FOREWORD This manual has been developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) under the authority of the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DoDD) 3150.8, DoD Response to Radiological Accidents, June 13,1996, and supersedes DoD Manual 5100.52-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Manual, September 4, 1990. This manual applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments (including the U.S. Coast Guard when it is operating as a Military Service in the U.S. Navy), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, other Federal organizations when operating with DoD, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components"). The term "Services," as used herein, refers to the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. This manual is effective immediately (its use is mandatory by all DoD components). This manual provides planners for Combatant Commanders, the Services, Response Task Force (RTP) Commanders and Initial Response Force (IRF) Commanders with the information necessary to understand the overall response concept, the role of the IRF and RTF, the relationship of the IRF, RTF, and DoD to other Federal agencies. This manual also provides guidance in conducting site remediation activities following an accident involving a nuclear weapon in DoD custody or other types of radiological accidents or incidents. It assumes that a radiological release of some rnagflitude has occurred and that some remediation of the affected land is required. It is not intended as a comprehensive document to encompass all aspects of site remediation, but seeks to define a process by which response organizations may effectively face the challenge of site remediation. This manual provides a notional RTF organization, identifies applicable DoD publications and resources used in response efforts, describes the policies and responsibilities outlined in these publications, identifies specific radiological information available in other publications, and provides a basis for Combatant Command and RTF planners to develop detailed plans tailored to each Theater of Operations and RTF area of operations. It provides a framework for DoD elements responding to non~DoD radiological events. This manual also describes the substantial resources other Federal agencies make available to assist in the response effort. This manual will be widely disseminated and made available to all commanders and staff who are tasked to primarily respond to a nuclear weapon accident and, secondly, to radiological accidents or incidents. It should serve as a guide for more detailed planning by response forces and will be used to improve training and exercise programs. Suggestions to update or improve this manual are encouraged. Send proposed changes through appropriate channels to: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ATTN: NSER 6801 Telegraph Road Alexandria, VA 22310-3398 DoD components may obtain copies of this manual through their own publications channels. Other Federal agencies and the public may obtain copies from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. Jacques S. Gansler USD (AT&L) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FOREWORD2 TABLE OF CONTENTS4 FIGURES7 TABLES8 REFERENCES9 DEFINITIONS11 ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS33 PART I - PLANNING, POLICY, AND RESPONSE GUIDANCE44 C1. CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION45 C2. CHAPTER 2 - NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES52 C3. CHAPTER 3 - SHIPBOARD ACCIDENT RESPONSE83 PART II - TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT RESPONSE 95 C4. CHAPTER 4 - RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING96 C5. CHAPTER 5 - RESPIRATORY AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION198 C6. CHAPTER 6 - CONTAMINATION CONTROL206 C7. CHAPTER 7 - BIOASSAY PROCEDURES216 C8. CHAPTER 8 - RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, CHARACTERISTICS, HAZARDS, AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS225 C9. CHAPTER 9 - CONVERSION FACTORS FOR WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM232 C10. CHAPTER 10 - MEDICAL239 C11. CHAPTER 11 - SECURITY256 C12. CHAPTER 12 - WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATIONS266 C13. CHAPTER 13 - COMMUNICATIONS274 C14. CHAPTER 14 - PUBLIC AFFAIRS288 C15. CHAPTER 15 - LEGAL320 C16. CHAPTER 16 - LOGISTIC SUPPORT332 C17. CHAPTER 17 - TRAINING342 PART III - SITE REMEDIATION GUIDANCE 345 C18. CHAPTER 18 - OVERVIEW OF THE SITE REMEDIATION PROCESS346 C19. CHAPTER 19 - ACCIDENT SCENCE RESPONSE351 C20. CHAPTER 20 - INTERMEDIATE ACTIONS358 C21. CHAPTER 21 - LONG-TERM ACTIONS365 PART IV - SPECIALIZED ASSETS AND POINTS OF CONTACT 372 C22. CHAPTER 22 - SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES373 C23. CHAPTER 23 - BIBLIOGRAPHY384 APPENDICES C3.AP1. SHIPBOARD FIREFIGHTING89 C3.AP2. SHIPBOARD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL91 C4.AP1. RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT114 C4.AP2. RADIATION DETECTION AND MEASUREMENT117 C4.AP3. ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING128 C4.AP4. SPECIALIZED RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, RADIAC REPAIR, AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT/CAPABILITIES TEAMS135 C4.AP5. AREA AND RESOURCES SURVEYS160 C4.AP6. RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, MEASUREMENT, AND CONTROL FORMS166 C10.AP1. NON-RADIOLOGICAL TOXIC HAZARDS251 C14.AP1. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE/CONTINGENCY RELEASES295 C14.AP2. RADIATION FACT SHEETS301 C14.AP3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESPONSE ORGANIZATION CONCEPT311 C14.AP4. JIC/CIB ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMUNICATION AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT/EQUIPMENT314 C14.AP5. JIC/CIB RECOMMENDED KEY MESSAGES AND NON-RELEASABLE INFORMATION316 C14.AP6. CHECK LIST319 C15.AP1. PERTINENT STATUTES AND INSTRUCTIONS325 C16.AP1. LOGISTICS RESOURCES339 C22.AP1. POINTS OF CONTACT380 FIGURES FigureTitle Page C1.F1.Accident Operational Responses 46 C1.F2.Relationshiip of Initial Response Actions 48 C1.F3.Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Reecovery Operations Flow Diagram 49,50 C2.F1.Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification Flow 54 C2.F2.Sample Accident Site Organization 59 C2.F3.Response Task Force General Composition 62 C2.F4.Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Locations 80 C4.F1.Joint Hazard Evaluation Center Functional Organization 104 C4.F2.Sample Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Form 112 C4.AP2.F1.Spectral Plot 123 C4.AP3.F1.Air Sampler Placement 131 C4.AP4.F1.HPAC Modeling Prediction Surface Dose 136 C4.AP4.F2.HPAC Modeling Prediction Hazards Area Effects 137 C4.AP4.F3.HPAC Process 138 C4.AP4.F4.Hotspot Fire Model Geometry 143 C4.AP4.F5.Hotspot Explosion Model Geometry 144 C4.AP4.F6.Hotspot Downwind Plume Centerline (Stability A-F) 145 C4.AP4.F7.Hotspot Plume Contour Plot 146 C4.AP4.F8.Hotspot Plum Contour Displayed on Geographical Map 147 C4.AP4.F9.ARAC PLOT Lung Dose 150 C4.AP4.F10.ARAC PLOT Deposition 151 C4.AP4.F11.Aerial Survey Results Early Phase Radiological Data 156 C4.AP4.F12.Aerial Survey Results Radiological Data Measurements, AMS Serpentine, and Field Measurements 157 C4.AP4.F13.Aerial Survey Results Radiological Data Measurements, AMS Contours, and AMS KIWI 158 C4.AP6.F1.Access Work Permit Form 168 C4.AP6.F2.Team Dress Requirements CCS Form 173 C4.AP6.F3.Team Entry/Exit Permit CCS Form 174 C4.AP6.F4.Analysis Data Form 175 C4.AP6.F5.Personnel Sample Form 179 C4.AP6.F6.Geographic Location Form 182 C4.AP6.F7.Field Sample Data Form 185 C4.AP6.F8.Field Measurement Data Form 188 C4.AP6.F9.JHEC Equipment Data Form 192 C4.AP6.F10.Air Sample Data Form 195 C5.F1.Aerial Survey Results Protective Action Guides (PAGs), Evacuation PAGs, and Quarantine Areas 202 C6.F1.Personnel Contamination Control Station (Example) 209 C6.F2.Vehicle Contamination Control Station (Example) 215 C7.F1.Estimated 50-Year Committed Effective Dose 220 C11.F1.Security Concept 260 C13.F1.Signal Operating Instruction 285 C18.F1.Nuclear Accident Response Phases 346 C18.F2.The Site Remediation Process 348 C19.F1.Site Remediation: Early Stages 352 C19.F2.Remediation Phase Relationships 355 C19.F3.SRWG Approval and Coordination Process 356 C21.F1.Notional Site Remediation Plan and Approval Process 365 C21.F2.Steps in the Approval Process 371 TABLES TableTitle Page C2.T1.Nuclear Weapon Confirmation Guidelines 65 C4.AP2.T1.Commonly Considered Radioactive Contaminants and Their Primary Associated Radioactive Emissions 120 C4.AP3.T1.Air Sampler Calibration 129 C4.AP3.T2.Air Sampler Placement (No. 2) Distance 131 C5.T1.Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for Emergency Workers as a Function of Airborne Contamination 200 C5.T2.Protective Devices for Emergency Worker as a Function of Surface Contamination 200 C6.T1.Contamination Control Station Materials List 211 C6.T2.CCS Personnel 212 C7.T1.Guidelines for Bioassay Sampling 222 C7.T2Guidelines for Assignment of Priorities for Collection and Processing of Bioassays 223 C9.T1.Conversion Factors for Weapons Grade Plutonium 232 C9.T2.Conversion Table (CPM to g/m2 or Ci/m2) AN/PDR-56 Alpha Meter 235 C9.T3.Conversion Table (CPM to g/m2or Ci/m2) AN/PDR-60 or AN/PDR-56 Alpha Meter 236 C9.T4.Conversion Table (MBq to mCi and Ci) 237 C9.T5.Conversion to SI Units 238 C10.T1.Heat Injury Prevention Guidelines 248 C17.T1.Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Training Courses 344 REFERENCES (a) DoD Directive 3150.8, "DoD Response to Radiological Accidents," June 13, 1996 (b) Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), May 1, 1996 (c) DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements," June 1998 (d) DSWA 5100.52.1-L, "Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing," April 1997 (e) DoD Directive 5200.8, "Security of Military Installations and Resources," April 25, 1991 (f) CJCSM 3150.03, "Joint Reporting Structures, Event and Incident Reports," June 19, 1998 (g) DoD Directive 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance," December 20, 1993 (h) Joint DoD, DOE, and FEMA Agreement for Response to Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Nuclear Weapon Significant Incidents, January 1981 (i) TP 20-11, "General Firefighting Guidance," July 1995 (j) Naval Ships Technical Manual (NSTM) 079, Vol II, "Damage Control - Practical Damage Control," February 25, 1999 (k) BUMEDINST 6470.10A, "Irradiated or Radioactively Contaminated Personnel," December 7, 1998 (l) Federal Guidance Report No. 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion and Ingestion," EPA, 1988 (m) AR 40-14, "Control and Recording Procedures for Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation," September 1984 (n) NAVMED P-5055, "Radiation Health Protection Manual," December 2, 1992 (o) AFI 48-125, "The U.S. Air Force Personnel Dosimetry Program" (p) AR 600-10, "The Army Casualty System," August 1987 (q) AFI 36-3002, "Casualty Services," August 1994 (r) BUPERS Manual Article 4210100, "Personnel Casualty Reporting," February 1982 (s) NCRP Report #37, June 1980 (t) Joint Pub 4-06. (u) DA Circular 40-82-3, "Prevention of Heat Injury" (v) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures 60-1, August 1997 (w) "Internal Security Act of 1950" (50 USC 797) (x) DoD Directive 5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual," April 1994 (y) DoD Directive 5210.41, "Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons," September 23, 1988 (z) DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, "Information Security Regulation," January 1997 (aa) DoD Directive 5210.2, "Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data," January 12, 1978 (ab) CJCSI 6110.01, "CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets," June 25,1996 (ac) Allied Communications Publication 134, "Communications Assets," January 1975 (ad) U.S. Forces Command Manual 105-1,"Joint Communication Deployment and Employment," June 1980 (ae) USA FM 24-2, "Spectrum Management," August 21, 1991 (af) AFI 33-118, "Radio Spectrum Frequency Management," August 1997 (ag) Joint Pub 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations," May 14, 1997 (ah) DoD Directive 5400.13, "Joint Public Affairs Operations," January 9, 1996 (ai) DoD Instruction 5400.14, "Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations," January 22, 1996 (aj) Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8.29, January 1984 (ak) DoD 4000.25-1-M, "Military Standards Requisitioning and Issue Procedure (MILSTRIP)," May 1987 DL1. DEFINITIONS DL1.1.1. Access Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. DL1.1.2. Accident Response Group (ARG). A group of technical and scientific experts, with specialized equipment; composed of a cadre of senior scientific advisors, weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear safety and high-explosive safety, health physicists, radiation control technicians, industrial hygienists, physical scientists, packaging and transportation specialists, and other specialists from the Department of Energy (DOE) weapons complex. ARG maintains readiness to provide DOE technical assistance to peacetime accidents and significant incidents involving special nuclear materials anywhere in the world. DL1.1.3. Accident Scene. The cordoned area surrounding an accident site from which all non-essential personnel and resources are evacuated and prohibited. DL1.1.4. Accident Site. The area surrounding the impact point in which hazards to personnel (wreckage, fire, or damage) are readily identifiable. DL1.1.5. Aerial Measuring System (AMS). Performs aerial measurements of ground and airborne radioactivity over large areas by utilizing instrumentation for detecting and recording gamma radiation, both as gross count rates and gamma energy spectra. Equipment for determining the position of the aircraft is also integrated into the system. Can be both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. DL1.1.6. Airborne Radioactivity. Any radioactive material suspended in the atmosphere. DL1.1.7. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). A field-qualified team of worldwide deployable physicists and health physics technicians established at the Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis (IERA). The mission of AFRAT is to provide commanders and leaders with viable solutions to operational obstacles imposed by the presence of radioactive materials or radiation hazards, nuclear weapon accidents, nuclear facility incidents, radiation releases, or terrorist activity. DL1.1.8. Air Sampler. A device used to collect a sample of the radioactive particulates suspended in the air. DL1.1.9. Alpha Particle, Radiation. A positively charged particle made up of two neutrons and two protons, emitted by certain radioactive nuclei. Alpha particles can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, and pose no direct or external radiation threat; however, they can pose a serious health threat, if internalized. DL1.1.10. Armed. The configuration of a nuclear weapon in which a single signal initiates the action for a nuclear detonation. DL1.1.11. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). A tri-Service facility chartered in 1961 that conducts research in the field of radiobiology and related matters essential to the operational and medical support of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Military Services. The institute collaborates with other governmental facilities, academic institutions, and civilian laboratories in the United States and other countries. AFRRI provides the Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT) component of the Defense Nuclear Advisory Team (DNAT). DL1.1.12. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). A centralized computer-based system that provides estimates of the transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive or other hazardous material (HAZMAT) released to the atmosphere and dose projections to people and the environment. DL1.1.13. Background Count. (In connection with health protection.) The background count includes radiation produced by naturally occurring radioactivity and cosmic rays. DL1.1.14. Background Radiation. The natural radioactivity in the environment. Nuclear (or ionizing) radiation arising from within the body and from the surroundings to which individuals are always exposed. DL1.1.15. Becquerel. The International System unit of activity of a radionuclide, equal to the activity of a quantity of a radionuclide having 1 spontaneous nuclear transition per second. Symbolized as Bq. DL1.1.16. BENT SPEAR. A DoD term used to identify and report a nuclear weapon significant incident involving a nuclear weapon/warhead, nuclear component, or vehicle when nuclear loaded. DL1.1.17. Beta Particle, Radiation. An electron or positron emitted by an atomic nucleus during radioactive decay. Beta radiation can be harmful depending upon the dose and time of exposure; it is easily shielded by aluminum. DL1.1.18. Bioassay. The method(s) for determining the amount of internal contamination received by an individual. DL1.1.19. BROKEN ARROW. A DoD term to identify and report an accident involving a nuclear weapon, warhead, or nuclear component DL1.1.20. CentiGray (cGy). A unit of absorbed dose of radiation (one centiGray equals one radiation absorbed dose [RAD]). DL1.1.21. Combined Information Bureau (CIB). A facility at the scene of a radiological accident or significant incident that occurred overseas to coordinate all public affairs. The CIB includes representation from DOE, DoD, other agencies, and foreign government organizations. DL1.1.22. Consequence Management. Those planning actions and preparations taken prior to an accident to identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response forces and to develop the executable plans implemented in response to an accident, and the actions taken following an accident to mitigate and recover from the effects of an accident. DL1.1.23. Contamination. The deposit, adsorption, or absorption of radioactive material on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. DL1.1.24. Contamination Control. Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove, or render harmless, temporarily or permanently, nuclear materials contamination for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military operations. DL1.1.25. Contamination Control Line (CCL). A control line surrounding the radiological control area. Initially, the contamination control line extends 100 meters beyond the known/suspected radiological contamination to provide a measure of safety. Once the Contamination Control Station (CCS) is operational, the CCL becomes the outer boundary that separates the reduced hazard area from the clean area. DL1.1.26. Contamination Control Station. An area (tent or facility) specifically designated for permitting ingress and egress of personnel and equipment to/from the radiation control area. The outer boundary of the CCS is the CCL, and the inner boundary is the line segment labeled the hot line. For illustration of the CCS, see Figures C2.F2., C6.F1., and C6.F2. DL1.1.27. Contamination Reduction Area (CRA). The area concept is employed at the CCS to eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) contamination adhering to personnel in the contaminated area. The concept uses supervised, structured, and meticulous clothing/equipment removal procedures precluding mechanical transfer of contamination on a person/object and outside the CCS. DL1.1.28. Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information (CNWDI). TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA or SECRET RESTRICTED DATA revealing the theory of operation or design of the components of a thermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb, warhead, demolition munition, or test device. Specifically excluded is information concerning arming, fusing, and firing systems; limited-life components; and totally contained quantities of fissionable, fusionable, and high-explosive materials by type. DL1.1.29. Cumulative Dose (Radiation). The total dose resulting from repeated exposure to radiation in the same region or of the whole body. DL1.1.30. Curie (Ci). A unit of radioactivity; the activity of a quantity of any radioactive nuclide undergoing 37 thousand million disintegrations per second, the amount of activity in 1 gram of radium. DL1.1.31. Custody. The responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement of, and access to weapons and components. Custody also includes the maintenance of and accountability for weapons, components, and radioactive materials. DL1.1.32. Decay (Radioactive). The decrease in the radiation intensity or mass of any radioactive material with respect to time. DL1.1.33. Decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing contaminated material clinging to or around it. DL1.1.34. Decontamination Station. A building or location suitably equipped and organized where personnel and material are cleansed of radiological contaminents. DL1.1.35. Defense Coordinating Element. A staff formed to provide support to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) in a disaster area. DL1.1.36. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). A Commander-in-Chief (CINC)-appointed officer who serves as the DoD single point of contact to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for the purpose of providing DoD resources during disaster assistance operations. DL1.1.37. Director of Military Support (DOMS). The Secretary of Defense directs the Secretary of the Army to act as the DoD executive agent to plan for and commit DoD resources in response to requests from civil authorities. The DOMS serves as the Army's action agent for planning and executing DoD's support mission to civilian authorities within the United States. DL1.1.38. Disaster Control. Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage, minimize its effects, and initiate recovery. DL1.1.39. Disaster Control Group (DCG). The U.S. Air Force (USAF) Response Force element that goes to the scene of a major accident or natural catastrophe to provide command and control under the direction of the On-Scene Commander (OSC). DL1.1.40. Disaster Cordon. A physical barrier surrounding the accident scene where control is established to preclude unauthorized entry. DL1.1.41. Disaster Field Office (DFO). The on-scene focal point established by the Senior Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Official (SFO), as required, for coordinating the Federal response to a radiological accident or significant incident. Representatives of other Federal, State, local, and volunteer agencies will be located in the center. DL1.1.42. Disaster Preparedness. That series of actions to control and manage radiological accidents or incidents and bring them to a practicable conclusion within the established security, response, and recovery framework. These actions include initial and subsequent reporting response, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) procedural action on the weapon(s), appropriate security, legal and medical aspects, public information, and control of hazards caused by the accident. Control of the accident-caused hazards includes survey of the incident/accident area to establish isodose lines and all types of monitoring, personnel, and area decontamination, and disposition of nuclear, high-explosive, and contaminated items. DL1.1.43. Disaster Response Force. The USAF base-level organization that responds to disasters/accidents, establishing command and control (C2) and supporting disaster operations. DL1.1.44. Disaster Support Group. A USAF major command and field operating agency headquarters command and control element. It coordinates and supports the headquarters response to a contingency. DL1.1.45. Dose. The amount of energy deposited in body tissue due to radiation exposure. Various technical terms, such as dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent and collective dose, are used to evaluate the amount of radiation an exposed person receives. These terms are used to describe the differing interactions of radiation with tissue as well as to assist in the management of personnel exposure to radiation. DL1.1.46. Dose Rate Contour Line. A line on a map, diagram, or overlay joining all points at which the radiation dose rate at a given time is the same. DL1.1.47. Dosimetry. The measurement of radiation dose. It applies to both the devices used (dosimeters) and to the techniques. DL1.1.48. DULL SWORD. A team used in DoD to identify and report a nuclear weapon safety deficiency. DL1.1.49. Emergency Action and Coordination Team (EACT). The DOE senior management team at headquarters that coordinates the initial Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP) response to radiological emergencies. DL1.1.50. EMPTY QUIVER. A reporting term used by DoD to identify and report the seizure, theft, or loss of a U.S. nuclear weapon. DL1.1.51. Entry Control Point. The place where entry into and exit from the disaster cordon is controlled. It is located on the disaster cordon near the onscene control point. DL1.1.52. Exclusion Area. Any designated area containing one or more nuclear weapons, components, or radioactive materials. DL1.1.53. Explosive Ordnance. All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical agents. This ordnance includes bombs and warheads, guided and ballistic missiles, and artillery, mortar, rocket, and small arms ammunition. Also, ordnance includes all mines, torpedoes, and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridges and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature. DL1.1.54. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The detection, identification, field evaluation, rendering-safe, and/or disposal of explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration when the disposal of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities of personnel assigned to routine disposal. DL1.1.55. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Incident. The suspected or detected presence of unexploded ordnance or damaged explosive ordnance that constitutes a hazard to operations, installation, personnel, or material. Not included in this definition are the accidental arming or other conditions that develop during the manufacture of high-explosive material, technical service assembly operations, or the laying of mines and demolition charges. DL1.1.56. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. Those particular courses or modes of action for access to, recovery, rendering safe, and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any HAZMAT associated with an explosive ordnance disposal incident. DL1.1.56.1. Access Procedures. Those actions to exactly locate and gain access to unexploded ordnance. DL1.1.56.2. Recovery Procedures. Those actions to recover unexploded explosive ordnance. DL1.1.56.3. Render Safe Procedures. The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving the application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. DL1.1.57. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit. Personnel with special training and equipment who render explosive ordnance (such as bombs, mines, projectiles, and booby traps) safe, make intelligence reports on such ordnance, and supervise the safe removal thereof. DL1.1.58. Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance involving the investigation, detection, location, marking, initial identification, and reporting of suspected unexploded ordnance, by explosive ordnance reconnaissance agents, to determine further action. DL1.1.59. Exposure. The level of radiation flux to which a material or living tissue is exposed. The actual dose of radiation resulting from the exposure depends upon a number of factors. DL1.1.60. FADED GIANT. A reporting term to identify an event involving a nuclear reactor or radiological accident. DL1.1.61. Federal Coordinating Officer. Appointed by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to coordinate Federal assistance to a State affected by a disaster or emergency. The source and level of the Federal Coordinating Officer will likely depend on the nature of the Federal response. DL1.1.62. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This Agency establishes Federal policies for and coordinates all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of executive agencies. FEMA assists local and State agencies in their emergency planning. Its primary role in a radiological accident is one of coordinating Federal, State, local, and volunteer response actions. DL1.1.62.1. Emergency Information and Coordination Center (EICC). The EICC is the location in FEMA Headquarters in Washington, DC, from which the Emergency Support Team (EST) provides coordination support for Federal and State emergency response activities to a radiological accident or emergency. DL1.1.62.2. Emergency Response Team (ERT). An inter-Agency team, headed by FEMA, deployed to a radiological emergency scene by the FEMA Director to make an initial assessment of the situation and then provide FEMAs primary response capability. DL1.1.62.3. Emergency Support Team (EST). The FEMA Headquarters team that carries out notification activation and coordination procedures from the FEMA EICC. The EST is responsible for Federal Agency headquarters coordination, staff support of the FEMA Director, and support of the SFO. DL1.1.63. Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). The Federal plan to assist State and local government officials or other Federal Agencies in the response to a radiological emergency in the United States, its possessions, and territories. DL1.1.64. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). A coalition of all Federal off-site monitoring and assessment efforts to assist the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), State(s), and local authorities. A FRMAC, led by a DOE FRMAC Director, is established in response to the LFA or State request when a major radiological emergency is anticipated or has occurred. DL1.1.65. Field Instrument for the Detection of Low-Energy Radiation (FIDLER). A field survey instrument specifically designed to measure low-energy x-rays and gamma rays from weapons grade plutonium. The detector consists of a 5-inch diameter by 1/16-inch thick sodium iodide crystal coupled through a quartz light pipe to a 5-inch diameter photomultiplier tube. The detector is coupled to a single-channel analyzer instrument such as the ESP-2 or E600. DL1.1.66. Film Badge. A photographic film packet or badge carried by personnel for measuring and recording gamma ray dosage permanently. Mostly replaced by Thermoluminescent Dosimetry. DL1.1.67. Final Disposal Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. DL1.1.68. Follow-On Element. The USAF non-emergency response element of a disaster response force that deploys to the accident scene after the initial response element to expand C2 and perform support functions. DL1.1.69. Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). Information removed from the Restricted Data category upon determination jointly by DOE and DoD that such information relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and that such information can be safeguarded adequately as national security information. DL1.1.70. Fragmentation Zone. A calculated distance that fragments created by an explosion are projected. DL1.1.71. Gamma-Ray, Radiation. High-energy electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei during a nuclear reaction. Gamma radiation requires thick layers of dense materials, such as lead, for shielding. Potentially lethal to humans, depending on the intensity of the field. DL1.1.72. Half-Life. The time required for the activity of a given radioactive species to decrease to half of its initial value due to radioactive decay. The half-life is a characteristic property of each radioactive species and is independent of its amount or condition. The effective half-life of a given isotope in the body is the time in which the quantity in the body will decrease to half as a result of both radioactive decay and biological elimination. DL1.1.73. Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC). HPAC is a forward deployable modeling capability available for Government, Government-related or academic use. This software tool assists in emergency response to hazardous agent releases. Its fast running, physics-based algorithms enable users to model and predict hazard areas and human collateral effects in minutes. HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of hazardous material (HAZMAT) releases into the atmosphere and its impact on civilian and military populations. DL1.1.74. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT). Any material that is flammable, corrosive, an oxidizing agent, explosive, toxic, poisonous, etiological, radioactive, nuclear, unduly magnetic, a chemical agent, biological research material, compressed gases, or any other material that, because of its quantity, properties, or packaging, may endanger life or property. DL1.1.75. High Explosive. An energetic material that detonates (instead of deflagrating or burning); the rate of advance of the reaction zone into the unreacted material exceeds that velocity of sound in the unreacted material. DL1.1.76. Hot Line. The inner boundary of the contamination control station, marked with tape or line. The station personnel use the line as the inner side being contaminated and the side away from the accident as an area of reduced contamination. DL1.1.77. Hotspot. A mobile radiological laboratory deployed with the DOE ARG to conduct soil, water, and air samples as well as bioassays and whole body counting. Hotspot is also a modeling program similar to HPAC. DL1.1.78. Hot Spot. The region in a contaminated area in which the level of radioactive contamination is considerably greater than in neighboring regions in the area. DL1.1.79. Ingestion Pathway. The means by which a person is exposed to radiation through ingestion (i.e., hand-to-mouth, inhalation with open mouth, etc.). DL1.1.80. Inhalation Pathway. The means by which a person at the accident area or downwind is subjected to respiratory radiation exposure. DL1.1.81. Initial Render Safe Procedure. An EOD process that results in electrical isolation of the high explosive preventing a nuclear yield. DL1.1.82. Initial Response Force (IRF). That DoD entity directed to proceed to the scene of a radiological accident or incident for the purpose of rendering emergency assistance, including maintaining command and control of the accident site until relieved by the Commander, Response Task Force (CRTF). Subject to its capabilities, the IRF may be tasked to perform the following: DL1.1.82.1. Rescue operations. DL1.1.82.2. Accident site security. DL1.1.82.3. Firefighting. DL1.1.82.4. Initiation of appropriate EOD procedures. DL1.1.82.5. Radiation monitoring. DL1.1.82.6. Establishment of C2 and communications. DL1.1.82.7. Public affairs activities. DL1.1.83. Institute for Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis. A USAF unit that provides consultant, engineering, and analytical support in radiological, occupational, and environmental health programs. The USAF unit offers a multitude of technical services on radiological problems. The radiological field unit of the IERA is called the AFRAT. DL1.1.84. Joint Communications Contingency Station Assets. The communications station provides high-frequency radio, tropospheric scatter terminals, automatic digital network terminals, manual secure voice, and other equipment. DL1.1.85. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). Provides Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)-directed contingency and crisis communications to meet operational and support needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Services, Unified Commands, Defense Agencies, and non-Defense agencies. DL1.1.86. Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC). A facility, staffed by representatives from each of the agencies conducting hazard survey and radiological operations, for the coordination of hazard survey data and radiological safety/health physics matters on site. DL1.1.87. Joint Information Center (JIC). A facility at the scene of a radiological accident or significant incident to coordinate all public affairs. The JIC includes representation from DOE, DoD, FEMA, and other Federal, State, and local agencies. DL1.1.88. Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). DoD and DOE operate coordiating centers for exchanging and maintaining information about radiological assistance capabilities and activities. These centers are separated geographically but linked by direct communications networks. DL1.1.89. Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The Agency that is responsible for leading and coordinating all aspects of the Federal response is referred to as the LFA and is determined by the type of emergency. In situations where a Federal Agency owns, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise deemed responsible for the facility or radiological activity causing the emergency, and has authority to conduct and manage Federal actions on site, that Agency normally will be the LFA. DL1.1.90. Licensed Material. Source material, special nuclear material, or byproduct material received, possessed, used, or transferred under a general or specific license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or a State. DL1.1.91. Linear Accelerator (LINAC). A DOE ARG asset that provides high-energy radiography and real-time radiography in the field. DL1.1.92. Liquid Abrasive Cutter (LAC). A DOE ARG remotely operated cutting tool using high-pressure water and abrasive medium. DL1.1.93. Maximum Permissible Dose. That radiation dose that a military commander or other appropriate authority may prescribe as the limiting cumulative radiation dose to be received over a specific period of time by members of the command, consistent with operational military considerations. DL1.1.94. Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team. AFFRIs team of highly qualified radiation medicine physicians, health physicists, and related scientists who provide state-of-the-art advice and assistance to CINCs of U.S. and allied forces, Federal Agencies, State and local governments, and others in radiological matters including accidents and incidents of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, radiological dispersal devices, and industrial/medical sources. They provide expertise for emergency treatment of radiation injuries, operational health physics, physical and bio-dosimetry, hazard prediction, and site remediation. DL1.1.95. Monitoring. The act of detecting the presence of radiation and the measurement thereof with radiation measuring instruments. DL1.1.96. National Defense Area (NDA). An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions, or territories for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DoD equipment and/or material. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of DoD and results only from an emergency event. The senior DoD representative at the scene will define the boundary, have the boundary marked with a physical barrier, and have warning signs posted. The landowners consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA. DL1.1.97. National Security Area (NSA). An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions, or territories for the purpose of safeguarding classified and/or restricted data information or protecting DOE equipment and/or material. Establishment of an NSA temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of DOE and results only from an emergency event. The senior DOE representative having custody of the material at the scene will define the boundary, have the boundary marked with a physical barrier, and have warning signs posted. The landowners consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, operational necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NSA. DL1.1.98. Need-to-Know. A criterion used in security procedures that requires the custodians of classified information to establish, prior to disclosure, that the intended recipient must have access to the information to perform his or her official duties. DL1.1.99. Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing (NARCL). A listing of DoD and DOE installations, facilities, or activities with nuclear accident/incident response and radiation detection capabilities. DL1.1.100. Nuclear Component. Weapon components composed of fissionable or fusionable materials that contribute substantially to nuclear energy released during detonation. Nuclear components include radioactive boosting materials. DL1.1.101. Nuclear Contribution. Explosive energy released by nuclear fission or fusion reactions as part of the total energy released by a radiological accident or incident. Any nuclear contribution equivalent to 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT) is considered significant and would add beta and gamma radiation hazards to other radiological and toxic hazards present at a radiological accident site. DL1.1.102. Nuclear Detonation. A nuclear explosion resulting from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as from a nuclear weapon. DL1.1.103. Nuclear Radiation. Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons effects standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. DL1.1.104. Nuclear Reactor Accident. An uncontrolled reactor criticality resulting in damage to the reactor core or an event such as loss of coolant that results in significant release of fission products from the reactor core. DL1.1.105. Nuclear Safing. The prevention of a nuclear yield in the event of accidental detonation of the high explosive (HE) of a HE assembly weapon or ignition of the propellant of a gun assembly weapon. DL1.1.106. Nuclear Weapon. . A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy. DL1.1.107. Nuclear Weapon Accident. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons that results in any of the following: DL1.1.107.1. An accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S. forces or U.S.-supported allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapons system. DL1.1.107.2. Accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonation. DL1.1.107.3. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon. DL1.1.107.4. Radioactive contamination. DL1.1.107.5. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component. DL1.1.107.6. Public hazard, actual or perceived. DL1.1.108. Nuclear Weapon Incident. An unexpected event involving a nuclear weapon, facility, or component resulting in any of the following, but not constituting a nuclear weapon(s) accident: DL1.1.108.1. An increase in the possibility of explosion or radioactive contamination. DL1.1.108.2. Errors committed in the assembly, testing, loading, or transportation of equipment, and/or the malfunctioning of equipment and material that could lead to an unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming and/or firing sequence or that could lead to a substantial change in yield or increased dud probability. DL1.1.108.3. Any act of God, unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to a weapon, facility, or component. DL1.1.109. Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons, nuclear components, or a nuclear weapon transport or launch vehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated, loaded, or on board that does not fall into the nuclear weapon accident category but that: DL1.1.109.1. Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon or nuclear components to the extent that major rework, complete replacement, or examination or recertification by DOE is required. DL1.1.109.2. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons security. DL1.1.109.3. May result in adverse public reaction (national or international) or inadvertent release of classified information. DL1.1.109.4. Could lead to a nuclear weapon accident and warrants that senior national officials or Agencies be informed to take action. DL1.1.110. Nuclear Yield. The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon, measured in terms of the kilotons or megatons of TNT, required to produce an equivalent energy release. DL1.1.111. Off Site. That area beyond the boundaries of a DoD installation or DOE facility, including the area beyond the boundary of an NDA or NSA, that has been or may become affected by a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident. DL1.1.112. One-Point Detonation. A detonation of HE that is initiated at a single point. DL1.1.113. One-Point Safe. The criterion for design safety that a weapon must have less than one chance in a million of producing a nuclear yield of more than 4 pounds of TNT (equivalent energy release) when the HE is initiated and detonated at any single point. DL1.1.114. On-Scene Commander. The senior person designated to coordinate the response efforts at the accident scene prior to the arrival of the Response Task Force Commanders. DL1.1.115. On Site. That area around the scene of a radiological accident or significant incident under the operational control of the installation commander, facility manager, DoD CRTF, or DOE SEO. The on-site area includes any area within an NDA or NSA. DL1.1.116. Operational Exposure Guidance (OEG). Command guidance establishing radiation exposure limits for assigned or attached personnel. OEG should be established in advance of operations and included in Operations Plans (OPLANs), Contingency Plans (CONPLANs), or Functions Plans (FUNCPLANs). DL1.1.117. Oralloy. Enriched uranium. One of the primary fissionable materials in nuclear weapons. DL1.1.118. Particulate Radiation. Radiation in the form of particles (for example, neutrons, electrons, and alpha and beta particles) as opposed to electromagnetic radiation. DL1.1.119. Personal Protective Clothing. Clothing consisting of coveralls, shoe covers, cotton gloves, and hood or hair caps. Personal protective clothing provides protection for the user from alpha-beta radiation but is primarily a control device to prevent the spread of contamination. A respirator can be worn with the personal protective clothing; this provides protection against the inhalation of contaminants. DL1.1.120. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). A program implemented for all personnel who control, handle, have access to, or control access to nuclear weapon systems. The program covers selection, screening, and continuous evaluation of the personnel assigned to various nuclear duties. The program seeks to ensure that personnel coming under its purview are mentally and emotionally stable and reliable. DL1.1.121. Physical Security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. DL1.1.122. Plutonium (Pu). An artificially produced fissile material. The Pu-239 isotope is primarily used in nuclear weapons. DL1.1.123. Protective Action Guide (PAG). A radiation exposure level or range established by appropriate Federal or State agencies beyond which protective action should be considered. DL1.1.124. Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). Advice to the State on emergency measures it should consider in determining action for the public to take in order to avoid or reduce exposure to radiation. DL1.1.125. Quantity/Distance (Q/D) Safety Standards. . Directives pertaining to the amounts and kinds of explosives that can be stored and the proximity of such storage to buildings, highways, railways, magazines, and other installations. DL1.1.126. Radiation Absorbed Dose. RAD is an obsolete term. Commonly used unit of absorbed dose radiation. It has been replaced by CentiGray (cGy). DL1.1.127. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). A World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Center that provides 24-hour direct or consulting assistance to medical and health physics practitioners dealing with radiation-related health problems or injuries from local, national, or international radiation incidents. REAC/TS provides advice and assistance to the LFA responding to nuclear events. In addition to their operational response capabilities, REAC/TS provides extensive training opportunities for healthcare providers through their in-residence and Mobile Training Team programs. DL1.1.128. Radioactivity. The spontaneous emission of radiation, generally alpha or beta particles, often accompanied by gamma rays from the nuclei of an unstable isotope. DL1.1.129. Radioactivity Detection, Indication, and Computation. A term designating various types of radiological measuring instruments or equipment. DL1.1.130. Radiological Accident. A loss of control over radiation or radioactive material that presents a hazard to life, health, property, or the environment, or that may result in any member of the general population exceeding limits for exposure to ionizing radiation. DL1.1.31. Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT). Special DoD response teams located at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), Washington, DC, and the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine located in Landstuhl, FRG. The teams are specially trained to assist and furnish guidance to the CRTF or other responsible officials at an accident site and to local medical authorities concerning radiological health hazards and radiological exposure criteria. DL1.1.132. Radiological Air Sampling and Analysis Lab (RASCAL). A mobile, self-sufficient analytical laboratory capable of supporting a large number of air samples and providing rapid air sample analyses. DL1.1.133. Radiological Assistance. That assistance provided after an accident involving radioactive materials to: DL1.1.133.1. Evaluate the radiological hazard. DL1.1.133.2. Accomplish emergency rescue and first aid. DL1.1.133.3. Minimize safety hazards to the public. DL1.1.133.4. Minimize exposure of personnel to radiation of radioactive materials. DL1.1.133.5. Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination. DL1.1.133.6. Minimize damaging effects on property. DL1.1.133.7. Disseminate technical information and medical advice to appropriate authorities. DL1.1.134. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team. Trained and equipped DOE teams available through DOE regional offices to provide first response capability in radiological emergencies. DL1.1.135. Radiological Control Area (RCA). The control area encompassing all known, or suspected, radiological contamination at the site of a radiological accident or significant incident. DL1.1.136. Radiological Control (RADCON) Team. Special DoD radiological team organized to provide technical assistance and advice in radiological emergencies. DL1.1.137. Radiological Event. . Used to refer to any accident, incident, or significant incident involving radioactive materials in DoD custody or any Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) incident involving other materials. This includes BROKEN ARROW, BENT SPEAR, and EMPTY QUIVER. DL1.1.138. Radiological Survey. The directed effort to determine the distribution of radiological material and dose rates in an area. DL1.1.139. RANGER. A mobile, real-time mapping system that monitors large areas of land for radiological contamination. DL1.1.140. Recovery Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. DL1.1.141. Re-Entry Recommendations (RERs). Advice provided to the State concerning guidance that may be issued to members of the public on returning to an area affected by a radiological emergency, either permanently or for short-term emergency actions. DL1.1.142. Render Safe Procedures. See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. DL1.1.143. Residual Contamination. Contamination that remains after steps have been taken to remove it. These steps may consist of nothing more than allowing the contamination to decay naturally. DL1.1.144. Response Task Force (RTF). A DoD response force appropriately manned, equipped, and able to coordinate all actions necessary to control and recover from a radiological accident or significant incident. The specific purpose of the RTF is to accompany weapon recovery and to provide radiological accident/significant incident assistance. RTFs are organized and maintained by those Combatant Commanders whose component commands have custody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon components. DL1.1.145. Restricted Data (RD). All data (information) concerning: DL1.1.145.1. Design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons. DL1.1.145.2. Production of special nuclear material. DL1.1.145.3. Use of special nuclear material in the production of energy but not including data declassified or removed from the restricted data category. DL1.1.146. Roentgen. An obsolete unit of exposure of gamma (or x-ray) radiation in field dosimetry. DL1.1.147. Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal (REM). An obsolete unit of dose replaced by the Sievert (Sv). One REM is the quantity of ionizing radiation of any type which, when absorbed by man or other mammals, produces a physiological effect equivalent to that produced by the absorption of 1 roentgen of x-ray or gamma radiation. DL1.1.148. Safing. As applied to weapons and ammunition, the changing from a state of readiness for initiation to a safe condition. DL1.1.149. Security Area. The area surrounding the accident site in an overseas country where a two-person security policy is established to prevent unauthorized access to classified defense information, equipment, or material. The cooperation by local authorities and host nation consent should be obtained through prior host nation agreements. DL1.1.150. Senior Energy Official (SEO). Responsible for DOE's response organization and the focal point for interfacing with DoD and other Agencies, coordinating DOE asset deployment, integration (including identifying and coordinating logistics requirements), and operations when DOE is in a support role to DoD. When DOE is the LFA during a response, the SEO is responsible for the overall Federal response, and the DOE OSC is responsible for the DOE response organization. DL1.1.151. Senior FEMA Official. A person appointed by the Director of FEMA, or Directors representative, to initially direct the FEMA response at the scene of a radiological emergency. Also acts as the Team Leader for the Advance Element of the Emergency Response Team (ERTA). DL1.1.152. Sievert (Sv). International System of Units (SI) unit of any of the quantities expressed as dose equivalent. The dose equivalent in sieverts is equal to the absorbed dose in grays multiplied by the quality factor (1 Sv = 100 REMs). DL1.1.153. Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG). An organization formed at the accident scene whose sole purpose is to focus on site remediation issues. The SRWG draws upon the expertise of the various elements who respond to the accident to form a coordinated site remediation team. DL1.1.154 Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Plutonium and uranium enriched in the 238 or 235 isotope, and any other material that DOE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 51 of the AEA of 1954, determines to be special nuclear material. Does not include source material. DL1.1.155. Transuranic. Being an element having an atomic number greater than that of uranium. DL1.1.156. Tritium (T or H-3). Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen having one proton and two neutrons in the nucleus. Tritium is a low-beta emitter and poses a radiation hazard from inhalation. DL1.1.157. Tuballoy (TU). A term, of British origin, for uranium metal containing U-238 and U-235 in natural proportions; therefore, the term is considered ambiguous, and its use is discouraged. This term is sometimes applied to depleted uranium. DL1.1.158. Two-Person Concept. A system designed to prohibit access by an individual to nuclear weapons and certain designated components by requiring the presence at all times of at least two authorized persons capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed. Also referred to as the two-person rule or policy. DL1.1.159. Two-Person Control. The close surveillance and control of materials at all times by a minimum of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed and each familiar with established security requirements. DL1.1.160. Uranium (U). Uranium is a heavy, silvery white, radioactive metal. In air, the metal becomes coated with a layer of oxide that will make it appear from a golden-yellow color to almost black. Uranium is an alpha emitter. Uranium presents chemical and radiation hazards and exposure may occur during mining, processing of ore, or production of uranium metal. Uranium and its compounds have both toxic chemical and radiation effects, depending on dose and exposure time, as well as type of exposure, such as inhalation or skin contact. DL1.1.161. Warhead. That part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munitions that contains the nuclear or thermonuclear system, HE system, chemical or biological agents, or inert materials intended to inflict damage. DL1.1.162. Warhead Section (WHS). A completely assembled warhead including appropriate skin sections and related components. DL1.1.163. Warning Order. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. DL1.1.164. Weapon Debris (nuclear). The residue of a nuclear weapon after it has exploded or burned; that is, the materials used for the casing and other components of the weapon, plus unexpended plutonium or uranium, together with fission products, if any. DL1.1.165. Weapons Recovery. Includes a comprehensive assessment of the accident, neutralizing the weapon hazards, and removing, packaging, and shipping of the weapon hazards. AL1. ABBREVIATIONS AND/OR ACRONYMS AL1.1. AAC Ambient Air Concentration AL1.2. AB Air Base AL1.3. ACC Air Combat Command AL1.4. ACE Adaptive Communications Element AL1.5. AE Ammunition ship AL1.6. AEA Atomic Energy Act AL1.7. AF Air Force AL1.8. AFB Air Force Base AL1.9. AFCA (U.S.) Air Force Communications Agency AL1.10. AFCIC Air Force Communications and Information Center AL1.11. AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam AL1.12. AFI (U.S.) Air Force Instruction AL1.13. AFOC Air Force Operations Center AL1.14. AFR Average Flow Rate AL1.15. AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team AL1.16. AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute AL1.17. Am Americium AL1.18. AM Amplitude Modulation AL1.19. AMC Air Mobility Command AL1.20. AMS Aerial Measuring System AL1.21. AOC Army Operations Center AL1.22. AOE Fast combat support ship AL1.23. AR (U.S.) Army Regulation AL1.24. ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability AL1.25. ARG Accident Response Group AL1.26. ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) AL1.27. AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph AL1.28. ATSD(NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs AL1.29. AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network AL1.30. AUTOSEVOCOM Automated Secure Voice Communication System AL1.31. AWP Access Work Permit AL1.32. Be Beryllium AL1.33. Bq Becquerel AL1.34. BUMED Bureau of Medicine and Surgery AL1.35. C2 Command and Control AL1.36. CANTRAC Catalog of Naval Training Courses AL1.37. CAT Crisis Action Team AL1.38. CCA Contamination Control Area AL1.39. CCG Combat Communications Group (U.S.) AL1.40. CCG Crisis Coordinating Group AL1.41. CCL Contamination Control Line AL1.42. CCS Contamination Control Station AL1.43. CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention AL1.44. CDCE Contamination Disposal Coordinating Element AL1.45. CDRH Center for Devices and Radiological Health AL1.46. CE Civil Engineer (Air Force) AL1.47. CE Corps of Engineers AL1.48. CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act AL1.49. CF Composite Fiber AL1.50. CF Conversion Factor AL1.51. CFA Cognizant Federal Agency AL1.52. CFM Cubic Feet per Minute AL1.53. CFR Code of Federal Regulations AL1.54. cGy CentiGray AL1.55. CHPPM Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (Army) AL1.56. Ci Curie AL1.57. CIB Combined Information Bureau AL1.58. CINC Commander-in-Chief AL1.59. CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff AL1.60. CJCSI Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction AL1.61. CMAT Consequence Management Advisory Team (formerly DNAT) AL1.62. CNWDI Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information AL1.63. CO Commanding Officer AL1.64. COM Chief of Mission AL1.65. COMNAVSTA Commander, Naval Station AL1.66. COMSEC Communications Security AL1.67. CONPLAN Contingency Plan AL1.68. CONUS Continental United States AL1.69. CP Command Post AL1.70. CPM Counts per Minute AL1.71. CPR Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation AL1.72. CPX Command Post Exercise AL1.73. CRA Contamination Reduction Area AL1.74. CRTF Commander, Response Task Force AL1.75. CV Aircraft carrier AL1.76. CVN Aircraft carrier, nuclear powered AL1.77. DA Department of the Army AL1.78. DAC Derived Air Concentration AL1.79. DC Data Center AL1.80. DCE Defense Coordinating Element AL1.81. DCG Disaster Control Group AL1.82. DCO Defense Coordinating Officer AL1.83. DCS Defense Communications Systems AL1.84. DDI Dymeryl diisocyanate AL1.85. DDO Deputy Director of Operations AL1.86. DECON Decontamination AL1.87. DERA Defense Environmental Restoration Act AL1.88. DFO Disaster Field Office AL1.89. DII Defense Information Infrastructure AL1.90. DNA Defense Nuclear Agency (see DSWA and DTRA) AL1.91. DNAT Defense Nuclear Advisory Team (now CMAT) AL1.92. DNWS Defense Nuclear Weapons School (formerly INWS) AL1.93. DOC Department of Commerce AL1.94. DoD Department of Defense AL1.95. DoDD Department of Defense Directive AL1.96. DoDG Department of Defense Guide AL1.97. DoDI Department of Defense Instruction AL1.98. DoDM Department of Defense Manual AL1.99. DOE Department of Energy AL1.100. DOE/AL Department of Energy/Albuquerque Operations AL1.101. DOE/NV Department of Energy/Nevada Operations AL1.102. DOI Department of the Interior AL1.103. DOMS Director of Military Support AL1.104. DOS Department of State AL1.105. DOT Department of Transportation AL1.106. DPM/m3 Disintegrations per Minute per cubic meter AL1.107. DRF Disaster Response Force AL1.108. DSFO Deputy Senior FEMA Official AL1.109. DSN Defense Switched Network AL1.110. DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly DNA and now part of DTRA) AL1.111. DTPA Diethylenetriamine Pentaacetic Acid AL1.112. DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency (includes what was formerly DSWA) AL1.113. DU Depleted Uranium AL1.114. EAC Emergency Actions Committee AL1.115. EACT Emergency Action and Coordination Team AL1.116. ECP Entry Control Point AL1.117. ECS Exercise Control Staff AL1.118. EDTA Ethylenediamine Tetraacetic Acid AL1.119. EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information AL1.120. EICC Emergency Information and Coordination Center (FEMA) AL1.121. E-Mail Electronic Mail AL1.122. EMR Electro-Magnetic Radiation AL1.123. EMT Emergency Medical Team AL1.124. EO Executive Order AL1.125. EOC Emergency Operations Center AL1.126. EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal AL1.127. EPA Environmental Protection Agency AL1.128. EPZ Emergency Planning Zone AL1.129. ERT Emergency Response Team AL1.130. ERT-A Emergency Response Team-Advance Element AL1.131. ESC Executive Support Center AL1.132. EST Emergency Support Team AL1.133. FAA Federal Aviation Administration AL1.134. fax facsimile AL1.135. FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation AL1.136. FCDTRA Field Command, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (now Albuquerque Operations) AL1.137. FCO Federal Coordinating Officer AL1.138. FDA Food and Drug Administration AL1.139. FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency AL1.140. FIDLER Field Instrument for the Detection of Low-Energy Radiation AL1.141. FLTSAT Fleet Satellite AL1.142. FM Frequency Modulation AL1.143. FOE Follow-On Element AL1.144. FOIA Freedom of Information Act AL1.145. FRC Federal Response Center AL1.146. FRD Formerly Restricted Data AL1.147. FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan AL1.148. FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center AL1.149. FRMAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan AL1.150. FRP Federal Response Plan AL1.151. FRPCC Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee AL1.152. FTS Federal Telecommunications System AL1.153. FTX Field Training Exercise AL1.154. FUNCPLAN Functional Plan AL1.155. GEP Ground Entry Point AL1.156. GMF Ground Mobile Force AL1.157. GMT Greenwich Mean Time AL1.158. GPS Global Positioning System AL1.159. GSA General Services Administration AL1.160. Gy Gray (unit of dose) AL1.161. HAZMAT Hazardous Materials AL1.162. HE High Explosive AL1.163. HEPA High Efficiency Particle Air AL1.164. HEU Highly Enriched Uranium AL1.165. HF High Frequency AL1.166. HHS Department of Health and Human Services AL1.167 HICOM High Command AL1.168. HOTSPOT Department of Energy Mobile Counting Laboratory AL1.169. HPAC Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability AL1.170. HQ Headquarter(s) AL1.171. HTO Tritium water vapor (also TO) AL1.172. HTPB Hydroxyl Terminated Polybutadine AL1.173. HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development AL1.174. IC Inhaled Concentration AL1.175. ICC Interstate Commerce Commission AL1.176. ICRP International Council of Radiological Protection AL1.177. IERA Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis AL1.178. IHE Insensitive High Explosive AL1.179. IMA Installation Medical Authority AL1.180. IND Improvised Nuclear Device AL1.181. INMARSAT International Marine Satellite AL1.183. INWS Interservice Nuclear Weapon School AL1.184. IRE Initial Response Element AL1.185. IRF Initial Response Force AL1.186. ISB Independent Sideband AL1.187. IV Intravenous; intravenously AL1.188. JA Judge Advocate AL1.189. JACC/CP Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post AL1.190. JCCSA Joint Communications Contingency Station Assets AL1.191. JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff AL1.192. JCSE Joint Communications Support Element AL1.193. JCTA Joint Controlled Tactical Communications Assets AL1.194. JHEC Joint Hazard Evaluation Center AL1.195. JIC Joint Information Center AL1.196. JLCO Joint Legal Claims Office AL1.197. JMOCC Joint Maritime Operations Command Center AL1.198. JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center AL1.199. JNAIRT Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team AL1.200. JOC Joint Operations Center AL1.201. JS Joint Staff AL1.202. JSCC Joint Security Control Center AL1.203. JSCP Joint Strategic Capability Plan AL1.204. keV Thousand Electron Volts AL1.205. KIWI Ground measuring system named for a flightless bird AL1.206. LAC Liquid Abrasive Cutter AL1.207. LAN Local Area Network AL1.208. LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory AL1.209. LFA Lead Federal Agency AL1.210. LGX Logistics Plans AL1.211. Li Lithium AL1.212. LINAC Linear Accelerator AL1.213. LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory AL1.214. LMR Land Mobile Radio AL1.215. LOS Limit of Sensitivity AL1.216. uCi/m3 MicroCuries per cubic meter AL1.217. iCi/m2 MicroCuries per meter squared AL1.218. MARD Mobile Accident Response Development AL1.219. MASt Military Anti-Shock (trousers) AL1.220. MAST Mobile Ashore Support Terminal AL1.221. MDS Meteorological Data Servers AL1.222. MET Meteorological AL1.223. MeV Million Electron Volts AL1.224. MICFAC Mobile Integrated Command Facility AL1.225. MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures AL1.226. MOP Military Operational Posture AL1.227. MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration AL1.228. mph miles per hour AL1.229. MRAT Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team AL1.230. MRT Medical Radiology Team AL1.231. MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration AL1.232. NAICO Nuclear Accident and Incident Control Office AL1.233. NARCL Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing AL1.234. NARP Nuclear (Weapon) Accident Response Procedures AL1.235. NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration AL1.236. NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization AL1.237. NAVEDTRA Naval Education and Training AL1.238. NAVMED Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery AL1.239. NAVSCOLEOD Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal AL1.240. NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical AL1.241. NCA National Command Authority AL1.242. NCAIC Nuclear Chemical Accident/Incident Control AL1.243. NCC National Coordinating Center AL1.244. NCC Navy Command Center AL1.245. NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements AL1.246. NCS National Communications System AL1.247. NCTAMSLANT Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic AL1.248. NDA National Defense Area AL1.249. NDE Non-Destructive Evaluation AL1.250. NECC National Emergency Coordination Center (FEMA) AL1.251. NESDIS National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service AL1.252. NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency AL1.253. NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health AL1.254. NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology AL1.255. NMCC National Military Command Center AL1.256. NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service AL1.257. NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration AL1.258. NOS National Ocean Service AL1.259. NRC National Response Center AL1.260. NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission AL1.261. NSA National Security Area AL1.262. NSC National Security Council AL1.263. NSFO Navy Standard Fuel Oil AL1.264. NSN National Stock Number AL1.265. NSTM Naval Ships Technical Manual AL1.266. NTS Nevada Test Site AL1.267. NTSB National Transportation Safety Board AL1.268. NWS National Weather Service AL1.269. OAR Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research AL1.270. OASD(PA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) AL1.271. OATSD(NCB) Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs) AL1.272. OBA Oxygen Breathing Apparatus AL1.273. OCONUS outside continental United States AL1.274. ODCSOP Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans AL1.275. OEG Operational Exposure Guidance AL1.276. OEMT Operational Emergency Management Team AL1.277. OPLAN Operations Plan AL1.278. OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations Instructions AL1.279. OPREP Chief of Naval Operations Instructions AL1.280. OPSEC Operational Security AL1.281. OSC On-Scene Commander AL1.282. OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense . AL1.283. PA Public Affairs AL1.284. PACAF Pacific Air Forces AL1.285. PAG Protective Action Guide AL1.286. PAO Public Affairs Officer AL1.287. PAR Protective Action Recommendation AL1.288. Pb Lead AL1.289. PF Protection Factor AL1.290. PHS Public Health Service AL1.291. PKP Purple K (fire extinguisher) AL1.291. PL Public Law AL1.292. PLA Principal Legal Advisor AL1.293. POC Point of Contact AL1.294. POL Petrolium, Oil and Lubricants AL1.295. PPE Personal Protective Equipment AL1.296. PRC Planned Requirements Conversion AL1.297. PRP Personnel Reliability Program AL1.298. PSA Public Service Announcement AL1.299. Pu Plutonium AL1.300. Q/D Quantity Distance AL1.301. R Roentgen AL1.302. RAD Radiation Absorbed Dose AL1.303. RADCON Radiological Control AL1.304. RADIAC Radioactivity Detection, Indication, and Computation AL1.305. RAM Radar Absorbent Materials AL1.306. RAMT Radiological Advisory Medical Team AL1.307. RAP Radiological Assistance Program AL1.308. RASCAL Radiological Air Sampling Counting and Analysis Lab AL1.309. RASO Radiological Safety Officer AL1.310. RCA Radiological Control Area AL1.311. RCL Radiological Control Line AL1.312. RCO Regional Coordinating Office AL1.313. RD Restricted Data AL1.314. REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site AL1.315. REM Roentgen Equivalent Man/Mammal AL1.316. RER Re-Entry Recommendation AL1.317. RF Resuspension Factor AL1.318. RI/FS Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study AL1.319. ROE Rules of Engagement AL1.320. RPM Remedial Project Manager AL1.321. RSP Render Safe Procedure AL1.322. RTF Response Task Force AL1.323. RTR Real-Time Radiography AL1.324. SAAM Special Assignment Airlift Mission AL1.325. SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus AL1.326. SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information AL1.327. SECORD Secure Cord Switchboard AL1.328. SEO Senior Energy Official AL1.329. SFO Senior FEMA Official AL1.330. SGF Super High Frequency AL1.331. SITREP Situation Report AL1.332. SNM Special Nuclear Material AL1.333. SOFA Status of Forces Agreement AL1.334. SOI Signal Operating Instructions AL1.335. SR Site Remediation AL1.336. SRP Site Remediation Plan AL1.337. SRWG Site Remediation Working Group AL1.338. SSB Single Sideband AL1.339. SSN or SSAN Social Security Number AL1.340. STANAG Standard Agreement AL1.341. STU-III Secure Telephone Unit Third Generation AL1.342. Sv Sievert (unit of exposure) AL1.343. SWOP Special Weapons Ordnance Publication AL1.344. T Time AL1.345. TAC/LGX Tactical Air Force Communications/Logistics Plans AL1.346. TACSAT Tactical Satellite AL1.347. TELEX Telephone Exchange AL1.348. Th Thorium AL1.349. TLD Thermo-Luminescent Dosimeter AL1.350. TNT Trinitrotoluene AL1.351. TO Tritium water vapor (also HTO) AL1.352. TP Technical Publication AL1.353. T ot (HP3) Tritium AL1.354. Tu Tuballoy AL1.355. TWX Teletypewriter Exchange AL1.356. TYCOM Type Commander AL1.357. U Uranium AL1.358. UCT Universal Coordinated Time AL1.359. UHF Ultra High Frequency AL1.360. U.S. United States AL1.361. USA U.S. Army AL1.362. USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers AL1.363. USAF U.S. Air Force AL1.364. USAFE U.S. Air Forces in Europe AL1.365. USANCA U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency AL1.366. USC U.S. Code AL1.367. USCA U.S. Code Anotated AL1.368. USCINCACOM U.S. Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command AL1.369. USCINCEUR U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command AL1.370. USCINCPAC U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Command AL1.371. USCINCSO U.S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command AL1.372. USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture AL1.373. USFORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command AL1.374. USG U.S. Government AL1.375. USMC U.S. Marine Corps AL1.376. VHF Very High Frequency AL1.377. WATS Wide Area Telephone Service AL1.378. WHO World Health Organization AL1.379. WHS Warhead Section AL1.380. WHSR White House Situation Room AL1.381. WRAMC Walter Reed Army Medical Center PART I PLANNING, POLICY, AND RESPONSE GUIDANCE C1. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION C1.1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE This manual updates policy, responsibilities, and procedures for: C1.1.1. Department of Defense (DoD) forces to prepare for and respond to a radiological accident or event. This manual expands and prescribes procedures found in DoD Directive (DoDD) 3150.8, DoD Response to Radiological Accidents, reference (a). C1.1.2. Standardizing, where appropriate, DoD methods and integrating them with Department of State (DOS) responsibilities and procedures, Department of Energy (DOE) responsibilities and procedures, and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) responsibilities and procedures, reference (b). C1.1.3. Providing a framework for DoD elements responding to non-DoD radiological events under the FRERP or interagency support agreements. C1.2. POLICY It is DoD policy that: C1.2.1. DoD take the lead in responding to an accident or incident involving radioactive materials when DoD is responsible for the material. DoD is responsible for the material when the material is or was in DoD custody at the time of the accident, incident, or loss. C1.2.2. An Initial Response Force (IRF) be dispatched from the closest military installation having an appropriate emergency response capability at the time of the radiological event. C1.2.3. A Combatant Commander will be designated as the supporting Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and dispatch a Response Task Force (RTF) to relieve the IRF. C1.3. RESPONSIBILITIES C1.3.1. There are three identifiable operational responses to a radiological accident or event: initial response, emergency actions, and site remediation. Initial response and emergency actions (Figure C1.F1.) have identifiable beginning and end points but some actions may overlap; site remediation does not have an identifiable end point. Planning for and execution of response activities covering each area mentioned will overlap. Preparations and training for responses are not addressed in this manual. C1.3.1.1. First Responders. Initial response begins when the accident occurs. The response is comprised predominantly of actions by fire and rescue, emergency medical, and law enforcement personnel whose response actions focus on the treatment and rescue of people involved. The first responders may be civilian, military (IRF), or a combination of both. Figure C1.F1. Accident Operational Responses Figure C1.F2., although not all-inclusive, illustrates the interrelationship of initial response actions. When it is determined that the accident/event involves radiological materials, the preceding agencies may be joined by explosive ordnance disposal, contamination control, and other personnel with specific expertise unique to the situation. IRF procedures and responsibilities are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Reconnaissance should be started as soon as possible after rescue and firefighting actions are completed. C1.3.1.2. Emergency Actions. The IRF initiates emergency actions that are continued by the RTF upon arrival. The focus of activity will, over time, shift when personnel involved in the accident are rescued and weapon recovery becomes the prime concern of the Commander of the RTF (CRTF). See Chapter 2 for more on the RTF. Once the radiological materials have been safely packaged and removed, the third operational response, site remediation, becomes of primary concern. NOTE: A radiological response may not always require weapons recovery and site remediation. C1.3.1.3. Site Remediation. Initial site remediation actions may begin soon after the accident occurs, but emergency actions take precedence. The importance of site remediation grows steadily as emergency actions resolve the imminent danger. The Site Remediation Working Group (SRWG) provides the forum within which the site remediation process is formulated. The end point of the process cannot be projected without an extended period of planning. Site remediation is discussed in detail in Part 3 of this manual. C1.3.2. Combatant Commanders tasked with responding to radiological accidents are encouraged to supplement or modify this manual, as needed, to satisfy specific Host Nation or Status of Forces agreements. C1.3.3. The organizational structures provided for the IRF and RTF are notional and based upon a large-scale response to a radiological accident. Specific circumstances may necessitate modifications to the organizational elements in this manual. Situational awareness and knowledge, coupled with sound professional judgment, must be utilized to tailor the notional response structure and tasks provided to accomplish the response mission. The Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Operations Flow Diagram, Figure C1.F3., depicts the various response actions and the approximate time of their occurrence. Also, Figure C1.F3. may be of assistance in accident response planning. Figure C1.F2. Relationship of Initial Response Actions Figure C1.F3. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Recovery Operations Flow Diagram C1.3.4. This manual is designed to furnish a general approach to a nuclear weapon accident/event response. It is not a standalone manual. To be effective, the procedures contained in this manual must be used in conjunction with DoD Directives, Federal instructions, State/local plans, international/bilateral agreements, and theater policy. C1.3.5. All radiological monitoring, measurement, and control forms described in this manual are operating documents. Operating documents are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraph C4.4.2. of DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements," reference (c). C1.3.6. All routine, situation, accident data, and incident reports are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraph C4.4.3. of DoD 8910.1-M, reference (c). C1.3.7. All information collected relative to Public Information Releases is exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraph C4.4.5. of DoD 8910.1-M, reference (c). C1.3.8. All investigative surveys are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraphs C3.8.2.2.4. and C4.4.8. of DoD 8910.1-M, reference (c). C2. CHAPTER 2 NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES C2.1. INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE C2.1.1. Selection. The IRF will normally be dispatched from the nearest military installation having a disaster response capability. This installation need not have a nuclear mission or radiological responsibility, but its IRF must accomplish certain minimum functions as outlined below. If more than one installation is equal distance from the accident, choose the installation most nuclear capable in accordance with DSWA 5100.52.1-L, reference (d). C2.1.2. Decision to Deploy. An IRF may be directed to deploy as the result of: C2.1.2.1. A request for assistance by local authorities. C2.1.2.2. Direction to do so by a Combatant Commander or the National Military Command Center (NMCC). C2.1.2.3. >The Installation Commander's decision. C2.1.3. Minimum Composition. The IRF, as a minimum, should contain these specialties (preferably with knowledge and training in radiological hazards and emergency response procedures). C2.1.3.1. Command element. C2.1.3.2. Medical, Fire, and Rescue elements. C2.1.3.3. Security element. C2.1.3.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). C2.1.3.5. Communications element. C2.1.3.6. Public affairs element. C2.1.4. Extended Composition. If available, the IRF should contain these specialties in addition to the above. C2.1.4.1. Weapons maintenance specialists. C2.1.4.2. Legal element. C2.1.4.3. Engineering element. C2.1.4.4. Radiological hazard control element. C2.1.5. Minimum IRF Functions. The IRF, as a minimum, will: C2.1.5.1. Establish DoD command and control (C2), at the scene. This will normally be the IRF Commander and supporting elements; however, the establishment of C2 will initially be by the first military presence at the accident scene until the arrival of the IRF Commander. C2.1.5.2. Establish contact with the NMCC and the responsible Combatant Command (Figure C2.F1.). Once notified, the NMCC will maintain open communications with the reporting unit. This link must be re-established immediately if broken. The NMCC will determine when this conference may be terminated. Figure C2.F1. Nuclear Weapon Accident Notification Flow C2.1.5.3. On foreign territory, establish contact with the U.S. Chief of Mission (COM) and applicable Host Nation authorities. NOTE During initial response, medical and firefighting responders should be given immediate and unrestricted access to the accident site. Medical and firefighting responders should coordinate with EOD personnel to determine hazards in the accident area. The decision to withdraw medical and firefighting responders should be made by the Senior Fire Official and/or the IRF Commander and only when these responders are in immediate and excessive risk. The evacuation and treatment of casualties are the highest priority. Security, PRP requirements should not impede these actions, but EOD initial explosive safety issues must be considered. Firefighting activities needed to cool involved weapons or support medical response should take priority over security, PRP requirements, and EOD considerations. Casualties need not be decontaminated prior to administration of lifesaving or other significant medical procedures, nor should evacuation or transport to medical facilities be delayed. When the situation is stabilized, security and PRP requirements must be enforced, and EOD teams should be permitted to initiate procedures to mitigate hazards. C2.1.5.4. Extinguish fires. Local firefighting capabilities may be used. If the weapon is exposed to high temperatures, civilian fire departments will require advice on proper cooling of the weapon. C2.1.5.5. Rescue, stabilize, and evacuate casualties. Local ambulances and hospitals may be used. Casualties need not be decontaminated prior to evacuation, transport to medical facilities, or treatment; however, care must still be taken to minimize the spread of contamination. Decontamination (DECON) will occur once casualties are medically stabilized. Ambulances departing with casualties will not be decontaminated. Although it must be anticipated that such actions may spread contamination to a medical facility, it is unlikely to pose a significant threat to medical personnel and is appropriate whenever life threatening injuries exist. Responding medical personnel should not be denied access to the accident site for reasons of security, potential explosive hazards, or the nature of the accident, but should attempt to coordinate with EOD personnel when available. If possible, EOD should mark a clear path, or accompany emergency medical personnel into the accident site to assist in avoiding radioactive, explosive, and toxic hazards. C2.1.5.6. Establish a National Defense Area (NDA) or Security Area in accordance with DoDD 5200.8, "Security of Military Installations and Resources," reference (e). If military security forces are unavailable or insufficient, local law enforcement personnel may be asked to restrict access to the area until an NDA, National Security Area (NSA), or Security Area is established. C2.1.5.7. Secure the airspace over the accident site via the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Host Nation. C2.1.5.8. Assess status of weapons and report this information to the NMCC. C2.1.5.9. If EOD assets are available, perform Initial Render Safe Procedures (RSPs) only. Beyond Initial RSP, EOD performs safing procedures on nuclear weapons only, with direct support of the DOE Accident Response Group (ARG). C2.1.5.10. Brief the CRTF before the RTF assumes control. C2.1.6. Extended Functions. Depending upon the originating installation, some IRFs may be capable of additional actions. C2.1.6.1. If capabilities permit: C2.1.6.1.1. Establish a temporary contamination control line, if required. C2.1.6.1.2. Identify a forward operating location, staging area, and reception center for follow-on forces. C2.1.6.2. Provide necessary operational security. C2.1.6.2.1. Have a security element for perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and property. C2.1.6.2.2. If internal resources are not available, request assistance of local law enforcement officials to secure the area, prevent unauthorized entry, and remove unauthorized personnel. C2.1.6.2.3. Establish an operations area, base camp, and contamination control area. C2.1.6.2.4. Provide appropriate protective equipment for perimeter guards who are posted in a contaminated area. When posting perimeter guards, consider the possibility of contamination of clean areas due to wind shift and resuspension of contaminants. C2.1.6.3. Determine if contamination is present and the nature of the contamination. The NMCC shall be advised if contamination is or is not detected. C2.1.6.3.1. Determine and report weather conditions. C2.1.6.3.2. Place air samplers upwind and downwind of the accident site. C2.1.6.3.3. Receive and use Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) plots or Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) modeling predictions, if previously requested. C2.1.6.3.4. Determine the status and location of all radioactive material. C2.1.6.3.5. If no radiation was released during the accident, prepare to respond in the event of a release during recovery operations. C2.1.6.4. Ensure that information conduits are established. C2.1.6.4.1. Initiate and continue reporting in accordance with Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3150.03, "Joint Reporting Structures, Event and Incident Reports," reference (f), until relieved by the CRTF. Reports shall not be delayed to gather more information. C2.1.6.4.2. Initiate Public Affairs (PA) procedures and establish direct communications with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)). C2.1.6.4.3. Provide appropriate news releases. C2.1.6.4.4. If applicable and necessary, confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in accordance with DoDD 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance," reference (g). DoD policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any specific location, but exceptions under reference (b) are allowed when it is necessary to implement public safety actions or reduce public alarm. Some Host Nation agreements may require automatic and immediate confirmation of the presence of a nuclear weapon. C2.1.6.4.5. If on foreign territory, establish liaison with applicable Host Nation authorities and the U.S. COM. C2.1.6.5. Protect the public and mitigate health and safety hazards. C2.1.6.5.1. Coordinate with civil law enforcement agencies/Host Nation law agencies. C2.1.6.5.2. Notify officials and personnel of potential hazards. C2.1.6.5.3. Identify and decontaminate, as necessary, persons who may have been contaminated. NOTE Personnel entering an area that is contaminated, suspected of containing contamination, or who could be contaminated, should wear personal protective clothing and respiratory protection until contamination levels are established. Personnel may then change to the appropriate protective measures for the situation. C2.2. TRANSITION OF INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE TO RESPONSE TASK FORCE C2.2.1. Summary C2.2.1.1. The CRTF and staff should receive a briefing from the IRF prior to the CRTF assuming command. The form and content of the briefing will vary depending upon the location and nature of the accident and the relative arrival times of the various response assets. The briefing may be developed and presented solely by the IRF or could be a joint product of the IRF, RTF, and other responding Federal or Host Nation staff elements. This chapter provides a template for the changeover briefing. This template may be reduced, expanded, or otherwise modified, as needed. C2.2.1.2. Nearly simultaneously with IRF to RTF changeover, the Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) will transfer responsibility for managing the DoD response from the NMCC to the supported Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) Command Center or other operations center. C2.2.2. Briefing Template C2.2.2.1. IRF Commander's introduction and general situation discussion. C2.2.2.2. Weather C2.2.2.2.1. Discussion of effect on recovery operations. C2.2.2.2.2. Discussion of downwind contamination impact. C2.2.2.3. Intelligence. Discussion of hostile collection or exploitation efforts. C2.2.2.4. Operations C2.2.2.4.1. Diagram of the accident scene layout (Figure C2.F2.). Figure C2.F2. Sample Accident Site Organization C2.2.2.4.2. Location of weapons. C2.2.2.4.3. RSPs. C2.2.2.4.4. Known or estimated contamination. C2.2.2.4.5. Contamination control procedures in place. C2.2.2.5. Security C2.2.2.5.1. NDA, NSA, or Security Area established, as appropriate. C2.2.2.5.2. Interactions with Host Nation, State, or local law enforcement. C2.2.2.5.3. Badging and access issues. C2.2.2.5.4. Rules of Engagement (ROE). C2.2.2.6. Medical C2.2.2.6.1. Casualties or injuries. C2.2.2.6.2. Status and impact on facilities. C2.2.2.7. Legal C2.2.2.7.1. Significant or unusual legal activity. C2.2.2.7.2. Relationship with Host Nation or Federal and State authorities. C2.2.2.7.3. ROE. C2.2.2.8. Logistics C2.2.2.8.1. Personnel on site and expected to arrive. C2.2.2.8.2. Status of messing and billeting. C2.2.2.8.3. Status of support infrastructure. C2.2.2.9. Public Affairs C2.2.2.9.1. Media on site. C2.2.2.9.2. Public awareness and concerns. C2.2.2.10. Presentations by Host Nation or other Federal elements. C2.3. RESPONSE TASK FORCE C2.3.1. The RTF (Figure C2.F3.) is organized by the Combatant Commander having responsibility for responding to the accident in accordance with DoDD 3150.8, reference (a). The RTF may be either Joint or formed from a single Service. On U.S. territory, the RTF is responsible for DoD taskings in accordance with the FRERP, reference (b). On foreign territory, the RTF is responsible for DoD taskings in accordance with applicable Host Nation and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Figure C2.F3. Response Task Force General Composition C2.3.2. Responsibilities. The CRTF shall: C2.3.2.1. If possible, establish direct communications with the IRF Commander prior to arriving at the site. C2.3.2.2. Receive a briefing from the IRF Commander on the situation prior to assuming command. C2.3.2.3. Establish priorities for recovery of radiological material. C2.3.2.4. Establish priorities for all other requests for emergency support, secondary emergencies, and logistic requirements. C2.3.2.5. Establish the Joint Operations Center (JOC). C2.3.2.6. Establish the Joint Information Center (JIC)/Combined Information Bureau (CIB). C2.3.2.7. Establish the Joint Hazard Evaluation Center (JHEC) (Figure C4.F1.). C2.3.2.8. If possible, establish the Joint Legal Claims Office (JLCO). C2.3.2.9. Establish the Joint Security Control Center (JSCC). C2.3.2.10. Continue IRF activities, as required, and accomplish any actions normally performed by the IRF that are not yet completed. C2.3.2.11. If needed, ensure or establish secure communications with the NMCC. C2.3.2.12. Initiate or continue reporting in accordance with CJCSI 3150.03, reference (f). C2.3.2.13. On U.S. territory, establish or continue liaison with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Disaster Field Office (DFO) (if the DFO is established), DOE's Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), and local civil and law enforcement authorities. C2.3.2.14. On foreign territory, establish or continue liaison with the U.S. Embassy, the Host Nation's civil emergency authorities, and local civil and law enforcement authorities. C2.3.2.15. Integrate civilian authorities into Command and Control and response forces if the civilian community is affected. Provide necessary liaison officers. C2.3.2.16. Coordinate actions with any accident investigation board or team. To the greatest extent possible, evidence necessary to the conduct of the accident investigation shall be preserved; however, recovery and security of weapons and safety of responders shall take priority. C2.3.2.17. Assist the involved government (foreign, State, or local) with ensuring health and safety of civilians. On foreign territory, the U.S. Embassy representative will assist in implementing measures to satisfy Host Nation requirements under applicable treaties or agreements. C2.3.2.18. Provide required medical, logistical, and administrative support, as needed, by follow-on Federal forces. C2.3.2.19. If required, confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in accordance with DoDD 5230.16, reference (g). The guidelines provided in Table C2.T1. do not supplant this Directive's requirements. Table C2.T1. Nuclear Weapon Confirmation Guidelines Confirmation Guidelines for the CRTF It is DoD policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular installation or location. There are two exceptions to this policy. 1. The CRTF is required to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the interest of public safety if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon. The OASD(PA) shall be advised of this confirmation as soon as possible. 2. The CRTF may confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. The OASD(PA) shall be advised before or, as soon as possible, after such notification. Special Instructions for Accidents Outside the United States, its Territories, or Possessions. 1. If the specific Host Nation agreement does not say otherwise, the CRTF must have the concurrence of the Combatant Commander and the Host Nation's government, via the U.S. COM, before making the notifications above. 2. Some bilateral U.S.-Host Nation agreements, to conform with Host Nation statutes, may require an immediate confirmation of the presence of nuclear weapons by Host Nation officials. The CRTF shall support this notification and advise the Combatant Commander, DOS, U.S. COM, and OASD(PA), as soon as possible, of the Host Nation's notification. C2.3.2.20. Be responsible for the operation of the RTF in accordance with the notional responsibilities below. The unique conditions of an accident shall determine specific activities and the need for any modification to the notional RTF organization. Situation awareness and sound professional judgment apply at all times. C2.3.2.21. Initiate planning activities and actions, where possible, that address site remediation (SR), the third operational response. Appoint a CRTF representative, knowledgeable in SR matters, as personal liaison to State and local authorities and the citizenry. C2.3.3. Organization. The RTF should include, as a minimum, the nominal elements below. Specific circumstances or applicable Host Nation agreements may require modification of the recommended response structure and organization. C2.3.3.1. Safety. The safety element will operate the JHEC. The JHEC should: C2.3.3.1.1. Advise the CRTF of precautionary measures for residents and other persons in potentially contaminated areas. C2.3.3.1.2. Coordinate and integrate the capabilities of specialized teams working on site. C2.3.3.1.3. Implement applicable health and safety standards and monitor the safety procedures of all personnel participating in weapon recovery operations. C2.3.3.1.4. Identify and monitor potentially contaminated personnel on site, including decontamination efforts. C2.3.3.1.5. If required, determine if contamination has been released. C2.3.3.1.6. Recommend methods and procedures to prevent spread of radioactive contamination and advise the public of health safety issues. C2.3.3.1.7. Establish a contamination control line that marks the approximate perimeter of the on-site contamination area. C2.3.3.1.8. Establish and operate a Contamination Control Station (CCS) for personnel and vehicles (Figures C6.F1. and C6.F2.). If necessary, additional CCSs may be established. C2.3.3.1.9. Initiate on-site hazard and radiation health, weapons recovery, and safety and environmental monitoring. C2.3.3.1.10. Brief and train people prior to entering potentially contaminated areas not designated previously as radiation workers who will be working in the contaminated area on personal protective equipment (PPE), hazards, and safety measures. C2.3.3.1.11. Establish dosimetry and documentation procedures during personnel decontamination and remediation operations. C2.3.3.1.12. Establish a bioassay program. C2.3.3.1.13. Monitor the tempo of the response effort and, if required, recommend safety standdown periods to preclude undue physical and mental fatigue. C2.3.3.1.14. Determine levels of contamination present and on-site boundaries of contaminated areas through ground air samples and air surveys when appropriate or required. C2.3.3.1.15. Consider the possibility of resuspension and dispersion of contamination in case of wind shifts. C2.3.3.1.16. Develop and provide contamination plots and other required data to the CRTF. C2.3.3.1.17. Consolidate all radiological assessment information for on-site recovery operations and provide it to the CRTF. C2.3.3.1.18. Analyze and correlate all contamination data collected to identify inconsistencies requiring further investigation. C2.3.3.1.19. Review and correlate records from CCSs and other personnel processing points to ensure bioassays or other appropriate followup actions are taken. C2.3.3.1.20. Coordinate off site with FRMAC and civilian authorities. C2.3.3.1.21. Be prepared to present radiological contamination findings and results at press conferences and community forums. Present data in clear, concise, and non-technical briefings, outlining hazards, precautionary measures, business recovery, and where to obtain more information and/or assistance. C2.3.3.1.22. When the NDA, NSA, or Security Area is dissolved, transfer applicable JHEC personnel and equipment to support FRMAC operations (if on U.S. territory) or to the corresponding Host Nation authorities off site. C2.3.3.1.23. On U.S. territory, assist the FRMAC in developing and coordinating the SR plan. On foreign territory, assist Host Nation representatives in developing and coordinating the SR plan. C2.3.3.1.24. Refer all unofficial and media requests for information to the JIC/CIB. C2.3.3.1.25. Coordinate environmental protection plans. C2.3.3.2. Security. The security element should: C2.3.3.2.1. Initiate or continue activities of the IRF security force. C2.3.3.2.2. Maintain a Security Control Center. C2.3.3.2.3. Recommend operational security measures. C2.3.3.2.4. Ensure a secure perimeter for the NDA, NSA, or Security Area. NOTE: More than one NDA, NSA, or Security Area can be established, as required. C2.3.3.2.5. Locate the NDA, NSA, or Security Area perimeter outside of the fragmentation zone. Coordinate with the JHEC and EOD to determine the required radius. C2.3.3.2.6. Provide for protection of exposed classified components from viewing or overhead surveillance. C2.3.3.2.7. Establish an Entry Control Point (ECP). If necessary, multiple ECPs may be used, but should be minimized to the fewest necessary to conduct the operation. C2.3.3.2.8. Establish a standardized access control system to the restricted area. This will include implementation and use of : C2.3.3.2.8.1. An identification and/or badging system; C2.3.3.2.8.2. Entry control logs; and C2.3.3.2.8.3. A record of all personnel entering the accident areas that will be transferred to the historian when no longer needed (as defined by the CRTF). C2.3.3.2.9. Have a security element for perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and property. C2.3.3.2.10. If necessary, establish a security alert force. C2.3.3.2.11. Protect radiological materials, weapons and components, other classified materials and information, and Government property. C2.3.3.2.12. In case of further emergency responses into the NDA, develop procedures that ensure immediate access by fire and medical responders. C2.3.3.2.13. Provide for special areas within the NDA, NSA, or Security Area, independently secured, for discussion of Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI), TOP SECRET, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), or other restricted information. Depending upon need and frequency of use, a single area may be used. C2.3.3.2.14. Provide security for special areas, independently secured, for storage of classified documents, recovered nuclear weapons, weapon components, weapon residue, and other radiological materials. C2.3.3.2.15. As required, debrief personnel with access to classified information. C2.3.3.2.16. Coordinate security actions with State, local, or Host Nation officials. C2.3.3.2.17. Coordinate use-of-force with local and Host Nation law enforcement officials. C2.3.3.2.18. On U.S. territory, coordinate with the Principal Legal Advisor (PLA) to ensure that actions of military security personnel do not violate the Posse Comitatus Act. C2.3.3.2.19. On foreign territory, coordinate with the PLA to ensure actions of military security personnel do not violate SOFA or Host Nation laws. C2.3.3.2.20. On U.S. territory, notify the Senior FEMA Official (SFO) and FRMAC of personnel apprehended within the NDA or NSA. On foreign territory, notify the applicable Host Nation law enforcement authorities of personnel apprehended within the Security Area. C2.3.3.2.21. Notify the CRTF, JHEC, JOC, and Legal element of personnel apprehended inside the NDA, NSA, or Security Area. C2.3.3.2.22. Coordinate with the JHEC to determine procedures for handling unprotected personnel and human remains encountered in contaminated areas. C2.3.3.2.23. Arrange for turnover of apprehended individuals to the local law enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or Host Nation authorities, as applicable. C2.3.3.2.24. Provide a military intelligence function. C2.3.3.2.25. Provide advice and assistance in counterintelligence to the CRTF staff. Counter potential terrorist and/or radical group activities or intelligence collection efforts. C2.3.3.2.26. Provide a liaison to and coordinate with Federal, Host Nation, State, and local law enforcement and security agencies on threats to response organizations and operations. C2.3.3.2.27. Coordinate and advise the CRTF and security staff regarding operations security. C2.3.3.2.28. Investigate and report incidents of immediate security interest to the CRTF and the security staff in cooperation with the FBI or applicable Host Nation law enforcement authorities. C2.3.3.2.29. Advise and assist the CRTF and the security staff on matters of personnel and information security. C2.3.3.2.30. Coordinate requests for large-scale photographic coverage of the accident site. C2.3.3.2.31. When appropriate, coordinate disestablishment of the NDA, NSA, or Security Area with State, local, or Host Nation governments. C2.3.3.3. Medical. The Medical element will oversee routine health maintenance of RTF personnel. The Medical element should: C2.3.3.3.1. Assist in accident-related emergency medical treatment and in establishing health and safety programs to support response operations over an extended period of time. C2.3.3.3.2. Promptly treat RTF personnel and other responders who are injured or become ill during recovery operations. NOTE Lifesaving procedures shall not be delayed or precluded due to radiation contamination. C2.3.3.3.3. Assist in casualty DECON. Supervise the DECON of support personnel should initial DECON efforts fail to achieve desired results. C2.3.3.3.4. Assess and report the magnitude of the accident, numbers and categories of injuries, suspected contamination, and priority for transport to a medical facility. C2.3.3.3.5. Advise medical facilities receiving casualties, in coordination with radiological personnel, of possible contamination and measures that can be taken to prevent its spread. C2.3.3.3.6. Implement the collection of bioassay samples from response personnel and ensure bioassay and external exposure data become part of individual health records. C2.3.3.3.7. Establish a heat/cold exposure prevention program, if appropriate. C2.3.3.3.8. Assist in obtaining radiation health history of all personnel involved in accident response, including civilians in the surrounding community exposed to radiation or contamination. C2.3.3.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. As the primary element responsible for weapon recovery, the EOD element will: C2.3.3.4.1. Conduct weapons damage assessment. C2.3.3.4.2. Perform RSPs augmented by Follow-on Accident Response Group (ARG) support. C2.3.3.4.3. Initiate systematic search to re-establish accountability of weapons and components. C2.3.3.4.4. Stabilize the site of nuclear and conventional hazards. C2.3.3.5. Public Affairs. The PA element should: C2.3.3.5.1. Establish and jointly operate, with proper authorities, the JIC/CIB and a PA program. C2.3.3.5.2. Establish direct communications with OASD(PA), any involved U.S. Embassies, and the Combatant Commander providing the RTF. C2.3.3.5.3. Advise the CRTF and staff members on media relations and prepare them for news conferences. C2.3.3.5.4. Prepare news releases. Emphasis should be placed on achieving public understanding and addressing public concerns about nuclear and radiological issues, including SR. C2.3.3.5.5. Notify civilian authorities of precautions taken and other measures needed to protect public health and property. Present data in clear, concise, and non-technical briefings outlining hazards, precautionary measures, business recovery, and where to obtain more information and/or assistance. C2.3.3.6. Legal. The Legal element will: C2.3.3.6.1. Advise the CRTF and functional staff elements on any legal matters related to the response effort. C2.3.3.6.2. Organize and supervise the legal functional element at the site, including establishing and operating a Claims Office. C2.3.3.6.3. Locate in or near the JOC with direct access to the CRTF. C2.3.3.6.4. If possible, include at least two counsels and one legal clerk that should allow for 24-hour operations in support of the JOC. The counsels must be capable of addressing complex and politically sensitive issues involving national defense policy and response operations that result from the accident. C2.3.3.6.5. To the greatest extent possible, take immediate action to ensure preservation of factual and evidentiary information for both safety investigations and claims resolution. This includes photographs and/or videos, interviews with witnesses, documentation of radiological hazards and safety procedures, identification of responding forces and civilians at or near the accident scene, and appropriate recording and receipting of property. C2.3.3.6.6. Be knowledgeable concerning the authority and responsibility of DoD as well as other Federal Departments and Agencies involved in a radiological accident. This includes the relationships between Federal (and as appropriate), State, local, and Host Nation authorities, as well as jurisdictional principles, security requirements, claims administration, the authority to establish an NDA, use of force, evacuation of civilians, and damage to public or private property. C2.3.3.6.7. Establish liaison with all major functional elements of the CRTF's staff to make all elements aware of the need for coordination of planned actions. Maintain a prioritized list of planned actions and events and a record of completed actions. C2.3.3.6.8. Identify and establish liaison with local law enforcement officials, legal authorities, and local and State emergency response organizations. C2.3.3.6.9. Review operational plans to identify potential legal problems and to ensure they are legally sufficient, with emphasis on security, radiological safety, and documentation of factual evidence for use in resolving claims or in litigations. C2.3.3.6.10. Coordinate on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) prior to finalization. C2.3.3.6.11. Coordinate legal issues with the principal legal advisors of other participating Departments or Agencies, as required. For consistency, all legal advice and assistance should be coordinated jointly through the DoD primary legal advisor. C2.3.3.6.12. Upon request, and if resources permit, provide legal advice and assistance to other Federal Agencies involved in the response effort. C2.3.3.6.13. When required, coordinate legal issues with the Combatant Commander's and DoD's General Counsels. C2.3.3.6.14. Ensure that personnel involved refer all queries for information to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). C2.3.3.6.15. Coordinate with the PAO to review proposed public statements for legal sufficiency and implications. C2.3.3.6.16. Establish a Claims Office at a location easily accessible to the public and mutually agreeable to local officials. C2.3.3.6.17. Ensure that any information provided to claimants is in accordance with established policies and that queries for any information other than claims procedures are referred to the PAO. C2.3.3.6.18. When possible, collocate the Claims Office facility with the Civil Emergency Relief and Assistance Office. As soon as the claims processing facility is established, information regarding the location should be provided to the JIC/CIB for inclusion in a news release. C2.3.3.7. Protocol. It is the responsibility of the Protocol element to provide support to any senior military or civil official visiting the accident scene. C2.3.3.8. Financial. The Military Service having custody of the nuclear weapon or radiological materials at the time of the accident is responsible for reimbursing, upon request, the Combatant Command providing the RTF and, upon request, other Federal Agencies with a direct or supporting role in the response effort. The Financial element shall track expenditure of funds and requests for reimbursement. C2.3.3.9. Communications. The Communications element will: C2.3.3.9.1. Establish timely external communications to higher headquarters. The accident site may be in a remote area lacking military or civil support installations. C2.3.3.9.2. Ensure voice connectivity with the NMCC/JNAIRT, OASD(PA), DoD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC), and the supported CINC with conferencing capability. C2.3.3.9.3. Coordinate frequency usage of all response organizations to prevent interference and radio operations in areas where electromagnetic emissions may create explosive hazards or affect electronic and field laboratory instruments. C2.3.3.9.4. Provide secure field phones for EOD operations, if needed. C2.3.3.9.5. Establish secure and non-secure voice communications. C2.3.3.9.6. Establish local radio nets and assign call signs. C2.3.3.9.7. Provide ultra-high frequency (UHF)/very-high frequency (VHF) nets for command (secure), weapon recovery (secure), radiological operations (secure), security, and public affairs. C2.3.3.9.8. Provide telephone communications between fixed-site locations, such as between the JOC and JHEC. C2.3.3.9.9. Provide multiple secure and non-secure telephones to support response force elements. C2.3.3.9.10. Determine the need for any additional communications assets. Communication sources and capabilities are discussed in detail in Chapter 13. C2.3.3.9.11. If required, request Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), deployable communications assets. C2.3.3.9.12. Establish communications links with the NMCC and Defense Communications System (DCS) from remote locations. C2.3.3.9.13. Establish access to the DCS for record communications. C2.3.3.9.14. Provide secure voice communications via satellite, telephone, or high frequency (HF). C2.3.3.9.15. If required, obtain leased commercial communications. C2.3.3.9.16. If required, request frequency clearances. C2.3.3.9.17. Coordinate communications assets and frequency requirements of response organizations and coordinate these actions with the National Communications System (NCS) Representative. C2.3.3.9.18. Coordinate with other Federal, State, and local officials to ensure mutual communications support and eliminate interference. C2.3.3.9.19. If required, publish a Signal Operating Instruction (SOI) for all response organizations. C2.3.3.10. Logistics. The Logistics element should: C2.3.3.10.1. Consist of personnel to control the materiel, administrative, and supply functions. C2.3.3.10.2. In coordination with the JOC and Safety element, provide for medical evacuation of acute casualties. C2.3.3.10.3. Using the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), identify the military installations nearest the accident site, determine their support capabilities, and establish liaison to alert the base of the potential support requirements. C2.3.3.10.4. Using Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) 5100.52.1-L, "Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing (NARCL)," reference (d), request assistance from DoD installations, DOE facilities, or other activities with nuclear weapon accident response and radiation detection capabilities. C2.3.3.10.5. Request, via the CRTF and CINC, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) project code from the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board. C2.3.3.10.6. Provide logistics support to DOE in accordance with the "Joint Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Federal Emergency Management Agency Agreement for Response to Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Nuclear Weapon Significant Incidents," reference (h). Coordination with the DOE Support Team Coordinator should be accomplished. C2.3.3.10.7. Plan for operations during both the Crisis Management and Consequence Management phases to involve up to 2,500 personnel. The Consequence Management, Site Remediation (SR), and recovery phase may extend to a period of 6 months or longer. As a minimum, billeting and mess services will be provided. C2.3.3.10.8. Provide personal protective and other specialized clothing. C2.3.3.10.9. Provide water for DECON of equipment and personnel DECON stations and temporary fixation of contaminants by sprinkling or leaching. C2.3.3.10.10. Provide for electrical power. C2.3.3.10.11. Provide general purpose vehicles for the response force. C2.3.3.10.12. Provide for vehicle maintenance. C2.3.3.10.13. Provide for petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). C2.3.3.10.14. Assist in providing materials for packaging and shipping of weapons, components, contaminated waste, and other radioactive materials. C2.3.3.10.15. Provide sanitation facilities. C2.3.3.10.16. Provide appropriate laundry facilities for contaminated and uncontaminated clothing. C2.3.3.10.17. Provide heavy equipment for base camp construction and recovery/remediation actions. C2.3.3.10.18. Provide for airfield cargo support for air delivery of support equipment to remote sites. C2.3.3.10.19. Provide for transport from the airfield or nearest military installation. C2.3.3.10.20. Provide documentation of accident-related costs. C2.3.3.10.21. If required, include DECON criteria and hazardous working condition clauses in any contracts awarded to assist in the recovery effort. Contractual work shall be coordinated with the RTF Legal element. C2.3.3.10.22. Develop and disseminate procedures for requesting logistical or administrative support. C2.3.3.10.23. Provide, as authorized, billeting, messing, and transportation support for news media. C2.3.3.11. Contracting. Contracting support will include, but not be limited to, local purchase agreements, long-term rental of facilities and equipment, and immediate procurement of communications, computers, and transportation services. To accomplish these actions, the contracting representative will: C2.3.3.11.1. Establish local service contracts to facilitate logistics support for the following services: C2.3.3.11.1.1. POL C2.3.3.11.1.2. Water C2.3.3.11.1.3. Food C2.3.3.11.1.4. Sanitation C2.3.3.11.1.5. Maintenance C2.3.3.11.1.6. Laundry C2.3.3.11.1.7. Administration equipment C2.3.3.11.1.8. Specialized equipment/clothing items, as needed C2.3.3.11.1.9. Lodging C2.3.3.11.2. Consider purchase agreements for equipment/supplies that may not be returnable following recovery operations. C2.3.3.11.3. Document all accident response/recovery-related costs. C2.3.3.12. Command and Control. The CRTF will establish the JOC. The manning of the C2 element will be determined by the Combatant Commander and CRTF. The JOC, which will operate 24 hours each day, should: C2.3.3.12.1. Continue or initiate submission of reports in accordance with CJCSI 3150.03, reference (f). C2.3.3.12.2. Develop and implement a radioactive materials recovery plan in coordination with DOE ARG, including packaging requirements, transportation from site, and final disposition. C2.3.3.12.3. Establish coordination with applicable Service and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident investigation teams. C2.3.4. Other Assets and Follow-On Forces. Many Federal, State, local, or Host Nation organizations will respond to an accident. These capabilities will normally be integrated into the RTF. Otherwise, arrangements must be made to keep these organizations informed of activities of the RTF. C2.3.4.1. U.S. Department of Energy C2.3.4.1.1. Senior Energy Official (SEO). The SEO will: C2.3.4.1.1.1. Be operationally responsible to the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) On-Scene Commander (OSC) for provision of DOE support on scene. C2.3.4.1.1.2. Be responsible for and serve as the point of contact for DOE support to the LFA, when DOE is not the LFA. C2.3.4.1.2. The Accident Response Group. The DOE ARG will: C2.3.4.1.2.1. Deploy an Advance Team consisting of a Team Leader, Senior Scientific Advisor, and other specialists to determine if any additional DOE assets are needed. C2.3.4.1.2.2. Deploy accident equipment and additional personnel after coordination through the CRTF and DOE EOC. The request will be routed through the DoD JNACC. C2.3.4.1.2.3. Be responsible for providing assistance to the CRTF for on-site activities. C2.3.4.1.3. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. Established initially by DOE to define and monitor the radiological impact of an emergency. FRMAC will: C2.3.4.1.3.1. Be responsible for coordinating all Federal off-site monitoring and assessment activities during a response to a radiological emergency, including response to nuclear weapons accident, to assist the LFA, State(s), and local authorities, in accordance with the provisions of the FRERP, reference (b). C2.3.4.1.3.2. Provide various operational resources, including radiation detection and measurement equipment, communications support, and aerial monitoring capability, as appropriate. C2.3.4.1.3.3. Following the initial phase of the emergency, provide off-site support to EPA when it assumes long-term leadership/management of the FRMAC. C2.3.4.1.4. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) C2.3.4.1.4.1. Request for Assistance. Requests for RAP assistance may be directed to one o