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| [1] | Washington Supreme Court |
| [2] | No. 63828-4 |
| [3] | 925 P.2d 978, 130 Wash.2d 594, 1996.wa.2 <http://www.versuslaw.com> |
| [4] | November 7, 1996 |
| [5] | STATE OF WASHINGTON, PETITIONER, v. EDWARD DEAN BASH AND LAWRENCE EDWARD DELZER, RESPONDENTS. |
| [6] | Appeal from Superior Court of Yakima County. Docket No: 95-1-01840-3.
Date filed: 02/20/96. Judge signing: Hon. Robert N. Hackett JR. |
| [7] | For Petitioner: Bruce Hanify, Yakima County Deputy Prosecutor, Yakima,
Wa. |
| [8] | For Respondents: John A. Moore Jr., Yakima, Wa, Kenneth W. Raber, Kirschenmann
Devine Fortier & Raber, Yakima, Wa. |
| [9] | Authored by Barbara A. Madsen. Concurring: Richard P. Guy, Gerry L. Alexander,
Richard B. Sanders, Barbara Durham, Charles W. Johnson, Philip A. Talmadge.
Dissenting: James M. Dolliver, Charles Z. Smith. |
| [10] | The opinion of the court was delivered by: Madsen |
| [11] | EN BANC |
| [12] | MADSEN, J.-- Respondents Lawrence E. Delzer and Edward D. Bash were charged
by information with violating RCW
16.08.100(3), which provides that the owner of a dog which aggressively
attacks and causes severe injury or death of a human being is guilty of
a class C felony. The trial court concluded that the statute sets forth
a strict liability offense but that a defendant may assert as an affirmative
defense that he or she neither knew nor should have known that the dog was
a potentially dangerous or dangerous dog. We granted discretionary review
and reverse, holding that the statute does not define a strict liability
crime, but instead requires that the dog's owner either knew or should have
known that the dog was a potentially dangerous or dangerous dog. |
| [13] | STATEMENT OF CASE |
| [14] | The State says that it will produce evidence at trial that two pit bulls
owned by respondents attacked and killed Mr. Walt Freser, a seventy-five-year-old
man, who was sitting in a wheel chair in his back yard, and that the dogs
also seriously injured a neighbor, Mr. Herman Miller, when he tried to rescue
Mr. Freser. |
| [15] | Respondents' cases were consolidated for trial. Respondents moved for
dismissal of the charges because the State failed to allege any mental element
of the crime and it appeared the prosecution would proceed on the basis
that RCW
16.08.100(3) defines a strict liability crime. Respondents maintained
that RCW
16.08.100(3) does not set forth a strict liability offense, and, if
it does, it is unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
The court ruled that the statute sets forth a strict liability offense.
The court was troubled by what it perceived to be due process problems attendant
with the strict liability nature of the offense, however, and therefore
further ruled that the statute would be unconstitutional unless a judicially
imposed defense was available to a defendant charged under the statute.
Accordingly, the court, drawing by analogy from the "unwitting possession"
defense against the strict liability crime of possession of a controlled
substance, concluded that respondents would be entitled to assert the defense
that they did not know or reasonably should not have known of the potential
dangerousness or dangerousness of either or both of the dogs. Clerk's Papers
at 4-6. The court reasoned the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance
of the evidence would be on the defendant. The court fashioned a jury instruction
to this effect. |
| [16] | The State sought discretionary review by this court of that part of the
trial court's order creating a defense. The State's motion was granted.
Trial court proceedings are stayed pending this court's decision in the
case. |
| [17] | ANALYSIS |
| [18] | In 1987, the Legislature enacted a number of statutes concerning the ownership
of dogs. Laws of 1987, ch. 94. RCW
16.08.100 is one of those statutes. To place the statute in context,
an overview of the 1987 legislation is helpful. In general, the 1987 statutes
define potentially dangerous and dangerous dogs, set forth requirements
regarding ownership of dangerous dogs, and establish criminal liability
under several circumstances. |
| [19] | RCW
16.08.070(1) defines "Potentially dangerous dog" [as] any
dog that when unprovoked: |
| [20] | (a) Inflicts bites on a human or a domestic animal either on public or
private property, or (b) chases or approaches a person upon the streets,
sidewalks, or any public grounds in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude
of attack, or any dog with a known propensity, tendency, or Disposition
to attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or otherwise to threaten the safety
of humans or domestic animals. |
| [21] | RCW
16.08.070(2) defines "Dangerous dog" [as] any dog that according
to the records of the appropriate authority, (a) has inflicted severe injury
on a human being without provocation on public or private property, (b)
has killed a domestic animal without provocation while off the owner's property,
or (c) has been previously found to be potentially dangerous, the owner
having received notice of such and the dog again aggressively bites, attacks,
or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals. "'Severe injury'
means any physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations
requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery." RCW
16.08.070(3). |
| [22] | Under RCW
16.08.080, it is unlawful to have an unregistered dangerous dog (with
an exception for police dogs). A certificate of registration will be issued
upon sufficient evidence of a proper enclosure for the dog and $50,000 in
liability insurance covering injuries caused by the dog. RCW
16.08.080. A dangerous dog must be properly restrained and muzzled in
accordance with RCW
16.08.090(1) when outside its enclosure. Potentially dangerous dogs
are not regulated under RCW
16.08, but instead are to be regulated by local, municipal, and county
ordinances. RCW
16.08.090(2). Dogs are not to be declared dangerous if the threat, injury,
or damage was sustained by a person who either committed a willful trespass
or other tort or crime on the owner's premises, or had tormented, abused,
or assaulted the dog. RCW
16.08.090(3). |
| [23] | Finally, in addition to providing for criminal liability under RCW
16.08.100(3), RCW
16.08.100 provides for confiscation of a dangerous dog if it is not
registered, the owner has failed to secure liability insurance, the dog
is not maintained in a proper enclosure, or the dog is not properly restrained
while outside the owner's dwelling or the dog's proper enclosure. In these
instances, the owner is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. RCW
16.06.100(1). If a dangerous dog of an owner who has a prior conviction
under RCW
16.08 attacks or bites a person or domestic animal, the owner is guilty
of a class C felony and the dog must be confiscated and humanely destroyed.
RCW
16.08.100(2). The statutory provision at issue in this case is RCW
16.08.100(3), which provides: |
| [24] | The owner of any dog that aggressively attacks and causes severe injury
or death of any human, whether the dog has previously been declared potentially
dangerous or dangerous, shall be guilty of a class C felony punishable in
accordance with RCW
9A.20.021. In addition, the dog shall be immediately confiscated by
an animal control authority, placed in quarantine for the proper length
of time, and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner. Under
RCW
9A.20.021(c), a class C felony is punishable by confinement for five
years in a state correctional facility, by a fine of $10,000, or both. |
| [25] | The State maintains, and the trial court agreed, that RCW
16.08.100(3) sets forth a strict liability crime, one having no required
mental element. Respondents maintain that the statute does have a mental
element, or, at the least, it is ambiguous and should be construed as having
a mental element requirement. |
| [26] | Respondents correctly argue that the statute is ambiguous, primarily as
a result of the clause "whether the dog has previously been declared
potentially dangerous or dangerous." RCW
16.08.100(3). This clause can be read two ways. It can be read to mean
"whether or not" the dog has previously been declared potentially
dangerous or dangerous, an owner is criminally liable. This is the way in
which the trial court construed the statute. The clause can also be read
to mean "whether the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous
or whether the dog has been previously declared dangerous," i.e., one
or the other. Under this reading, criminal liability would only arise if
the dog had previously been classified as either a "potentially dangerous
dog" or a "dangerous dog," in accord with the definitions
in RCW
16.08.070. |
| [27] | An ambiguous statute is subject to construction. Whatcom
County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash. 2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996).
Where a statute is amenable to more than one interpretation, legislative
history and other aids to construction may provide guidance in construing
the statute to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Kadoranian
v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash. 2d 178, 185, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992).
The court has frequently looked to final bill reports as part of an inquiry
into legislative history. E.g., State
v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wash. 2d 472, 479, 886 P.2d 138 (1994). |
| [28] | The final bill report on SSB 5301, the bill enacted as RCW
16.08, provides some background but no clarification to the legislation.
The report indicates that while current law then held dog owners liable
for injury a person sustained as a result of a dog bite, the dog owners
were not required to establish the ability to pay until after an incident
occurred. Some owners refused or were unable to pay damages for injuries
suffered. Senate Comm. on Judiciary, House Comm. on Judiciary, Final Bill
Report, SSB 5301, 49th Legislature (1987). With regard to RCW
16.08.100(3), the report states "The owner of any dog that causes
severe injury or death to any human, irrespective of the dog's previous
classification, is guilty of a class C felony and the dog must be quarantined
and destroyed." Id.; Clerk's Papers at 137. |
| [29] | Unfortunately, the final bill report does not resolve the ambiguity in
the statute. It can be read to say that regardless of any, or no, previous
classification, criminal liability arises--a reading consistent with the
State's position that RCW
16.08.100(3) sets forth a strict liability crime. Alternatively, because
the explanation in the final bill report refers to "the dog's previous
classification," it can be read to mean that the dog had a previous
classification which, under the statutory scheme and the language in RCW
16.08.100(3), would have been as a potentially dangerous dog or a dangerous
dog. |
| [30] | Principles of statutory construction may also be applied to resolve an
ambiguity. Applicable here is the rule that statutes should be construed
so that all of the language used is given effect, and no part is rendered
meaningless or superfluous. Whatcom
County, 128 Wash. 2d at 546. If, as the trial court concluded, the "whether"
clause means "whether or not" the dog has been declared either
potentially dangerous or dangerous, the clause adds nothing to the meaning
and is superfluous--if it were eliminated, the statute would mean the same
thing. Giving meaning to the clause requires that it be construed as providing
that regardless of whether the dog was previously classified as either a
potentially dangerous dog or as a dangerous dog (but it was classified as
one or the other), criminal liability may arise. |
| [31] | Respondents also urge that in the context of RCW
16.08 as a whole, the 1987 statutes are inconsistent if RCW
16.08.100(3) is read as a "first bite" statute, one which
imposes criminal liability without regard to any previous classification
of the dog. This court assumes that the Legislature did not intend to create
an inconsistency in statutes, and seeks to construe statutes so as to avoid
inconsistency. Timberline
Air Service, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wash. 2d 305, 314,
884 P.2d 920 (1994). Under RCW
16.08.070(2)(a) a dog which inflicts severe injury on a human being
is a dangerous dog which must be registered for lawful ownership. Under
RCW
16.08.070(2)(c), a dog previously found to be potentially dangerous,
which again aggressively attacks a human is a dangerous dog which must be
registered. In neither case do the statutes mandate destruction of the dog.
However, under RCW
16.08.100(3), the dog must be destroyed. If RCW
16.08.100(3) is read to apply to any dog which aggressively attacks
and inflicts severe injury on a human, regardless of any previous classification,
it is inconsistent with RCW
16.08.070(2). The statutes would then provide that a dog attacking a
human and inflicting severe injury could be registered as a dangerous dog
under RCW
16.08.070(2) and .080, but would have to be destroyed under RCW
16.08.100(3). |
| [32] | Perhaps more importantly, under RCW
16.08.070(2)(a), an owner can register as a dangerous dog a dog which
has inflicted severe injury on a human being apparently without being subjected
to a felony prosecution, while under RCW
16.08.100(3), a dog which aggressively attacks and causes severe injury
to a human being is subject to a felony prosecution for a first attack under
the State's position and the trial court's construction of the statute.
We decline to construe RCW
16.08.100(3) in a manner which would render it inconsist with other
provisions in the statute. |
| [33] | Resolving the ambiguity in the statute as requiring the State to prove
the dog was either a potentially dangerous dog or a dangerous dog, however,
does not answer the question of whether a mental element is part of the
crime established by RCW
16.08.100 because the statutes do not in general contain provisions
attributing knowledge about the animal's aggressive or dangerous propensities
to the owner, especially with regard to potentially dangerous dogs. Under
the statutory scheme, a dog could be either an unregistered dangerous dog
or a potentially dangerous dog without the owner's knowledge--the statute
does not expressly tie the classification to notice to the owner except
in one instance. That one instance is that a dangerous dog includes one
previously found to be potentially dangerous, "the owner having received
notice of such and the dog again aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers
the safety of humans or domestic animals." RCW
16.08.070(2)(c) (emphasis added). By this provision, it is apparent
that the Legislature contemplated that an owner might have a potentially
dangerous dog with no notice of that classification. Also, while the definition
of "dangerous dog" includes the fact that the records of the appropriate
agency reflect the dog's conduct, thus suggesting the owner may have some
reason to know of it, the definition of "potentially dangerous dog"
does not contain such language. Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that
the statutes are not clear about how a dog is "declared" or "classified"
as either a "potentially dangerous dog" or a "dangerous dog." |
| [34] | Where a statute does not specify a mental element, legislative intent
may be determined by resort to another body of law generally guiding such
an inquiry. Although there is no fixed test, courts have considered several
factors in deciding whether a criminal statute provides for a strict liability
crime where it does not specify a mental element. Whether a mental element
is an essential element of a crime is a matter to be determined by the Legislature.
State
v. Cleppe, 96 Wash. 2d 373, 378, 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1006 (1982) (citing State
v. Henker, 50 Wash. 2d 809, 812, 314 P.2d 645 (1957)); see also Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1796-97, 128 L. Ed. 2d
608 (1994). The Legislature may create strict liability crimes. State
v. Rivas, 126 Wash. 2d 443, 452, 896 P.2d 57 (1995) (citing Cleppe,
96 Wash. 2d at 380; State
v. Stroh, 91 Wash. 2d 580, 583-84, 588 P.2d 1182, 8 A.L.R.4th 760 (1979),
and Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed.
288 (1952)). |
| [35] | Thus, deciding whether a statute sets forth a strict liability crime is
a statutory construction question aimed at ascertaining legislative intent.
The inquiry begins with the statute's language and legislative history.
The "whether" clause in RCW
16.08.100(3) indicates legislative intent that a strict liability crime
was not intended, on the ground that the dog must have exhibited some aggressive
or dangerous conduct giving the owner indication that the animal needed
to be controlled or it might cause harm. Further, use of the word "declared"
in that clause suggests the Legislature envisioned some notice of the dog's
status. |
| [36] | In the context of the statutes as a whole, the Legislature was seeking
to identify dogs likely to pose a significant danger to people and to require
owners to take precautions reducing that danger. It is therefore reasonable
to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to impose criminal liability
if the owner were unaware of the dog's aggressiveness or dangerous propensities. |
| [37] | Moreover, RCW
16.08.040, enacted in 1941, provides for strict civil liability of an
owner for damages resulting from a dog bite "regardless of the former
viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness."
The Legislature clearly knew how to eliminate any knowledge requirement
as it expressly did in RCW
16.08.040, and could similarly have done so in RCW
16.08.100(3) if that had been the Legislature's intent. |
| [38] | In Staples, the United States Supreme Court identified several considerations
which bear upon legislative intent to impose strict liability: (1) a statute's
silence on a mental element is not dispositive of legislative intent; the
statute must be construed in light of the background rules of the common
law, and its conventional mens rea element; (2) whether the crime can be
characterized as a "public welfare offense" created by the Legislature;
(3) the extent to which a strict liability reading of the statute would
encompass seemingly entirely innocent conduct; (4) and the harshness of
the penalty. Other considerations include: (5) the seriousness of the harm
to the public; (6) the ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining
the true facts; (7) relieving the prosecution of difficult and time-consuming
proof of fault where the Legislature thinks it important to stamp out harmful
conduct at all costs, "even at the cost of convicting innocent-minded
and blameless people"; and (8) the number of prosecutions to be expected.
1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law sec. 3.8,
at 341-44 (1986). Finally, criminal offenses with no requirement of a mental
element have a "generally disfavored status." E.g., Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1985)
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438, 98
S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1978)); United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d
887, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1995). |
| [39] | For several centuries, common law crimes were defined to require both
an actus reus, or guilty conduct, and a mens rea, the culpable state of
mind, whether intent, knowledge, recklessness, or, more rarely, negligence. |
| [40] | 1 LaFave & Scott sec. 3.8, at 340; see Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251
(common law crimes "generally constituted only from concurrence of
an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand"); State
v. Smith, 17 Wash. App. 231, 234, 562 P.2d 659 (1977), review denied,
89 Wash. 2d 1022 (1978) (at common law, general rule was that intent or
scienter was an element of every crime). "The contention that an injury
can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial
or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." Morissette,
342 U.S. at 250. |
| [41] | More modernly, statutes were enacted defining criminal acts, and courts
concluded that common law crimes when codified continued to require intent
or guilty knowledge, even if the statutes were silent on the matter. Id.
at 252. An associated principle is that crimes which involve moral turpitude
are malum in se and have been held to require a mental element, some level
of "guilty knowledge," even if the statute does not specify that
element. State
v. Turner, 78 Wash. 2d 276, 280, 474 P.2d 91, 41 A.L.R.3d 493 (1970).
In contrast, statutory crimes which are mala prohibita, if properly enacted
within the police power, are often upheld without proof of an evil intent,
and even without any mental element at all. Id. at 280. Such crimes often
fall within a category of crimes called "public welfare" or "regulatory"
offenses, such as those involving "pure food and drugs, labeling, weights
and measures, building, plumbing and electrical codes, fire protection,
air and water pollution, sanitation, highway safety and numerous other areas[.]"
Id. at 280; see Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1797-98. Many of the public welfare
offenses "are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions,
with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect
where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many violations
of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or
property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law
seeks to minimize." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255-56. |
| [42] | Respondents argue that the goal of RCW
16.08.100(3) is to prevent aggressive dog attacks causing injury or
death in humans, and that such occurrences are bad in and of themselves.
Respondents urge that the crime is thus a malum in se crime requiring scienter,
and is unlike regulatory crimes such as erecting a building without a permit.
The State maintains, to the contrary, that RCW
16.08.100(3) establishes a malum prohibitum offense which is a strict
liability crime. |
| [43] | In identifying the typical "public welfare offense," the nature
of the thing regulated is often a crucial inquiry. Items within such regulation
have included "potentially harmful or injurious items[,]" and
"dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials[.]"
Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1798 (quoting United States v. International Minerals
& Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65, 91 S. Ct. 1697, 29 L. Ed. 2d 178
(1971)). The Court has reasoned, though, that even statutes regulating dangerous
items will not be treated as defining a public welfare offense where strict
liability would criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent behavior.
Id. at 1798-1800. The Court said in Staples, involving a statute criminalizing
possession of unregistered machine-guns, that items or devices, even if
dangerous, must be of a nature to "alert individuals to the likelihood
of strict regulation." Id. at 1800. The Court reasoned that "despite
their potential for harm, guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence."
Id. at 1800. The Court observed that virtually any semi-automatic weapon
may be converted, by internal modification, or in some cases by wear and
tear, into a machine-gun within the meaning of the statute at issue, and
give no visible external indication it is fully automatic. Id. at 1802.
The Court held that under the statute criminalizing possession of an unregistered
machine-gun, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant knew that the gun possessed had characteristics bringing it
within the statutory definition of a machine-gun, and rejected the Government's
argument that the statute established a strict liability public welfare
offense. |
| [44] | This notion that a dangerous or destructive item which is regulated must
be such as to put the owner on notice of the likelihood of regulation in
order to find a strict liability crime favors respondents in this case.
The analogy would be that as a general proposition, ownership of dogs is
"so commonplace" (see Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1800), and often
occurs with such "perfect innocence" (see Staples, 114 S. Ct.
at 1800), that dog owners would not be put sufficiently on notice of the
likelihood of regulation to an extent to justify interpreting RCW
16.08.100(3) as not requiring a mental element (compare Staples, 114
S. Ct. at 1800). |
| [45] | The Court in Staples also reasoned that the harshness of the penalty is
a relevant consideration in deciding whether Congress intended a strict
liability crime. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1802-04; see 1 LaFave & Scott
sec. 3.8, at 340-41, 343. "Other things being equal, the greater the
possible punishment, the more likely some fault is required; and, conversely,
the lighter the possible punishment, the more likely the legislature meant
to impose liability without fault." 1 LaFave & Scott sec. 3.8,
at 343 %(citing, among other cases, State v. Strong, 294 N.W.2d 319 (Minn.
1980)) (statute defining crime of taking contraband into state prison without
specifying mental element not a strict liability crime; court stresses crime
punishable by 3 to 5 years imprisonment); see also United States v. X- Citement
Video, Inc., U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 464, 130 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1994) (mental element
requirement presumed where violations of statute criminalizing transporting
or receiving visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct
punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment). The Court in Staples stopped
short of saying that punishing a crime as a felony was incompatible with
the theory of the public welfare offense, but strongly hinted in that direction
and then concluded that "absent a clear statement from Congress that
mens rea is not required, we should not apply the public welfare offense
rationale to interpret any statute defining a felony offense as dispensing
with mens rea." Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1804. |
| [46] | The crime defined in RCW
16.08.100(3) is a class C felony, punishable by 5 years' imprisonment,
or a $10,000 fine, or both, and the harshness of this penalty may indicate
the Legislature did not intend a strict liability crime in RCW
16.08.100(3). However, it should also be noted that this court has found
a statute to state a strict liability offense where the conduct was punishable
as a felony. State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 215P. 41 (1923) (state banking
act punishing bank director for borrowing from bank; one to five-year indeterminate
sentence imposed). LaFave and Scott observe, though, that generally in cases
where a strict liability statute has been found even with a harsh penalty,
other factors in the cases pointed toward strict liability. 1 LaFave &
Scott sec. 3.8, at 345. |
| [47] | The seriousness of the possible harm to the public arguably weighs in
favor of a strict liability offense. "Other things being equal, the
more serious the consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature
meant to impose liability without regard to fault, and vice versa."
LaFave & Scott sec. 3.8, at 343. Animals which attack humans are a serious
problem and the history recounted in the final bill report discussed above
demonstrates legislative concern for accountability. That history expressly
concerns financial responsibility, a matter addressed in the legislation
making $50,000 in liability insurance mandatory as a condition of owning
a dangerous dog. But criminal liability was undoubtedly thought of by the
Legislature as having a deterrent effect which would protect the public
from unrestrained and uncontrolled dogs. Whether a strict liability standard
would accomplish the goal of deterrence is doubtful, however, because unless
the owner knows or reasonably should know of the dog's dangerous propensities,
it is unlikely that the owner would think it necessary to use extraordinary
care in controlling the dog. The record does not offer any information regarding
the difficulty for the prosecution in proving fault nor whether the burden
would be so time-consuming that imposing strict liability would be justified.
Likewise, the record is silent as to the number of prosecutions which can
be expected under the RCW
16.08.100(3). |
| [48] | On balance, the statutory scheme as a whole favors reading the statute
as not setting forth a strict liability crime. At the least, as respondents
argue, the inclusion of the "whether" clause in the statute does
not clearly eliminate scienter, and given the nature of the crime as a felony
and the harshness of the potential punishment, legislative intent to dispense
with a mental element should be clear before the court concludes the statute
defines a strict liability crime. Actual knowledge of a dog's dangerous
propensities, or a "should have known" standard, like a negligence
standard, is consistent with the Legislature's apparent purpose in enacting
the 1987 statutes in RCW
16.08 regarding regulation and control of aggressive and dangerous dogs. |
| [49] | Cases cited by the State are not to the contrary. In its motion for discretionary
review, the State relied upon State
v. Coria, 120 Wash. 2d 156, 839 P.2d 890 (1992) and State
v. Rivas, 126 Wash. 2d 443, 896 P.2d 57 (1995) as examples of areas
of the criminal law where strict liability has been upheld. Coria involved
statutes imposing enhanced penalties for drug dealing within 1,000 feet
of a school bus stop. The court held that the statute constitutionally imposed
the enhanced penalties regardless of the drug dealers' knowledge whether
he was in a drug-free zone. Coria is unlike the present case in an important
regard, however. While dog ownership is widespread and generally innocent
behavior, selling drugs is not. |
| [50] | Rivas is also unlike the present case. Rivas involved the question whether
under the vehicular homicide by intoxication statute there was a required
causal connection between intoxication and the victim's death. Rivas,
126 Wash. 2d at 452-53. The crime there involved consumption of alcohol
to a state of intoxication, and the driving of a motor vehicle. Courts have
recognized that alcohol is an inherently dangerous substance producing harmful
secondary effects such as drunk driving, and accordingly alcohol-related
offenses may be strict liability offenses. State v. Larson, 653 So. 2d 1158
(La. 1995). Moreover, the conduct in vehicular homicide by intoxication
requires the choice to consume alcohol and drive, an unquestionably dangerous
combination. In general, owning a dog is not fraught with the same danger
potential. |
| [51] | We reverse the order of the trial court and hold that criminal liability
arises under RCW
16.08.100(3) only if the dog which severely injures or kills a human
being previously fell within the definition of either a potentially dangerous
or dangerous dog and that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant either knew or should have known that his or her dog
was a potentially dangerous or dangerous dog as an element of the crime. |
| [52] | DURHAM, C.J. (concurring) -- Under RCW
16.08.100(3), the owner of a dog that attacks and severely injures or
kills a human being may be guilty of a felony if that dog has "previously
been declared potentially dangerous or dangerous." Although the statute
is not well drafted, its meaning is clear. The majority properly refuses
the State's invitation to construe the statute in a manner that renders
the quoted passage superfluous. |
| [53] | Unfortunately, the majority then proceeds to ignore the plain meaning
of the same passage. This leads the majority to an analysis of a notice
or knowledge issue that is not presented by the facts of this case. The
majority's concern for owners who may be unaware of their dogs' dangerous
propensities is misplaced. Contrary to the majority's paraphrasing, RCW
16.08.100(3) does not apply to the owners of dogs that "previously
fell within the definition of either a potentially dangerous or dangerous
dog." Majority at 18. The statute applies only to the owners of dogs
that have "previously been declared" to meet either of those definitions.
*fn1 Strict criminal liability
for harm caused by such animals is entirely appropriate. |
| [54] | As the majority points out, RCW
16.08.100(3) does not explain how, as a practical matter, particular
dogs are to be "declared" to be "potentially dangerous"
or "dangerous." *fn2
But the statute does not exist in a vacuum. Chapter 16.08 clearly contemplates
local administrative regulation and enforcement. The definition of a "dangerous
dog" is based on the records of local animal control authorities. RCW
16.08.070(2). "Dangerous" dogs must be registered with local
authorities. RCW
16.08.080. Liability insurance, proper enclosures, and warning signs
are all prerequisites to legal ownership of such dogs. RCW
16.08.080(2). Failure to comply with these requirements for "dangerous"
dogs is a gross misdemeanor. RCW
16.08.100(1). Local governments may further regulate "potentially
dangerous" dogs. RCW
16.08.090(2). These provisions are not self executing. They must be
implemented and enforced by local animal control authorities. |
| [55] | The Yakima County Code creates a dog control department with the administrative
authority to declare dogs to be "potentially dangerous" or "dangerous"
for purposes of RCW
Ch. 16.08. Yakima County Code 8.36.040(b)(1). Unless Yakima County animal
control authorities have previously declared Respondents' dogs to be "potentially
dangerous" or "dangerous," Respondents cannot be charged
with a felony under RCW
16.08.100(3). Because Informations filed against each Respondent (Clerk's
Papers at 33-34 (Bash); 166-67 (Delzer)) do not even allege that such declarations
have been made, the charges against Respondents must be dismissed. This
determination should have been dispositive of this appeal. |
| [56] | The majority's failure to acknowledge the plain meaning of RCW
16.08.100(3) leads the majority to the questionable assumption that
dog owners may become liable under the statute without prior knowledge of
their dogs' dangerous propensities. This assumption leads to the majority's
unnecessary Conclusion that RCW
16.08.100(3) does not define a strict liability offense. Contrary to
the majority's analysis, this statute does not criminalize a broad range
of apparently innocent behavior. The statute applies only to the owners
of dogs that, based on prior aggressive behavior, have been administratively
declared "potentially dangerous" or "dangerous." Only
those persons who choose to continue to own and take legal responsibility
for such an animal may become liable under the statute. The seriousness
of the potential harm fully justifies holding the owners of such dogs criminally
liable for any failure to prevent such dogs from harming a human being. |
| [57] | The additional element of actual or constructive knowledge is probably
unnecessary. An administrative declaration that a particular dog is "potentially
dangerous" or "dangerous" would presumably include notice
of that fact to the dog's owner. If local animal control authorities declared
a dog to be "potentially dangerous" or "dangerous" without
notice to the owner, any subsequent prosecution under RCW
16.08.100(3) could be challenged on procedural due process grounds.
*fn3 A subsequent owner who was
not aware that a dog had previously been declared "potentially dangerous"
or "dangerous" might make the same argument advanced by Respondents
here. I find it unnecessary to reach this issue because the Informations
do not allege that these dogs were ever declared to be "potentially
dangerous" or "dangerous" for purposes of RCW
16.08.100(3). |
| [58] | DOLLIVER, J. (dissenting)--I Dissent. Regardless of the elaborate and
sometimes tendentious argument of the majority, I believe the statute is
definitely a strict liability statute. The majority attempts to convert
this into a "second bite" statute, but Mr. Walt Freser was killed
by the attack of the dogs. Surely the majority did not wish to make this
a "second death" statute. |
| [59] | We may have serious objections to the method which the Legislature chose
to resolve this problem, but we are not platonic guardians. If we were to
take on every instance of disagreement with a legislature that drafts its
statutes in a manner unpleasing to us, we would have a full-time job. It
is not the prerogative of this court to pass upon the desirability of a
statute. The Legislature has perceived a problem, written a statute, and
now it must live with the consequences. It is not our duty to do otherwise. |
| [60] | SMITH, J., concurs with DOLLIVER, J. |
|
|
|
| Opinion Footnotes | |
|
|
|
| [61] | *fn1 RCW
16.08.070(1),(2) defines "potentially dangerous" and "dangerous"
dogs. |
| [62] | *fn2 "The statutes are not
clear about how a dog is 'declared' or 'classified' as either a 'potentially
dangerous dog' or a 'dangerous dog.'" Majority at 9. We are concerned
with the meaning of the term "declared" as it is used in RCW
16.08.100(3). The term "classified" does not appear anywhere
in RCW
Ch. 16.08. |
| [63] | *fn3 See State
v. Whitney, 78 Wash. App. 506, 897 P.2d 374 (prosecution for driving
with suspended driver's license requires a showing that driver was provided
with notice of suspension and an opportunity to be heard), review denied,
128 Wash. 2d 1003, 907 P.2d 297 (1995). |
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