground to effectively share information.”

Finding: Joint Task Force Katrina command staff lacked joint training, which contributed to the lack of coordination between active duty components

Hurricane Katrina required the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to work together in an emergency mission in the continental United States. Although skilled and trained in war-fighting missions abroad, conducting joint missions in this country, quickly, and under tremendous public pressure, posed integration challenges. One of the findings in an after action report from the Department of the Navy stated: “Service cultural issues seemed to dominate in a negative fashion.”

The core element of the JTF is formed by the 1st Army Staff. There is a perception that JTF is in essence, an Army Task Force, with joint augmentation and that this disposition colors their decision making processes and view of the conduct of operations. . . . In a crisis, organizations play to their strengths and [tend] to disregard unfamiliar capabilities or concepts.

Retired Coast Guard Vice Admiral Jim Hull was asked by Northern Command to assess the command’s Katrina response. Hull’s observations were critical of JTF Katrina, noting that the capabilities of 1st Army headquarters, which formed the nucleus of JTF Katrina, “was not organized or resourced to operate as a Joint Task Force.” Specific challenges ranged from inexperienced personnel to lack of communications and equipment. “The JTF is an ad-hoc organization doing the best it can without the resources necessary to make it an optimal enabler,” he said. Hull noted that as Honoré made command decisions away from his headquarters, his staff was not always informed. “We track General Honoré’s location by watching CNN,” JTF Katrina staff said.

Joint Doctrine was largely ignored. In the melee of the first few days where lives literally hung in the balance, perhaps this was a necessary course of action. However, as the Active Duty Force began to develop, the JTF Katrina headquarters never transitioned from the very tactical mindset of life saving to the operational mindset of sustaining and enabling a Joint Force. Since the Forward Command Element (General Honoré) was unable to communicate, they became embroiled and distracted with the tactical and were unable to focus on even the most basic of operational issues.… Other units who were responding from outside the area to integrate with what was called a “Joint” task force expected certain doctrinal norms which materialized very slowly or not at all.

The report also remarked that since the JTF did not establish a commander for all land components, 1st Army, 5th Army, and the Marine Corps were unclear on JTF Katrina expectations, causing confusion and lack of coordination between land forces in New Orleans. The effects of the difficulties with creating and sustaining a truly joint effort were visible on the ground in Louisiana, especially during later evacuation efforts, and the patrolling of New Orleans parishes.
Finding: Joint task force Katrina, the National Guard, Louisiana, and Mississippi lacked needed communications equipment and the interoperability required for seamless on the ground coordination

Reliable communications were the exception in the aftermath of Katrina. Even Honoré experienced communications problems. Honoré moved into Camp Shelby before he had the communications equipment necessary to support JTF Katrina. Honoré’s staff was frustrated at the lack of communications equipment. According to a Navy after action report, “At this stage it is believed that when the commander leaves Camp Shelby in the morning and returns in the evening, the staff’s only access to communicate with him is through a borrowed Nextel cell phone and his Blackberry. The Navy reported the USS IWO JIMA did have task force-capable communications equipment during the first ten days of the storm that would have been of great help to General Honoré.”

Blum also noted that “one critical area where we lack integration is in interoperable communications. National Guard units do not have the equipment necessary to effectively share information with Title 10 forces. This caused significant challenges on the ground that then bubbled up the chains.”

At the time of Katrina, Northern Command had yet to establish standardized communications architecture or to identify the system and information requirements to be used during homeland response operations. Oxford Analytica reported:

Since September 11, emergency response planners have recognized that during a major disaster, local communications systems would be disrupted or disabled, and communication between federal, state, and local officials is a particularly weak link in coordinating emergency response. Katrina showed that little has been accomplished to fix this disconnect. Within the military, the National Guard was hindered by a shortage of communications equipment. These shortcomings suggest that the Pentagon does not assign homeland defense a sufficiently high priority.

The loss of communications infrastructure in Mississippi and Louisiana due to hurricane forces caused a great deal of confusion for days following landfall. Communication outages that occurred in state emergency offices also caused problems in situational awareness. The state Adjutant General of Mississippi on the Gulf coast could not reach the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency in Jackson until two days after landfall. When cell phones and towers were destroyed or lost power, states were not equipped with backup communications capabilities even with Guard forces. According to Cross:

One of the biggest lessons learned was the need to adequate, redundant communications systems with an emphasis on satellite backhaul capability in the event of cellular and landline failure. Obviously, this type of equipment requires resourcing. The Mississippi National Guard received $29,100 for fiscal year 2005 for Military Support to Civil Authorities. $8,000 of this amount was applied to pay the satellite phone service bill for the seven satellite phones currently on hand. In order for the Mississippi National Guard to be prepared to respond to catastrophic events, it must be funded accordingly.

The Louisiana National Guard also experienced problems with lost or weak communications infrastructure. Immediately after Hurricane Katrina passed, the Industrial Canal levee broke, flooding the National Guard headquarters at Jackson Barracks. The Guard had to abandon its headquarters operations center and establish a new one, including new communications connections, at the Superdome. Re-establishing these communications was greatly facilitated by the arrival of the state’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (CST) and its emergency communications suite.

However, the National Guard in Louisiana was also plagued by problems with the state’s 800 Megahertz public safety radio system, which it shares with the state’s law enforcement and other public safety agencies. State officials said this system was about 11 years old and
limited to 48 channels. They said it was not designed to handle thousands of calls, so the volume of calls after Hurricane Katrina overloaded the system. In addition, one of the state’s three 800 MegaHerz relay towers, the Buras tower in Plaquemines Parish, was toppled by the hurricane, which further degraded the capacity of the system. Louisiana National Guard officials cited the weaknesses in this system as one of the reasons they had problems communicating with the state’s Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge.

The National Guard Bureau confirmed that its liaison teams should also be deployed with significant mobile communications. The Louisiana NGB Liaison Officer was equipped with a satellite phone, which was critical during the first days of response.

**Finding: EMAC processing, pre-arranged state compacts, and Guard equipment packages need improvement**

Although there was a consensus among federal, state, and local officials that Emergency Mutual Assistant Compacts worked very well, the current EMAC approval process is cumbersome, and therefore not fast or suited to a large scale emergency. While initial Adjutant General to Adjutant General coordination allowed for rapid deployment of National Guard forces during Katrina, the sheer size of the emergency pointed out weaknesses in the current system.

As key communications infrastructure was taken out, the ability to negotiate state-to-state compacts became difficult, if not impossible. In the hours immediately following landfall, when it was needed most, offers of assistance from states all over the country were delayed in the EMAC process, as other states’ invaluable assets were not immediately visible to the states affected.

The National Guard Bureau stepped in to help the Gulf state Adjutants General prior to landfall, and increased its management of requests for National Guard forces throughout the response, but some states still used the standard EMAC process through the National Coordinating Committee (NCC). As both the National

**The current EMAC approval process is cumbersome, and therefore not fast or suited to a large scale emergency.**

Guard Bureau and the NCC tried to anticipate requests, this dual track approach for requesting troops caused confusion and duplicated efforts. Better coordination between the NGB and the NCC was needed.

In addition, not all National Guard personnel are trained in the EMAC process. Louisiana National Guard officers seemed to lack the knowledge and experience necessary to manage the tremendous surge of requests for assistance, as well as field offers from other states under EMAC. This inexperience was one of the reasons the National Guard Bureau played an unusually large role in the EMAC process.

More familiarity with the EMAC procedures and assets by Northern Command and other federal forces would also have enhanced joint response efforts and given them a better appreciation of National Guard capabilities.

**Finding: Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected the National Guard response**

**Needed equipment and manpower**

The Army National Guard relied heavily on its aviation units and found that helicopter hoist-equipped aircraft resulted in immediate and successful search and rescue operations. Current Army doctrine, however, does not provide sufficient numbers of hoist-equipped aircraft to its Guard counterpart, nor stage them regionally to support responses to events of significant size. For example, the Mississippi National Guard needed more airlift and helicopters immediately. Cross suggested pre-arranged state compacts for hurricane assets, especially search and rescue aviation assets, would make these assets more readily available and not run the risk they could not be obtained through EMAC requests.
The Air National Guard also relied heavily on its airlift capabilities during Hurricane Katrina. The Air National Guard flew 351 missions with C-130s between August 30 and September 6. Air National Guard personnel reported that:

The C-130 is the ANG work horse, moving equipment for the National Guard such as CST’s, EMEDS, and civil engineering equipment into areas with moderate to heavy infrastructure damage…the Guard can’t have enough of them for responding to major homeland emergencies…they are essential.

New aircraft like the C-17 are better suited to carry over-size equipment such as the Rapid Engineer Deployable Operational Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE) Squadrons, but the limited number of C-17s in inventory require its use to take care of war fighting requirements overseas. This 404-person mobile construction squadron does it all: rapid damage assessment, repair, contingency heavy construction operations such as roads and ramps. Red Horse Squadrons were invaluable during Katrina.

At the time of Katrina’s landfall, Northern Command had not yet articulated specific requirements or capabilities that National Guard forces need during major homeland disasters. Without established formal requirements, the equipment deemed necessary for the National Guard to assist civilian authorities in Katrina had not been purchased by the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force. The military departments only establish units and procure equipment for which formal mission requirements have been validated, like Title 10 warfighting missions abroad. Northern Command has yet to determine — with or without input from DHS — which specific military assets should be dedicated to provide military assistance to civilian authorities, in part because DHS has not articulated the requirement to DOD in any formal manner. Therefore, at the present time, DOD does not require the purchase of equipment specifically for homeland defense or military assistance to civilian authorities for the National Guard.

Attempts to rent needed equipment were complicated by the great demand for heavy machinery created by the storm. Cross noted that contractors responding to other federal, state, and local requests for assistance leased the same type of equipment sought by the National Guard, leaving little available for National Guard use.

In a National Guard After Action Review dated September 2005, it was strongly recommended that the Department of Defense “identify the Continental United States mission as a valid requirement and equip it as a valid tasking.”

“I was there. I saw what needed to be done. They were the fastest, best capable, most appropriate force to get there in the time allowed. And that’s what it’s all about.” General Blum

Hurricane Katrina required significant National Guard manpower, and quickly. With the current level of 457,000 personnel in the National Guard, the Katrina response demonstrated the Guard response was not hindered by the deployment of Guard troops to support the War on Terrorism. According to Blum, although National Guard from the affected states were deployed overseas, Guardsmen from surrounding, and then other states quickly supplemented the effort. At landfall, over 40 percent of the Mississippi Guard, some 4,200 troops, were deployed overseas. Fortunately, critical engineering units and military police units were home. In Louisiana, Blanco asked for the immediate return of Louisiana National Guard troops from Iraq, but the National Guard Bureau was satisfied it could provide sufficient troops from other states to meet the needs of Louisiana more quickly than trying to extract Louisiana troops from combat operations in Iraq. The Joint Staff and Center for Army Lessons Learned were very impressed at the ability of the Guard to mobilize and move a Corps worth of personnel and equipment in four days.

Nonetheless, organizational challenges surfaced in this rapid deployment. The National Guard forces flowing...
into the staging areas at Alexandria, Louisiana, and to the Naval Air Station New Orleans at Belle Chasse arrived so quickly that the number of Guardsmen assigned to process and task these units was too small. The capabilities of each unit were not readily known by the logistics personnel tasking officers, causing further delays.

A lack of well defined personnel and equipment packages by the Department of Defense to support civilian authorities in large disasters degraded instant tasking of units deployed to Louisiana. General DOD development of regional strike forces composed of various National Guard units would have done a great deal to mitigate the effects of a large natural disaster or other catastrophic event: "Hurricane equipment packages for the Guard should be developed by the Department of Defense to help them provide more adequate assistance to civilian authorities in the future," Cross said.238

Current law hindered some congressionally mandated National Guard Civil Support Teams’ response

Congress established WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs) to deploy rapidly to assist local incident commanders in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident; provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations; and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. The first 10 teams were funded as part of the National Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1999. Each team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard members who are federally resourced, trained, and exercised in chemical, biological, and nuclear specialties, and skilled in reconnaissance, medical support, logistics, administration, communications, air liaison, and security.

In these capacities, especially the use of their communications vehicles, the National Guard CSTs proved invaluable to the Katrina response. On September 2, a JTF Katrina official relayed a report from the National Guard Bureau that CSTs from Connecticut, North Carolina, Nebraska, Utah, Arkansas, West Virginia, Indiana, Kansas, Alabama, and the District of Columbia were on route to the Gulf Coast.

During Katrina, there was confusion regarding the legal aspects of CST deployment, as some states interpreted the law to mean they were only authorized to be used for WMD incidents, and only in their states. This interpretation delayed deployment of these vehicles to Mississippi. Lieutenant Colonel Smithson of the Mississippi National Guard said, "CSTs saved the day, I just wish they were here sooner." Clarifying that they are available for use beyond WMD events would have greatly enhanced states abilities to react quickly to the Katrina disaster.

Guard personnel categories caused confusion

Multiple types of duty status of National Guard personnel presented some legal challenges in the proper employment of forces. State military lawyers interpreted laws, regulations, and policies pertaining to the various statuses and units of assignment very differently, which caused unnecessary delays. Delays in the Title 32 approval process, previously identified, added to the difficulty. The National Guard Bureau May 23, 2005 after action report on TOPOFF 3 found:

As highlighted in Operation Winter Freeze, the Democratic National Convention, the Republican National Convention, and the G-8 summit, and further during Ardent Sentry 05 events, the Title 10/Title 32 approval process must be standardized. Current process is lengthy, largely undefined, and requires excessive time periods for approval.

E-mails from various state Adjutants General began to arrive at the National Guard Bureau immediately after landfall inquiring about changing all Guard response to Title 32. The National Guard Bureau agreed with these suggestions and began to actively discuss this status change with the Department of Defense. On September 2, 4 and 5 respectively, Governor Riley of Alabama, Governor Barbour of Mississippi, and Governor Blanco of Louisiana wrote to the Secretary of Defense to formally ask that all National Guard personnel responding in their states be put on Title 32, Chapter 9, a new operational section of Title 32 that allows for the National Guard to perform homeland missions under governor control.

The Select Committee believes the Guard response in Katrina would have been more effective had the decision to place National Guard troops in Title 32 status been made earlier by the governors, the National Guard Bureau, and the Secretary of Defense.
Lack of unified DOD support for enhanced Guard resources under Title 32

A September 10 NGB e-mail to Blum indicated frustration at the lack of understanding by the Army and Air Force and some DOD offices of Title 32 and the resources that were to flow to the National Guard of states participating in the Katrina response. Currently, there are no clear directives for the use of Title 32 National Guard homeland missions, so the confusion was not unexpected. The e-mail indicates, however, that some officials in DOD did not totally embrace the use of Title 32 during the Katrina response. The e-mail stated specifically that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Craig Duehring, expressed that Title 32 would only apply to the three affected states; that Service Secretaries must get approval from the Deputy Secretary of Personnel and Readiness before issuing any orders; and that the Office of Reserve Affairs will “run this” and have a matrix of needed information that will be required before any consideration is given to funding of Guard activities. Even though the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved use of Title 32 on September 7, uncertainty within the Pentagon on Title 32 parameters, required the National Guard Bureau to ensure Title 32 status for those states who had rushed in to help.

Lack of training for Military Assistance to Law Enforcement (MSCLEA)

Before the storm, the Louisiana National Guard opened the Superdome for evacuees with a minimal number of staff, many of whom were not military police or formally trained for crowd control operations. On Monday night, August 29, when an increased number of Louisiana National Guard arrived at the Superdome, they found many Guard personnel working at checkpoints alone, with no hand held radios, and unarmed. Though the crowd was generally peaceful, even when the plumbing failed, these soldiers were in a volatile situation they were not trained to handle. An Army National Guard after action report dated December 21 found these Guard personnel were not properly trained to respond to areas where there are a large number of civilians, resulting in risk to their safety and the safety of others. McHale indicated the Pentagon is interested in enhanced training for National Guard in this homeland role. “I think we will be looking at formalizing the training, equipment and deployment capability associated with National Guard military police units,” McHale said.

Finding: Search and rescue operations were a tremendous success, but coordination and integration between the military services, the National Guard, the Coast Guard, and other local, state, and federal rescue organizations was lacking

“During the first four days, no single organization or agency was in charge of providing a coordinated effort for rescue operations.”

Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander, NORTHERN COMMAND

Urban search and rescue operations are multi-agency in nature and no standardized federal system currently exists to effectively integrate operations. The lack of a coordination mechanism and standardized processes led to duplication of effort in some locations
and a lack of response in others. Each military entity relied on its own airspace coordinators during the first critical days, which also contributed to a lack of awareness of who was doing what.

In New Orleans, the Louisiana National Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard maintained separate tactical operations centers for airborne search and rescue missions. The National Guard had its tactical operations center with Task Force Eagle at the Superdome, and the Coast Guard had its tactical operations center at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station. The two entities divided up areas and ran separate operations.

Because of the urgent emphasis on getting victims to high ground, the drop-off points were not well coordinated. While some were dropped off at the Superdome (which provided shelter, food, and water), others were dropped off at the Convention Center (which provided only shelter), and others were dropped off on freeway overpasses or levees (with nothing at all). The philosophy at that point was to save first, then worry later about providing other relief. This situation resulted in people being saved from the floodwaters, but then suffering — some for days — in sweltering conditions with or without food and water.
1 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) [written statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense at 4] [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
2 Id. at 8.
3 Id. at 6.
6 E-mail correspondence from Col. Richard Chavez, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support to Anthony Capra, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, et al., (Aug. 30, 2005) (12:18 p.m.).
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William L. Carwile, III
Hurricane Katrina Federal Coordination Officer for Mississippi
Select Committee hearing, December 7, 2005