III. Reconciling Traditional Public Health Jurisprudence and 
  the Jurisprudence of Prevention 
For the past generation, civil rights activists have pushed 
  the courts to apply ever more rigorous standards to criminal prosecutions. At 
  the same time, conservatives have pushed the courts to give the states more 
  authority to contain crime, drugs, and degeneracy. The collision of these political 
  agendas has resulted in the jurisprudence of prevention: courts have preserved 
  the protections of criminal law, but have also given states the authority to 
  avoid some of these protections through civil detentions. 
In the prevention cases, the Supreme Court has transformed the 
  traditional police power to restrict disease carriers into a general power to 
  restrict individuals whose criminal activity poses a threat to society.
[393] 
  In its infancy, prevention jurisprudence was merely an ad hoc approach
 *385 
  that appeared in disparate cases. With Allen,
[394] 
  Hilton,
[395] and Salerno,
[396] 
  it has moved into adolescence. Prevention jurisprudence is characterized by 
  highly technical distinctions between punishment and regulation,
[397] 
  meticulous attention to requiring only the bare minimum of procedural due process,
[398] 
  and the granting of broad authority to decision makers.
[399] 
  These characteristics mirror traditional public health authority. 
In the public health model, the decisionmaker is the public 
  health official; the standard for the decision is reasonable medical probability; 
  the individual is treated, and released after the danger of communicability 
  has passed; and the health department is concerned only with future acts.
[400] 
  This model works very well for gonorrhea.
[401] 
  It is potentially most restrictive in the case of pan-drug-resistant tuberculosis.
[402] 
  Most public outcry over the traditional public health model has surrounded HIV/AIDS 
  because the untreatability and inevitable fatality of the disease could be called 
  on to justify the use of such Draconian measures such as indefinite confinement.
[403] 
  The jurisprudence of prevention represents legislative and judicial reaction 
  to the real and perceived dangers in
 *386 American society. The fear 
  is that courts will use the jurisprudence of prevention to impose punishment 
  without affording the procedural protections that the Constitution requires 
  in a criminal context. 
The fear that traditional public health authority will be used 
  for sinister ends is exacerbated by the prevention cases. All such rulings have 
  been controversial, drawing fire from dissenting justices
[404] 
  and from scholarly commentators.
[405] Rather 
  than recognizing the pattern that is emerging from these isolated cases, however, 
  the critics have focused on the arbitrariness of the Supreme Court's actions. 
  
[393] This transformation 
  mirrors the introduction of the doctrine of ferae naturae, that a wild animal 
  belongs to the person who catches it, into modern oil and gas law. Oil and gas 
  were once thought to run free underground. By analogy with the law applying 
  to the capture of wild animals, it was decided that oil and gas belonged to 
  whomever captured it. 
 
[394] See supra Part II, 
  Section B, subsection 5. 
 
[395] See supra Part II, 
  Section B, subsection 6. 
 
[396] See supra Part II, 
  Section B, subsection 7. 
 
[397] Bell, 441 U.S. at 560-62; 
  Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101; Allen, 478 U.S. at 370. See supra note 190 and 
  accompanying text.
 
[398] See supra note 231 
  and accompanying text. 
 
[399] Schall 467 U.S. at 
  278-281. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
 
[400] This model does not 
  involve judicial hearings except as necessary to obtain police cooperation in 
  apprehending a recalcitrant disease carrier. If a person is unjustly confined, 
  the only recourse is a habeas corpus petition. 
 
[401] In this context, "working 
  well"' reflects that disease carriers are rapidly treated and returned to the 
  community. The ease and speed of treatment reduces the necessary restriction 
  of individual liberty to a minimum. "Working well"' is harder to evaluate in 
  the face of 3 million cases of gonorrhea a year. See HETHCOTE, supra note 90 
  at 1. 
 
[402] Once a person becomes 
  symptomatic with tuberculosis he may die unless he is provided prolonged treatment 
  with antituberculosis drugs. It is a difficult disease to treat and requires 
  treatment with somewhat toxic drugs for several months. In some cases, the bacillus 
  becomes resistant to the drugs and thus becomes untreatable. Patients with infectious, 
  drug resistent tuberculosis pose a particular problem because some of the persons 
  that they infect will also develop drug resistent tuberculosis. Pan-drug resistent 
  tuberculosis is frequently fatal in adults and children, despite all available 
  treatments. 
 
Richards, supra note 1, at 149; see also B. KETCHER, L. YOUNG, 
  & M. KODA- KIMBEL, APPLIED THERAPEUTICS: THE CLINICAL USE OF DRUGS 682 (1983). 
  
[403] [T]he point of mandatory 
  AIDS antibody testing is the degradation of gays and the reconsecration of heterosexual 
  supremacy as a sacred value, even though mandatory testing, to date, has not 
  been directly aimed at gays nor, indeed, has made any mention of them. AIDS-testing 
  legislation is not to be understood as business-as-usual public policy-making 
  aimed at maximizing overall social utility or realizing public goods--it can 
  adequately be understood only in terms of the nature and function of social 
  rituals, in particular, purification rituals. 
 
Mohr, Policy, Ritual, Purity: Gays and Mandatory AIDS Testing, 
  15 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 178 (1987). 
[404] See Allen, 478 U.S. 
  at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
[405] See Constitutional 
  Law--Criminal Law and Procedure: Pretrial Detention--Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
  101 HARV. L. REV. 169, 179 (1987). This article is illustrative because it recognizes 
  the difficult problem posed by defendants such as Salerno who are willing to 
  kill to avoid prosecution. It does not, however, accept that this real danger 
  justifies beggaring the presumption of innocence. While this is an admirable 
  position from an individual rights perspective, it oversimplifies the role of 
  the Court in preserving societal harmony. For a nonjudgmental discussion of 
  the impact of the decision and its potential mitigation through pretrial services, 
  see Wanger, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled 
  Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320 (1987). 
 
   
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