12/15/97 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. JOINER
BLUE BOOK CITATION FORM: 1997.SCT.102 (http://www.versuslaw.com)
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
v.
JOINER
____ U. S. ____ (1997)
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of
the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.
S. 321, 337.
[2] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[3] GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. et al. v. JOINER et ux.
[4] Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh
Circuit
[5] No. 96-188.
[6] Argued October 14, 1997
[7] Decided December 15, 1997
[8] After he was diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, respondent Joiner
sued in Georgia state court, alleging, inter alia, that his disease was
"promoted" by his workplace exposure to chemical "PCBs"
and derivative "furans" and "dioxins" that were manufactured
by, or present in materials manufactured by, petitioners. Petitioners
removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment. Joiner
responded with the depositions of expert witnesses, who testified that
PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer, and opined that Joiner'
exposure to those chemicals was likely responsible for his cancer. The
District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, but granted summary judgment
for petitioners because (1) there was no genuine issue as to whether he
had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and (2) his experts' testimony
had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and
small-cell lung cancer and was therefore inadmissible because it did not
rise above "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." In
reversing, the Eleventh Circuit applied "a particularly stringent
standard of review" to hold that the District Court had erred in
excluding the expert testimony.
[9] Held:
[10] 1. Abuse of discretion -- the standard ordinarily applicable to
review of evidentiary rulings -- is the proper standard by which to review
a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence.
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, did not somehow alter this general
rule in the context of a district court's decision to exclude scientific
evidence. Daubert did not address the appellate review standard for evidentiary
rulings at all, but did indicate that, while the Federal Rules of Evidence
allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific
testimony than did pre-existing law, they leave in place the trial judge's
"gatekeeper" role of screening such evidence to ensure that
it is not only relevant, but reliable. Id., at 589. A court of appeals
applying "abuse of discretion" review to such rulings may not
categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and
rulings which disallow it. Compare Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488
U. S. 153, 172, with United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 54. This Court
rejects Joiner's argument that because the granting of summary judgment
in this case was "outcome determinative," it should have been
subjected to a more searching standard of review. On a summary judgment
motion, disputed issues of fact are resolved against the moving party
-- here, petitioners. But the question of admissibility of expert testimony
is not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion
standard. In applying an overly "stringent" standard, the Eleventh
Circuit failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark
of abuse of discretion review. Pp. 4-5.
[11] 2. A proper application of the correct standard of review indicates
that the District Court did not err in excluding the expert testimony
at issue. The animal studies cited by respondent's experts were so dissimilar
to the facts presented here -- i.e., the studies involved infant mice
that developed alveologenic adenomas after highly concentrated, massive
doses of PCBs were injected directly into their peritoneums or stomachs,
whereas Joiner was an adult human whose small-cell carcinomas allegedly
resulted from exposure on a much smaller scale -- that it was not an abuse
of discretion for the District Court to have rejected the experts' reliance
on those studies. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in concluding
that the four epidemiological studies on which Joiner relied were not
a sufficient basis for the experts' opinions, since the authors of two
of those studies ultimately were unwilling to suggest a link between increases
in lung cancer and PCB exposure among the workers they examined, the third
study involved exposure to a particular type of mineral oil not necessarily
relevant here, and the fourth involved exposure to numerous potential
carcinogens in addition to PCBs. Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.
Pp. 6-9.
[12] 3. These conclusions, however, do not dispose of the entire case.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court's conclusion that Joiner
had not been exposed to furans and dioxins. Because petitioners did not
challenge that determination in their certiorari petition, the question
whether exposure to furans and dioxins contributed to Joiner's cancer
is still open. Pp. 9-10.
[13] 78 F. 3d 524, reversed and remanded.
[14] Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with
respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to
Part III, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[15] Opinion of the Court
[16] GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
v.
[17] JOINER
[18] ____ U. S. ____ (1997)
[19] NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors,
in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes
to press.
[20] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[21] No. 96-188
[22] GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ROBERT K. JOINER
et ux.
[23] On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For
The Eleventh Circuit
[24] [December 15, 1997]
[25] Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
[26] We granted certiorari in this case to determine what standard an
appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to
admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). We hold that abuse of discretion is the appropriate
standard. We apply this standard and conclude that the District Court
in this case did not abuseits discretion when it excluded certain proffered
expert testimony.
I.
[27] Respondent Robert Joiner began work as an electrician in the Water
& Light Department of Thomasville, Georgia (City) in 1973. This job
required him to work with and around the City's electrical transformers,
which used a mineral-based dielectric fluid as a coolant. Joiner often
had to stick his hands and arms into the fluid to make repairs. The fluid
would sometimes splash onto him, occasionally getting into his eyes and
mouth. In 1983 the City discovered that the fluid in some of the transformers
was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). PCBs are widely
considered to be hazardous to human health. Congress, with limited exceptions,
banned the production and sale of PCBs in 1978. See 90 Stat. 2020, 15
U. S. C. Section 2605(e)(2)(A).
[28] Joiner was diagnosed with small cell lung cancer in 1991. He*fn1
sued petitioners in Georgia state court the following year. Petitioner
Monsanto manufactured PCBs from 1935 to 1977; petitioners General Electric
and Westinghouse Electric manufactured transformers and dielectric fluid.
In his complaint Joiner linked his development of cancer to his exposure
to PCBs and their derivatives, polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans)
and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Joiner had been a smoker
for approximately eight years, his parents had both been smokers, and
there was a history of lung cancer in his family. He was thus perhaps
already at a heightened risk of developing lung cancer eventually. The
suit alleged that his exposure to PCBs "promoted" his cancer;
had it not been for his exposure to these substances, his cancer would
not have developed for many years, if at all.
[29] Petitioners removed the case to federal court. Once there, they
moved for summary judgment. They contended that (1) there was no evidence
that Joiner suffered significant exposure to PCBs, furans, or dioxins,
and (2) there was no admissible scientific evidence that PCBs promoted
Joiner's cancer. Joiner responded that there were numerous disputed factual
issues that required resolution by a jury. He relied largely on the testimony
of expert witnesses. In depositions, his experts had testified that PCBs
alone can promote cancer and that furans and dioxins can also promote
cancer. They opined that since Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, furans,
and dioxins, such exposure was likely responsible for Joiner's cancer.
[30] The District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs. But it nevertheless
granted summary judgment for petitioners because (1) there was no genuine
issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and
(2) the testimony of Joiner's experts had failed to show that there was
a link between exposure to PCBs and small cell lung cancer. The court
believed that the testimony of respondent's experts to the contrary did
not rise above "subjective belief or unsupported speculation."
864 F. Supp. 1310, 1329 (ND Ga. 1994). Their testimony was therefore inadmissible.
[31] The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 78 F. 3d
524 (1996). It held that "[b]ecause the Federal Rules of Evidence
governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we
apply a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's
exclusion of expert testimony." Id. at 529. Applying that standard,
the Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in excluding
the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The District Court had made
two fundamental errors. First, it excluded the experts' testimony because
it "drew different conclusions from the research than did each of
the experts." The Court of Appeals opined that a district court should
limit its role to determining the "legal reliability of proffered
expert testimony, leaving the jury to decide the correctness of competing
expert opinions." Id. at 533. Second, the District Court had held
that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner
had been exposed to furans and dioxins. This was also incorrect, said
the Court of Appeals, because testimony in the record supported the proposition
that there had been such exposure.
[32] We granted petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari, 520 U.
S. _____ (1997), and we now reverse.
II.
[33] Petitioners challenge the standard applied by the Court of Appeals
in reviewing the District Court's decision to exclude respondent's experts'
proffered testimony. They argue that that court should have applied traditional
"abuse of discretion" review. Respondent agrees that abuse of
discretion is the correct standard of review. He contends, however, that
the Court of Appeals applied an abuse of discretion standard in this case.
As he reads it, the phrase "particularly stringent" announced
no new standard of review. It was simply an acknowledgement that an appellate
court can and will devote more resources to analyzing district court decisions
that are dispositive of the entire litigation. All evidentiary decisions
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. He argues, however,
that it is perfectly reasonable for appellate courts to give particular
attention to those decisions that are outcome-determinative.
[34] We have held that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of
review of a district court's evidentiary rulings. Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U. S. ____, ____ n. 1 (1997) (slip op., at 1-2, n.1), United
States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 54 (1984). Indeed, our cases on the subject
go back as far as Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645, 658 (1879) where
we said that "cases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion
with the court whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate
court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly
erroneous." The Court of Appeals suggested that Daubert somehow altered
this general rule in the context of a district court's decision to exclude
scientific evidence. But Daubert did not address the standard of appellate
review for evidentiary rulings at all. It did hold that the "austere"
Frye standard of "general acceptance" had not been carried over
into the Federal Rules of Evidence. But the opinion also said:
[35] "That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence
does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the
admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge
disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules
the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 509 U. S., at 589 (footnote
omitted).
[36] Thus, while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts
to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have
been admissible under Frye, they leave in place the "gatekeeper"
role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals
applying "abuse of discretion" review to such rulings may not
categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and
rulings which disallow it. Compare Beech Aircraft Corp v. Rainey, 488
U. S. 153, 172 (1988) (applying abuse of discretion review to a lower
court's decision to exclude evidence) with United States v. Abel, supra
at 54 (applying abuse of discretion review to a lower court's decision
to admit evidence). We likewise reject respondent's argument that because
the granting of summary judgment in this case was "outcome determinative,"
it should have been subjected to a more searching standard of review.
On a motion for summary judgment, disputed issues of fact are resolved
against the moving party -- here, petitioners. But the question of admissibility
of expert testimony is not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under
the abuse of discretion standard.
[37] We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the exclusion
of Joiner's experts' testimony. In applying an overly "stringent"
review to that ruling, it failed to give the trial court the deference
that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion review. See, e.g., Koon v.
United States, 518 U. S. ____, ____ (1996)(slip op., at 14-15).
III.
[38] We believe that a proper application of the correct standard of
review here indicates that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.
Joiner's theory of liability was that his exposure to PCBs and their derivatives
"promoted" his development of small cell lung cancer. In support
of that theory he proffered the deposition testimony of expert witnesses.
Dr. Arnold Schecter testified that he believed it "more likely than
not that Mr. Joiner's lung cancer was causally linked to cigarette smoking
and PCB exposure." App. at 107. Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum testified that
Joiner's "lung cancer was caused by or contributed to in a significant
degree by the materials with which he worked." Id. at 140.
[39] Petitioners contended that the statements of Joiner's experts regarding
causation were nothing more than speculation. Petitioners criticized the
testimony of the experts in that it was "not supported by epidemiological
studies . . . [and was] based exclusively on isolated studies of laboratory
animals." Joiner responded by claiming that his experts had identified
"relevant animal studies which support their opinions." He also
directed the court's attention to four epidemiological studies*fn2 on
which his experts had relied.
[40] The District Court agreed with petitioners that the animal studies
on which respondent's experts relied did not support his contention that
exposure to PCBs had contributed to his cancer. The studies involved infant
mice that had developed cancer after being exposed to PCBs. The infant
mice in the studies had had massive doses of PCBs injected directly into
their peritoneums*fn3 or stomachs. Joiner was an adult human being whose
alleged exposure to PCBs was far less than the exposure in the animal
studies. The PCBs were injected into the mice in a highly concentrated
form. The fluid with which Joiner had come into contact generally had
a much smaller PCB concentration of between 0-500 parts per million. The
cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic adenomas; Joiner had
developed small-cell carcinomas. No study demonstrated that adult mice
developed cancer after being exposed to PCBs. One of the experts admitted
that no study had demonstrated that PCBs lead to cancer in any other species.
[41] Respondent failed to reply to this criticism. Rather than explaining
how and why the experts could have extrapolated their opinions from these
seemingly far-removed animal studies, respondent chose "to proceed
as if the only issue [was] whether animal studies can ever be a proper
foundation for an expert's opinion." Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1324.
Of course, whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for
an expert's opinion was not the issue. The issue was whether these experts'
opinions were sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they
purported to rely. The studies were so dissimilar to the facts presented
in this litigation that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District
Court to have rejected the experts' reliance on them.
[42] The District Court also concluded that the four epidemiological
studies on which respondent relied were not a sufficient basis for the
experts' opinions. The first such study involved workers at an Italian
capacitor*fn4 plant who had been exposed to PCBs. Bertazzi, Riboldi, Pesatori,
Radice, & Zocchetti, Cancer Mortality of Capacitor Manufacturing Workers,
11 American Journal of Industrial Medicine 165 (1987). The authors noted
that lung cancer deaths among ex-employees at the plant were higher than
might have been expected, but concluded that "there were apparently
no grounds for associating lung cancer deaths (although increased above
expectations) and exposure in the plant." Id. at 172. Given that
Bertazzi et al. were unwilling to say that PCB exposure had caused cancer
among the workers they examined, their study did not support the experts'
conclusion that Joiner's exposure to PCBs caused his cancer.
[43] The second study followed employees who had worked at Monsanto's
PCB production plant. J. Zack & D. Munsch, Mortality of PCB Workers
at the Monsanto Plant in Sauget, Illinois (Dec. 14, 1979)(unpublished
report), 3 Rec., Doc. No. 11. The authors of this study found that the
incidence of lung cancer deaths among these workers was somewhat higher
than would ordinarily be expected. The increase, however, was not statistically
significant and the authors of the study did not suggest a link between
the increase in lung cancer deaths and the exposure to PCBs.
[44] The third and fourth studies were likewise of no help. The third
involved workers at a Norwegian cable manufacturing company who had been
exposed to mineral oil. Ronneberg, Andersen, Skyberg, Mortality and Incidence
of Cancer Among Oil-Exposed Workers in a Norwegian Cable Manufacturing
Company, 45 British Journal of Industrial Medicine 595 (1988). A statistically
significant increase in lung cancer deaths had been observed in these
workers. The study, however, (1) made no mention of PCBs and (2) was expressly
limited to the type of mineral oil involved in that study, and thus did
not support these experts' opinions. The fourth and final study involved
a PCB-exposed group in Japan that had seen a statistically significant
increase in lung cancer deaths. Kuratsune, Nakamura, Ikeda, & Hirohata,
Analysis of Deaths Seen Among Patients with Yusho -- A Preliminary Report,
16 Chemosphere, Nos. 8/9, 2085 (1987). The subjects of this study, however,
had been exposed to numerous potential carcinogens, including toxic rice
oil that they had ingested.Respondent points to Daubert's language that
the "focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions that they generate." 509 U. S., at 595. He
claims that because the District Court's disagreement was with the conclusion
that the experts drew from the studies, the District Court committed legal
error and was properly reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions
and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained experts
commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert
or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered. See Turpin v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F. 2d 1349, 1360 (CA 6), cert. denied,
506 U. S. 826 (1992). That is what the District Court did here, and we
hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing.
[45] We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper standard
by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific
evidence. We further hold that, because it was within the District Court's
discretion to conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied
were not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to support
their conclusions that Joiner's exposure to PCBs contributed to his cancer,
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding their testimony.
These conclusions, however, do not dispose of this entire case.
[46] Respondent's original contention was that his exposure to PCBs,
furans, and dioxins contributed to his cancer. The District Court ruled
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had
been exposed to PCBs, but concluded that there was no genuine issue as
to whether he had been exposed to furans and dioxins. The District Court
accordingly never explicitly considered if there was admissible evidence
on the question whether Joiner's alleged exposure to furans and dioxins
contributed to his cancer. The Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court's conclusion that there had been no exposure to furans and dioxins.
Petitioners did not challenge this determination in their petition to
this Court. Whether Joiner was exposed to furans and dioxins, and whether
if there was such exposure, the opinions of Joiner's experts would then
be admissible, remain open questions. We accordingly reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
[47] It is so ordered.
[48] Breyer, J., concurring
[49] GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
v.
[50] JOINER
[51] ____ U. S. ____ (1997)
[52] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[53] No. 96-188
[54] GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ROBERT K. JOINER
et ux.
[55] On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For
The Eleventh Circuit
[56] [December 15, 1997]
[57] Justice Breyer, concurring.
[58] The Court's opinion, which I join, emphasizes Daubert's statement
that a trial judge, acting as "gatekeeper, " must " `ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.' " Ante, at 5 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 589 (1993)). This requirement
will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated determinations
about scientific methodology and its relation to the conclusions an expert
witness seeks to offer -- particularly when a case arises in an area where
the science itself is tentative or uncertain, or where testimony about
general risk levels in human beings or animals is offered to prove individual
causation. Yet, as amici have pointed out, judges are not scientists and
do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of
such decisions. See, e.g., Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
as Amicus Curiae 15; Brief for The New England Journal of Medicine et
al. as Amici Curiae 2 ("Judges . are generally not trained scientists
").
[59] Of course, neither the difficulty of the task nor any comparative
lack of expertise can excuse the judge from exercising the "gatekeeper"
duties that the Federal Rules impose -- determining, for example, whether
particular expert testimony is reliable and "will assist the trier
of fact," Fed. Rule Evid. 702, or whether the "probative value"
of testimony is substantially outweighed by risks of prejudice, confusion
or waste of time. Fed. Rule Evid. 403. To the contrary, when law and science
intersect, those duties often must be exercised with special care.
[60] Today's toxic tort case provides an example. The plaintiff in today's
case says that a chemical substance caused, or promoted, his lung cancer.
His concern, and that of others, about the causes of cancer is understandable,
for cancer kills over one in five Americans. See U. S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, Health United
States 1996-97 and Injury Chartbook 117 (1997) (23.3% of all deaths in
1995). Moreover, scientific evidence implicates some chemicals as potential
causes of some cancers. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Service, National Toxicology Program, 1 Seventh Annual Report
on Carcinogens, pp. v-vi (1994). Yet modern life, including good health
as well as economic well-being, depends upon the use of artificial or
manufactured substances, such as chemicals. And it may, therefore, prove
particularly important to see that judges fulfill their Daubert gatekeeping
function, so that they help assure that the powerful engine of tort liability,
which can generate strong financial incentives to reduce, or to eliminate,
production, points towards the right substances and does not destroy the
wrong ones. It is, thus, essential in this science-related area that the
courts administer the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to achieve the
"end[s]" that the Rules themselves set forth, not only so that
proceedings may be "justly determined," but also so "that
the truth may be ascertained." Fed. Rule Evid. 102.
[61] I therefore want specially to note that, as cases presenting significant
science-related issues have increased in number, see Judicial Conference
of the United States, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 97
(Apr. 2, 1990) ("Economic, statistical, technological, and natural
and social scientific data are becoming increasingly important in both
routine and complex litigation"), judges have increasingly found
in the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure ways to help them overcome
the inherent difficulty of making determinations about complicated scientific
or otherwise technical evidence. Among these techniques are an increased
use of Rule 16's pretrial conference authority to narrow the scientific
issues in dispute, pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject
to examination by the court, and the appointment of special masters and
specially trained law clerks. See J. Cecil & T. Willging, Court-Appointed
Experts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 706, pp. 83-88 (1993); J. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass
Tort Litigation 107-110 (1995); cf. Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski,
Jr., 100 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 713-715 (1987) (discussing a judge's use of
an economist as a law clerk in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D Mass 1953), aff'd, 347 U. S. 521 (1954)).
[62] In the present case, the New England Journal of Medicine has filed
an amici brief "in support of neither petitioners nor respondents"
in which the Journal writes:
[63] "[A] judge could better fulfill this gatekeeper function if
he or she had help from scientists. Judges should be strongly encouraged
to make greater use of their inherent authority . to appoint experts .
. Reputable experts could be recommended to courts by established scientific
organizations, such as the National Academy of Sciences or the American
Association for the Advancement of Science."
[64] Brief for The New England Journal of Medicine 18-19; cf. Fed. Rule
Evid. 706 (court may "on its own motion or on the motion of any party"
appoint an expert to serve on behalf of the court, and this expert may
be selected as "agreed upon by the parties" or chosen by the
court); see also Weinstein, supra, at 116 (a court should sometimes "go
beyond the experts proffered by the parties" and "utilize its
powers to appoint independent experts under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence"). Given this kind of offer of cooperative effort, from
the scientific to the legal community, and given the various Rules-authorized
methods for facilitating the courts' task, it seems to me that Daubert's
gatekeeping requirement will not prove inordinately difficult to implement;
and that it will help secure the basic objectives of the Federal Rules
of Evidence; which are, to repeat, the ascertainment of truth and the
just determination of proceedings. Fed. Rule Evid. 102.
[65] Opinion of Stevens, J.
[66] GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
v.
[67] JOINER
[68] ____ U. S. ____ (1997)
[69] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[70] No. 96-188
[71] GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ROBERT K. JOINER
et ux.
[72] On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For
The Eleventh Circuit
[73] [December 15, 1997]
[74] Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[75] The question that we granted certiorari to decide is whether the
Court of Appeals applied the correct standard of review. That question
is fully answered in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. Part III answers
the quite different question whether the District Court properly held
that the testimony of plaintiff 's expert witnesses was inadmissible.
Because I am not sure that the parties have adequately briefed that question,
or that the Court has adequately explained why the Court of Appeals' disposition
was erroneous, I do not join Part III. Moreover, because a proper answer
to that question requires a study of the record that can be performed
more efficiently by the Court of Appeals than by the nine members of this
Court, I would remand the case to that court for application of the proper
standard of review.
[76] One aspect of the record will illustrate my concern. As the Court
of Appeals pointed out, Joiner's experts relied on "the studies of
at least thirteen different researchers, and referred to several reports
of the World Health Organization that address the question of whether
PCBs cause cancer." 78 F. 3d 524, 533 (CA11 1996). Only one of those
studies is in the record, and only six of them were discussed in the District
Court opinion. Whether a fair appraisal of either the methodology or the
conclusions of Joiner's experts can be made on the basis of such an incomplete
record is a question that I do not feel prepared to answer.
[77] It does seem clear, however, that the Court has not adequately explained
why its holding is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 702,*fn5 as
interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S.
579 (1993).*fn6 In general, scientific testimony that is both relevant
and reliable must be admitted and testimony that is irrelevant or unreliable
must be excluded. Id., at 597. In this case, the District Court relied
on both grounds for exclusion.
[78] The relevance ruling was straightforward. The District Court correctly
reasoned that an expert opinion that exposure to PCBs, "furans"
and "dioxins" together may cause lung cancer would be irrelevant
unless the plaintiff had been exposed to those substances. Having already
found that there was no evidence of exposure to furans and dioxins, 864
F. Supp. 1310, 1318-1319 (ND Ga. 1994), it necessarily followed that this
expert opinion testimony was inadmissible. Correctly applying Daubert,
the District Court explained that the experts' testimony "manifestly
does not fit the facts of this case, and is therefore inadmissible."
864 F. Supp., at 1322. Of course, if the evidence raised a genuine issue
of fact on the question of Joiner's exposure to furans and dioxins --
as the Court of Appeals held that it did -- then this basis for the ruling
on admissibility was erroneous, but not because the district judge either
abused her discretion or misapplied the law.*fn7
[79] The reliability ruling was more complex and arguably is not faithful
to the statement in Daubert that "[t]he focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate." 509 U. S., at 595. Joiner's experts used a "weight
of the evidence" methodology to assess whether Joiner's exposure
to transformer fluids promoted his lung cancer.*fn8 They did not suggest
that any one study provided adequate support for their conclusions, but
instead relied on all the studies taken together (along with their interviews
of Joiner and their review of his medical records). The District Court,
however, examined the studies one by one and concluded that none was sufficient
to show a link between PCBs and lung cancer. 864 F. Supp., at 1324-1326.
The focus of the opinion was on the separate studies and the conclusions
of the experts, not on the experts' methodology. Id., at 1322 ("Defendants
. persuade the court that Plaintiffs' expert testimony would not be admissible
. by attacking the conclusions that Plaintiffs' experts draw from the
studies they cite").
[80] Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals expressly decided
that a "weight of the evidence" methodology was scientifically
acceptable.*fn9 To this extent, the Court of Appeals' opinion is persuasive.
It is not intrinsically "unscientific" for experienced professionals
to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific evidence
-- this is not the sort of "junk science" with which Daubert
was concerned.*fn10 After all, as Joiner points out, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) uses the same methodology to assess risks, albeit
using a somewhat different threshold than that required in a trial. Brief
for Respondents 40-41 (quoting EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment,
51 Fed. Reg. 33992, 33996 (1986)). Petitioners' own experts used the same
scientific approach as well.*fn11 And using this methodology, it would
seem that an expert could reasonably have concluded that the study of
workers at an Italian capacitor plant, coupled with data from Monsanto's
study and other studies, raises an inference that PCBs promote lung cancer.*fn12
[81] The Court of Appeals' discussion of admissibility is faithful to
the dictum in Daubert that the reliability inquiry must focus on methodology,
not conclusions. Thus, even though I fully agree with both the District
Court's and this Court's explanation of why each of the studieson which
the experts relied was by itself unpersuasive,a critical question remains
unanswered: When quali-fied experts have reached relevant conclusions
on thebasis of an acceptable methodology, why are their opinions inadmissible?
[82] Daubert quite clearly forbids trial judges from assessing the validity
or strength of an expert's scientific conclusions, which is a matter for
the jury.*fn13 Because I am persuaded that the difference between methodology
and conclusions is just as categorical as the distinction between means
and ends, I do not think the statement that "conclusions and methodology
are not entirely distinct from one another," ante, at 9, is either
accurate or helps us answer the difficult admissibility question presented
by this record.
[83] In any event, it bears emphasis that the Court has not held that
it would have been an abuse of discretion to admit the expert testimony.
The very point of today's holding is that the abuse of discretion standard
of review applies whether the district judge has excluded or admitted
evidence. Ante, at 5. And nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules
of Evidence requires a district judge to reject an expert's conclusions
and keep them from the jury when they fit the facts of the case and are
based on reliable scientific methodology.
[84] Accordingly, while I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion,
I do not concur in the judgment or in Part III of its opinion.
***** BEGIN FOOTNOTE(S) HERE *****
[85] *fn1 Joiner's wife was also a plaintiff in the suit and is a respondent
here. For convenience, we refer to respondent in the singular.
[86] *fn2 Epidemiological studies examine the pattern of disease in human
populations.
[87] *fn3 The peritoneum is the lining of the abdominal cavity.
[88] *fn4 A capacitor is an electrical component that stores an electric
charge.
[89] *fn5 Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."
[90] *fn6 The specific question on which the Court granted certiorari
in Daubert was whether the rule of Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C.
46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), remained valid after the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, but the Court went beyond that issue and set forth
alternative requirements for admissibility in place of the Frye test.
Even though the Daubert test was announced in dicta, see 509 U. S., at
598-601 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
we should not simply ignore its analysis in reviewing the District Court's
rulings.
[91] *fn7 Petitioners do not challenge the Court of Appeals' straightforward
review of the District Court's summary judgment ruling on exposure to
furans and dioxins. As today's opinion indicates, ante, at 10, it remains
an open question on remand whether the District Court should admit expert
testimony that PCBs, furans and dioxins together promoted Joiner's cancer.
[92] *fn8 Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum elaborated on that approach in his deposition
testimony: "[A]s a toxicologist when I look at a study, I am going
to require that that study meet the general criteria for methodology and
statistical analysis, but that when all of that data is collected and
you ask me as a patient, `Doctor, have I got a risk of getting cancer
from this?' That those studies don't answer the question, that I have
to put them all together in my mind and look at them in relation to everything
I know about the substance and everything I know about the exposure and
come to a conclusion. I think when I say, `To a reasonable medical probability
as a medical toxicologist, this substance was a contributing cause,' .
to his cancer, that that is a valid conclusion based on the totality of
the evidence presented to me. And I think that that is an appropriate
thing for a toxicologist to do, and it has been the basis of diagnosis
for several hundred years, anyway." Supp. App. to Brief for Respondents
19.
[93] *fn9 The court explained: "Opinions of any kind are derived
from individual pieces of evidence, each of which by itself might not
be conclusive, but when viewed in their entirety are the building blocks
of a perfectly reasonable conclusion, one reliable enough to be submitted
to a jury along with the tests and criticisms cross-examination and contrary
evidence would supply." 78 F. 3d 524, 532 (CA11 1996).
[94] *fn10 An example of "junk science" that should be excluded
under Daubert as too unreliable would be the testimony of a phrenologist
who would purport to prove a defendant's future dangerousness based on
the contours of the defendant's skull.
[95] *fn11 See, e.g., Deposition of Dr. William Charles Bailey, Supp.
App. to Brief for Respondents 56 ("I've just reviewed a lot of literature
and come to some conclusions . . . .").
[96] *fn12 The Italian capacitor plant study found that workers exposed
to PCBs had a higher-than-expected rate of lung cancer death, though "the
numbers were small [and] the value of the risk estimate was not statistically
significant." 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (ND Ga. 1994). The Monsanto
study also found a correlation between PCB exposure and lung cancer death,
but the results were not statistically significant. Id., at 1325. Moreover,
it should be noted that under Georgia law, which applies in this diversity
suit, Joiner need only show that his exposure to PCBs "promoted"
his lung cancer, not that it was the sole cause of his cancer. Brief for
Respondents 7, n. 16 (quoting Brief for Appellants in No. 94-9131 (CA
11), pp. 7-10).
[97] *fn13 The Court stated in Daubert: "Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden
of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence. . . . Additionally, in the event the trial court
concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position
is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position
more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment,
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 56. . . . These conventional devices, rather than wholesale
exclusion under an uncompromising `general acceptance' test, are the appropriate
safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards
of Rule 702." 509 U. S., at 596.
***** END FOOTNOTE(S) HERE *****
[Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are
available in the print version]
Copyright 1998 VersusLaw, Inc., (425) 250-0142 http://www.versuslaw.com
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