Home |
Climate Change Project |
Table of Contents |
Courses | Search |
| [1] | SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |
| [2] | No. 99-1185 |
| [3] | 2001.SCT.0000011 <http://www.versuslaw.com> |
| [4] | January 17, 2001 |
| [5] | MARK SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL COMMITMENT CENTER, PETITIONER V. ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG |
| [6] | SYLLABUS BY THE COURT |
| [7] | Syllabus |
| [8] | OCTOBER TERM, 2000 |
| [9] | SELING v. YOUNG |
| [10] | NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. |
| [11] | SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |
| [12] | SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL COMMITMENT CENTER v. YOUNG |
| [13] | Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit |
| [14] | No. 99-1185. |
| [15] | Argued October 31, 2000 |
| [16] | Decided January 17, 2001 |
| [17] | Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the
civil commitment of "sexually violent predators," persons who
suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Respondent Young
is confined under the Act at the Special Commitment Center (Center), for
which petitioner is the superintendent. Young's challenges to his commitment
in state court proved largely unsuccessful. Young then instituted a habeas
action under 28 U. S. C. §2254, seeking release from confinement. The District
Court initially granted the writ, concluding that the Act was unconstitutional.
While the superintendent's appeal was pending, this Court decided Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, holding that a similar commitment scheme, Kansas'
Sexually Violent Predator Act, on its face, met substantive due process
requirements, was non-punitive, and thus did not violate the Double Jeopardy
and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration
in light of Hendricks. The District Court then denied Young's petition.
In particular, the District Court determined that, because the Washington
Act is civil, Young's double jeopardy and ex post facto claims must fail.
The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling. The "linchpin" of Young's
claims, the court reasoned, was whether the Act was punitive "as applied"
to Young. The court did not read Hendricks to preclude the possibility that
the Act could be punitive as applied. Reasoning that actual confinement
conditions could divest a facially valid statute of its civil label upon
a showing by the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is punitive in
effect, the court remanded the case for the District Court to determine
whether the conditions at the Center rendered the Act punitive as applied
to Young. |
| [18] | Held: An Act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive "as applied"
to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses and provide cause for release. Pp. 9-16. |
| [19] | (a) Respondent cannot obtain release through an "as-applied"
challenge to the Act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. The Act
is strikingly similar to, and, in fact, was the pattern for, the Kansas
Act upheld in Hendricks. Among other things, the Court there applied the
principle that determining the civil or punitive nature of an Act must begin
with reference to its text and legislative history. See 521 U. S., at 360-369.
Subsequently, the Court expressly disapproved of evaluating an Act's civil
nature by reference to its effect on a single individual, holding, instead,
that courts must focus on a variety of factors considered in relation to
the statute on its face, and that the clearest proof is required to override
legislative intent and conclude that an Act denominated civil is punitive
in purpose or effect. Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100. With this
in mind, the Ninth Circuit's "as-applied" analysis for double
jeopardy and ex post facto claims must be rejected as fundamentally flawed.
This Court does not deny the seriousness of some of respondent's allegations.
Nor does the Court express any view as to how his allegations would bear
on a court determining in the first instance whether Washington's confinement
scheme is civil. Here, however, the Court evaluates respondent's allegations
under the assumption that the Act is civil, as the Washington Supreme Court
held and the Ninth Circuit acknowledged. The Court agrees with petitioner
that an "as-applied" analysis would prove unworkable. Such an
analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is
punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme's
validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. Confinement
is not a fixed event, but extends over time under conditions that are subject
to change. The particular features of confinement may affect how a confinement
scheme is evaluated to determine whether it is civil or punitive, but it
remains no less true that the query must be answered definitively. A confinement
scheme's civil nature cannot be altered based merely on vagaries in the
authorizing statute's implementation. The Ninth Circuit's "as-applied"
analysis does not comport with precedents in which this Court evaluated
the validity of confinement schemes. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.
S. 364, 373-374. Such cases presented the question whether the Act at issue
was punitive, whereas permitting respondent's as-applied challenge would
invite an end run around the Washington Supreme Court's decision that the
Act is civil when that decision is not before this Court. Pp. 9-13. |
| [20] | (b) Today's decision does not mean that respondent and others committed
as sexually violent predators have no remedy for the alleged conditions
and treatment regime at the Center. The Act gives them the right to adequate
care and individualized treatment. It is for the Washington courts to determine
whether the Center is operating in accordance with state law and provide
a remedy. Those courts also remain competent to adjudicate and remedy challenges
to civil confinement schemes arising under the Federal Constitution. Because
the Washington Supreme Court has held that the Act is civil in nature, designed
to incapacitate and to treat, due process requires that the conditions and
duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which persons are committed. E.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U. S. 71, 79. Finally, the Court notes that an action under 42 U. S. C.
§1983 is pending against the Center and that the Center operates under an
injunction requiring it to take steps to improve confinement conditions.
Pp. 13-15. |
| [21] | (c) This case gives the Court no occasion to consider how a confinement
scheme's civil nature relates to other constitutional challenges, such as
due process, or to consider the extent to which a court may look to actual
conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine
in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. Whether
such a scheme is punitive has been the threshold question for some constitutional
challenges. See, e.g., Allen, supra. However, the Court has not squarely
addressed the relevance of confinement conditions to a first instance determination,
and that question need not be resolved here. Pp. 15-16. |
| [22] | 192 F. 3d 870, reversed and remanded. |
| [23] | O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter, J., joined. Thomas, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting
opinion. |
| [24] | The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice O'Connor |
| [25] | On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth
Circuit |
| [26] | Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 authorizes the civil
commitment of "sexually violent predators," persons who suffer
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely
to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.010
et seq. (1992). Respondent, Andre Brigham Young, is confined as a sexually
violent predator at the Special Commitment Center (Center), for which petitioner
is the superintendent. After respondent's challenges to his commitment in
state court proved largely unsuccessful, he instituted a habeas action under
28 U. S. C. §2254, seeking release from confinement. The Washington Supreme
Court had already held that the Act is civil, In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d
1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc), and this Court held a similar commitment
scheme for sexually violent predators in Kansas to be civil on its face,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997). The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that respondent could challenge the
statute as being punitive "as applied" to him in violation of
the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, and remanded the case to
the District Court for an evidentiary hearing. |
| [27] | I. |
| [28] | A. |
| [29] | Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) was a response
to citizens' concerns about laws and procedures regarding sexually violent
offenders. One of the Act's provisions authorizes civil commitment of such
offenders. Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.010 et seq. (1992 and Supp. 2000). The
Act defines a sexually violent predator as someone who has been convicted
of, or charged with, a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.
§71.09.020(1) (Supp. 2000). The statute reaches prisoners, juveniles, persons
found incompetent to stand trial, persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity, and persons at any time convicted of a sexually violent offense
who have committed a recent overt act. §71.09.030. Generally, when it appears
that a person who has committed a sexually violent offense is about to be
released from confinement, the prosecuting attorney files a petition alleging
that that person is a sexually violent predator. Ibid. That filing triggers
a process for charging and trying the person as a sexually violent predator,
during which he is afforded a panoply of protections including counsel and
experts (paid for by the State in cases of indigency), a probable cause
hearing, and trial by judge or jury at the individual's option. §§71.09.040-71.09.050.
At trial, the State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person is a sexually violent predator. §71.09.060(1). |
| [30] | Upon the finding that a person is a sexually violent predator, he is committed
for control, care, and treatment to the custody of the department of social
and health services. Ibid. Once confined, the person has a right to adequate
care and individualized treatment. §71.09.080(2). The person is also entitled
to an annual examination of his mental condition. §71.09.070. If that examination
indicates that the individual's condition is so changed that he is not likely
to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, state officials must authorize
the person to petition the court for conditional release or discharge. §71.09.090(1).
The person is entitled to a hearing at which the State again bears the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not safe to be at large.
Ibid. The person may also independently petition the court for release.
§71.09.090(2). At a show cause hearing, if the court finds probable cause
to believe that the person is no longer dangerous, a full hearing will be
held at which the State again bears the burden of proof. Ibid. |
| [31] | The Act also provides a procedure to petition for conditional release
to a less restrictive alternative to confinement. §71.09.090. Before ordering
conditional release, the court must find that the person will be treated
by a state certified sexual offender treatment provider, that there is a
specific course of treatment, that housing exists that will be sufficiently
secure to protect the community, and that the person is willing to comply
with the treatment and supervision requirements. §71.09.092. Conditional
release is subject to annual review until the person is unconditionally
released. §§71.09.096, 71.09.098. |
| [32] | B. |
| [33] | Respondent, Andre Brigham Young, was convicted of six rapes over three
decades. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. Young was scheduled to be released
from prison for his most recent conviction in October 1990. One day prior
to his scheduled release, the State filed a petition to commit Young as
a sexually violent predator. Id., at 32a. |
| [34] | At the commitment hearing, Young's mental health experts testified that
there is no mental disorder that makes a person likely to reoffend and that
there is no way to predict accurately who will reoffend. The State called
an expert who testified, based upon a review of Young's records, that Young
suffered from a severe personality disorder not otherwise specified with
primarily paranoid and antisocial features, and a severe paraphilia, which
would be classified as either paraphilia sexual sadism or paraphilia not
otherwise specified (rape). See generally American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 522-523, 530, 532,
634, 645-646, 673 (4th ed. 1994). In the state expert's opinion, severe
paraphilia constituted a mental abnormality under the Act. The State's expert
concluded that Young's condition, in combination with the personality disorder,
the span of time during which Young committed his crimes, his recidivism,
his persistent denial, and his lack of empathy or remorse, made it more
likely than not that he would commit further sexually violent acts. The
victims of Young's rapes also testified. The jury unanimously concluded
that Young was a sexually violent predator. |
| [35] | Young and another individual appealed their commitments in state court,
arguing that the Act violated the Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, Due Process,
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution. In major respects,
the Washington Supreme Court held that the Act is constitutional. In re
Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc). To the extent the
court concluded that the Act violated due process and equal protection principles,
those rulings are reflected in subsequent amendments to the Act. See Part
I-A, supra. |
| [36] | The Washington court reasoned that the claimants' double jeopardy and
ex post facto claims hinged on whether the Act is civil or criminal in nature.
Following this Court's precedents, the court examined the language of the
Act, the legislative history, and the purpose and effect of the statutory
scheme. The court found that the legislature clearly intended to create
a civil scheme both in the statutory language and legislative history. The
court then turned to examine whether the actual impact of the Act is civil
or criminal. The Act, the court concluded, is concerned with treating committed
persons for a current mental abnormality, and protecting society from the
sexually violent acts associated with that abnormality, rather than being
concerned with criminal culpability. The court distinguished the goals of
incapacitation and treatment from the goal of punishment. The court found
that the Washington Act is designed to further legitimate goals of civil
confinement and that the claimants had failed to provide proof to the contrary.
122 Wash. 2d, at 18-25, 857 P. 2d, at 996-1000. |
| [37] | The Act spawned several other challenges in state and federal court, two
of which bear mention. Richard Turay, committed as a sexually violent predator,
filed suit in Federal District Court against Center officials under Rev.
Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging unconstitutional conditions of
confinement and inadequate treatment at the Center. In 1994, a jury concluded
that the Center had failed to provide constitutionally adequate mental health
treatment. App. 64-68. The court ordered officials at the Center to bring
the institution up to constitutional standards, appointing a Special Master
to monitor progress at the Center. The Center currently operates under an
injunction. Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (WD Wash. 2000). See also
Brief for Petitioner 8-9. |
| [38] | Turay also appealed his commitment as a sexually violent predator in state
court, claiming, among other things, that the conditions of confinement
at the Center rendered the Washington Act punitive "as applied"
to him in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Washington Supreme
Court ruled that Turay's commitment was valid. In re Turay, 139 Wash. 2d
379, 986 P. 2d 790 (1999) (en banc). The court explained that in Young,
it had concluded that the Act is civil. 139 Wash. 2d, at 415, 986 P. 2d,
at 869. The court also noted that this Court had recently held Kansas' Sexually
Violent Predator Act, nearly identical to Washington's Act, to be civil
on its face. Ibid. The Washington Supreme Court rejected Turay's theory
of double jeopardy, reasoning that the double jeopardy claim must be resolved
by asking whether the Act itself is civil. Id., at 416-417, 986 P. 2d, at
810 (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997)). The court concluded
that Turay's proper remedy for constitutional violations in conditions of
confinement at the Center was his §1983 action for damages and injunctive
relief. 139 Wash. 2d, at 420, 986 P. 2d, at 812. |
| [39] | C. |
| [40] | That brings us to the action before this Court. In 1994, after unsuccessful
challenges to his confinement in state court, Young filed a habeas action
under 28 U. S. C. §2254 against the superintendent of the Center. Young
contended that the Act was unconstitutional and that his confinement was
illegal. He sought immediate release. The District Court granted the writ,
concluding that the Act violated substantive due process, that the Act was
criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and
ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp.
744 (WD Wash. 1995). The superintendent appealed. While the appeal was pending,
this Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997), which held
that Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act, on its face, met substantive
due process requirements, was non-punitive, and thus did not violate the
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded Young's case to the District Court for reconsideration in light
of Hendricks. 122 F. 3d 38 (1997). |
| [41] | On remand, the District Court denied Young's petition. Young appealed
and the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part.
192 F. 3d 870 (1999). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling
that Young's confinement did not violate the substantive due process requirement
that the State prove mental illness and dangerousness to justify confinement.
Id., at 876. The Court of Appeals also left undisturbed the District Court's
conclusion that the Act meets procedural due process and equal protection
guarantees, and the District Court's rejection of Young's challenges to
his commitment proceedings. Id., at 876-877. Young did not seek a petition
for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit for its decision affirming
the District Court in these respects, and accordingly, those issues are
not before this Court. |
| [42] | The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's determination that because
the Washington Act is civil, Young's double jeopardy and ex post facto claims
must fail. The "linchpin" of Young's claims, the court reasoned,
was whether the Act was punitive "as applied" to Young. Id., at
873. The court did not read this Court's decision in Hendricks to preclude
the possibility that the Act could be punitive as applied. The court reasoned
that actual conditions of confinement could divest a facially valid statute
of its civil label upon a showing by the clearest proof that the statutory
scheme is punitive in effect. 192 F. 3d, at 874. |
| [43] | The Court of Appeals reviewed Young's claims that conditions of confinement
at the Center were punitive and did not comport with due process. Id., at
875. Young alleged that for seven years, he had been subject to conditions
more restrictive than those placed on true civil commitment detainees, and
even state prisoners. The Center, located wholly within the perimeter of
a larger Department of Corrections (DOC) facility, relied on the DOC for
a host of essential services, including library services, medical care,
food, and security. More recently, Young claimed, the role of the DOC had
increased to include daily security "walk-throughs." Young contended
that the conditions and restrictions at the Center were not reasonably related
to a legitimate non-punitive goal, as residents were abused, confined to
their rooms, subjected to random searches of their rooms and units, and
placed under excessive security. |
| [44] | Young also contended that conditions at the Center were incompatible with
the Act's treatment purpose. The Center had a policy of videotaping therapy
sessions and withholding privileges for refusal to submit to treatment.
The Center residents were housed in units that, according to the Special
Master in the Turay litigation, were clearly inappropriate for persons in
a mental health treatment program. The Center still lacked certified sex
offender treatment providers. Finally, there was no possibility of release.
A court-appointed resident advocate and psychologist concluded in his final
report that because the Center had not fundamentally changed over so many
years, he had come to suspect that the Center was designed and managed to
punish and confine individuals for life without any hope of release to a
less restrictive setting. 192 F. 3d, at 875. See also Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Supplemental Brief on Remand, and Motion to Alter
Judgment 4-5, 8-9, 11-12, 15, 20, 24-26, in No. C94-480C (WD Wash.), Record,
Doc. Nos. 57, 155, and 167. |
| [45] | The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[b]y alleging that [the Washington
Act] is punitive as applied, Young alleged facts which, if proved, would
entitle him to relief." 192 F. 3d, at 875. The court remanded the case
to the District Court for a hearing to determine whether the conditions
at the Center rendered the Act punitive as applied to Young. Id., at 876. |
| [46] | This Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 529 U. S. 1017
(2000), to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Washington Supreme Court. Compare 192 F. 3d 870 (1999), with In
re Turay, 139 Wash. 2d 379, 986 P. 2d 790 (1999). |
| [47] | II. |
| [48] | As the Washington Supreme Court held and the Ninth Circuit acknowledged,
we proceed on the understanding that the Washington Act is civil in nature.
The Washington Act is strikingly similar to a commitment scheme we reviewed
four Terms ago in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997). In fact, Kansas
patterned its Act after Washington's. See In re Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246,
249, 912 P. 2d 129, 131 (1996). In Hendricks, we explained that the question
whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory
construction. 521 U. S., at 361 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364,
368 (1986)). A court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the
statute to establish civil proceedings. A court will reject the legislature's
manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act provides the clearest
proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect
as to negate the State's intention. 521 U. S., at 361 (citing United States
v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249 (1980)). We concluded that the confined
individual in that case had failed to satisfy his burden with respect to
the Kansas Act. We noted several factors: The Act did not implicate retribution
or deterrence; prior criminal convictions were used as evidence in the commitment
proceedings, but were not a prerequisite to confinement; the Act required
no finding of scienter to commit a person; the Act was not intended to function
as a deterrent; and although the procedural safeguards were similar to those
in the criminal context, they did not alter the character of the scheme.
521 U. S., at 361-365. |
| [49] | We also examined the conditions of confinement provided by the Act. Id.,
at 363-364. The Court was aware that sexually violent predators in Kansas
were to be held in a segregated unit within the prison system. Id., at 368.
We explained that the Act called for confinement in a secure facility because
the persons confined were dangerous to the community. Id., at 363. We noted,
however, that conditions within the unit were essentially the same as conditions
for other involuntarily committed persons in mental hospitals. Ibid. Moreover,
confinement under the Act was not necessarily indefinite in duration. Id.,
at 364. Finally, we observed that in addition to protecting the public,
the Act also provided treatment for sexually violent predators. Id., at
365-368. We acknowledged that not all mental conditions were treatable.
For those individuals with untreatable conditions, however, we explained
that there was no federal constitutional bar to their civil confinement,
because the State had an interest in protecting the public from dangerous
individuals with treatable as well as untreatable conditions. Id., at 366.
Our conclusion that the Kansas Act was "non-punitive thus remove[d]
an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post
facto claims." Id., at 369. |
| [50] | Since deciding Hendricks, this Court has reaffirmed the principle that
determining the civil or punitive nature of an Act must begin with reference
to its text and legislative history. Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S.
93 (1997). In Hudson, which involved a double jeopardy challenge to monetary
penalties and occupational debarment, this Court expressly disapproved of
evaluating the civil nature of an Act by reference to the effect that Act
has on a single individual. Instead, courts must evaluate the question by
reference to a variety of factors " `considered in relation to the
statute on its face' "; the clearest proof is required to override
legislative intent and conclude that an Act denominated civil is punitive
in purpose or effect. Id., at 100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza&nbhyph;Martinez,
372 U. S. 144, 169 (1963)). |
| [51] | With this in mind, we turn to the Court of Appeals' determination that
respondent could raise an "as-applied" challenge to the Act on
double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds and seek release from confinement.
Respondent essentially claims that the conditions of his confinement at
the Center are too restrictive, that the conditions are incompatible with
treatment, and that the system is designed to result in indefinite confinement.
Respondent's claims are in many respects like the claims presented to the
Court in Hendricks, where we concluded that the conditions of confinement
were largely explained by the State's goal to incapacitate, not to punish.
521 U. S., at 362-368. Nevertheless, we do not deny that some of respondent's
allegations are serious. Nor do we express any view as to how his allegations
would bear on a court determining in the first instance whether Washington's
confinement scheme is civil. Here, we evaluate respondent's allegations
as presented in a double jeopardy and ex post facto challenge under the
assumption that the Act is civil. |
| [52] | We hold that respondent cannot obtain release through an "as-applied"
challenge to the Washington Act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds.
We agree with petitioner that an "as-applied" analysis would prove
unworkable. Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a
particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination
of the scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
Brief for Petitioner 30; Reply Brief for Petitioner 9. Unlike a fine, confinement
is not a fixed event. As petitioner notes, it extends over time under conditions
that are subject to change. The particular features of confinement may affect
how a confinement scheme is evaluated to determine whether it is civil rather
than punitive, but it remains no less true that the query must be answered
definitively. The civil nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered
based merely on vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute. |
| [53] | Respondent contends that the Ninth Circuit's "as-applied" analysis
comports with this Court's precedents. He points out that this Court has
considered conditions of confinement in evaluating the validity of confinement
schemes in the past. Brief for Respondent 11-16, 29 (citing Hendricks, supra,
at 363; Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-302 (1993); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 747-748 (1987); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364,
373-374 (1986); Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269-273 (1984)). |
| [54] | All of those cases, however, presented the question whether the Act at
issue was punitive. Permitting respondent's as-applied challenge would invite
an end run around the Washington Supreme Court's decision that the Act is
civil in circumstances where a direct attack on that decision is not before
this Court. |
| [55] | Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, takes issue with our view
that the question before the Court concerns an as applied challenge to a
civil Act. He first contends that respondent's challenge is not a true "as-applied"
challenge because respondent does not claim that the statute " `by
its own terms' is unconstitutional as applied ... but rather that the statute
is not being applied according to its terms at all." Post, at 2. We
respectfully disagree. The Act requires "adequate care and individualized
treatment," Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.080(2) (Supp. 2000), but the Act
is silent with respect to the confinement conditions required at the Center,
and that is the source of many of respondent's complaints, see supra, at
7-8. Justice Thomas next contends that we incorrectly assume that the Act
is civil, instead of viewing the Act as " `otherwise ... civil,' or
civil `on its face.' " Post, at 1 (emphasis added by Thomas, J.). However
the Washington Act is described, our analysis in this case turns on the
prior finding by the Washington Supreme Court that the Act is civil, and
this Court's decision in Hendricks that a nearly identical Act was civil.
Petitioner could not have claimed that the Washington Act is "otherwise"
or "facially" civil without relying on those prior decisions. |
| [56] | In dissent, Justice Stevens argues that we "incorrectly assum[e]"
that the Act is "necessarily civil," post, at 2, but the case
has reached this Court under that very assumption. The Court of Appeals
recognized that the Act is civil, and treated respondent's claim as an individual,
"as-applied" challenge to the Act. The Court of Appeals then remanded
the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine respondent's
conditions of confinement. Contrary to the dissent's characterization of
the case, the Court of Appeals did not purport to undermine the validity
of the Washington Act as a civil confinement scheme. The court did not conclude
that respondent's allegations, if substantiated, would be sufficient to
refute the Washington Supreme Court's conclusion that the Act is civil,
and to require the release of all those confined under its authority. The
Ninth Circuit addressed only respondent's individual case, and we do not
decide claims that are not presented by the decision below. Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 379 (1996). We reject the Ninth
Circuit's "as-applied" analysis for double jeopardy and ex post
facto claims as fundamentally flawed. |
| [57] | III. |
| [58] | Our decision today does not mean that respondent and others committed
as sexually violent predators have no remedy for the alleged conditions
and treatment regime at the Center. The text of the Washington Act states
that those confined under its authority have the right to adequate care
and individualized treatment. Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.080(2) (Supp. 2000);
Brief for Petitioner 14. As petitioner acknowledges, if the Center fails
to fulfill its statutory duty, those confined may have a state law cause
of action. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 10-11, 52. It is for the Washington courts
to determine whether the Center is operating in accordance with state law
and provide a remedy. |
| [59] | State courts, in addition to federal courts, remain competent to adjudicate
and remedy challenges to civil confinement schemes arising under the Federal
Constitution. As noted above, the Washington Supreme Court has already held
that the Washington Act is civil in nature, designed to incapacitate and
to treat. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d, at 18-25, 857 P. 2d, at 996-1000. Accordingly,
due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under
the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are
committed. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 79 (1992); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U. S. 307, 324 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). |
| [60] | Finally, we note that a §1983 action against the Center is pending in
the Western District of Washington. See supra, at 6-7. The Center operates
under an injunction that requires it to adopt and implement a plan for training
and hiring competent sex offender therapists; to improve relations between
residents and treatment providers; to implement a treatment program for
residents containing elements required by prevailing professional standards;
to develop individual treatment programs; and to provide a psychologist
or psychiatrist expert in the diagnosis and treatment of sex offenders to
supervise the staff. App. 67. A Special Master has assisted in bringing
the Center into compliance with the injunction. In its most recent published
opinion on the matter, the District Court noted some progress at the Center
in meeting the requirements of the injunction. Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp.
2d, at 1154-1155. |
| [61] | This case gives us no occasion to consider how the civil nature of a confinement
scheme relates to other constitutional challenges, such as due process,
or to consider the extent to which a court may look to actual conditions
of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first
instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. Justice Scalia,
concurring, contends that conditions of confinement are irrelevant to determining
whether an Act is civil unless state courts have interpreted the Act as
permitting those conditions. By contrast, Justice Stevens would consider
conditions of confinement at any time in order to gain "full knowledge
of the effects of the statute." Post, at 3. |
| [62] | Whether a confinement scheme is punitive has been the threshold question
for some constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U. S. 346 (1997) (double jeopardy and ex post facto); United States v. Salerno,
481 U. S. 739 (1987) (due process); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364 (1986)
(Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Whatever these cases
may suggest about the relevance of conditions of confinement, they do not
endorse the approach of the dissent, which would render the inquiry into
the "effects of the statute," post, at 3, completely open ended.
In one case, the Court refused to consider alleged confinement conditions
because the parties had entered into a consent decree to improve conditions.
Flores, 507 U. S., at 301. The Court presumed that conditions were in compliance
with the requirements of the consent decree. Ibid. In another case, the
Court found that anecdotal case histories and a statistical study were insufficient
to render a regulatory confinement scheme punitive. Martin, 467 U. S., at
272. In such cases, we have decided whether a confinement scheme is punitive
notwithstanding the inherent difficulty in ascertaining current conditions
and predicting future events. |
| [63] | We have not squarely addressed the relevance of conditions of confinement
to a first instance determination, and that question need not be resolved
here. An Act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive "as applied"
to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses and provide cause for release. |
| [64] | The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. |
| [65] | It is so ordered. |
| [66] | Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Souter joins, concurring. |
| [67] | I agree with the Court's holding that a statute, "found to be civil
in nature, cannot be deemed punitive" or criminal "as applied"
for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. Ante, at
15. The Court accurately observes that this holding gives us "no occasion
to consider the extent to which a court may look to actual conditions of
confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first
instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature." Ante, at
14. I write separately to dissociate myself from any implication that this
reserved point may be an open question. I do not regard it as such since,
three years ago, we rejected a similar double jeopardy challenge (based
upon the statute's implementation "as applied" to the petitioner),
where the statute had not yet been determined to be civil in nature, and
where we were making that determination "in the first instance."
See Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997). To be consistent with
the most narrow holding of that case (which, unlike this one, did not involve
imposition of confinement), any consideration of subsequent implementation
in the course of making a "first instance" determination cannot
extend to all subsequent implementation, but must be limited to implementation
of confinement, and of other impositions that are "not a fixed event,"
ante, at 11. That, however, would be a peculiar limitation, since even "fixed
events" such as the imposition of a fine can, in their implementation,
acquire penal aspects -- exemplified in Hudson by the allegedly punitive
size of the fines, and by the availability of reduction for "good-faith"
violations, see 522 U. S., at 97-98, 104. Moreover, the language and the
reasoning of Hudson leave no room for such a peculiar limitation. |
| [68] | In that case, the petitioners contended that the punitive nature of the
statute that had been applied to them could be assessed by considering the
aforementioned features of the fines. We flatly rejected that contention,
which found support in our prior decision in United States v. Halper, 490
U. S. 435 (1989). Halper, we said, had erroneously made a "significant
departure" from our prior jurisprudence, in deciding "to `asses[s]
the character of the actual sanctions imposed,' 490 U. S., at 447, rather
than, as Kennedy [v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1963),] demanded,
evaluating the `statute on its face' to determine whether it provided for
what amounted to a criminal sanction, [id.], at 169." 522 U. S., at
101. The Kennedy factors, we said, " `must be considered in relation
to the statute on its face,' " 522 U. S., at 100, quoting from Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 169 (1963). We held that "[t]he
fact that petitioners' `good faith' was considered in determining the amount
of the penalty to be imposed in this case [a circumstance that would normally
indicate the assessment is punitive] is irrelevant, as we look only to `the
statute on its face' to determine whether a penalty is criminal in nature."
Hudson, supra, at 104, quoting Kennedy, supra, at 169. We repeated, to be
sure, the principle that the statutory scheme would be criminal if it was
sufficiently punitive " `either in purpose or effect,' " Hudson,
supra, at 99 (emphasis added), quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U. S.
242, 248-249 (1980), but it was clear from the opinion that this referred
to effects apparent upon the face of the statute. |
| [69] | The short of the matter is that, for Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clause purposes, the question of criminal penalty vel non depends upon the
intent of the legislature;*fn1
and harsh executive implementation cannot "transfor[m] what was clearly
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty," Rex Trailer Co.
v. United States, 350 U. S. 148, 154 (1956), any more than compassionate
executive implementation can transform a criminal penalty into a civil remedy.
This is not to say that there is no relief from a system that administers
a facially civil statute in a fashion that would render it criminal. The
remedy, however, is not to invalidate the legislature's handiwork under
the Double Jeopardy Clause, but to eliminate whatever excess in administration
contradicts the statute's civil character. When, as here, a state statute
is at issue, the remedy for implementation that does not comport with the
civil nature of the statute is resort to the traditional state proceedings
that challenge unlawful executive action; if those proceedings fail, and
the state courts authoritatively interpret the state statute as permitting
impositions that are indeed punitive, then and only then can federal courts
pronounce a statute that on its face is civil to be criminal. Such an approach
protects federal courts from becoming enmeshed in the sort of intrusive
inquiry into local conditions at state institutions that are best left to
the State's own judiciary, at least in the first instance. And it avoids
federal invalidation of state statutes on the basis of executive implementation
that the state courts themselves, given the opportunity, would find to be
ultra vires. Only this approach, it seems to me, is in accord with our sound
and traditional reluctance to be the initial interpreter of state law. See
Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500-501 (1941). |
| [70] | With this clarification, I join the opinion of the Court. |
| [71] | Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment. |
| [72] | We granted certiorari to decide whether "an otherwise valid civil
statute can be divested of its civil nature" simply because of an administrative
agency's failure to implement the statute according to its terms. Pet. for
Cert. i (emphasis added). The majority declines to answer this question.
Instead, it assumes that the statute at issue is civil -- rather than "otherwise
... civil," or civil "on its face." Young v. Weston, 122
F. 3d 38 (CA9 1997). And then it merely holds that a statute that is civil
cannot be deemed the opposite of civil -- "punitive," as the majority
puts it -- as applied to a single individual. Ante, at 15. In explaining
this conclusion, the majority expressly reserves judgment on whether the
manner of implementation should affect a court's assessment of a statute
as civil in the "first instance." Ante, at 11, 15. I write separately
to express my view, first, that a statute which is civil on its face cannot
be divested of its civil nature simply because of the manner in which it
is implemented, and second, that the distinction between a challenge in
the "first instance" and a subsequent challenge is one without
a difference. |
| [73] | Before proceeding, it is important to clarify the issue in this case.
The majority adopts the Ninth Circuit's nomenclature and refers to respondent's
claim as an "as applied" challenge, see, e.g., ante, at 12, but
that label is at best misleading. Typically an "as applied" challenge
is a claim that a statute, "by its own terms, infringe[s] constitutional
freedoms in the circumstances of [a] particular case." United States
v. Christian Echoes Nat. Ministry, Inc., 404 U. S. 561, 565 (1972) (per
curiam) (emphasis added). In contrast, respondent's claim is not that Washington's
Community Protection Act of 1990 (Washington Act), Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.010
et seq. (1992), "by its own terms" is unconstitutional as applied
to him,*fn2 but rather
that the statute is not being applied according to its terms at all.*fn3
Respondent essentially contends that the actual conditions of confinement,
notwithstanding the text of the statute, are punitive and incompatible with
the Act's treatment purpose. See ante, at 7-8. |
| [74] | A challenge, such as this one, to the implementation of a facially civil
statute is not only "unworkable," as the majority puts it, ante,
at 11, but also prohibited by our decision in Hudson v. United States, 522
U. S. 93 (1997). In Hudson, we held that, when determining whether a statute
is civil or criminal, a court must examine the "statute on its face."
Id., at 101, quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 169 (1963)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In so holding, we expressly disavowed
the approach used in United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448 (1989),
which evaluated the "actual sanctions imposed." 522 U. S., at
101, quoting Halper, supra, at 447 (internal quotation marks omitted). Respondent's
claim is flatly inconsistent with the holding of Hudson because respondent
asks us to look beyond the face of the Washington Act and to examine instead
the actual sanctions imposed on him, that is, the actual conditions of confinement.
Respondent argues, and the Ninth Circuit held, that Hudson's reach is limited
to the particular sanctions involved in that case -- monetary penalties
and occupational disbarrment -- and does not apply here, where the sanction
is confinement. Hudson, however, contains no indication whatsoever that
its holding is limited to the specific sanctions at issue. To the contrary,
as we explained in Hudson, a court may not elevate to dispositive status
any of the factors that it may consider in determining whether a sanction
is criminal.*fn4 522
U. S., at 101. One of these nondispositive factors is confinement. Id.,
at 99 (stating that one of the factors is "[w]hether the sanction involves
an affirmative disability or restraint," quoting Mendoza-Martinez,
supra, at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Yet elevating confinement
to dispositive status is exactly what respondent asks us to do when he advances
his distinction between confinement and other sanctions. Because Hudson
rejects such an argument, respondent's claim fails. |
| [75] | An implementation-based challenge to a facially civil statute would be
as inappropriate in reviewing the statute in the "first instance,"
ante, at 11, 15 (majority opinion), as it is here. In the first instance,
as here, there is no place for such a challenge in the governing jurisprudence.
Hudson, which requires courts to look at the face of the statute, precludes
implementation-based challenges at any time. Moreover, the implementation-based
claim would be as "unworkable," ante, at 11 (majority opinion),
in the first instance as in later challenges. Because the actual conditions
of confinement may change over time and may vary from facility to facility,
an implementation-based challenge, if successful, would serve to invalidate
a statute that may be implemented without any constitutional infirmities
at a future time or in a separate facility. To use the majority's words,
the validity of a statute should not be "based merely on vagaries in
the implementation of the authorizing statute." Ibid. |
| [76] | And yet the majority suggests that courts may be able to consider conditions
of confinement in determining whether a statute is punitive. Ante, at 12,
15. To the extent that the conditions are actually provided for on the face
of the statute, I of course agree. Cf. Hudson, supra, at 101 (directing
courts to look at " `the statute on its face' "). However, to
the extent that the conditions result from the fact that the statute is
not being applied according to its terms, the conditions are not the effect
of the statute, ante, at 13, but rather the effect of its improper implementation.*fn5
A suit based on these conditions cannot prevail. |
| [77] | The Washington Act does not provide on its face for punitive conditions
of confinement, and the actual conditions under which the Act is implemented
are of no concern to our inquiry. I therefore concur in the judgment of
the Court. |
| [78] | Justice Stevens, dissenting. |
| [79] | A sexual predator may be imprisoned for violating the law, and, if he
is mentally ill, he may be committed to an institution until he is cured.
Whether a specific statute authorizing the detention of such a person is
properly viewed as "criminal" or "civil" in the context
of federal constitutional issues is often a question of considerable difficulty.
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (reversing, by a 5 to 4 vote,
a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court invalidating Kansas' Sexually Violent
Predator Act); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (upholding, by a
5 to 4 vote, Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); In re Young, 122
Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc) (upholding, by a 5 to 4 vote,
the provisions of Washington's Community Protection Act of 1990 dealing
with sexually violent predators). |
| [80] | It is settled, however, that the question whether a state statute is civil
or criminal in nature for purposes of complying with the demands of the
Federal Constitution is a question of federal law. If a detainee comes forward
with " `the clearest proof' that `the statutory scheme [is] so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' that the
proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal." Allen, 478 U.
S., at 369 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249 (1980))
(emphasis added). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 100, 105
(1997). Accordingly, we have consistently looked to the conditions of confinement
as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the statute and its actual
effect. See Hendricks, 521 U. S., at 361, 367-369; Schall v. Martin, 467
U. S. 253, 269-271 (1984); Allen, 478 U. S., at 369, 373-374. As we have
acknowledged in those cases, the question whether a statute is in fact punitive
cannot always be answered solely by reference to the text of the statute. |
| [81] | The majority in this case, however, incorrectly assumes that the Act at
issue is necessarily civil. The issue the majority purports to resolve is
whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed criminal
in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a particular
prisoner. However, respondent Young's petition did not present that issue.
Rather, consistent with our case law, Young sought to introduce evidence
of the conditions of confinement as evidence of the punitive purpose and
effect of the Washington statute. See Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus
6 and Supp. Brief on Remand 2, 6, 10-11, in No. C94-480C (WD Wash.), Record,
Doc. Nos. 57, 155. As a result, Young in no way runs afoul of Hudson v.
United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997). Properly read, Hudson acknowledges that
resolving whether an Act is civil or criminal in nature can take into account
whether the statutory scheme has a punitive effect.*fn6
Id., at 99. What Hudson rejects is an approach not taken by respondent --
one that bypasses this threshold question in favor of a dispositive focus
on the sanction actually imposed on the specific individual.*fn7
Id., at 101-102. |
| [82] | To be sure, the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature
"is initially one of statutory construction." Ante, at 9 (majority
opinion). However, under the majority's analysis, there is no inquiry beyond
that of statutory construction. Ante, at 11. In essence, the majority argues
that because the constitutional query must be answered definitively and
because confinement is not a "fixed event," conditions of confinement
should not be considered at all, except in the first challenge to a statute,
when, as a practical matter, the evidence of such conditions is most likely
not to constitute the requisite "clearest proof." This seems to
me quite wrong. If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has
been punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant
that the scheme has been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge
of the effects of the statute.*fn8 |
| [83] | In this case, Young has made detailed allegations concerning both the
absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the starkly punitive
character of the conditions of his confinement. If proved, those allegations
establish not just that those detained pursuant to the statute are treated
like those imprisoned for violations of Washington's criminal laws, but
that, in many respects, they receive significantly worse treatment.*fn9
If those allegations are correct, the statute in question should be characterized
as a criminal law for federal constitutional purposes. I therefore agree
with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondent should be given the
opportunity to come forward with the "clearest proof" that his
allegations are true. |
| [84] | Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
|
|
|
| Opinion Footnotes | |
|
|
|
| [85] | *fn1 Hudson v. United
States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997), addressed only the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Since, however, the very wording of the Ex Post Facto Clause -- "No
State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law," U. S. Const., Art.
I, §10, cl.1 (emphases added) -- leaves no doubt that it is a prohibition
upon legislative action, the irrelevance of subsequent executive implementation
to that constitutional question is, if anything, even clearer. |
| [86] | *fn2 Respondent has
made the claim that the terms of the Washington Act are criminal so that
his confinement under the Act thus violates the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post
Facto Clauses, but this claim was rejected below -- first by the Washington
Supreme Court, In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 18-23, 857 P. 2d 989, 996-999
(1993), and then by the Ninth Circuit, Young v. Weston, 192 F. 3d 870, 874
(1999) -- and has not been presented to this Court. |
| [87] | *fn3 Disagreeing with
this characterization, the majority contends that the statute is silent
with respect to conditions of confinement. See ante, at 12. Even if the
majority were correct -- which it is not, see Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.070
(requiring annual examinations of each person's mental conditions); §71.09.080(2)
(Supp. 2000) (requiring "adequate care and individualized treatment");
see also In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d, at 18-23, 857 P. 2d, at 996-999 (discussing
similar provisions on conditions of confinement in 1990 version of Washington
Act) -- the question on which we granted certiorari expressly assumes that
the statute "mandate[s]" the "conditions of confinement"
that petitioner seeks. See Pet. for Cert. i. |
| [88] | *fn4 The Hudson Court
referred to the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U. S. 144 (1963), as "useful guideposts": "(1) whether the
sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment -- retribution and deterrence; (5) whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned." 522 U. S., at 99-100, quoting Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at
168-169 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). |
| [89] | *fn5 The dissent argues
that, "under the majority's analysis, there is no inquiry beyond that
of statutory construction," post, at 3. Although it is unclear to me
whether the dissent is correct on this score, I hope that state and federal
courts so interpret the majority opinion. For even if the majority opinion
does not preclude venturing beyond the face of the statute, Hudson certainly
does. See Hudson, 522 U. S., at 101 (holding that courts must examine a
statute " `on its face' " and may not consider the " `actual
sanctions imposed' "); supra, at 2-3. To dispel any suggestion to the
contrary, ante, at 9-10, 12, 15 (majority opinion); post, at 2 (Stevens,
J., dissenting), I note that Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997) does
not provide support for implementation-based challenges. In Hendricks, "none
of the parties argue[d] that people institutionalized under the ... civil
commitment statute are subject to punitive conditions." Id., at 363.
The viability of an implementation-based challenge was simply not at issue.
And significantly, six months after Hendricks, we held in Hudson that inquiries
into whether a statute is civil are restricted to the "face" of
the statute. Hudson, supra, at 101. To the extent that Hendricks (or any
previous opinion, ante, at 15 (majority opinion)) left a door open by not
answering the implementation question, Hudson closed that door. |
| [90] | *fn6 In his concurrence,
Justice Scalia concludes that, under the rule of Hudson v. United States,
522 U. S. 93 (1997), courts may never look to actual conditions of confinement
and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether
a confinement scheme is civil in nature. See ante, at 1. Justice Thomas,
concurring in the judgment, would take Hudson even further, precluding implementation-based
challenges "at any time." Ante, at 4. However, for the reasons
set out above, I believe that both concurrences misread Hudson. I also note
that Hudson did not involve confinement. In cases that do involve confinement,
this Court has relied on the principle that a statutory scheme must be deemed
criminal if it was sufficiently punitive "either in purpose or effect."
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 361, 367-369 (1997); Schall v. Martin,
467 U. S. 253, 269-271 (1984); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 369, 373-374
(1986). |
| [91] | *fn7 In response to
my dissent, the Court has made it clear that it is simply holding that respondent
may not prevail if he merely proves that the statute is punitive insofar
as it has been applied to him. The question whether he may prevail if he
can prove that the statute is punitive in its application to everyone confined
under its provisions therefore remains open. In sum, the Court has rejected
the narrow holding of the Ninth Circuit, but has not addressed the sufficiency
of the broadest claim that petitioner has advanced. |
| [92] | *fn8 In this case,
those detained pursuant to Washington's statute have sought an improvement
in conditions for almost seven years. Their success in the courts, however,
has had little practical impact. |
| [93] | *fn9 Under such conditions,
Young has now served longer in prison following the completion of his sentence
than he did on the sentence itself. |
The Climate Change and Public Health Law Site
The Best on the WWW Since 1995!
Copyright as to non-public domain materials
See DR-KATE.COM for home hurricane and disaster preparation
See WWW.EPR-ART.COM for photography of southern Louisiana and Hurricane Katrina
Professor Edward P. Richards, III, JD, MPH - Webmaster
Provide Website Feedback - https://www.lsu.edu/feedback
Privacy Statement - https://www.lsu.edu/privacy
Accessibility Statement - https://www.lsu.edu/accessibility