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United States Supreme Court
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Nos. 00-1770 and 00-1781
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122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258,
2002.SCT.0000052<http://www.versuslaw.com>, 70 USLW 4206, 70 USLW
4205, 2 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2683
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March 26, 2002
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DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
PETITIONER
v.
PEARLIE RUCKER ET AL.
OAKLAND HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET
AL., PETITIONERS
v.
PEARLIE RUCKER ET AL.
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SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
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OCTOBER TERM, 2001
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Argued February 19, 2002
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Title 42 U. S. C. §1437d(l)(6) provides that each "public housing
agency shall utilize leases ... provid[ing] that ... any drug-related
criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing]
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the
tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's
control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Respondents are four
such tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA). Paragraph 9(m) of
their leases obligates them to "assure that the tenant, any member of the
household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall
not engage in ... any drug-related criminal activity on or near the
premises." Pursuant to United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) regulations authorizing local public housing authorities
to evict for drug-related activity even if the tenant did not know, could
not foresee, or could not control behavior by other occupants, OHA
instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging
violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household
or a guest. Respondents filed federal actions against HUD, OHA, and OHA's
director, arguing that §1437d(l)(6) does not require lease terms
authorizing the eviction of so-called "innocent" tenants, and, in the
alternative, that if it does, the statute is unconstitutional. The
District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was
affirmed by the en banc Ninth Circuit, which held that HUD's
interpretation permitting the eviction of so-called "innocent" tenants is
inconsistent with congressional intent and must be rejected under Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837,
842-843.
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Held: Section 1437d(l)(6)'s plain language unambiguously requires
lease terms that give local public housing authorities the discretion to
terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest
engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew,
or should have known, of the drug-related activity. Congress' decision not
to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the
term "any" to modify "drug-related criminal activity," precludes any
knowledge requirement. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 609.
Because "any" has an expansive meaning -- i.e., "one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind ," United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S.
1, 5 -- any drug-related activity engaged in by the specified persons is
grounds for termination, not just drug-related activity that the tenant
knew, or should have known, about. The Ninth Circuit's ruling that "under
the tenant's control" modifies not just "other person," but also "member
of the tenant's household" and "guest," runs counter to basic grammar
rules and would result in a nonsensical reading. Rather, HUD offers a
convincing explanation for the grammatical imperative that "under the
tenant's control" modifies only "other person": By "control," the statute
means control in the sense that the tenant has permitted access to the
premises. Implicit in the terms "household member" or "guest" is that
access to the premises has been granted by the tenant. Section
§1437d(l)(6)'s unambiguous text is reinforced by comparing it to 21 U. S.
C. §881(a)(7), which subjects all leasehold interests to civil forfeiture
when used to commit drug-related criminal activities, but expressly
exempts tenants who had no knowledge of the activity, thereby
demonstrating that Congress knows exactly how to provide an "innocent
owner" defense. It did not provide one in §1437d(l)(6). Given that
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, Chevron,
supra, at 842, other considerations with which the Ninth Circuit attempted
to bolster its holding are unavailing, including the legislative history,
the erroneous conclusion that the plain reading of the statute leads to
absurd results, the canon of constitutional avoidance, and reliance on
inapposite decisions of this Court to cast doubt on §1437d(l)(6)'s
constitutionality under the Due Process Clause. Pp. 4-11.
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237 F. 3d 1113, reversed and remanded.
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Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except Breyer, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the cases.
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Together with No. 00-1781, Oakland Housing Authority et al. v. Rucker
et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Court Below: 237 F. 3d 1113
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The opinion of the court was delivered by: Chief Justice
Rehnquist
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535 U. S. ____ (2002)
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on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the
ninth circuit
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With drug dealers "increasingly imposing a reign of terror on public
and other federally assisted low-income housing tenants," Congress passed
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. §5122, 102 Stat. 4301, 42 U. S. C.
§11901(3) (1994 ed.). The Act, as later amended, provides that each
"public housing agency shall utilize leases which ... provide that any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal
activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant,
any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under
the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." 42 U. S.
C. §1437d(l)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Petitioners say that this statute
requires lease terms that allow a local public housing authority to evict
a tenant when a member of the tenant's household or a guest engages in
drug-related criminal activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or
had reason to know, of that activity. Respondents say it does not. We
agree with petitioners.
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Respondents are four public housing tenants of the Oakland Housing
Authority (OHA). Paragraph 9(m) of respondents' leases, tracking the
language of §1437d(l)(6), obligates the tenants to "assure that the
tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the
tenant's control, shall not engage in ... [a]ny drug-related criminal
activity on or near the premise[s]." App. 59. Respondents also signed an
agreement stating that the tenant "understand[s] that if I or any member
of my household or guests should violate this lease provision, my tenancy
may be terminated and I may be evicted." Id., at 69.
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In late 1997 and early 1998, OHA instituted eviction proceedings in
state court against respondents, alleging violations of this lease
provision. The complaint alleged: (1) that the respective grandsons of
respondents William Lee and Barbara Hill, both of whom were listed as
residents on the leases, were caught in the apartment complex parking lot
smoking marijuana; (2) that the daughter of respondent Pearlie Rucker, who
resides with her and is listed on the lease as a resident, was found with
cocaine and a crack cocaine pipe three blocks from Rucker's apartment;*fn1 and (3) that on three instances within a 2-month
period, respondent Herman Walker's caregiver and two others were found
with cocaine in Walker's apartment. OHA had issued Walker notices of a
lease violation on the first two occasions, before initiating the eviction
action after the third violation.
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United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
regulations administering §1437d(l)(6) require lease terms authorizing
evictions in these circumstances. The HUD regulations closely track the
statutory language,*fn2 and provide that "[i]n deciding to evict for criminal
activity, the [public housing authority] shall have discretion to consider
all of the circumstances of the case ... ." 24 CFR §966.4(l)(5)(i) (2001).
The agency made clear that local public housing authorities' discretion to
evict for drug-related activity includes those situations in which "[the]
tenant did not know, could not foresee, or could not control behavior by
other occupants of the unit." 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567
(1991).
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After OHA initiated the eviction proceedings in state court,
respondents commenced actions against HUD, OHA, and OHA's director in
United States District Court. They challenged HUD's interpretation of the
statute under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A),
arguing that 42 U. S. C. §1437d(l)(6) does not require lease terms
authorizing the eviction of so-called "innocent" tenants, and, in the
alternative, that if it does, then the statute is unconstitutional.*fn3 The District Court issued a preliminary injunction,
enjoining OHA from "terminating the leases of tenants pursuant to
paragraph 9(m) of the ` Tenant Lease' for drug-related criminal activity
that does not occur within the tenant's apartment unit when the tenant did
not know of and had no reason to know of, the drug-related criminal
activity." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 01-770, pp.
165a-166a.
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A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that §1437d(l)(6)
unambiguously permits the eviction of tenants who violate the lease
provision, regardless of whether the tenant was personally aware of the
drug activity, and that the statute is constitutional. See Rucker v.
Davis, 203 F. 3d 627 (CA9 2000). An en banc panel of the Court of Appeals
reversed and affirmed the District Court's grant of the preliminary
injunction. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F. 3d 1113 (2001). That court held
that HUD's interpretation permitting the eviction of so-called "innocent"
tenants "is inconsistent with Congressional intent and must be rejected"
under the first step of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). 237 F. 3d, at
1119.
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We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 976 (2001), 534 U. S. ___ (2001), and
now reverse, holding that 42 U. S. C. §1437d(l)(6) unambiguously requires
lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion
to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and
guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the
activity.
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That this is so seems evident from the plain language of the statute.
It provides that "each public housing authority shall utilize leases which
... provide that ... any drug-related criminal activity on or off such
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the
tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's
control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." 42 U. S. C.
§1437d(l)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The en banc Court of Appeals thought the
statute did not address "the level of personal knowledge or fault that is
required for eviction." 237 F. 3d, at 1120. Yet Congress' decision not to
impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term
"any" to modify "drug-related criminal activity," precludes any knowledge
requirement. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 609 (1989). As
we have explained, "the word `any' has an expansive meaning, that is, `one
or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.' " United States v. Gonzales,
520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Thus, any drug-related activity engaged in by the
specified persons is grounds for termination, not just drug-related
activity that the tenant knew, or should have known, about.
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The en banc Court of Appeals also thought it possible that "under the
tenant's control" modifies not just "other person," but also "member of
the tenant's household" and "guest." 237 F. 3d, at 1120. The court
ultimately adopted this reading, concluding that the statute prohibits
eviction where the tenant "for a lack of knowledge or other reason, could
not realistically exercise control over the conduct of a household member
or guest." Id., at 1126. But this interpretation runs counter to basic
rules of grammar. The disjunctive "or" means that the qualification
applies only to "other person." Indeed, the view that "under the tenant's
control" modifies everything coming before it in the sentence would result
in the nonsensical reading that the statute applies to "a public housing
tenant ... under the tenant's control." HUD offers a convincing
explanation for the grammatical imperative that "under the tenant's
control" modifies only "other person": "by `control,' the statute means
control in the sense that the tenant has permitted access to the
premises." 66 Fed. Reg. 28781 (2001). Implicit in the terms "household
member" or "guest" is that access to the premises has been granted by the
tenant. Thus, the plain language of §1437d(l)(6) requires leases that
grant public housing authorities the discretion to terminate tenancy
without regard to the tenant's knowledge of the drug-related criminal
activity.
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Comparing §1437d(l)(6) to a related statutory provision reinforces the
unambiguous text. The civil forfeiture statute that makes all leasehold
interests subject to forfeiture when used to commit drug-related criminal
activities expressly exempts tenants who had no knowledge of the activity:
"[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph ... by reason of
any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of the owner." 21 U. S. C.
§881(a)(7) (1994 ed.). Because this forfeiture provision was amended in
the same Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 that created 42 U. S. C.
§1437d(l)(6), the en banc Court of Appeals thought Congress "meant them to
be read consistently" so that the knowledge requirement should be read
into the eviction provision. 237 F. 3d, at 1121-1122. But the two sections
deal with distinctly different matters. The "innocent owner" defense for
drug forfeiture cases was already in existence prior to 1988 as part of 21
U. S. C. §881(a)(7). All that Congress did in the 1988 Act was to add
leasehold interests to the property interests that might be forfeited
under the drug statute. And if such a forfeiture action were to be brought
against a leasehold interest, it would be subject to the pre-existing
"innocent owner" defense. But 42 U. S. C. §1437(d)(1)(6), with which we
deal here, is a quite different measure. It is entirely reasonable to
think that the Government, when seeking to transfer private property to
itself in a forfeiture proceeding, should be subject to an "innocent owner
defense," while it should not be when acting as a landlord in a public
housing project. The forfeiture provision shows that Congress knew exactly
how to provide an "innocent owner" defense. It did not provide one in
§1437d(l)(6).
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The en banc Court of Appeals next resorted to legislative history. The
Court of Appeals correctly recognized that reference to legislative
history is inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous. 237
F. 3d, at 1123. Given that the en banc Court of Appeals' finding of
textual ambiguity is wrong, see supra, at 4-6, there is no need to consult
legislative history.*fn4
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Nor was the en banc Court of Appeals correct in concluding that this
plain reading of the statute leads to absurd results.*fn5 The statute does not require the eviction of any
tenant who violated the lease provision. Instead, it entrusts that
decision to the local public housing authorities, who are in the best
position to take account of, among other things, the degree to which the
housing project suffers from "rampant drug-related or violent crime," 42
U. S. C. §11901(2) (1994 ed. and Supp. V), "the seriousness of the
offending action," 66 Fed. Reg., at 28803, and "the extent to which the
leaseholder has ... taken all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the
offending action," ibid. It is not "absurd" that a local housing authority
may sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of the drug-related
activity. Such "no-fault" eviction is a common "incident of tenant
responsibility under normal landlord-tenant law and practice." 56 Fed.
Reg., at 51567. Strict liability maximizes deterrence and eases
enforcement difficulties. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.
S. 1, 14 (1991).
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And, of course, there is an obvious reason why Congress would have
permitted local public housing authorities to conduct no-fault evictions:
Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who "cannot control drug crime, or other
criminal activities by a household member which threaten health or safety
of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the project." 56
Fed. Reg., at 51567. With drugs leading to "murders, muggings, and other
forms of violence against tenants," and to the "deterioration of the
physical environment that requires substantial governmental expenditures,"
42 U. S. C. §11901(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V), it was reasonable for Congress
to permit no-fault evictions in order to "provide public and other
federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free from
illegal drugs," §11901(1) (1994 ed.).
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In another effort to avoid the plain meaning of the statute, the en
banc Court of Appeals invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance. But
that canon "has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity."
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494
(2001). "Any other conclusion, while purporting to be an exercise in
judicial restraint, would trench upon the legislative powers vested in
Congress by Art. I, §1, of the Constitution." United States v. Albertini,
472 U. S. 675, 680 (1985). There are, moreover, no "serious constitutional
doubts" about Congress' affording local public housing authorities the
discretion to conduct no-fault evictions for drug-related crime. Reno v.
Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 314, n. 9 (1993) (emphasis deleted).
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The en banc Court of Appeals held that HUD's interpretation "raise[s]
serious questions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," because it permits "tenants to be deprived of their property
interest without any relationship to individual wrongdoing." 237 F. 3d, at
1124-1125 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U. S 203, 224-225 (1961);
Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482
(1915)). But both of these cases deal with the acts of government as
sovereign. In Scales, the United States criminally charged the defendant
with knowing membership in an organization that advocated the overthrow of
the United States Government. In Danaher, an Arkansas statute forbade
discrimination among customers of a telephone company. The situation in
the present cases is entirely different. The government is not attempting
to criminally punish or civilly regulate respondents as members of the
general populace. It is instead acting as a landlord of property that it
owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and
which Congress has expressly required. Scales and Danaher cast no
constitutional doubt on such actions.
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The Court of Appeals sought to bolster its discussion of
constitutional doubt by pointing to the fact that respondents have a
property interest in their leasehold interest, citing Greene v. Lindsey,
456 U. S. 444 (1982). This is undoubtedly true, and Greene held that an
effort to deprive a tenant of such a right without proper notice violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But, in the present
cases, such deprivation will occur in the state court where OHA brought
the unlawful detainer action against respondents. There is no indication
that notice has not been given by OHA in the past, or that it will not be
given in the future. Any individual factual disputes about whether the
lease provision was actually violated can, of course, be resolved in these
proceedings.*fn6
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We hold that "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S., at 842. Section 1437d(l)(6) requires lease terms that give
local public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of
a tenant when a member of the household or a guest engages in drug-related
activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have known, of
the drug-related activity.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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It is so ordered.
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Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these
cases.
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Opinion Footnotes |
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*fn1 In February 1998, OHA dismissed the unlawful detainer
action against Rucker, after her daughter was incarcerated, and thus no
longer posed a threat to other tenants.
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*fn2 The regulations require public housing authorities
(PHAs) to impose a lease obligation on tenants: "To assure that the
tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the
tenant's control, shall not engage in: "(A) Any criminal activity that
threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's
public housing premises by other residents or employees of the PHA, or
"(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises. Any
criminal activity in violation of the preceding sentence shall be cause
for termination of tenancy, and for eviction from the unit." 24 CFR
§966.4(f)(12)(i) (2001).
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*fn3 Respondents Rucker and Walker also raised Americans
with Disabilities Act claims that are not before this Court. And all of
the respondents raised state-law claims against OHA that are not before
this Court.
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*fn4 Even if it were appropriate to look at legislative
history, it would not help respondents. The en banc Court of Appeals
relied on two passages from a 1990 Senate Report on a proposed amendment
to the eviction provision. 237 F. 3d, at 1123 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-316
(1990)). But this Report was commenting on language from a Senate version
of the 1990 amendment, which was never enacted. The language in the Senate
version, which would have imposed a different standard of cause for
eviction for drug-related crimes than the unqualified language of
§1437d(l)(6), see 136 Cong. Rec. 15991, 16012 (1990) (reproducing S. 566,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., §§521(f) and 714(a) (1990)), was rejected at
Conference. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-943, p. 418 (1990). And, as the
dissent from the en banc decision below explained, the passages may
plausibly be read as a mere suggestion about how local public housing
authorities should exercise the "wide discretion to evict tenants
connected with drug-related criminal behavior" that the lease provision
affords them. 237 F. 3d, at 1134 (Sneed, J., dissenting). Respondents also
cite language from a House Report commenting on the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000, codified at 18 U. S. C. §983. Brief for Respondents
15-16. For the reasons discussed supra at 6-7, legislative history
concerning forfeiture provisions is not probative on the interpretation of
§1437d(l)(6). A 1996 amendment to §1437d(l)(6), enacted five years after
HUD issued its interpretation of the statute, supports our holding. The
1996 amendment expanded the reach of §1437d(l)(6), changing the language
of the lease provision from applying to activity taking place "on or near"
the public housing premises, to activity occurring "on or off" the public
housing premises. See Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996,
§9(a)(2), 110 Stat. 836. But Congress, "presumed to be aware" of HUD's
interpretation rejecting a knowledge requirement, made no other change to
the statute. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978).
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*fn5 For the reasons discussed above, no-fault eviction,
which is specifically authorized under §1437d(l)(6), does not violate
§1437d(l)(2), which prohibits public housing authorities from including
"unreasonable terms and conditions [in their leases]." In addition, the
general statutory provision in the latter section cannot trump the clear
language of the more specific §1437d(l)(6). See Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 524-526 (1989).
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*fn6 The en banc Court of Appeals cited only the due
process constitutional concern. Respondents raise two others: the First
Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause. We agree with Judge O'Scannlain,
writing for the panel that reversed the injunction, that the statute does
not raise substantial First Amendment or Excessive Fines Clause concerns.
Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360 (1988), forecloses respondents
claim that the eviction of unknowing tenants violates the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of association. See Rucker v. Davis, 203 F. 3d 627,
647 (2000). And termination of tenancy "is neither a cash nor an in-kind
payment imposed by and payable to the government" and therefore is "not
subject to analysis as an excessive fine." Id., at
648.
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