The are all derived from trespass.

Trespass to chattels and conversion. Trespass to chattels can include minor injuries or inconvenience. Unlike conversion, it does not require bad faith or the intent to interfere with the rights of others. There can be transferred intent with trespass to chattels, but not with conversion.

Close relatives

At the scene

Defendant knows they are there

Bramon v. U-Haul, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 676 (Mo.App. E.D. May 27, 1997)

[83] In an action for malicious prosecution plaintiff must plead and prove six elements:

(1) the commencement of a prosecution against the plaintiff;

(2) instigation by the defendant;

(3) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff;

(4) the want of probable cause for the prosecution;

(5) the defendant's conduct was actuated by malice and

(6) that the plaintiff was damaged. Sanders v. Daniel Intern. Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 807[1] (Mo.banc 1984).

The citizen filing the claim is the defendant and the police are not.

Under Missouri decisions the existence of reasonable cause for apprehension of mere bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a shooting in self-defense. There must be reasonable cause of apprehension of imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.

[75] Nor does the record disclose other facts and circumstances sufficient to form a substantial evidentiary basis for a jury finding that Yeoham fired the shot in furtherance of the partnership business and for its benefit - as opposed to his unequivocally expressed reason for his action - that he fired the weapon as a measure to save his wife and himself from serious bodily harm.

Hale v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 522 (Mo.App. 1996)

[17] Res ipsa loquitur permits the fact finder to infer negligence without proof of specific negligent conduct on the part of the defendant where:

"(1) The incident resulted in an injury of the kind which ordinarily does not occur without someone's negligence;

(2) the incident is caused by an instrumentality under the control of the defendant; and

(3) the defendant has superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the incident." Christie v. Ruffin, 824 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Mo. App. 1992). The event must be an unusual occurrence which ordinarily results from negligence and which, thereof, negligence is a reasonable inference. Id.

King v. Morgan, 873 S.W.2d 272 (Mo.App. W.D. Mar 08, 1994)

(1) There was, in fact, a violation of the statute;

(2) The injured plaintiff was a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute;

(3) The injury complained of was of the kind the statute was designed to prevent; and

(4) The violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury. Eckert v. Thole , 857 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Mo. App. 1993).

King v. Morgan, 873 S.W.2d 272 (Mo.App. W.D. Mar 08, 1994)

A penal statute may be pleaded as a standard of care in a negligence action if

(1) The injured party is in the class of persons for whose protection the statute was enacted; and

(2) The statute was enacted to protect persons or property, conserve public health, or promote public safety. Moore v. Riley , 487 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Mo. 1972); State ex rel. Wells v. Mayfield , 365 Mo. 238, 246-47, 281 S.W.2d 9, 13 (banc 1955).

[31] Morgan also argues he was not in violation of § 304.170.1 because he had a special over-dimension permit from the Missouri Department of Highways and Transportation authorizing him to transport loads up to 12 feet, 4 inches wide. *fn3 If his permit had been valid at the time of the accident, we would agree. However, at the time of the accident, Morgan's special overwidth permit was void because his vehicle was not in compliance with 7 CSR 10-2.010(10)(A). This regulation says that vehicles with loads more than 10 feet, 6 inches wide must have two large (at least 7 feet long by 18 inches high) yellow signs with black letters reading "OVERSIZE LOAD" -- one on the front, and one on the rear. Morgan stipulated that his vehicle (which, as we noted earlier, was at least 11 feet wide, including load), had no such signs. The regulation also says that "red or orange fluorescent flags in good condition with a minimum size of eighteen inches (18") square must be displayed at the extreme ends or projections of all overdimension loads . . . ." Morgan also stipulated that he had only one orange flag, and that was on the left or driver's side of the bulldozer blade farthest away from King. *fn4

Wilkerson:

To prove nondisclosure, the plaintiff is required to produce expert testimony to show what disclosures a reasonable medical practitioner would have made under the same or similar circumstances.

Stated another way, a plaintiff must show that the disclosures made by the defendant do not meet the standard of what a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed under the same or similar circumstances. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965).

Reasonable person

Mo - what does the reasonable doc tell

Ca - what are the material risks

The key problem is causation: can you convince the jury what a reasonable person would have declined life-saving surgery because of the fear of a low probability complication?

[88] There is no doubt that Kelly is within the class to be protected by the Act. However, because the Act makes individuals who do not report abuse subject to criminal penalties but does not provide a civil remedy, we do not believe Plaintiff has demonstrated a clear legislative intention to provide for civil remedies. Because this Court finds no private cause of action can be implied under the Child Abuse Reporting Act, section 210.115, the alleged breach of the Act also does not amount to negligence per se. Imperial Premium Fin. v. Northland Ins. Co., 861 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. App. 1993). For these reasons, the trial court's dismissal of Count IV is affirmed.

It does not like it.

Bradley v. Ray

[72] In applying these principles to the instant case and in accord with the vast majority of other courts which have addressed this issue, we hold that the public policy of this State, in addition to the special relationship between defendants and their patient, and the foreseeability of harm to Kelly, give rise to a duty on the part of defendants to warn appropriate authorities of the risk of future harm of Kelly by Mr. Pope. Specifically, we hold that when a psychologist or other health care professional knows or pursuant to the standards of his profession should have known that a patient presents a serious danger of future violence to a readily identifiable victim the psychologist has a duty under Missouri common law to warn the intended victim or communicate the existence of such danger to those likely to warn the victim including notifying appropriate enforcement authorities. *fn7 In so holding, this Court joins the well-established line of other jurisdictions which have imposed similar duties.

[59] While the firefighter's rule "may provide a shield of liability for defendants in cases involving ordinary negligence, it is not a license to act with impunity or without regard for the safety officer's well-being." Lambert, 839 S.W.2d at 29. The firefighter's rule does not apply to: (1) acts involving reckless or wanton negligence, or willful conduct; (2) separate and independent acts; or (3) intentional torts. (citations omitted).

Why did this fail for the party?

[62] The Hockensmiths first allege that the parents willfully, wantonly, and recklessly breached their duty to supervise in giving Brown permission to attend the party at the Bullins' home. However, in the parents' depositions, both parents testified that they had not given Brown permission to attend any party and did not even know that there was a party. The Hockensmiths presented no evidence to refute this testimony. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 376. Thus, there is no genuine issue of fact concerning this allegation. Because it is undisputed that the parents did not give Brown permission, there can be no argument that granting such permission constituted willful, wanton, or reckless negligence, because they did not have knowledge of the facts that would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., 740 S.W.2d at 235.

[63] The next two allegations assert that the parents were willfully, wantonly, and recklessly negligent in failing to adequately supervise Brown by restricting his access to alcohol and in dealing with his addiction. The undisputed facts are as follows. Brown lived with, and under the supervision of, his parents before this incident occurred. When Brown was 15, he was expelled from school for his involvement in approximately three fights on school grounds. The parents were also aware that Brown was involved in another fight after he was expelled.

Why does this also fail for drugs and alcohol?

[64] In March 1991, Brown was convicted of possession of drugs. Soon after this conviction, Brown admitted to his parents that he had a drug problem. Brown then entered an outpatient drug rehabilitation program, where, during counseling, the parents learned that their son was also addicted to alcohol. After learning of Brown's substance abuse problems, he was strictly monitored and the parents required him to get permission before going anywhere. Brown has received counseling for his addictions both before and after the incident at issue here.

[65] The parents did not drink, nor did they keep alcohol in their home. In August 1991, they moved, partly in an effort to remove their son from the unhealthy influences in their old neighborhood, and partly due to Mr. Brown's deteriorating health.

Crawford v. Pacific Western Mobile Estates, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 216 (Mo.App. Feb 28, 1977)

[19] Section 339 of the Restatement (1965 Revision) *fn2 provides as follows:

[20] " § 339. Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children

[21] "A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if

[22] (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and

[23] (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and

[24] (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and

[25] (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and

[26] (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children."

[36] "There are many dangers, such a those of fire and water, or of falling from a height, which under ordinary conditions may reasonably be expected to be fully understood and appreciated by any child of an age to be allowed at large. To such conditions the rule stated in this Section ordinarily has no application, in the absence of some other factor creating a special risk that the child will not avoid the danger, such as the fact that the condition is so hidden as not to be readily visible, or a distracting influence which makes it likely that the child will not discover or appreciate it."

The key is that crazy defendants are liable for their intentional torts, unless the madness is so pervasive that they do not know that they are doing. If this is sudden onset of insanity, defendant must show that was like a seizure and took away her free will, thus defeating intent. If it is ongoing madness, she must show that it is so severe that it made her incapable of recognizing the consequences of her actions - the devil is not a person and she never intended to kill a person, so there is not transferred intent. Plaintiff will want to show that she thought the devil was a real persons and tried to kill him, thus setting up transferred intent to Jim. If it is a chronic insanity, plaintiff will argue that if she could drive, she had enough judgment to know that she was doing something that was going to injure someone, i.e., driving her car at a person.

Assistant troop leader helping out at the Girl Scout Troop leader's house.

Licensee - this is a volunteer activity with no economic benefit to the homeowner. She is just a guest, hence a licensee.

Avon Lady ringing a client's door bell.

At least until the homeowner knows who it is and allows her to present her sales pitch, she is a license. She would be an invitee if she has an appointment with the homeowner or the homeowner has otherwise indicated an intent to do business with her. She is not a trespasser because she is using the public access to the house that is provided by the homeowner.

Gas meter reader while reading the gas meter.

Invitee - legal right to enter the property and read the meter and this is of great importance to the homeowner.

Customer at McDonalds in the rest room after eating his burger.

Invitee - came in and did business with the store, was in a place clearly open to customers.

Same customer at McDonalds in storeroom looking for toilet paper because the rest room did not have any.

While he was an invitee in the rest room, he becomes a trespasser when he enters parts of the store that are not open to customers. He might still keep his invitee status if the storeroom were next to the rest room and door was open and the toilet tissue was in plain view, as if customers were meant to get more if needed.

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